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ABSTRACT 
This thesis presents an aggregated econometric model 
of the world shipping markets. The model distinguishes 
between dry cargo and tankers and also between the a) 
freight market, b) second hand market for ships, C) 
shipbuilding market, d) scrap market. 
Chapters 1,2 of the thesis examine the history of 
shipping in the last 100 years or so, analyse the 
cyclical behaviour of the industry, and consider past 
theoretical attempts at modelling the shipping markets. 
It is argued that the structure of existing models of the 
shipping industry is theoretically f lawed In its 
treatment of the demand for new and second hand ships as 
well as in the treatment of expectations. 
Chapter 3 presents a 'new' theoretical model of the 
behaviour of shipping markets that attempts to remedy- 
these defects. Novel features of this theory are the 
assumption of 'rational expectations' in shipping markets 
as well as the treatment of new and second-hand ships as 
assets, the portfolio demand for which varies with the 
own expected return relative to the return on other 
assets. 
Econometric versions of the theoretical model are 
estimated from post World War II annual data, separately 
for the dry cargo and tanker sectors In chapters 4, S. 
The two models are linked In chapter 6 and the models are 
used In order to simulate the dynamic response of the 
shipping markets to anticipated and unanticipated 
external shocks. A crucial role in the adjustment process 
is played by the forward looking speculative positions of 
investors in the second hand and newbuilding markets. 
. Chapter 7 tests the assumption of the rational 
expectations hypothesis in the shipping markets by 
examining the evidence from the freight futures, time 
charter and newbuilding markets. The stochastic behaviour 
of these variables is examined and statistical tests are 
performed in order to Investigate the extent to which 
this Is considered to be consistent 
-with the efficient 
markets / rational expectations hypothesis. The results 
are somewhat mixed. 
Chapter 8 illustrates how the model can be used for 
real world forecasting purposes and scenario planning. 
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is 
INTRODUCTION A D-OVERVIEW 
This thesis attempts to model the way equilibrium freight 
rates, second-hand and newbuilding prices, shipbuilding 
output and scrapping are determined by the interactions 
and exogenous impulses af f ecting the freight market, 
second-hand, newbuilding and scrapping market. 
Chapter 1 examines the history of freight rates, prices, 
shipbuilding and scrapping over the last 100 years or so. 
It relates the fluctuations in these variables to the 
influence of external factors. It draws on an extensive 
database 
, 
in order to discuss 
- 
the characteristic features 
of a typical shipping cycle. 
Chapter 2 reviews previous attempts at modelling the 
behaviour of shipping markets. It is argued that, past 
attempts have been deficient in two important respects. 
First, new and second-hand ships, have not been treated as 
capital assets. Secondly, expectations have not been 
treated properly. 
Chapter 3 develops a theoretical model which aims to 
remedy these def Iciencies in past work. Thus both 
newbuilding -; and second hand ships are treated as capital 
assets. Secondly, 
- 
expectations are assumed 
-to be 
rational. This ý allows - us to simulate - the market's 
response to anticipated or unanticipated shocks. 
In chapter 4,5 the theory Is used in order, to specify 
and subsequently estimate an econometric model of the dry 
cargo and tanker market respectively. - These models are 
also, used in order to carry out simulations of the 
effects of various shocks. 
is 
In chapter 6 the individual dry cargo and tanker models 
are linked 
, 
into an integrated model of the shipping 
markets. This Integration allows us to simulate the 
spillover effects from one sector to 
-, 
the, other. These 
spillover effects reflect the freight, shipbuilding and 
scrap market links that exist between the two sectors. 
Chapter 7 tests the assumption of rational expectations 
in the various shipping markets. Evidence from freight 
futures, time charter and newbuilding markets is used. 
Unbiasedness, weak rationality and semi-strong 
rationality tests are performed. 
Chapter 8 illustrates how the model can be used for 
forecasting and scenario planning and presents forecasts 
of the shipping industry up to the year 2000. The 
implications of a Base Run scenario are analysed as well 
as those of alternative scenarios involving anticipated 
and unanticipated oil shocks. 
The main results of this study are the following: 
Firstly, the theoretical analysis Illustrates the role of 
speculation and the Importance of Onews'. The 
overshooting behaviour of rates, prices, shipbuilding and 
scrapping during a hypothetical cycle is demonstrated. 
The actual cyclical patterns are consistent with rational 
behaviour In an enviroment characterised by uncertainty. 
Secondly, the empirical estimates for the freight market 
sector are consistent with a priori views and with the 
results of other studies. The empirical results for the 
ship markets are also consistent with a priori 
expectations and give support to the capital asset 
approach. Simulations of the empirical models allow us to 
derive sensitivity results regarding the response of the 
market to various shocks. The spillover effects from the 
tanker to the dry cargo sector and vice versa are weak. 
The rationality tests indicate that the assumption of 
rational expectations in the time charter market cannot 
17 
be rejected while the results for the freight futures 
markets are somewhat mixed. 
Finally, the forecasts indicate that the recent recovery 
In freight rates and prices Is largely sustainable and is 
expected to be followed by a doubling of shipbuilding 
output and a permanent reduction in scrappings. 
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This chapter presents the history of world shipping 
in the last 100 years. The presentation heavily relies on 
the use of charts. The main movements in the external 
factors such as the growth of trade, fuel and metal 
prices and interest rates are considered and their effect 
on the shipping markets is analysed. 
The Introductory section brief ly discusses the 
interrelationship bewtween world trade and shipping. 
Section 2 considers the history of the dry cargo market 
in the last 100 years. Three separate periods are 
distinguished; pre-World War I, the interwar period and 
the post war period. Section 3 does the same for the 
tanker market. The post war period Is also divided into a 
pre and post OPEC era. 
Section 4 takes another look at the historical 
evidence and Identifies the characteristic patterns of a 
typical shipping cycle. A main objective of this thesis 
is to explain why and how these patterns arise. 
20 
1.1 Introduction 
ý Ever since ' 1500 - BC, sail ships are 
- 
known to have 
carried cargoes across the Mediterranean Sea. The 
alternative of overland transportation was at the time 
much more dangerous, time consuming, costly and sometimes 
not even feasible. ' The' invention of the 
- 
ship 
significantly reduced the costs of 'trade and opened up 
new' possibilities. There followed' an expansion In trade, 
enabling- the world as a whole 'to enrich' itself by leading 
to a- general increase in output through specialization in 
production according to comparative advantage. The 
surplus , output , of individual areas could then be 
exchanged for- theý'produce of other parts of the world, 
increasing the availability of goods at home. 
Tradeý' and shipping ''have always been Inextricably 
interwoven. On the one hand, ships ý provide cheap 
transportation services thereby reducing the economic 
barriers to trade. On the other hand it is the desire to 
trade that generates ý the, demand- for shipping. Shipping 
would 'not exist' but for trade'. ý In turn' the primary causes 
of trade are the individual local , demand ' and supply 
conditions ' for various' goods in various ' parts of the 
world. In the absence of trade these would determine the 
local prices of goods. These In general would differ 
across various countries. Wen trade becomes feasible 
there is an enormous economic 'incentive to carry goods 
from areas where they are cheap to areas where they can 
be sold for a higher -price, thereby generating -a demand 
for transportation services. 
The existence of the shipping industry also 
presupposes a shipbuilding industry capable of supplying 
the market with new vessels at a sufficiently low cost. 
Low shipbuilding costs are required so that the minimum 
freight rates needed to recover the capital invested, are 
low enough so as not to prohibit trade. This was crucial 
for the initial development of the industry. In recent 
21 
years, 
- 
technological advances in shipbuilding have , pushed 
freight rates to such a low ý level, that they now 
represent, a very small proportion of the price of the 
goods carried. Trade is therefore no longer sensitive -and 
dependent on fluctuations in freight rates but it is 
purely determined by the other factors mentioned above as 
well as the trade policies of the participating 
countries. 
Throughout 
- 
the rest of this study, , trade will , be 
considered to be completely determined by these other 
factors, so that it generates a purely inelastic demand 
for shipping transportation services. It is outside the 
scope, of, this thes is 
- 
to look 
- 
further ý into the primary 
determinants of the pattern and volume of trade. The main 
objective will rather be to 
. 
analyse , both theoretically 
and empirically the impact of fluctuations in the level 
of demand f or 
-f reight - and of other exogenous f actors such 
as fuel prices, shipbuilding costs, interest 
-rates etc., 
on the shipping 
- 
markets. Chapter 3- utilizes the 
suggestions of economic 
, 
theory in order 
. 
to model the 
behaviour of economic agents, in the 
-freight, second hand, 
shipbuilding and, scrapping 
. 
markets. 
, 
In the subsequent 
chapters, we use empirical ý data from the, 
- 
1950s up to 
- 
the 
1980s, in order to estimate an econometric model 
- 
of the 
post war shipping markets,, based,, on the theory of 
-chapter 
3. 
--The model aims to provide-an, explanation for the 
cyclical 
. 
patterns in freight 
- 
rates, , prices, shipbuilding 
and scrappings. It may also, be used, as a forecasting tool 
and for simulating ýhow the market responds to various 
shocks. 
This chapter takes- an 
-, extensive - look at -the actual 
historical movements in the -shipping markets over the 
last 100 years. 
, 
The evidence comes - in the form 'of long 
term time series and, covers the more distant past as well 
as the postwar period. The reasons- for doing this are 
manifold. First, in sections 1.2 and, -1.3, the data are 
simply used in order to give a short outline of the 
economic history of world shipping over the, 
- 
last 100 
years or so. The theoretical framework of chapter 3 is 
22 
used in order to analyse the major cyclical episodes and 
secular trends and to relate them to various exogenous 
shocks. In passing we shall take the opportunity to use 
the data in order to support or question the theoretical 
framework. Finally, another objective of this 
introductory review of ' the data will be to pinpoint the 
major patterns of a typical shipping cycle. This Is the 
main theme of section 1.4. A theoretical explanation of 
why and how these patterns arise is - one 'of the main 
objectives of this study. 
1.2 Historical fluctuations in the dry cargo market, 
Historical fluctuations are interesting 'in their own 
right but they are also useful for comparison with the 
more recent ones. These can suggest whether the various 
market mechanisms and the patterns they generate have 
been stable over long periods of time. We find that the 
historical cyclical episodes' bare *an extremely close 
resemblance toýmore recent ones'which suggests that there 
has been a stable underlying market structure for over a 
century. In spite of the enormous changes in ship types, 
trade patterns, modes of operation, shipbuilding 
techniques, propulsion technology etc. that have taken 
place over the period under review, we still find that 
the ý aggregate fluctuations in market , conditions can be 
explained in terms of four Interacting markets being 
subjected to various external -shocks. These markets are 
the above mentioned freight, second -hand, shipbuilding 
and scrap markets and ' the exogenous shocks are the 
fluctuations in the growth rate of international trade, 
fuel prices, shipbuilding costs, ý returns to capital and 
other factors. Because, of , its nature, our historical 
investigation necessarily relies on quantitative data and 
the period of the study has been solely determined by 
data availability. The history Is presented by means of 
charts which are followed by aý discussion which relates 
the market movements shown on the charts to changes in 
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external conditions which are also "depicted ' on various 
graphs and, tables. 
We shall take a separate look 'at the dry cargo and 
tanker markets bearing in - mind that the two have always 
been closely ' related. Market 'fluctuations are analysed 
separately for the following" three' distinct periods: ' 
pre-World War, which begins from round about 1870; inter 
War, which covers the '1920s" and 1930s; and postwar which 
covers the more recent history from the 1950s up to the' 
1980s. For each period, 'the fluctuations in the exogenous 
factors such as the growth rate of demand, fuel prices, 
shipbuilding costs and interest rates are presented first 
in charts. A following set of charts then presents the 
oscillations in the shipping markets that were induced by 
f luctuations in the exogenous factors and speculation 
concerning their influence. 
The accompanying discussion to the charts, does not 
limit itself to a mere factual description of 'events and 
empirical' correlations. It rather aims to analyse 
-market 
f luctuations more' intelligently by ' using 'a theoretical 
framework'which is explained in detail'in chapter 3. 
1.2.1 Theoretical Prelude 
Here, We brief ly summarise 'the theory we present in 
chapter '3 about how the various" markets behave and 
interact and how they respond in the short run and in the 
longer term to various -shocks. We hope that this will 
assist the reader in "following the discussion of the 
charts. The' theory -distinguishes between four shipping 
markets; * the freight, ' second hand, ' shipbuilding and 
scrapping' markets. - There 'are' four major external factors 
which' influence ' these markets. These are the volume of 
trade; , fuel prices, shipbuilding costs and alternative 
returns to capital. The volume of trade directly affects 
the '-freight market by 'raising the 'demand for freight 
services. Bunker' prices also have a direct impact on the 
freight markeC by creating an incentive for' ships to 
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slowsteam and economize on fuel costs thereby reducing 
the supply. Shipbuilding costs operate directly through 
the shipbuilding market by affecting the supply of new 
ships. Metal prices which are part of the shipbuilding 
costs additionally Influence the market by, affecting the 
demand and price of scrap. Returns to capital affect the 
prices investors are willing to pay for ships given their 
expectations of future, profits. 
- 
The cyclical patterns that an 
'external shock will 
generate very much depends on whether the shock is 
anticipated or not. Indeed genuine news relating to a 
future expected shock will have a peculiar and immediate 
effect on the market through speculation. Here, for the 
purposes of,, our historical Investigation we, shall give 
more emphasis on how the market responds to unanticipated 
shocks since, indeed, the major market fluctuations have 
been induced by events which were totally unexpected. For 
example the two world wars, the Boer, and Korean wars, the 
trade wars 
, 
of the 1930s, the closures of 
- 
the Suez Canal 
or 
- 
the oil shocks of tthe , seventies which had a great 
impact on the shipping industry through changes in demand 
for, freight, 
, 
fuel ý, and , metal prices and Interest rates, 
were completely unforeseen by the market. 
Because the f leet is f ixed in the short run, demand 
and bunker shocks will have an 
-immediate and strong -short 
term impact on the,,, freight market and the markets for 
ships. In the long run however the - market 
-tends to absorb 
such shocks through compensating- changes in, the size, of 
the f leet. On the- other hand shipbuilding cost and 
interest rate shocks have_a smaller short term impact 
which increases in the, long run as- the changes in the 
fleet brought-about by 
-the. shock are, accumulated. For 
these reasons 
, 
changes in shipbuilding costs and returns 
to capital are not empirically very relevant 
. 
for 
analysing 
. 
cyclical 
. 
fluctuations. They are rather more 
relevant for explaining secular trends. On the other hand 
demand and bunker shocks tend to induce signif icant 
cyclical movements. 
An increase in demand leads to higher freight. rates 
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and insofar as this has not been anticipated, 'it can lead 
to large simultaneous Increases in prices, shipbuilding 
output and associated reductions in scrappings. The fleet 
can only respond slowly so the freight market boom can 
last for some time. The Increase in values however will 
raise the future fleet via reductions in scrappings and 
increased supply of newbuildings. This will cancel most 
of the short run changes in market conditions. Thus in 
the long run the market tends to absorb " the shock and 
return towards the path that it would have followed in 
the absence of the shock. 
An Increase in fuel prices operates 'directly through 
the supply of transportation services in the freight 
market. It generates an Incentive to slow steam and this 
leads 'to an increase' in "freight rates. Because demand is 
inelastic, this increase in rates outweighs the incrýýase 
in costs, so profits' also increase, assuming of course 
that demand has not'changed following the change in fuel 
prices. Here too, If these developments are 
unanticipated, they'*' will also' lead' to contemporaneous 
increases in prices ' and 'shipbuilding' and reductions in 
scrapping. These developments are also short term, since 
in the long run' the expansion of the fleet will cancel 
most of the initial changes. 
Shipbuilding costs directly' affect the supply' of new 
ships at a given level of ' ship prices. ' An increase In 
shipbuilding costs has a negative effect on the supply of 
new ships. This restraint in the growth rate of the 
fleet, leads to an increase' in future freight rates and 
through' expectations it also raises current prices. The 
latter causes a reduction in' scrappings and partly 
offsets the negative effect of the Increase in costs on 
the supply of new ships' but not'completely. 
Changes in alternative returns to capital operate 
directly through the second hand market by affecting the 
speculative asset demand for ships. At a given level of 
expected profitability, ' an Increase In alternative 
returns to capital leads to a drop in 'ship values. This 
in turn reduces the supply of new ships and increases 
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scrapping. The lower growth rate of the fleet will thus 
increase future freight 
, rates and profits which will help 
to cushion the initial speculative drop in -values without 
however cancelling it-completely. 
Unlike demand and fuel 
- 
shocks, 
- 
changes in 
shipbuilding costs and alternative returns to capital 
have a very small impact in the short term but a bigger 
effect in the long run. It is only gradually that the 
accumulated changes in the, size of the fleet brought 
about by increases In shipbuilding costs and returns to 
capital affect the freight market balance and rates. 
These are the 
-effects of permanent unanticipated 
changes in the external factors on the shipping markets. 
The major fluctuations in market conditions over the 
period , of our study have indeed been induced by such 
unanticipated shocks. As already mentioned changes, in 
demand for freight, 
- 
Interest rates, fuel and metal prices 
during the World Wars or the trade wars of the 1930s or 
during the closures of the Suez Canal or after Ahe oil 
shocks of the 1970s have indeed been unanticipated. The 
above 
-- 
discussion is therefore relevant for 
- 
analys Ing 
their effects. However the market can --move in 
anticipation of a change in - an external factor and the 
cyclical patterns generated under such conditions can , be 
quite different from those which, would arise if ý the shock 
had been 
, 
unf orseen. Only in the - case of an increase in 
alternative returns to - capital do we get similar patterns 
whether the change is anticipated or not. 
If the increase in demand is ý anticipated it will 'lead 
to speculative increases in prices and thence the f leet. 
Since demand has not as yet - risen, ý, rates will initially 
fall 
, and only when and if , the change in demand 
materializes will rates increase. Similar reasoning 
applies for an anticipated change in ' fuel , costs. An 
anticipated increase in shipbuilding costs -will -lead -to 
speculative increases in ship values. Since costs have 
not yet increased shipbuilding will initially -expand and 
rates will drop-. Only after the increase 
-in costs occurs 
will the fleet begin to drop and rates to rise. The--long 
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run ef f ects however of a shock are similar whether the 
shock has been anticipated or not., The ef f ects of various 
external shocks are more thoroughly analysed in the 
theoretical discussion of. chapter 3 and later on by means 
of computer simulations of the estimated econometric 
model. 
1.2.2 The pre-World War I dry cargo market 
Data for this period are available from as far back 
as, 1869. This was a period of rapid., structural change 
both for the world economy and the shipping markets as 
well. These, of course, were related to the process of 
industrialization which had a sign if icant inf luence on 
the demand and supply side of the shipping industry. Wen 
we pick up the story, the process Is already well under 
way. On the demand side, industrialization implied a 
significant increase in the growth rate of demand for 
freight, as the world economy expanded rapidly and 
together with it the 
- 
volume- of international 
transactions. The 
'composition. 
of demand also,., changed as 
shipments of 
, 
industrial commodities such, as coal and 
later on iron ore grew much f aster than that of the 
traditional agricultural grain shipments. On Ahe supply 
side the impact of 
, 
industrialization came., through the 
technological Invention 
- 
of the 
_ 
steamer and new 
shipbuilding techniques that contributed to 
,a 
reduction 
in the cost per ton of building a ship. 
- 
During our first 
period of study the sail ship became obsolescent as a 
result of the appearance of the more efficient steamer. 
The steamer brought about a secular decrease in freight 
rates which in turn led to the demise of the sail ship. 
Our study of_ the pre-World War., I period can be 
conceptually divided into two parts. The first , part 
considers the aggregate, cyclical 
, 
fluctuations in rates, 
prices and the total size of, the fleet brought about by 
changes in external factors. This part does not consider 
the diverging paths,, 
-followed by the sail and steamer 
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sectors during this period of time. We aggregate the 
fleet statistics for the two separate sectors together by 
using the standard 3 to 1 relationship between a steam 
ton and a sail ton as assumed by the English statistical 
publications of the time. In the second part we 
disaggregate, so as to analyse how within a generally 
growing market we have a declining sail sector and a 
rapidly expanding steamer one. 
Aggregate Market Fluctuations 
Fig. 1.1 to 1.6 show the developments in the major 
external factors during the period under review. Figure 
1.1 shows the level and composition of demand from 1870 
up to 1913. The implied growth rate of demand is plotted 
on Fig. 1.2. In the f irst 10 years, demand grew very 
rapidly at the extremely high rate of 7.4% p. a. on 
average. The world economy on the other hand did not grow 
faster than 2.5% p. a. Industrialization was 
shipp ing- intensive for many reasons. During that period 
the major Industrial power was Great Britain. Being an 
Island and an open economy it generated a big demand for 
shipping. Coal was the major source of energy and the 
growth of industry increased the demand for coal 
shipments. 
Traditional methods of production were mainly aimed 
towards satisfying local demand as high land transport 
costs and diseconomies of scale prevented extreme local 
specialization in production that would have led to an 
increase in trade. Improvements in road and -railway 
transport also contributed to an increase in shipments 
since other modes of transport are complements rather 
than substitutes to shipping. Together with the economies 
of scale that were associated with the modern production 
methods, reductions in land transportation costs 
encouraged increased specialization in production. 
Surplus output would be exported to other areas in 
exchange for imported goods that would satisfy the excess 
local demand. 
From 1880 to 1890 the growth rate dropped to an 
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average of 3.4% p. a while in the next decade this 
increased slightly to 4.6% p. a. In the first decade of 
this century demand grew at an average rate of 3.8% which 
in the last 3 years of this period prior to the f irst 
World War, rose to S. 6%. 
Signif icant ' exogenous shocks also occurred through 
the supply side of the market. The steamer ran on coal so 
that changes in its price would have a significant, 
negative impact on the supply of freight through the 
incentive to slow-steam and in turn this would raise the 
equilibrium freight rate. The impact of coal price 
changes became progressively more important as the 
proportion of steamers relative to sail ships increased 
s Ign if icantly. It can be seen from Fig. 1.3 that the 
price of coal fluctuated widely and as can be seen from 
Fig. 1.8 its peaks coincided with peaks in freight rates. 
Bunker prices peaked in 1873,1890 and 1900. The latter 
two peaks which occurred at' a time when the freight 
market balance was tight had a significant impact on 
rates. The 1873 peak which occurred at a time when 
f reight market balance was poor and when the proportion 
of the coal consuming steamer fleet in relation to the 
total potential supply was small, naturally did not have 
such a big Impact. Coal prices remained generally 
depressed throughout the eighties and this was also 
reflected in market conditions" * 
Fig 1.4 shows the fluctuations in the price of steel 
sheets which affect the supply of new ships. Prices were 
strong during the seventies restraining the supply of new 
ships. They weakened considerably during the subsequent 
period generating downward pressure on the market. 
Returns to capital declined up to the end of the 19th 
century reflecting the general deflationary conditions of 
the period. This deflation is also reflected in the coal 
and steel prices. ' Yields began to rise from 1900 onwards 
as the def lationary era - came to an end. Insofar as an 
increase in nominal returns to capital purely reflects -an 
increase in long term inf lationary expectations, ship 
values will not be' negatively affected. ' On the contrary 
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they will tend to appreciate In I Ine with general 
inflation, and in the short run they might even increase 
In real terms as investors tend to switch to real assets 
as a hedge. However an Increase in nominal yields that 
purely ref lects an increase in the real return to 
capital, will have of course an adverse effect on values 
as investors will tend to move out of ships until prices 
have fallen sufficiently so as to raise the expected 
return to a level which Is in line with that offered by 
other assets. The real return to capital as indicated by 
the real. yield on UK consols (Fig. 1.6) did not show any 
significant trends over the whole period but exhibited 
considerable cyclical volatility. The cyclical troughs 
occurred in 1873,1882,1890,1900,1907 
-and 1912. These 
cyclical troughs in real yields have tended to coincide 
with peaks in ship, values (Fig. 1.11), as suggested by 
our 
.. 
theoretical arguments. An exception to this Is 1907. 
Furthermore, we also notice. that peaks in the real return 
to capital. which in general occurred during the middle 
of the decades, have coincided with troughs in ship 
values. 
These movements ý In the exogenous factors are 
reflected in aggregate fluctuations 
- 
in freight rates, 
market balance, ship values, shipbuilding and scrapping. ý 
Aggregate 
-movements An market conditions, are depicted in 
Fig. 1.7 
- 
1.14. In theory, these reflect not only the 
actual movements in external factors shown in Fig. 1.1 
- 
1.6, but also speculation regarding future external 
conditions. The latter unfortunately cannot be observed 
since data on expectations are not available. This Is 
unfortunate, since expectations affect current market 
conditions so the full story, cannot be told without 
knowing what expectations were at each point in time. 
Suffice It to say however, that expectations affect the 
system only through their effect on current ship. prices. 
Once the latter are known, a partial story can be told 
where only the important link between speculation and 
ship. values will unfortunately be missing. 
As a whole, external conditions were most favourable 
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for the shipping industry during the seventies, when the 
average growth rate in demand for freight was over 7%, 
steel prices were strong while coal prices reached a very 
high level during the first part of the decade. Against 
that we have the general deflation of this period which 
Is indicated by the falling nominal yields and the rising 
real interest rates and this must have had an adverse 
effect on values. The secular downward effect on rates 
and values of this general deflation, was reinforced by 
the invention of the steamer and the rapid expansion of 
its f leet size. Throughout the remaining period the 
market -generally continued to follow Its downward trend 
but showed considerable cyclical fluctuations with peaks 
occuring roughly just before or at the turn of each 
decade. This to a large extent reflects the fact that the 
growth rate in demand happened to peak at roughly that 
time. 
The year to year changes in freight rates (Fig. 1.8) 
reflect changes in the level of demand and fuel prices 
and also to'a large extent changes in the capacity of the 
fleet. Fluctuations in the latter are shown on Fig 1.9 
and 1.10. Changes in the size of the fleet are positively 
related to ship values. This is because higher values 
have a positive effect on the supply of newbuildings 
while at the same time they reduce scrapping. 
I Fig. 1.11 records the general level of ship prices. 
We have constructed separate indices for sail ships and 
for steamers. These have been rebased so as to represent 
prices in X per dwt of a 10 year old 3500 dwt sail ship 
and a 10 year old 5000 , dwt steamer. These separate 
indices are needed for later reference. '- Appendix 'I 
contains a full description of how these indices have 
been constructed. For the time being we are interested in 
fluctuations in the general level of prices and how these 
affected the change in the fleet through an expansion in 
the supply of newbuildings and contraction in scrappings. 
Fig. 1.11 shows that prices rose strongly in the 
beginning of the seventies but from then on kept falling 
continuously up to the end of the eighties in line "with 
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external changes and with the exception of a cyclical 
upturn round about 1880. They rose again strongly towards 
the end of the eighties peaking in 1889. Then followed a 
significant depression In values which lasted until the 
Boer war in the beginning of this century absorbed a 
significant proportion of the fleet and coincided with an 
increase in coal prices. Another long and deep recession 
followed which lasted until 1910 when the market turned 
and prices begun to follow an upward trend. In 1915 they 
trebled as the War send rates sky rocketing. There was a 
milder speculative increase of prices round about 1904. 
Figs. 1.12 and 1.13 show the fluctuations in shipbuilding 
and scrapping which indeed mirror these developments in 
prices as we would expect. 
Supply of new ships and therefore actual deliveries 
of both steamers and sail ships rose exactly in line with 
actual movements in values peaking at or after the same 
year as prices. Scrapping on the other hand moved in a 
countercyclical way, peaking during the bottom of the 
depression and failing as soon as values increased. Even 
the small speculative increase In values of 1904 is 
reflected in these charts. 
Fig 1.14 
-shows the annual percentage changes in the 
fleet which reflects the excess of shipbuilding over 
scrapping. It follows from the above, that the growth 
rate of the fleet tended to increase when values were 
strong, while it tended to fall when values were weak. 
This Is clear from the chart. 
Annual changes in the f leet and In demand lead to 
changes in the freight market balance (Fig. 1.7) which is 
here defined as the ratio between demand and the fleet. 
These we expect should be reflected in fluctuations of 
freight rates and indeed they do as a comparison of Fig. 
1.7 and 1.8 Illustrates. The, correlation is not expected 
to be perfect because the fleet does ýnot completely 
determine supply. Changes in bunker prices create an 
Incentive to slow steam and this has an independent 
effect on rates. Indeed by comparing Fig. 1.3,1.7 and 
1.8 It can be seen that deviations of rates from freight 
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market balance are easily explained by changes In fuel 
prices. 
It can be observed that peaks in demand tend to 
coincide with peaks in coal and to a lesser extent steel 
prices and with troughs In the real return to capital. 
This adds further to the upward pressures generated by 
the strong demand. This positive correlation between 
growth rates in demand, bunker and steel prices and the 
negative correlation with real return to capital is 
empirically quite stable and can be observed throughout 
the whole period of the study including modern times. 
These correlations in the movements of the external 
factors most likely reflect structural features of the 
world economy and the type of shocks to which it was 
subjected. The implication for the shipping industry 
however is that the market tends to be volatile as 
favourable demand shocks tend to coincide with additional 
favourable supply shocks that both tend to push rates and 
prices in the same direction. Had the correlation between 
demand and supply shocks 
been 
negative, the industry 
would have been more stable as the positive effects of a 
demand shock say, would have been partly offset by 
negative effects of a likely simultaneous unfavourable 
supply shock. 
Steam and Sail Ships 
The secular downward trend In freight rates that we 
observe during this period, was to a large extent due to 
the appearance of the efficient steamer. Having looked at 
the aggregate fluctuations In rates, prices and the total 
fleet, as induced by actual movements in external factors 
and speculation, we can now consider the individual and 
divergent trends in the sail and steamer sectors. 
Fig. 1.10 shows the independent developments in the 
size of these two constituent parts of the fleet. F; gures 
are available from 1869 onwards. During that year the 
sail f leet amounted to 13.3 million nrt while the 
corresponding figure for steamers was 2.0 million nrt. 
Wen analysing the significance of these figures one must 
34 
allow for the fact that one "steam ton" represents a much 
higher amount of transport capacity than a "sail ton", 
the ratio being conventionally taken as 3: 1. Th is was 
because the steamer was able to maintain a high speed of 
10 knots under all weather conditions whereas the most 
efficient sail ship would only make about 8 knots under 
the most favourable conditions. Using these ratios we can 
work out that in '1869, sail ships represented more than 
85% 'of iýe total fleet in nrt terms but in effective 
capacity terms they actually represented something less 
than 70% of the potential supply. This was still a very 
significant proportion of the total fleet. 
During the early part of this period, the steam fleet 
was so small that demand could only be satisfied if a 
significant proportion of the sail fleet was utilized. 
Thu ,s, rates had to remain strong in order to attract the 
inef f icient 'sail ships out of lay I -up and into the market. 
Prices of steamers were firm reflecting the high rates 
and their higher productivity. This high level of prices 
was bringing forward and increasing supply 'of newbuilding 
steamers which were willingly bought by Investors because 
of their high profitability. At the same time there was 
little incentive to scrap highly valued steamers. Thus 
the' steam fleet was I growing at a much faster rate than 
demand during the first years of this period. 
This was causing a gradual secular' decrease in rates. 
Before the ' appearance of the steamer, rates were 
oscillating around a higher average level which was 
determined" by the fact that inefficient sail ships had to 
earn 'a return on their building cost. The secular 
decrease was pushing rates below this high level so that 
building of new sail ships at prices which would have 
been acceptable to both the investor and the builder was 
no longer feasible. Thus, as Fig. 1.12 illustrates, 
building of new sail ships dropped to an insignif icant 
level during the early part of this century. 
Parallel to the secular drop in rates, there was also 
a secular drop in prices of sail ships as shown on Fig. 
1.11. The sharp increase in prices during the early years 
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of the Great War was an aberration which was a mere 
reflection of the abnormal effects of world wars on 
demand for shipments. The downward trend in sail ship 
prices continued after the Great War when the market 
returned to more normal conditions. The drop in rates and 
prices of sail ships encouraged higher scrapping which 
was indeed on an upward trend throughout the period under 
rev iew as Fig. 1.13 illustrates. Thus, very soon 
scrappings and losses 
- 
which were considerable 
- 
exceeded the volume. of new construction and the sail 
fleet began to decline. This. decline is shown on Fig. 
1.10 and Fig. 1.14.1. 
- 
With the secular drop in rates, prices of steamers 
also began to decline as can 'be seen from Fig. 1.11. 
However rates 
-and prices were still at a high enough 
level to, encourage the construction , of newbuildings and 
deter scrapping of efficient steamers. Indeed as Fig. 
1.12 and Fig. 1.13 show, construction of new steamers was 
maintained at a high level throughout this period while 
scrapping was minimal. This of course implied a rapid 
growth rate in the size of the 
-steam fleet which 
contrasts with the rapid decline of the sail fleet as 
shown on Fig. 1.10 and Fig. 1.14. 
The secular drop in rates was caused by the rapid 
expansion of the steam fleet. Eventually rates had to 
drop to a level where they would force down the price of 
steamers sufficiently enough to depress the supply of 
newbuildings and encourage scrapping so as to bring down 
the growth rate of the fleet in Aine with that of,. demand. 
At that low level of rates the, sail ship could not 
survive. Fig. 1.11 shows the price per dwt of a 3500 dwt 
iron sail ship and a 5000 dwt steamer. It must be 
remembered that within a particular sector, smaller sized 
ships command a higher price per dwt than bigger vessels. 
With this in mind we can 
. 
Infer from the chart that ever 
since 1887 a "steam ton" already commanded a premium over 
a "sail ton" because of its higher effective capacity, 
lower Insurance charges and in spite of the higher 
running costs of steamers. These higher costs were due to 
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the fact that the steamer required a higher number of 
crew per dwt and in addition it had to pay for Its fuel 
while the sail ship did not. It seems however that the 
positive effects of the higher productivity, outweighed 
the negative effects of the higher costs reducing the 
cost per ton-mile delivered. 
The existence of a premium in the price of steamers 
would not on its own however have been sufficient to' 
cause an expansion in the steam fleet. Additionally, the 
extra profitability and the premium it implied had to be 
strong enough in order to cover the extra costs incurred 
in building steamers rather than sail ships. One can 
Imagine a situation where the cost of building steamers 
was so high as to prevent their appearance In spite of 
their extra efficiency. This however does not seem to 
have been the case as already by 1887 when the premium 
was small, many more steamers were being built than sail 
ships. 
From the time the steamer made its appearance the 
sail ship was doomed. Only a big increase in fuel costs 
or in the costs of building steamers could have prevented 
this. The steamer was efficient enough so that it' could 
earn a good return on its building cost at rates which 
the sail ship could not. Thus rates could fall to a level 
where profits and prices of steamers would be strong 
enough to bring forward enough supply of new steamers to 
satisfy the growing demand and to fill the gap left by 
the disappearing sail ship. The drop of 'rates to an 
uneconomic level for the sail ship was unavoidable. If 
rates tended to rise to a level where sail ships could 
survive, this would strengthen steamer profits and prices 
to such an extent that the steamer f leet would grow so 
rapidly as to ensure that this rate could not be 
maintained. 
After years of obsolesence, the merchant sail ship 
reappeared in the 1980's when high oil prices led to the 
construction of awkward looking modern ships which 
combined sail and oil fuel propulsion. 
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1.2.3 The interwar dry cargo market 
After the first World War the shipping markets were 
subjected to a series of severe deflationary shocks which 
caused the most serious and deepest depression of the 
whole period under review. Between 1913 and 1938 it is 
estimated that that volume of seaborne trade rose only by 
one-third. The coal trades which generated a significant 
proportion of the total demand where particularly 
depressed as oil continued to make inroads into the 
energy markets. At the same time the fleet grew by over 
50% and in effective capacity terms much more, owing to 
higher speeds and other technological improvements. 
During the Great War however, the market enjoyed a 
fantastic boom. Freight rates Increased over 10 times 
between 1914 and 1918. This was due to a combination of a 
demand and supply factors. The war operations of 1915 
brought a huge reduction of 6% In the size of the f leet 
as the belligerents bombarded each others' ships. At the 
same time demand for war related transport increased 
significantly. In addition, the productivity of the fleet 
dropped considerably as ships came under government 
control through long term time charters. The employment 
of the fleet was thus no longer determined by profit 
maximizing considerations which create an incentive for 
efficient utilization, but by the strategic needs of the 
waring parties. Other factors such as widespread market 
rationing of available resources, the Increase in fuel 
prices which created an incentive to slow-steam, and the 
increase in war risk related insurance premiums also 
contributed to a rise in rates. Parallel to the rise in 
rates there was a sevenfold Increase in prices between 
1914 and 1919. We estimate that the price of a 10 year 
old 5000 dwt steamer rose from L23000 in 1914 to X164000 
in 1919. Fig. 1.21 shows that between 1915 and 1919 the 
real yield on UK consols became negative, a phenomenon 
which was a natural consequence of the war. This further 
boosted the portfolio demand for ships and their values. 
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Inf lationary expectations also contributed positively 
towards a rise in values. 
The excesses of the war, however, were bound to cause 
a severe depression. Once the war was over, demand was 
expected to return to more normal levels. At the same 
time the f leet had grown considerably. It rose by 7% in 
1919 due to war related shipbuilding and virtually zero 
scrapping. Coal, oil and steel prices which rise 
considerably during the war in line with that of other 
primary commodities, were also expected to return - to 
normal levels. This would have a depressing' influence on 
the market since the lower fuel prices tend to Increase 
the supply of freight services and reduce rates to such 
an extent that profitability decreases. - Moreover" lower 
steel prices and the release of capacity absorbed by 
building of navy fighting ships, tend to increase the 
supply of new ships at a given level of ship 
-prices thus 
generating further downward pressure on rates, and -values. 
The productivity of the fleet was also expected to 
increase after the war as ships would be utilized more 
efficiently in the pursuit of profit. 
These expected developments did not however take 
place immediately after the war. There were some natural 
lags in increasing the productivity of a fleet which 
moreover had been badly damaged during the war. More 
importantly, the following reconstruction 
- 
period 
generated a big demand for primary -commodities and 
shipping which maintained freight rates, prices of 
bunkers and steel at a, very high level. This strong post 
war market probably contributed to the creation of some 
false optimistism about the future. This - helped to 
maintain prices at a very high level and; depressed 
scrapping. At the same time the supply of new ships 
responded strongly to the favourable market as soon as 
wartime restrictions ceased to operate. As a result the 
f leet grew by a further 12% In 1920 and 7% in 1921. This 
happened just when demand, fuel and steel prices began to 
fall while the f leet productivity Improved. These 
unfavourable demand and supply-shocks in conjunction with 
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the rapid increase In the size of the fleet caused rates 
to collapse and lay-up to rise to over 15% in 1922. Time 
charter rates fell from an averag e of 23' shillings per 
dwt per month in the f irst half of 1920, down to 3.5 
shillings by 1923. In the next 7 years they 'oscillated 
around that level. At the'-same time prices also dropped 
catastrophically as there was ' no way, that the huge 
surplus could be eliminated for some years without a big 
drop in prices that would increase scrapping and deter 
shipbuilding. The value of a 10 year old 5000 dwt steamer 
dropped down to 424000' in 1922 against 988000 in 1921 and 
C164000 in 1919. The real yield on alternative 
investments rose while inflationary - expectations also 
came down. This also contributed' towards a drop in 
values. 
Following the depression In the freight and second 
hand markets. the shipbuilding industry ' also became 
depressed while the volume of scrapping expanded 
considerably as can be seen from Fig. 1.27,1.28 and 
1.29. 
Subsequent developments in external factors were also 
unfavourable for the market. Bunker and steel prices 
remained depressed. The mild growth in demand during 1923 
and 1924 only contributed to a reduction in surplus but 
had no effect on rates and values. To make matters worse, 
demand fell significantly in 1925. There were some minor 
bright spots In the years 1927 to 1929 when demand grew 
strongly and prices rose by 50% from trough to peak while 
time charter rates briefly reached 6 shillings per ton. 
Shipbuilding also showed a minor recovery while scrapping 
dropped. Then came the biggest shock of the period which 
was of course the huge drop in demand that occurred 
during the Great Depression of the early thirties. The 
depression was to a great extent caused by the trade war 
policies of the industrialized countries. This meant that 
the shipping industry was disproportionately hit as 
demand for transportation services fell by a staggering 
30% within a space of 2 years. ' causing the already 
depressed rates to drop further. Time charter rates fell 
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to a level just over 2 shillings per ton and , did,, not 
increase throughout 1931 to 1935. Lay-up increased to 
over 20%. Shipbuilding volume, dwindled to less than 1%, of 
the f leet while scrapping rose to over 4% causing a 
reduction in the size of the f leet. The price of our 
representative cargo steamer dropped down to Z6800 in 
1932 against C30300 in 1929 as profits became negative 
and the real return to capital, rose. In real terms ship 
prices reached their lowest level of the whole period of 
the last 120 years. Shipbuilding as a percent of the 
fleet also hit all time lows while lay-up reached an all 
time high. The high level. of scrapping of this period was 
only surpassed during the recent depression of the 1980s. 
The f leet kept f alling for 
-a record period of 6 
consecutive years. This contributed to a gradual 
improvement in the freight market balance and a reduction 
in lay-up. The depression ended in 1937 when demand grew 
strongly and time charterirates soared to 9 shillings per 
dwt per month. Values, after rising gradually throughout 
the depression from 46800 in 1932 to 918500 in 1935 and 
, 
C26400 in 1936, jumped up, to, 456400 in 1937. The 
following year demand fell again and some pessimism 
returned to the 
, 
market. Time charter rates fell to 3 
shillings per ton and values dropped to Z30200. Then came 
the outbreak of the second world war which send rates and 
prices skyrocketing again. Time charter rate? rose to . $4 
dollars per month and the value of the 
. 
representative 
steamer reached C75300 in 1939, C92000 in 1940 and 
, 
081200 in 1941. 
1.2.4 The post war dry cargo market 
Unlike the 1920's and 1930's, the post war II market 
did not experience a major depression for a long time. 
There were also structural changes during this post war 
period, as the tanker sector grew at an average rate of 
13% p. a and in terms of both ton-mile and fleet figures 
it became larger than the dry cargo market. The 
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implication for our analysis is that the dry cargo market 
became now sensitive to events which can be considered as 
having a direct impact only on the tanker sector. Because 
of freight. shipbuilding and scrap market linkages 
between the two sectors, these events would eventually 
have repercussions on the dry market as well. Thus a 
rapidly growing demand for tankers would now absorb a 
signif Icant amount of shipbuilding capacity thereby 
restraining the growth rate of the dry cargo f leet. In 
the demolition market, it would lead to a withdrawal of 
tankers for scrap, the demand for which would then tend 
to be satisfied by increased dry cargo supply. This would 
further restrain the growth rate of the dry cargo fleet. 
On the freight market side, the rapid growth of the 
combi f leet during the 1960s and 1970s implied that 
f luctuations in the tanker market would immediately 
affect the dry sector as these versatile ships would 
switch from one market to the other In search of better 
profits. During the fifties, when combis were very few, 
the link between the two freight markets was weaker, 
based as it was on the limited capability of some tankers 
switching to the grain trades. Before World War II such 
linkages already existed between the two markets, but the 
small size of the tanker sector prevented it from having 
a significant impact on the major dry sector. Now that it 
had come of age, its f luctuations would quickly 
reverberate onto the dry cargo markets. Certainly 
external shocks are felt more strongly by the sector 
which is directly affected, while their effect tends to 
dissipate as it spreads to other sectors. However, 
because external factors affecting the tanker industry 
are more unstable than those affecting the dry cargo 
sector, this can make them as important in generating 
oscillations in the dry market as the latter. 
Demand for dry cargo shipments grew rapidly in the 
fifties and this absorbed a significant amount of the 
total capacity created during the war. The underlying 
economic/political environment contributed strongly to a 
rise in trade and demand for shipments. Europe run out of 
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domestic coal and iron ore and had to import from distant 
areas. The Japanese economy grew rapidly. Being an island 
economy poorely endowed. with primary materials, she had 
to import these goods by sea over long distances, in 
order to satisf y its hungry industry. The general 
agreements on tariffs and trade encouraged an expansion 
of International transactions. The strong growth rates 
implied an equilibrium freight market balance which had 
to be quite tight on average so as to maintain rates at a 
high level. These high rates were needed so that the 
costly investment on newbuildings required to satisfy the 
growing, demand could be recouped. The tight freight 
market balance in turn 
-implied 
that any spurt in the 
growth of demand above, its trend or af avourable supply 
shock could easily send rates soaring. 
- 
In 1951 the Korean War led to a stockpiling boom of 
strategic reserves in the industrialized countries 
generating big demand for shipments. At the same time 
bunker prices increased by over 60%. This restrained the 
supply and created further upward pressure on rates. 
Indeed rates and values more than doubled. Metal prices 
also went up restraining the supply of new ships thus 
justifying a more bullish 
_ 
outlook. The f ear of an 
escalation of the conflict brought down the real, yield on 
alternative investments raising the portfolio demand for 
ships and thus their values. The attractiveness of 
shipping investment during such periods, of global crisis, 
does not only reflect the strong demand for their 
services and the rates at which they can be sold. Under 
such circumstances, ships command an additional premium 
that reflects their geographical mobility which enables 
them to partly avoid increased government interference 
and other political risks associated with ownership of 
physically immobile assets. 
The Korean War created a once and for all increase in 
the level of demand but it did not raise any further the 
long run growth rate, so Its impact was bound to be short 
term. Moreover there was a one to one direct trade of f 
between the then current level of demand for shipments 
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and future level of demand. Following a stockpiling boom, 
future industrial demand for primary goods is satisfied 
by running down accumulated stocks rather than by new 
production and imports. 
The firm ship prices of the early 1950s, supported by 
strong underlying long term growth of demand and also by 
the psychological boost of a booming freight' market led' 
to an expansion in the supply of newbuildings. The 
reduction in scrapping that took place during the boom 
put an additional future burden on the market. Once the 
crisis and the associated stockpiling was over, demand 
fell. On the supply side the fleet expanded and bunker 
prices fell pushing rates further down to a third In 
comparison with their previous peak. Values followed a 
similar trend dropping by more than 90% which was a lot 
less than the drop in prof Itability at a time when real 
returns to capital were rising. This partly indicates 
that the market - correctly as it proved - 'retained some 
optimism for the future. The growth rate of the fleet did 
not register any sign if Icant drop and thus lay-up 
increased as growth In demand temporarily lagged behind 
growth In capacity. 
World economic growth recovered strongly during 1955 
and 1956 and with It the demand for shipping. Rates rose 
considerably and lay-up fell. In October 1956 came the 
first closure of the Suez Canal which caused time charter 
rates to rise above their Korean War peak and lay-up to 
fall to zero in the beginning of 1957. Metal and fuel 
prices rose again. The real return to capital fell. There 
was a risk of the canal remaining closed for a 
considerable amount of time and this helped to raise 
prices by 115% from trough to peak and to expand the 
order book considerably. 
The high average profitability of the period 1950 
- 
1957 should to a large extent be attributed to the high 
growth rates in the demand for shipments that were 
experienced during that time. The f Irm growth rate in the 
tanker market was also another contributing factor. 
Demand for tanker shipments was rising at annual rate of 
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10.6% p. a. over this 7 year period and had to 'be 
satisfied, by an annual output of new tankers which 
averaged' out at about 3. S million dwt per year whereas 
that of dry cargo amounted to slightly higher' amount of 
3.7'*million dwt per year. This indicates that already by 
that time the tanker industry was absorbing"a significant 
proportion of the available shipbuilding capacity thereby 
restraining the growth rate of the dry''cargo fleet. ' In 
order to'estimate more accurately the proportion of the 
shipyard capacity absorbed by 'tanker relative to--dry 
cargo construction allowance should be made for the, fact 
that one ton of a representative 'new tanker built' during 
that period absorbed a much' lower amount of shipyard 
resources than a ton of a new dry cargo ship. 'To a large 
extent this was due to the 'fact that the 'average size of 
a tanker newbuilding was much larger than that" of a- dry 
cargo one. Typically. the construction of a large ship 
requires a smaller amount of shipbuilding resources - as 
measured say, in compensated gross, registered tons (cgrt) 
terms 
- per ton. Taking a 30000 dwt tanker ýand a 10000 
dwt dry cargo ship as representative, newbuildings we find 
from conversion factor tables that the former required 
only 0.4 cgrtýper-ton whileýthe latter required about 1 
cgrt per ton - to be build. ' This implies that, the 
proportion' of the active capacity'- absorbed by tanker 
construction was as much as, 27% during that time. ' 
In 'March 1957-Ahe 'canal 
-reopened reducing the mile 
factor in the demand 
-, for ton-miles. Moreover world 
economic, growth also fell -at round about the same time 
thus reducing the 'volume of shipments as well. Suddenly 
most of the ships that had been ordered during the boom 
were not needed. These'' developments caused quite a 
severe depression which lasted for 6 years. Newbuildings 
delivered during 1958 and 1959 together constituted 1S% 
of the existing fleet. This 'extra, capacity was being 
delivered at a time when growth in 'demand had slowed down 
considerably' causing lay up, - to rise to over 7%. The 
depression also saw prices fall by 70% and rates by 75% 
from peak to trough. Scrapping rose to over 2. S%. 
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The low rates could not allow a return to be earned 
on a newbuilding even if it had been, bought at cost. The 
growth rate of the fleet was thus subsequently restrained 
and with demand growing strongly during the early 1960's 
the market begun to recover in 1963. Prices soon doubled- 
admittedly rising from a very low level. Prices and rates 
continued to recover throughout the sixties. 
. 
As can be 
seen from Fig. 1.31 the growth rate in demand was strong 
during these years. This was especially so in 1963 and 
1964 and as Fig. 1.35 indicates it contributed to a 
significant improvement in the freight market balance. 
Most of the laid up ships (Fig. 1.36) were absorbed by 
this increase. The 
. 
market benefited from the second 
closure of the Suez Canal In the summer of 1967 but in 
spite of these favourable shocks and the strong 
underlying long term growth in demand the market failed 
to boom properly until 1970. 
One reason for that was technological innovations on 
the shipbuilding side which led to the development of the 
bulk carrier. 
, 
This was a single deck 
, 
large vessel 
designed to carry dry bulk goods. The economies of scale 
associated with the operation and building of larger 
vessels allowed it to earn a, better return on its 
building cost than conventional cargo ships. Thus the low 
rates which had previously prohibited the building of 
conventional cargo ships could now encourage 
-the building 
of bulkers at prices which would allow both the investor 
to recoup his capital and the shipbuilder to make a 
profit boosting both the demand and the supply of these 
newbuildings. Thus the growth rate of the fleet could be 
maintained at a rate which roughly equalled that of 
demand without a big Increase in rates and prices being 
required. 
But for this development of new ship types in both 
the dry, cargo and tanker sectors the markets would have 
boomed much earlier as the average freight rates of the 
sixties could not justify the construction of the older 
ship types in large quantities. The sixties are a classic 
case of the technological development of a new, efficient 
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and cheap to build capital good, leading to an, increase 
In investment and a parallel dampening effect on rates. 
Of course rates did not actually fall because the 
negative effects of the innovation were more than 
cancelled out by the strong growth rate iý demand and the 
fact that initially the market was at a very low level 
and, finally; 'because of other factors operating through 
the supply side. ' 
By the end of the'sixties the market had become very 
tight and lay up , was at a very low level. This implied 
that' any spurt in demand above trend could cause a 
considerable increase in 'rates. It was statistically 
inevitable that under'such a situation of high growth and 
tight market balance, there would have been some years 
when additional growth would sent rates up. This occurred 
in 1970 when demand grew at around 11%, 'a six year 
record. Time charter rates doubled, while prices 
increased 75%. There were also positive developments 
taking place on the supply side. The booming tanker 
market had absorbed most of the combined carriers. The 
proportion of over-aged ships (Fig. 1.45) had increased 
significantly reflecting the abnormal shipbuilding output 
of World War II. The scrapping rate (Fig. 1.43) therefore 
persistently exceeded 2.8% during the late sixties and 
early seventies regardless of market conditions putting 
extra pressure on rates and prices. On the shipbuilding 
side, metal costs (Fig. 1.33) had been, on an upward trend 
ever since 1963 further restraining the growth of the 
fleet by hitting shipbuilding and increasing the demand 
for scrap. The tanker market was growing during the 
sixties by a compound average rate of 13.3% p. a absorbing 
32% of the active shipbuilding capacity. 
In 1971 and 1972 the growth of demand fell to 
something over 2% against a compound average of 9.2% over 
the previous 8 years. At the same time the f leet was 
growing at a rate of over 7% p. a. Thus lay up rose 
significantly almost reaching the' 2% mark. Freight rates 
fell considerably but prices only to a smaller extent. 
Bunker prices had begun to 'rise gradually since 1969 and 
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this was exerting a mild upward pressure on rates which 
finally boomed again as the growth rate of demand reached 
a 10 year record level of over 16% in 1973. Most of the 
laid up ships were absorbed and rates soon doubled. The 
tanker freight market was also booming more strongly 
absorbing most of the combined carriers. 
The optimism regarding future growth in tanker demand 
generated by falling US oil production and rising imports 
sent prices up, and the tanker order book expanded to a 
level which constituted 90% of the existing tanker fleet. 
As can be seen from Fig. 1.41 dry cargo deliveries as a 
percentage of the f leet had 'paradoxically' been on a 
downward trend ever since the closure of the Suez Canal 
in 1967 and this trend continued up to 1975, in spite of 
the strong market. The flow of causation was actually the 
opposite which explains the paradox of a strong market 
and falling delivery rates. Various factors where 
restraining the growth rate of the dry cargo fleet 
thereby contributing to the increase in rates and values. 
The strong tanker market was absorbing an increasing 
share of shipbuilding capacity thereby restraining the 
delivery rate of dry cargo ships (Fig. 1.41) and causing 
the dry market to rise further. In addition it was very 
difficult for shipbuilding capacity to expand rapidly. 
We estimate that between 1971 and 1976 and in cgrt terms, 
tanker construction absorbed a record 52% 
, 
of actual 
shipbuilding capacity. In 1974 the solid 11.1% growth in 
demand and the phenomenal increase in bunker prices (Fig. 
1.32) to something like $80 per ton caused the already 
booming time charter rates to reach a new post war peak 
which exceeded the previous best by around 55%. Prices 
also moved higher to a new peak which exceeded the 1956 
peak by around 65%. Part of this peak to peak increase 
was inflationary. 
It was impossible of course for the market to sustain 
itself at such a level even if subsequent events had been 
more favourable and more in line with expectations. The 
unanticipated increase in oil prices was engineered by 
means of a restraint in the supply of long haul OPEC 
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production which was up to then generating most of the 
growth in tanker demand. The implications for the tanker 
market were catastrophic as the massive orders of 1973 
and the stagnation of demand that was followed 'by a 
subsequent devastating drop of 50%, guaranteed that the 
tanker market would remain depressed for more than 10 
years. This was true with the exception of a small hiccup 
in 1980. The dry cargo market also became depressed 
shortly af ter. Industrial activity which generates most 
of the demand for dry cargo shipments was particularly 
hit by the increase in oil prices. As a result demand in 
the dry freight market actually fell by 2.3% in 1975 
(Fig. 1.31). The increase in oil prices actually had some 
beneficial effects on the market but these were swamped 
by the negative effects of the slowdown in growth. By 
raising fuel prices and restraining supply through the 
incentive to slow-steam they generated upward pressure on 
rates. The fleet continued to grow-strongly for some time 
as a result' of the 'initiation of construction programs 
during the previous good years. 
The stagnation of tanker demand was equally important 
for explaining the 1976 - 1978 dry cargo 'depression. Some 
of the tanker orders placed in 1973 'were converted to 
bulk carriers as a result of the collapse in tanker 
prices. Moreover as the tanker order book was being 
depleted shipbuilding capacity 'was released and had to 
look for alternative employment as there was no way that 
more worthless tankers could be built at prices that 
would be acceptable to' investors and that 'would be 
profitable to ' their builders. Under such circumstances 
the capacity tends to be diverted into the relatively 
better performing sectors until It depresses them as 
well. The poor performance of the whole shipping industry 
in the last 10 years Is directly related to the 
stagnation and subsequent drop In tanker demand which 
left the" shipbuilding industry' with no other alternative 
than to build other types even at a loss. 
Sudden unanticipated" depressions such as' those that 
occurred after the two oil shocks are usually I more 'severe 
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that the ones that can be partly foreseen. Shipyards 
expand their capacity and employ more labour If, the 
market Is expected to be good. These are long term 
decisions which, are difficult to reverse If unexpectedly 
the market becomes depressed. There are sunk costs in 
expanding shipyard capacity which cannot be recovered by 
restraining production. In addition rapid variation in 
labour employment 
-is costly. Long term labour contracts 
imply that wages do not count as part of the marginal 
costs. In the short run. which can be as long as 5 years, 
ships will be built as long as the variable metal costs 
are met. All these factors explain why substantial 
unprofitable production of new, ships can persist during a 
depression. This pushes the equilibrium level of prices 
and rates downwardsý and tends to prolong the depression. 
In addition the political costs of unemployment ' In 
shipyard industries and the strategic ý- value of 
shipbuilding leads tof an -increase in , subsidies , during 
difficult times that reduce the true cost of production 
and expand supply. This also - depresses, prices and 
prolongs the depression, ironically - cancelling out most 
of the intended benefit of the; subsidy. These factors and 
in particular the depression in' the tanker market explain 
why the dry cargo order book increased (Fig, 1.40) during 
the depression years of 197S and 1976. 
Ship prices fell , further while inflation raised metal 
prices and wages -An shipbuilding. Metal prices rose not 
only in nominal terms ý but also in real terms. These 
factors eventually- restrained the growth rate of the 
fleet by immediately increasing 
- 
scrapping and creating 
the incentive to cutback the unprofitable production of 
new ships at least in the long term. The growth rate of 
the f leet fell to around 2.5% in 1979 and 2% in 1980. By 
that time demand had picked up strongly growing at a 
compound average rate of 5.5% between 197S and 1980. 
Between 1978 and 1980 demand was growing faster than 
the fleet absorbing a significant amount of surplus. In 
1979 fuel prices which were already at a high level rose 
again and this ý in : combination with the tightening freight 
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market caused rates to increase again and triggered a new 
cycle. New ships were needed to satisfy the expected 
growth in demand. The actual increase in oil prices 
created the expectation of a substantial growth in coal 
shipments to replace expensive oil. Values rose to a new 
post war high and the order book expanded. Time charter 
rates more than trebled. 
The expectations did not materialize however as the 
growth rate of demand over the period 1980 to 1987 
averaged out at a very low level of 1.5% p. a. Demand 
dropped for two consecutive years in 1982 and 1983. This 
drop being unanticipated, it did not lead to any 
speculative adjustments in the fleet that 
, 
could have 
cushioned its negative effects. On the contrary the 
expectations about the growth rate of demand were running 
high in the early eighties. The new ships delivered after 
the boom added to the burden of a lower demand. ýThls new 
depression was definitely the most severe since the Great 
Depression. At the peak lay up reached a high level of 
around 6%. There was no help coming from the tanker 
market either as demand for oil shipments dropped by a 
staggering 60% during the first half of the eighties. 
starting from an initial position of high surplus. This 
did not leave room for alternative employment for the 
shipyards. Throughout these years there was an abundance 
of supply of surplus tankers for scrap. This tended to 
depress scrap prices which reduced the incentive to scrap 
dry cargo ships. , Shipbuilding capacity was excessively 
high in relation to requirements and the average age of 
the f leet was small. Subsidies to shipyards were 
increased. The process of cutting back costs by reducing 
the size of the labor force and restraining production 
was very slow. Metal prices had weakened considerably 
during the eighties tending to increase the supply of new 
ships and reduce the demand for scrap. Bunker prices were 
also falling this also having a depressing effect. 
In 1987 the market staged a strong comeback after a 
series of years of severe depression. The strength of the 
1987 market was partly a manifestation of the unavoidable 
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long term recovery that follows a deep' depression. Such 
depressions cannot last forever since the poor rates 
would not allow to recoup an investment in newbuildings 
even if they were bought at cost. These newbuildings are 
eventually needed to replace old ships 'and satisfy a 
growing demand. Scrapping capacity grew considerably 
during the eighties taking advantage of the availability 
of old ships at low scrap values. Accumulated cutbacks in 
shipbuilding capacity and labour - force led to 
considerable permanent improvements on the supply side. 
Tanker rates, but mostly values. rose first in 1986 as 
demand stabilized after several years of negative growth. 
Prices rose partly in anticipation of favourable supply 
side developments. The increase of tanker values In 1986 
led to a dramatic and immediate withdrawal of tankers 
from the scrap market. This led to a strengthening of 
scrap prices that brought forward an increasing supply of 
dry cargo ships for scrap to fill the gap, left by 
tankers. The dry cargo scrapping rate rose to an all time 
high of 4.5% causing the first post war drop In the size 
of the dry cargo f leet. Although a drop in values was 
justifiable and necessary in order to adjust the size of 
the fleet. the market probably went too far in 1986 and 
caused an underpricing of ships. 
- 
This actually 
contributed to the subsequent recovery by generating more 
scrapping and less shipbuilding than would otherwise have 
been forthcoming. Fig 1.35 indicates 'that by 1987 the 
freight market balance was approaching the average level 
around which it has tended to oscillate historically and 
to which It always tends to return. 
1.3 Historical f luctuations In the tanker market 
Fluctuations in the tanker markets have always been 
closely linked with events in the oil industry. Changes 
In the volume of production and its geographical 
distribution, ' which to a large extent determine, the 
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volume of transportation services required, have been 
very rapid during the whole history of the market. This 
history essentially began during the second half of the 
19th century with the discovery and economic exploitation 
of the North East USA oilfields. This section considers 
how the major events in the oil industry and other 
external developments have affected the 
, 
tanker market 
ever since 1861. Again three periods are distinguished. 
These are the pro-World War, the inter-War and the post 
War period. 
1.3.1 The pre-World War I tanker market 
During the beginning of the second 
-half of the , 19th 
century, substantial quantities of oil were discovered in 
the North East USA ollfields. This led to the beginning 
of the economic exploitation of this 
. 
new source of 
energy. The oil produced there was transported by railcar 
and later on also by pipelines, to the East Coast cities 
such as New York, Baltimore and Philadelphia. About 50% 
of it was destined for local East-Coast consumption while 
the remaining half was exported by ships to Europe and a 
small portion to the Far East. The first shipment was in 
1861. Europe and especially Britain were at that time the 
center of world industrial activity that would generate 
most of the demand for oil. The European economy however 
was based on coal and 
-the powerful interests vested in -it 
would not allow oil to capture the big lucrative primary 
fuel markets before a long and hard f Ight. 
- 
It, was the old 
vegetable and animal fats and oils against which 
petroleum could Immediately compete , In , the markets for 
lamp and lubricating oils. 
The only available means 
- 
of sea-transport which could 
carry the cargo from the US ports to LK/Continent where 
the traditional sail ships. 0 11 had to be loaded in 
barrels or tins which would then have to be stowed into 
the sail ships. This was obviously an inefficient and 
expensive method. Thus, during those - first few years In 
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the 1860's, freight rates on the Atlantic route could 
oscillate around the high level of 100 shillings per ton 
in order to make the voyage profitable and thus bring 
forward sufficient supply. This compares with the low 
rates of below 10 shillings that were paid during various 
years of the 1920's and 1930's by which time more 
ef f icient low cost transportation methods had been 
des igned. These high rates, however, created the 
incentive for experimentation in the construction of 
specialized ships that would carry oil at low cost. Thus 
the f irst tankers were born which were designed to carry 
oil in bulk in their tanks. Some of these experiments 
failed badly with the ships exploding and disappearing in 
the Atlantic. The obvious riskiness of these new, projects 
effectively *acted as an increase in the capital cost of 
investing in tankers and thus rates had to be maintained 
at a strong level in order to make the building of these 
ships economically attractive. Indeed the first 50 
-years 
of the tanker Industry are characterized by persistently 
very high freight rates which were never to be seen -again 
for such prolonged periods of time. The lack of knowledge 
and risk capital would prevent a rapid Increase In the 
size of the fleet. Equilibrium was established at a level 
were freight market balance would be tight and rates 
sufficiently high so as to induce risk taking In building 
tankers. Later 
- on such high freight rates would be 
experienced only for short-lived - periods , or during 
abnormal situations such as world wars. This was because 
with the passing of the years the shipbuilding industry 
acquired the necessary knowledge, experience, and 
resources to - bu I Id suf f IcIently good ships while 
investors understood the new market better so that, supply 
and demand for, tankers would respond quickly 'to a 
shortage in the freight markets. 
Certainly the sluggishness in the response of the 
supply of new ships to , market conditions, was 
contributing towards maintaining rates at a high level 
during the 19th century. Equally important, however, - were 
the very high growth rates in demand, for seaborne oil 
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movements which guaranteed that any tankers actually 
built would be quickly absorbed. Once the relatively 
efficient tankers were absorbed, the extra demand would 
have to be satisfied by dry cargo ships operating in the 
tanker freight market under the costly method of loading 
in barrels. 
The growth rate of oil shipments -from USA to Europe 
was maintained at the high levels of 20% in the 1860's, 
10.3% in the 1870's and 9.6% in the 1880's. Following 
their first imports from the US, the Europeans soon 
realized the advantages of oil and went on to search for 
new oilf lelds closer to home. Substantial discoveries 
were made in Russia. The Baku ollfields by the Caspian 
Sea begun to produce oil in commercial quantities In 
1871. In the beginning the whole output of these fields 
was transported to Moscow to satisfy local demand. There 
was no way at the time for the oil of the land-locked 
Caspian Sea to reach the Black Sea from where it-could be 
loaded onto tankers. Thus in the beginning this new 
production had no direct impact on the ocean tanker 
freight market. 
Meanwhile in America, Rockefeller's Standard Oil had 
monopolized the distribution system from the inland 
producing areas to the East Coast and used this power to 
monopolize the whole oil market in the US, Western Europe 
and the Far East. The Standard was destined to lose its 
monopoly in the Far East soon after 'a direct rail link 
between Baku and the Black Sea was established in 1883. 
With the major oil markets being under the monopoly of 
the Standard, the only outlets for exports from the Black 
Sea were Southern Europe-and the long haul routes to the 
Far East. During those years tankers were not allowed -to 
use the Suez Canal since the authorities considered them 
to be unsaf a. In 1882 however, Samuels' specially 
designed tankers got permission to use' the Canal to 
transport oil from the Black Sea to the Far East. With 
freight rates, being high in those early years, this gave 
Samuel a considerable cost advantage over Standards' US 
oil which had to travel considerably longer distances on 
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sail ships in order to reach the Far East. Thus the 
monopoly of Standard in the Far East market was broken up 
and Samuel set up a new company named Shell. 
The direct effects of these developments on the 
average distance of oil shipments and thus on the demand 
for tanker services was negative as the short haul 
Russian exports via Suez displaced more distant exports 
from the US. In 1885 shipments from 
, 
the Black Sea 
represented 10% of the volume of. oil carried on the 
Atlantic route. Within a space of 15 years this had grown 
to represent half the amount of oil carried from the US 
to Europe. However the opening up of the link between 
Baku and the Black Sea increased the overall availability 
of supplies in the world oil market and thus allowed 
demand and trade to grow more 
. 
rapidly than would 
otherwise have been the case. This certainly had 
.a 
positive effect on the demand for tankers which probably 
cancelled out the negative effects of the drop In average 
distance. In any case such minor fluctuations in demand 
during these early years would have had little impact on 
freight rates (and thus the whole tanker industry) since 
those were mainly determined by the need to attract the 
marginal, high cost, dry cargo sail ships. At these rates 
the 'efficient' tankers carrying oil In bulk would have 
made a healthy profit. The main cost however in building 
tankers were their capital costs and the uncertainty 
associated with the development of completely new 
projqcts in a new market. The high rates however 
justified the taking of these risks. 
By the beginning of the 20th century Russian output 
had surpassed that of the United States. In the tanker 
market however, Russian output was a less important 
source of demand as most of it was destined for local, 
consumption In Moscow. The first two decades of the 
century saw the decline of Russian output and the 
appearance of new producing areas. Ever since 1905, with 
the first internal political problems, Russian production 
begun to decrease. By 1917 and the coming of the 
Bolshevik revolution it had almost disappeared from the 
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international scene. New discoveries were made In the US 
Gulf, Texas California and Mexico. Rapid , developments 
were' * experienced not only in the geographical 
distribution of production but in the pattern of 
consumption as well. These would bring about "considerable 
structural changes in the tanker freight market with the 
emergence of new routes and the decline of old ones. 
Up' to that time industrial activity was concentrated 
in Europe and generated a significant proportion in the 
total demand and trade in oil. In 1900 Europe was 
consuming 50% of world oil production while the US only 
20%. Still, oil only accounted for 2.5% of world energy 
consumption. Kerosine was used' In the Illuminating market 
but other oil products such as fuel oil had not yet 
managed to gain any market share from 'coal. Ships. 
railways, and Industrial plants were still being 'fueled 
by coal. Industry and transportation were the markets 
that oil had yet to penetrate. Fuel oil was used only 
near the 'oil wells themselves especially If coal was not 
available. 
The US lagged far behind In "Industrial production but 
this would not last for long as it had the advantage of 
cheap local oil and an abundance of natural wealth of 
minerals and cultivable land. Europe not only lacked most 
of these resources but also had the additional 
disadvantage of being under the dominance of, coal. This 
created a natural resistance to rapid change in energy 
sources towards more economical oil. Moreover the two 
World Wars destroyed much of the wealth and industrial 
power of Europe. I- 
Technological innovations of that period created new 
more economic' engines running on oil. Some of these 
developments created completely new markets. The 
revolution which had 'the biggest impact was the internal 
combustion engine. Karl Benz developed a machine running 
on benzine, or gasoline and In 1908 Henry Ford launched 
his new 'Model V. In the space of 10 years, from 1910 to 
1920, car ownership in the US rose at an annual rate of 
33% while at the same time the growth rate of the, track 
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f leet was 27% p. a. These new vehicles generated a 
considerable increase in the demand for fuel. Railways 
and ships also started 
- 
to turn to fuel oil. In 1892 an 
alternative internal combustion engine also appeared. Dr 
Rudolf Diesel's invention was designed to run on any fuel 
but gas oil also known as diesel or fuel oil gave the 
best results. It was soon used to propel ships but was 
also useful on land. 
- 
Acceptance, of, oil in the big European industry and 
transport markets was slow. In the US however Industry 
quickly turned to fuel oil. Demand for oil in most parts 
of the US could be satisfied from local production and 
thus created no demand for tankers. It was however in the 
East Coast were most of the industrial activity and 
expansion was concentrated and the supplies from the 
North Eastern fields which arrived via pipelines were not 
sufficient to satisfy the demand. Thus whereas East Coast 
ports were the major exporting terminals 
, 
in the 19th 
century, exports would now completely cease and the, area 
would become the major importer and would keep this 
position until World War II. These imports would have to 
come from the new producing areas of Texas, US Gulf, 
California and Mexico. The same areas would begin to 
export to Europe but this Atlantic trade lost Its 
relative importance as US inter coastal flows into the 
East Coast came to dominate the tanker freight market. 
Exports from Texas could reach the East Coast either via 
pipelines linking into Standards' network or through the 
US Gulf ports by 'tanker. The second method was not only 
cheap but was also independent of Standards' grip. Thus a 
tanker route would again allow local producers to avoid 
the monopoly of the Standard and got a market share, 
, 
this 
time out of the major East Coast market. Thus two new 
companies would be formed based on their production from 
their South American fields, Texaco and, Gulf 011. Average 
distances in the tanker markets would fall, as now much 
more oil would be 
-flowing on the short-haul, local US 
routes than on the Atlantic route. This however did no, 
harm to the tanker market since the growth rate of 
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shipments along the Atlantic route was maintained. 
Imports into Europe from the East Coast were replaced by 
imports from the Gulf. Overall demand in the tanker 
markets increased as the, growth rates in the short haul 
routes accelerated while' those on the long haul Atlantic 
and Far East routes were maintained. This pattern of 
increased 'US coastal shipments and decreased relative 
importance 'of the Atlantic and Far -East routes, was to 
continue until the Second World War. ' 
1.3.2 The interwar tanker market 
The two World Wars created a significant shortage in 
the shipping markets as can be seen from the long term 
graphs of Fig. 1.68-1.76. Major wars have a direct, 
sign if icant impact on both the demand and supply of ocean 
dry cargo and tanker transportation services. The effect 
on demand' is as big as the effect on supply. Modern war 
operations' generate a big demand for fuel. The safer 
routes are not necessarily the shorter ones so average 
distances increase. There is a big impact also on the 
size and productivity of the fleet. It can be seen that 
both World Wars brought about very significant reductions 
in the dry cargo and tanker f leets as a result of naval 
warfare and the sinking of enemy ships. Most Importantly 
the productivity of the fleet falls as ships have to move 
in convoys which implies a higher average waiting time in 
port. ' Other inefficiencies also occur as the fleet passes 
under the -control of the governments which are more 
Interested in the logistics of war than In cost 
minimizing transport. The net effect of such changes In 
demand and supply conditions is to send freight rates and 
ship values sky rocketing. 
The wars usually also have a longer term impact on 
the, shipping markets. This is because of the war 
shipbuilding programs which are undertaken in order to 
satisfy the increased demand, ' compensate for -the decrease 
In productivity and replace the ships that have been 
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sunk. Because of this, the growth rate of the f leet rose 
very rapidly during the later phases of the World Wars as 
can be seen from the charts. This led to significant 
surpluses appearing in the post, war markets when demand 
returned to normal levels while the productivity of the 
fleet also increased. 
Thus after the Great War the tanker market became 
depressed as demand returned to normal levels while the 
f leet had just risen significantly as a result of the war 
shipbuilding programmes. It can be seen from Fig. 1.63 
that deliveries In 1921 amounted to over 22% of the fleet 
at a time when demand was slowing down and fleet 
productivity was increasing. However the 1920's were also 
years of very high growth rates of demand that would 
absorb the initial surplus. According to Koopmans (1939) 
worldwide demand for tanker ton-miles increased by an 
annual average of 12.9% during the first 5 years of the 
1920's and then by an average of 9.7% in the remaining 
half of that decade. As always, this average growth rate 
was not evenly distributed over the years. As a result, 
the tanker market experienced various profitable short 
lived booms whenever the growth rate of demand rose above 
its trend. These would be followed by rather longer 
periods of depression as soon as the growth rate of 
demand receded and/or the fleet rose in response to the 
previous boom. 
By that time the knowledge needed for building safe 
tankers had already been acquired partly through trial 
and error. Other factors also contributed to a lowering 
of the capital costs of investing in tankers such as the 
increased familiarity of investors with the tanker market 
and the increased willingness and capability of 
independent owners to enter the market with their own 
risk capital. These developments had helped to bring the 
shipbuilding industry into a position where It could 
increase the growth rate of the tanker fleet very rapidly 
as soon as the market conditions improved. This would 
eliminate quickly any large shortages and abnormal 
increases in rates. Initially the shortage would be 
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satisfied by increased participation of dry cargo sail 
ships carrying oil in barrels. But the f leet would 
respond rapidly pushing the sail ships out of the market 
and rates would soon go down to or below the level that 
would just allow a sufficient return to be earned on the 
cost of building tankers at a rate that, would keep the 
growth of the f leet in line with that of demand. The 
small size. of the tanker sector meant that it only took a 
small proportion of shipbuilding capacity to switch from 
dry to tanker construction, in order to ensure that there 
was enough supply of new tankers to bring rates down. 
Fig. 1.47 shows the f luctuations in the growth rate 
of demand during the inter-war years. It can be seen that 
during 1923, demand rose by the enormous amount of almost 
40%. The 1923 boost in demand was due to the sudden 
Californian export boom to the US via the Panama Canal. 
Output from Californian oilflelds suddenly doubled within 
a few days. Up to that time all Californian output was 
absorbed by local consumption. ý There was no way that the 
sudden big Increase cou Id be absorbed by local 
consumption anymore, so shipments began to the East Coast 
via the Panama Canal and to a lesser extent to the Far 
East. In those days when most of the trade was from the 
Gulf to the East Coast, these- new routes, were long-haul 
in comparison. Thus not only the volume of trade went up 
but the average distance rose too, causing the volume of 
ton-mile demand to grow by 39% within a year. As a 
result, all the postwar surplus was quickly absorbed and 
rates soared. Two years later demand dropped by S% as 
Californian exports began to decline almost as quickly as 
they increased and the market became depressed. Rates 
came down as in the meantime the f leet was growing in 
response to the previous boom. In the following year, 
however. demand grew by 16% thanks to an all-round 
increase in shipments to the East Coast. In 1929 the 
market enjoyed another good year thanks to Venezuelan 
production coming on stream and the strong consumption 
demand for oil. 
The high growth rates for oil transport during the 
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twenties, implied that, unlike the dry cargo market, the 
tanker freight balance was tight on average. Only this 
way would rates be strong enough to create an 'incentive 
for the system to expand the fleet rapidly In line with 
the growth in demand. Rates and prices (Fig. 1.51) were 
indeed strong on average. The latter was necessary in 
order to make shipbuilding profitable and ' bring forward 
the necessary supply of new ships. The tightness of the 
market implied that any spurt in demand would tend to 
push rates to very-high levels. 
However, during the first half of the thirties the 
market experienced its worst depression. This was partly 
due to an ordering boom which was fueled by the 
consecutive booms of the 1920's and in turn caused the 
fleet 'to grow by 7.5% and 13.9% in 1930 and 1931 
respectively. At the same time demand 'dropped by 10% in 
1931 in line with the drop in the general level of 
activity associated with the Great , Depression. The 
worsening of the freight, market balance led ýto freight 
rates falling to their lowest possible level determined 
by operating and lay up costs. Prices of tankers fell to 
all time lows. This led to a contraction In shipbuilding 
and an increase in scrapping (Fig. 1. SO which in the 
long run helped the market to return to normality. 
From 1933 onwards demand begun to increase at the 
considerably high level of 13% p. a and this led to a 
significant increase In rates so that part of the capital 
costs could also' now be met. Another contributing factor 
to' the increase in rates was the formation of the Tanker 
Pool during 1934. This is one of the rarest examples of a 
partly successful cartel formed by shipowners in order to 
raise rates. As is well known cartels can only manage to 
raise prices, If they succeed to restrict the supply 
forthcoming from Its members, at a level which is lower 
than what would be forthcoming ' If the market 'was 
competitive. The cartel must control a sign if Icant 
proportion of the total potential supply in order to be 
successful. Otherwise It will find that just' as it tries 
to withdraw supply from the market in order to 'raise 
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rates, the non members (which are not bound by any rules 
of the cartel regarding price and output) will raise 
their supply in order to take advantage of the higher 
prices. This will frustrate the price hike since cutbacks 
by the cartel will be partly cancelled by increases in 
the supply from the non cartel producers. This will 
require significant and possibly unacceptable sacrifices 
in output from the cartel in order to raise prices. Most 
of the benefit of the higher prices will, however, go to 
the non members who will be able to expand their supply 
while members will lose much of the benefits of the high 
price because of the necessary cutbacks in their own 
production. The strict self-interest of a member will 
then be to get out of the cartel so as to be free to 
raise output and take advantage of the higher price. If 
that happens the cartel tends to disintegrate, rapidly. As 
more members leave and expand their supply the higher 
will be the sacrifices that the remaining members will 
have to make so that they, will be less likely to stay. 
Thus cartels tend to be, unstable and the market tends to 
return to the competitive situation. 
This indeed was exactly what happened with earlier 
efforts by a group of Norwegian tanker owners which 
formed the "Tanks k ibscentralen " cartel. The group was set 
up in January 1933 and had all the f leet of Its members 
under central control. Prof its would be distributed to 
members in proportion of their tonnage. This scheme was 
naturally abandoned in 
, 
September 1933 as It didn't have 
the necessary support. In order to raise rates the group 
had withdrawn supply by raising its proportion of laid-up 
tonnage. As rates responded slightly the group found that 
the non members had taken their ships out of lay-up in 
order to reap the profit generated by the higher rates. 
The individual Interest of a member was to got out of the 
cartel so as to get more of his ships back to the market 
and so the group disintegrated. 
A cartel is more likely to be successful If It has 
the power to penalize those members who, violate the rules 
set by the group in order to 
-pursue their self interest. 
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Indeed, it was not the simplicity and ingenuity of the 
cartel's scheme by which It aimed to Increase rates that 
led to Its success, but the fact that the powerful oil 
companies supported it. The shipping departments of the 
oil majors participated in the cartel by undertaking not 
to charter any ship that was not entered in the Pool. 
Immediately all owners joined the cartel s ince the 
alternative option would imply very little business for 
their ships, as the oil majors were the main charterers. 
The mechanism through which the cartel aimed to raise 
rates was as follows: Members undertook the obligation to 
the Pool to pay a certain percentage from all their 
freight earnings. Then the Pool would distribute these 
funds equally over all laid up tankers. The main 
advantage of the this scheme was that It did not impose 
any compulsory restrictions on the supply that Its member 
would wish to offer to the market. Each member was free 
to pursue its optimal strategy under an incentive scheme 
that tended to reward the laying-up of a vessel and 
reduce the profit from sailing. 
However, it must be stressed that the Pool would not 
have been successful if the major oil companies had not 
given their support. It might seem strange that the oil 
companies should give support to a scheme that aimed to 
increase the price of a service of which they were' active 
buyers. The explanation lies in the fact that whereas the 
major oil companies carry most of their oil on their own 
ships, the independent oil producers have to rely 
completely on the freight market. An increase in freight 
rates was expected to hit the independent producers and 
give a cost advantage to the majors who were the bigger 
owners of tankers. The increase in costs was also 
expected to restrict supply from the independents and 
lead to an increase in the price of oil that would 
compensate for the higher freight rates. 
By the time the cartel came to be established, demand 
had already begun to rise strongly and the freight market 
balance had begun to improve. Rates, prices and 
shipbuilding were also gradually recovering until in 1937 
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the market boomed. It was now the European industry that 
was rapidly turning to oil and was generating this growth 
with its long haul imports from the US and the Middle 
East which was slowly beginning to emerge as a new 
producing area. In 193S the Middle East generated 15%, of 
the total demand for tanker transportation services. With 
the coming of World War II the peace time trade f lows 
would be disrupted once again and the same factors wou ld 
come to dominate the market as during the Great War. 
Indeed the market followed an identical path during both 
Wars with rates and values booming, the f leet being 
reduced initially as a result of bombings, while later on 
the increase 
-in shipbuilding output would more than 
compensate f or the early losses. The new ships would 
overhang the market once the War was over. 
1.3.3 The post War tanker market 
The whole 1950 to 1987 period can be easily divided 
in two parts, pro and post OPEC, with 1973 being the 
border year. The first Is a period of uninterrupted 
expansion and it Is characterized by extremely high 
average growth rates in demand. The second is a period of 
stagnation and rapid decline in shipments ýý caused by 
OPEC's price/production policies. 
The pre OPEC period 
During the 1950's the oil industry expanded as 
rapidly as it did during the first half of the century., 
European industrialized countries had destroyed most of 
their wealth including their coal industry. This made the 
transition to oil easier. Throughout the third quarter of 
the century the world economy experienced very high 
growth rates partly thanks to cheap oil. Industrial 
production in OECD countries expanded rapidly while less 
developed countries also began to Industrialize. The 
demand for oil grew, even faster as at the same time a 
rapid transition from coal to oil was occuring -in Europe, 
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Japan and to a lesser extent in the rest of the world. 
But demand in the tanker market was growing even faster 
as average distances were rapidly increasing creating 
extra demand on top of that generated by the general 
increase in the volume of oil production and trade. Thus 
whereas seaborne trade in oil grew at an annual rate of 
9.3% p. a. over the period 1950-1973, demand for tanker 
services grew at the faster rate of 11.9% reflecting an 
additional 2.6% p. a. increase in average length of haul. 
The reason for this. was the rapid increase in 
production from the vast Middle East oil fields. European 
growth in the demand for oil was totally satisfied by 
long haul shipments from the Middle East which completely 
displaced the relatively short haul imports from the US. 
Japanese demand became also totally dependent on Middle 
Eastern production. Indeed the Persian Gulf became the 
focal point of the tanker market as most of the oil trade 
was moving on these new routes to Europe and Japan. These 
involved considerably higher distances than the major 
Latin American, US intercoastal and Atlantic routes of 
the f irst half of the century. 
Within the 1950 to 1973 period one can further 
distinguish three distinct phases. 1950 to 1957 was a 
period of strong growth rates in demand. 1958 to 1966 was 
a period when growth rates fell while the fleet was 
rising strongly as a result of previous false optimistic 
expectations and innovations in the shipbuilding Industry 
which led to the construction of ever bigger and cheaper 
tankers. The third phase Is from 1967 to 1973 and is 
characterized by extreme growth rates in demand as the 
previous post war record of 15% was exceeded in almost 
every year. 
The high growth rates observed during the 1950 to 
1957 phase were directly related to the rapid expansion 
in oil consumption and Middle Eastern production. During 
this period, demand grew at an annual compound average of 
10.6%. The f leet rose at an average rate of 8.2% p. a in 
dwt terms, but because of the higher speeds of the new 
ships, the growth in effective capacity terms was much 
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closer to that of demand. However the solid growth in 
demand was not evenly distributed throughout these years. 
The volatility in demand for freight is illustrated by 
the fact that its growth rate ranged between between 3% 
to 15%. Naturally the growth rate of the fleet, which is 
geared 
'to 
perceptions of the less volatile, average long 
term growth in demand, was much more stable ranging 
between about 5% to 10%. This combination of a volatile 
demand and a more stable f leet, Implied that the 
oscilations in demand were Immediatelly reflected in 
freight rates and lay-up. 
The Korean war of 1951 and the Suez crisis that led 
to the closure of the canal from October 1956 to March 
1957 caused demand, 
- 
for, shipments to rise significantly 
above its long term trend. Fig. 1.57 shows how demand 
peaked in 1951 and 1955-1957. Fig. 1.60,1.61 show how 
the market became tight in those, years, with lay-up 
falling below 1% and rates rising dramatically. Fig. 
1.62,1.63,1.65 show 
. 
the response of prices, 
shipbuilding and scrapping which not only reflected short 
term developments but also long term views. Scrapping 
fell while prices and the orderbook Increased during the 
boom. The response in the latter tends to make the boom 
temporary even if demand stays at a high level. As It 
happened, growth in demand fell after peaking during the 
Korean War and the Suez crisis. 
Some of this drop was certainly foreseen given the 
temporary nature of the war and the crisis and, also the 
expected increase in the fleet. However, during 1958, 
demand dropped very ý much below expectations while the 
fleet was Increasing rapidly in response to the previous 
shortage and in line with a more optimistic outlook for 
demand. A setback in rates and prices was unavoidable, 
but the earlier, false optimism 
_ 
necessitated an even 
bigger drop. Indeed, to a great extent this was due to 
the soaring of the tanker order book In 1957 
. 
when 
existing shipyard orders for new tankers represented 70% 
of, the existing fleet. This led to a subsequent flooding 
of the market with new ships, while at the same time the 
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Suez Canal was reopened and demand dropped significantly. 
Thus during the 6 year period, from 1958 to 1963, the 
market was very depressed and occasionally rates were not 
sufficient to cover the operating costs let alone the 
capital costs. As a result of the drop in demand and the 
irreversible increase in the fleet, lay-up rose quickly 
to over 10% with the real surplus being even higher 
because of additional s low steaming. 
, 
Rates naturally 
fell. Prices also fell reflecting the immediate outlook 
but also the longer term fundamentals and prospects. Even 
though the drop in 
- 
values was expected to hit 
shipbuilding (Fig. 1.63,1.64) and Increase scrapping 
(Fig. 1.65) as it actually did, this could not have led 
to a significant improvement for some time. This was 
partly because of the size of the initial surplus. 
Moreover, this was a period when a series of 
innovations in shipbuilding led to a continuous Increase 
in the size of tankers being built. In 1950 the average 
size of tankers on order was 19SOO dwt rising to 26600 in 
1955,42000 in 1960,51100 in 1965,116300 In 1970 and 
peaking to 145800 in 1973. These new ships, by virtue of 
their size and the associated economies of scale in 
constructing and operating them, could make good profits 
at low rates and were cheaper to build. The former tended 
to increase the demand for those ships while the latter 
Increased the supply of newbuildings. Thus the f leet 
could now grow, even at rates which where uneconomic to 
build the older and smaller ship types. This tended to 
prolong- the depression and to push down the equilibrium 
rates and the prices of the existing smaller ship types. 
But the long term growth rate remained strong enough 
so by the mid sixties the surplus had been absorbed and 
thus followed a prosperous decade for shipowners. The 
growth rate in demand, which fell to below 3% In 1958, 
followed an upward trend in theý following 5 
_years 
averaging at 6% p. a.. This, together with the depressed 
prices which restrained the increase in the size of the 
f leet, helped to absorb a significant amount of the 
initial surplus and of the newbuildings delivered. By 
I 
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1963 lay-up had fallen to around 2%. As a result, rates 
began to oscillate around a higher level f rom 1963 
onwards. This was also due to a recovery In the growth 
rate* of demand which averaged out at 10.8% during the 
period 1963 to 1966. Prices and shipbuilding responded 
positively while scrapping fell. 
Two external events took place during the second 
phase which although Initially they had a small ef fect on 
the industry, they subsequently proved to have 
considerable long term implications. These were the 1959 
decision of the US government to Impose a quota on 
imports and the initiative of the producing countries 
that led to the formation of OPEC. According to the quota 
the proportion of future imports to the US was frozen to 
the 1959 level which was 4% of the domestic consumption. 
This was meant to protect the domestic economy from 
becoming dependent on unreliable foreign production. At 
that time Middle East and African production was rising 
rapidly and needed an outlet on the world markets of 
which the US was an important element. The producers 
correctly saw this action as a direct attack on their 
export revenues. With the door on the US market shut, 
their supply to the rest of the world increased and 
prices dropped. To stop the weakening of their oil prices 
and strengthen their negotiating position against the oil 
companies the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries was formed. Ample Middle East supplies 
depressed the world price of oil and led to rapid 
increases in demand and increas Ing share for OPEC 
production. 
The 1967 to 1973 phase was Undoubiedly the most 
profitable one of the whole post war period. The 
fundamental factors that contributed to this were many. 
Most important of all, was of course, the extreme 
increýse in the growth rate of demand for shipments. 
Indeed with the closure of the Suez Canal which lasted 
from '1967 up to 197S, the growtA rate in demand rose to 
record levels. During this latter phase of the pro OPEC 
era, the previous post war record of 15% growth in 
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demand, was exceeded in almost every yearl 
In turn, the three 
- main factors behind these solid 
growth rates, were the closure of the Suez Canal which 
lasted from 1967 up to 1975, the strong increase in world 
oil consumption/production - and trade activity. and 
finally the even faster Increase in the Middle East long 
haul exports to Japan, Europe and later on USA. Because 
of the closure of the canal, -the latter had to be routed 
round Africa in order to reach their destination. The 
dramatic increase in the growth rate of demand and the 
part of it attributed to the Increase in the average 
length of haul are shown on Fig. 1.56 and 1.57. 
Ironically, the increasing dependence of - the US on Middle 
East oil, was largely due to her 1959 import quota. The 
quota restricted the supply of oil to the US market and 
raised the domestic price. This created the incentive to 
explore and develop local reserves which were then 
depleted rapidly. By 1970 local consumption was growing 
much faster than production, thus requiring more Imports 
from the Middle East. 
From 1966 to 1973, demand grew at an average rate of 
17.4% p. a while the fleet only managed to grow at a rate 
of just 12.1% in spite of full shipyard capacity 
utilization and minimal scrapping. Other factors 
operating through the supply side of the market, also 
strongly contributed to an improvement in market 
conditions. Over this period we observe a real increase 
in metal and bunker prices, both of which had a positive 
effect on the market. The former restrains the Increase 
in the f leet by reducing the supply of new ships and 
expanding the demand for scrap. The latter restrains the 
supply in the freight market, thus directly raising 
rates. The Inflationary environment also led to at least 
a nominal increase in rates and values. The real yield on 
capital fell, further increasing the demand and prices of 
real assets such as ships. The growth rate of dry cargo 
shipments was also running at record levels, absorbing a 
significant amount- of shipyard capacity and restraining 
the increase in the tanker fleet. Some of these 
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developments were unexpected and thus the growth rate of 
the f leet was, at least initially, restrained by this 
early relative pessimism. 
Each of these factors on its own had a positive 
effect which would have been much smaller under normal 
market conditions. However, when all other factors tend 
to push in the same direction, the Incremental effect of 
an additional positive exogenous impulse is multiplied 
considerably. Further tightening of an already tight 
market, has significant effects on rates. In contrast It 
would only absorb lay-up and f ail to move rates 
signif icantly if It came at a time when the market was 
slack. This tendency of mutual reinforcement of the 
positive effects of each external impulse, intens if ied 
the final impact of these developments. 
Fig. 1.59 shows that the market became extremely 
tight during this period as a result of the above 
mentioned movements in the underlying fundamentals. 
Random but partly unavoidable explosions in rates and 
prices occurred during those years when demand grew above 
its trend level. This was a period when a series of 
demand-related surprises, coming at a time when the 
market was tight, helped to push rates upwards 
repeatedly. The first came in 1967 when the unexpected 
closure of the Suez Canal led to a freight market 
shortage. The second came in 1970 with the closure of the 
Tapline which necessitated a diversion of Saudi Arabian 
exports to Europe from the short haul pipeline route - 
which linked the Persian Gulf with the Mediterranean - to 
the long haul Persian Gulf/Western Europe via Cape route. 
The third and strongest increase came In 1973 when the 
general Increase In the volume of shipments together with 
the increase in distances associated with the rapid 
expansion of US long haul imports. led to a further 
tightening of the freight market. 
Tanker freight rates soared reaching Worldscale 280. 
At such a rate a 210000 dwt VLCC would make a prof It of 
$5 million from one voyage lasting 70 days. The price of 
this ship in early 70's would have been $30 million 
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implying that the vessel could have been repaid In just 
14 months. The expectation of a further rapid increase In 
US imports from the Middle East and the psychological 
boost from a continuously strong freight market led to 
spectacular speculative increases in values with prices 
of VLCC's reaching $65 million. Parallel to that the 1973 
order book expanded to a level which represented round 
about 90% of the existing fleetl 
Viewed within a larger *time framework. the whole 1950 
to 1973 period was one of very high growth rate In demand 
for tankers, which averaged out at a level of 11.9%. In 
order for this demand to be satisfied It was necessary 
for the f leet to grow at the same rate on average. That 
could only happen if prices of tankers were on average 
high enough to create an incentive for shipbuilders to 
supply the newbuildings needed to expand the fleet at 
this high rate. In turn this necessitated a tight freight 
market balance so that rates and profits would be strong 
enough to earn a sufficient return on the high price. The 
tight freight market balance in turn implied that even a 
small unexpected increase in demand above Its trend could 
easily lead to a booming market. Indeed during these 
years of, high growth the market experienced a number of 
short-lived highly profitable booms during which owners 
could repay a big portion of their capital costs. Each of 
these booms was closely associated with individual 
external events that led to sudden spurts in demand which 
in turn resulted in a tighter freight market and an 
explosion in rates. These events included the Korean War 
in 19S1, the Suez crisis In 1956-19S7, the Arab-Israeli 
war and the second closure of the rSuez Canal In 1967, the 
bombing of the Tapline in 1970 and the 1973 boom. 
Because these events were of a great general 
importance, there is a danger of attributing the 
resultant improvements In freight rates solely to these 
events. There is thus a tendency to lose sight of the 
fact that probably the fundamental reason for the 
regularity and magnitude of these booms was that 
- 
the 
average growth rate of demand remained high throughout 
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the whole period and not because there were some years 
when this average was exceeded. It would be an 
exaggeration, but a useful one, to say that each event 
merely acted as a "straw that broke the camel's back" 
which had already been strained by solid long run growth 
rates. As already explained, the high growth rates 
necessitated a tight freight market on average. It was 
thus inevitable that there should have been some years of 
random spurts in demand above the average trend, 
tightening the market further and leading to significant 
increase in rates. Had the average growth rate in demand 
been lower, equilibrium would have been established 
around a less tight market, so that sudden spurts in 
demand would have led mainly to an absorption in lay-up 
and other surpluses rather than increases in rates. The 
occurence of these events did affect the timing of the 
booms but their frequency and magnitude was only affected 
to a smaller extent. 
The post OPEC era 
With the orderbook running at a very high level at 
end 1973, it was unavoidable and natural that some calm 
would eventually return to the market, after the last 7 
stormy years of the pre-OPEC era. This would have 
happened even if actual growth in demand had moved in 
line with the high expectations of the early seventies. 
However instead of a soft landing towards a new long run 
equilibrium, the market fell from its sky high level. 
crashing into an abyss where it seemed there was no 
bottom to which prices and rates could sink. Investors 
were caught cold, as OPEC unexpectedly raised the price 
of oil in October 1973, which was the time when the 
tanker market and expectations were at their peak. 
Up to that year the oil and tanker industry had 
experienced almost uninterupted growth for over a 100 
years. In the last few years demand for tankers was 
growing at a particularly high average rate of over 15% 
p. a. With the rise of OPEC power the character of the oil 
market changed completely and unexpectedly. Actual 
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developments in the tanker market also followed a 
completely different course from what had been expected. 
OPEC's grievances had already begun to surface In 
1970 when Libya nationalized BPs assets and raised its 
posted price from $2.17 to $2.485. Thanks to the steady 
growth in the demand for oil, OPEC's power had increased 
and the rest of Its members soon followed Libya's example 
by also raising their prices. Subsequent events' show that 
OPEC had already acquired the power to manipulate the oil 
industry by gaining a considerable market share. Possibly 
out of lack of knowledge, confidence and coordination 
this power had not been exploited yet. The Yom Kippur War 
between Egypt and Israel broke out in October 1973 and 
acted as a catalyst. In a moment of Arab unity, OPEC 
decided to use the oil weapon against USA. Production and 
exports were immediately reduced. The price of oil 
quadrapled and the world economic boom was suddenly over. 
One of the biggest economic disaster stories of those 
years was the collapse of the tanker market. 
As a result of the cutback in long haul Middle East 
production, demand In the tanker market suddenly 
stagnated, remaining 'at around its 1973 level. This was 
at a time when the f leet was rising rapidly as a result 
of the 1973 ordering boom. The tankers on the massive 
orderbook were no' longer needed. According to the terms 
of the contract, owners had to accept delivery of the 
newbuildings. From 1973 to 1979 demand grew at a rate of 
0.5% p. a. whereas the fleet expanded at a rate of 7.2% 
p. a. wiping out all the gains in rates and freight market 
balance that had been achieved during the boom years of 
1963 to 1973. The surplus became so large and the outlook 
for demand was so poor that the market was bound to be 
depressed for at least a decade. Overnight, VLCC values 
fell by $20 million. A 210000 dwt VLCC which In 1973 
would have been ordered for $47 million, would be worth 
just $S million in 1977. Parallel to the drop In oil 
trade, there was a drop In the average lenght of haul 
which did not just 'reflect the cutback In the supply of 
long haul OPEC oil. Non-OPEC short haul reserves which 
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had been uneconomic to exploit at the pre 1972 oil price 
level, now became prof itable. Increasing supply came 
forward from short haul producing areas to fill the gap 
that the restraint in long haul OPEC production was 
creating, thereby further reducing the average length of 
hau 1. 
Scrapping rose to high levels during the late 
seventies and the orderbook evaporated as soon as 
, 
the 
pre-1974 orders had been delivered. There was just no way 
that new tankers could be built without considerable loss 
to the bu I Ider, at prices which would have been 
acceptable to Investors. The latter were extremely 
depressed as the huge surplus was not expected to be 
eliminated for at least a decade, even after taking into 
account the fact that the low values would stimulate 
scrapping and depress shipbuilding that could eventually 
lead to a market recovery. 
In 1979 the market made a partial recovery as the 
higher bunker prices associated with the doubling of oil 
prices and other exogenous fleet inefficiencies led to a 
freight market shortage. This short lived boom however 
was followed by a new depression which was even more 
severe than the previous one. The determination of the 
cartel to maintain the price at a high level, at a time 
when this very price was causing a contraction in demand 
and an expansion in non-OPEC supply, necessitated 
increas Ing cutbacks in OPEC long haul production. As a 
result, demand fell by a devastating 50% during the 1980 
to 198S period which translates to an annual rate of 
decline of 15% p. a. Freight rates, profits, prices and 
shipbuilding hit all time lows, while scrapping reached 
an all time high. Values of 10 year old VLCC's collapsed 
to scrap price levels. Lay-up rose to 20% of the f leet 
with the real surplus being as much as 50% according ý to 
some estimates. Scrapping boomed reaching the extremely 
high rate of 7% of the f leet. The orderbook remained 
extremely depressed. Profitability in the freight market 
was persistently negative. 
OPEC's power to manipulate prices however Is not 
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unlimited. Excessive use of that power can seriously 
weaken its ability to control the Industry in the long 
run. This is because demand for OPEC oil 
- 
which Is 
def ined as the difference between total demand and 
non-OPEC supply 
- 
is much more elastic in the long run 
than in the short run. The high oil price creates an 
incentive for non-OPEC members to explore for new 
reserves thereby expanding supply. In addition the higher 
energy prices induces an increase In the supply of coal, 
nuclear and other substitutes for oil. At the same time 
capital goods are designed or converted so'as to be able 
to utilize these relatively cheaper forms of energy. 
Thus, the demand for OPEC oil falls both because non-OPEC 
supply rises and because total demand for oil is falling. 
The cartel is then faced with two alternatives. It can 
either choose to maintain the price of oil at the cost of 
accepting increasing cutbacks in its own production and 
eventually this has a negative effect on profits. 
Alternatively it has the option to gain market share by 
increas Ing production which however ý will lead to a 
significant drop in the price as the extra output cannot 
otherwise be absorbed since In the short run demand Is 
inelastic. This also has a negative effect on profits. 
Both alternatives therefore Imply a short term reduction 
in profits but have different long term Implications. The 
second option causes, through the lower ' price, a 
contraction in non-OPEC exploration and future production 
and in addition a gradual switch back to oil. This has 
positive long term implications about the ability of the 
cartel to raise the price again with little sacrifice on 
output. ý1, 
In 1986 the cartel opted for the second alternative, 
refusing to accept additional sacrifices In production 
and thus allowing the price to drop. The Implications for 
the tanker market were considerable as long haul exports 
stabilized after 6 years of continuous devastating 
reductions. In the meantime the f leet had shrunk 
considerably but because of the size of the surplus this 
failed to have an 'impact on rates. More recently demand 
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has recovered slightly from Its very low level, as a 
result of OPEC's decision to expand its market share at 
the expense of allowing the price of oil to drop. 
Together with the 27% reduction In the fleet size that 
has gradually taken place over the period from 1979 to 
1987, this has had a beneficial effect on rates. Second 
hand values have risen by an even higher amount on the 
anticipation of further improvements in rates. The large 
proportion- of overaged tankers Is expected to lead to 
increased scrapping that will strengthen the market. High 
shipbuilding costs will prevent the fleet from rising 
until there is a realistic chance of rates increasing to 
a level that will make profitable the construction of 
replacement tankers for both investor and the 
shipbuilder. This points towards a permanent increase An 
rates and prices. Over the short term, demand might 
very well begin to grow again, certainly it will not 
fall. However, the stronger the short term growth of OPEC 
output and tanker demand, the higher are the chances of 
OPEC repeating Its behaviour of 1973/4 and 1978/9. 
1.4 Shipping cycles 
We have argued that the shipping industry is very 
volatile. During a typical shipping cycle, freight rates, 
values, shipbuilding, scrapping and thus the the growth 
rate of the fleet will exhibit wide fluctuations. These 
fluctuations are to a great extent stochastic, caused by 
events of a random nature such as wars, oil shocks. Canal 
closures etc. However one might also discern a more 
deterministic element in them. A very important feature 
of the cycle however Is the tendency of the market to 
revert to a more 'normal' or stable situation, once a 
shock from the external environment has led to a 
temporarily large disturbance. It is partly because, of 
this tendency, that the various cycles exhibit recurring 
patterns which are common to most of the historical 
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episodes. We suggest that this pattern of the market 
adapting to external shocks is due to the Immutable laws 
of economic behaviour that govern the behaviour of 
economic agents in the freight, second hand, shipbuilding 
and scrapping markets. This behaviour generates dynamic 
linkages between the freight and other shipping markets 
which induce these patterns. Insofar as the exogenous 
shocks that initiate the cycle are of a similar nature 
(e. g unexpected increases in the demand for freight) the 
various historical episodes can be expected to exhibit 
strong similarities provided the laws of motion of the 
system are stable. 
In this section we shall take another look at the 
available historical data on freight rates, ship prices. 
shipbuilding and scrappings for the dry cargo and tanker 
sectors. The objective Is to identif y the various 
cyclical patterns by casual observation and minimal 
resort to preconceived theoretical views. In subsequent 
chapters we explore these Issues more formally In terms 
of an econometric model that describes the rational 
behaviour of economic agents in the various sectors of 
the shipping market. We show that our proposed 
theoretical model is consistent with the data in the 
sense that it can reproduce the characteristic features 
of the typical shipping cycle when it Is subjected to 
random shocks such as those that occur in practise. 
Figures 1.68 
- 
1.72 show the history of dry cargo 
freight rates, ship prices, deliveries, scrapping and 
fleet growth rate over the last hundred years or so. 
Figures 1.73 
- 
1.76 show the history of tanker freight 
rates, deliveries, scrappings and fleet growth rate since 
the beginning of this century. Long run historical data 
on tanker ship prices Is not available. These charts 
illustrate the high volatility of the industry and the 
various comovements of the endogenous variables over the 
cycle. Casual investigation of the long term charts 1.68 
- 
1.76 as well as Fig. 1.1 - 1.67 which focus on specific 
shorter periods suggest the following characteristics: ' 
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- a) Freight market balance moves procyclically and in 
phase with rates 
- 
b) Time charter rates move procyclically and 'in 
complete phase with freight rates 
- 
C) Lay-up moves countercyclically and'also In complete 
phase with rates 
- 
d) Ship prices move procyclically and in phase with 
rates 
- e) Shipbuilding output also moves procyclically but 
tends to lag behind rates byýa_ year or so 
- 
f) Scrapping moves countercyclically and in phase with 
rates 
- 
g) The growth rate of the fleet which reflects the 
difference between shipbuilding and scrapping, moves 
procyclically but it also tends to lag behind rates 
These 
, 
are the characteristic features of a 
representative cycle. The duration of the cycle varies 
from one episode to' the other. Of course, historical 
cycles also exhibit other individual patterns. It is 
conceivable that future cycles might exhibit different 
patterns from those of the past. Historical movements not 
only reflect the way that the market reacts to exoge nous 
developments but also the nature of the external shocks 
to which it has been subjected. A cycle which has been 
initiated by a demand shock say, will exhibit different 
features from one that has- been prompted by a bunker 
price, or shipbuilding cost, shock. The theoretical model 
and 'the associated econometric model presented in 
subsequent chapters aim to provide a theoretical 
explanation of why such patterns occur. It will be seen 
that the historical patterns of a representative cycle 
can be replicated by model simulation of the effects of 
an unanticipated demand shock, such as those that often 
occur in practice. 
These simulations, which are presented In chapters 
3,4,5,6 show that a permanent, unexpected Increase in 
demand will. according to our model, lead to the 
following market response: 
79 
- a) There will be an immediate improvement In freight 
market balance at the time of the occurrence of the 
shock 
- 
b) At the same time, time charter rates will increase, 
part of this increase being speculative 
- 
C) Lay-up will fall immediately 
- 
d) There will also be an immediate speculative Increase 
in ship prices 
- 
e) Shipbuilding will begin to recover and this will be 
translated into an increase in deliveries after a 
year or so 
f) Scrapping will also drop Immediately 
g) The growth rate of the fleet will begin to recover 
immediately, as scrapping stops, with further 
increases occuring later on, when newbuildings come 
on stream 
However, this short term turmoil, will be followed by a 
recessionary phase were the market will gradually tend to 
return to the path that it would have- followed in the 
absence of- the-shock, until it Is again perturbed by a 
new shock. Exactly the opposite movements would occur in 
the case where the market had been subjected to an 
unanticipated drop, rather than increase, in demand. 
These simulated movements do resemble the pattern 
exhibited by a representative shipping cycle. Thus we 
might say, that the 
-model provides a theoretical 
explanation for the cyclical behaviour of the market. 
N* Appendix : Construction of ship price indices 
This appendix describes how the ship price indices 
shown on Fig. 11,26,39,51,62,70 have been 
constructed. The indices have been constructed from 
individual second hand sales of ships as reported by 
various brokers and shipping magazines over the years. 
About 5000 second hand sales spanning a time period of 
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over a 100 years have been used in order to construct the 
index shown on Fig. 70. For each sale reported the 
following information is extracted: 
a) The price (P) paid f or the vessel 
b) The size (DWT) of the vessel 
c) The age (A) of the vessel 
d) The year t of the sale 
The calendar Is rebased so that t runs from 1, 
..., 
T. 
Thus year 1 is the first year for which sales data have 
been collected while T is the last year. Other 
information regarding technological aspects of the ship 
have also been extracted. The sales have been grouped by 
year when the transaction took place. The aim is to use 
the data in order to construct a series for the general 
level of prices. The price P 1, t of 
the I th sale during a 
particular year t is assumed to reflect the general level 
of prices It during that year as well as vessel specific 
factors such as the size S I't of the ship and 
its age 
A 
I, t* 
A relationship of the following form is specified 
for the above variables: 
P 
I't -It 
f(S 
I't ,A I't 
) (1) 
This says that over time the price of a ship of a 
particular size and age moves in line with the general 
level of prices. For a given general level of values 1, 
dif ferences in prices of individual ships ref lect 
differences in their sizes and ages. It Is assumed that 
the functional form of f(-) Is the following: 
f (S A)w SSA7 
1, t, 1, t I't I't 
Equation (1), (2) imply 
ISO Aý, 
t I't I 
which in logarithms becomes 
ei 
p 
I't -It+ 13S I't + 7A I't +u I't 
where all variables in (4) are redefined to represent 
logarithms of the original levels and where in addition 
an error term u has been included to repre sent the I't 
effects on price of other random factors that have not 
been taken into account. We then stack the individual 
price, size and age data and we carry out the following 
regression 
T 
pi, 
t=EITDT+ 
13S I't + vA I't +u I't Tal 
where DT. -r - 1, 
... ,T is a series of dummy vectors 
which take the value 1 if -r -t and the value 0 when -r 
t. The calculated coefficient IT on the, dummy variable DT 
is the estimated logarithm of the general level of 
prices. 
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This chapter reviews previous attempts to model the 
behaviour of shipping markets. Section 2 looks at the 
early pre-World War II efforts of Tinbergen and Koopmans. 
Sections 3-7 look at the post war efforts which have led 
to the construction of econometric models of the freight 
market and the markets for ships. The structure of these 
models is reviewed in some detail. The concluding section 
compares the various models and points out the similarity 
of freight market structures embodied in various models. 
However, it also points out that the modelling of 
vessels' markets is a controversial issue which is 
illustrated by the disparity of second hand, newbuilding 
and scrapping market structures embodied in various 
model. This section also argues that, typically, work in 
this area has been theoretically flawed and inconsistent 
with rational behaviour. 
.1 
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2.1 Introduction 
Our objective in this chapter is to review previous 
attempts to model various aspects of the market for 
shipping and to set the- scene for our efforts.. Indeed, 
the freight market was one of the very, first areas of 
applied econometric analysis reflecting the development 
of econometrics in Holland under Tinbergen and Koopmans 
and Dutch Interests ý in world shipping during the 1930s. 
However, despite this * auspicious aspect of the freight 
market, applied econometrics has hardly flourished in the 
area of world shipping. Nevertheless, there have been 
several attempts to model world shipping markets either 
In whole or in part and these are the focus of attention 
in the present chapter. 
- 
At the outset we point out that freight markets have 
received most of the attention to the virtual exclusion 
of the markets In vessels. However, we argue that- the 
freight and vessel markets are so interdependent that a 
proper understanding of the dynamics of the ýone cannot be 
achieved without an analysis of the other. It Is also 
argued that the little work that has been, done on the 
vessel market for newbuildings and second hand ships Is 
theoretically flawed in two important respects. First. 
vessels have in general not been regarded as capital 
assets, which they obviously are. Secondly, the 
speculative aspect of the demand for new and second hand 
vessels has been either allocated, a secondary role or at 
best it has been treated in a naive way. In contrast, In 
our own efforts, the full weight of capital theory is 
brought forward to bear upon the design of the model 
while speculation is accorded a primary role in terms of 
the theory of "Rational Expectations" upon which our 
proposed modelis also based. 
es 
The pre World War 11 efforts 
The early pre World War II efforts concentrated on 
modelling supply in the 'freight market. There was, by 
contrast, relatively little focus on the demand side of 
the market basically because of 'the enormous practical 
dif f iculties involved. To our- knowledge, even until 
today, these difficulties have prevented the construction 
of a satisfactory simple empirical model of the demand 
for freight. Relatively little ýprogress was 'also made on 
the markets for ships despite the availability of 
sufficiently good , data. Empirical work -on the freight 
market was undertaken by Tinbergen (1933), (1934) and 
KoopMans (1939). In another theoretical contribution, 
Tinbergen (1931) considered how an endogenous 
shipbuilding cycle can arise out 'of the interactions of 
the freight and ship markets. 
Post World War 11 efforts 
Since World War II, there have been numerous 
contributions to the problem. Econometric studies have 
Investigated supply and demand relationships in various 
shipping markets. Based on these, integrated mathematical 
models of the tanker or dry cargo markets such as 
Norship, Dynamo or those of Hawdon (1978) or Charemza and 
Gronicki (1981) have been constructed. Extremely 
disaggregated models of the freight market such as 
Martinet have also appeared. 
2.2 7be early efforts (Tinbergen and Koopmans) 
We begin with the pioneering work of Tinbergen and 
Koopmans. Tinbergen (1934), In what is one of the 
earliest econometric applications, Investigated the 
sensitivity of freight rates to changes in the level of 
demand q on the one hand, and to the factors affecting 
supply on the other. The latter include the level of 
tonnage K and the price of bunkers Pb. Other factors such 
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as operating costs are also specified to Influence rates 
but since these are 
- 
more or less constant during the 
cycle in relation to other variables, their effect is 
treated as a constant. As in most models of the freight 
markets, Tinbergen considers demand , to be perf ectly 
inelastic with respect to freight rates. Supply on , the 
other hand ý, responds positively to freight rates and it 
will shift when changes in the size of the f leet or the 
price of fuel - occur. An increase in the size of the f leet 
increases the supply of, freight services q* as measured 
in ton-miles. On the other hand an -increase in the price 
of bunkers will cause supply at a given freight rate to 
contract as ships find that It Is now more economical to 
slow-steam while some vessels might even move into 
lay-up. Thus supply is implicitly specified to be 
= KPFT (1) 
where one would expect a to be close to I while P and y 
should be both positive. Tinbergen also , implicitly 
assumes that freight rates move in order to set demand 
equal to'supply. 
qs 
The two, expressions imply that the equilibrium freight 
rate can be written as a function of q, K, Pb. By 
substituting (1) into (2) and taking logarithms on both 
sides of the equation this relationship can be written as 
eIq-e2K+e. Pb ý 
where 
el m 1/7 
e2 a/7 
e3 ß/7 
(3) 
(3, ) 
and where all variables are now in logarithms. Equation 
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(3) expresses the relationship between equilibrium 
freight rates and the level of demand, the size of the 
fleet and bunker prices. In fact Tinbergen does not 
explicitly specify equations (1) and (2) but only (3) in 
a slightly different way but which is equivalent to ours. 
However (1) and (2) are implicit in his writings. They 
are specified explicitly here in order to set out a 
uniform notation and framework that will facilitate 
comparison with other work including our own. Tinbergen 
then uses data for ton-miles, the size of the f leet, 
bunker prices and freight rates over the period 1870 
- 
1913 to estimate the unknown parameters of (3) by 
1 
regression 
. 
His empirical estimates are 
F=1.7q 
- 
1.6K + 0.4Pb (4) 
"The formula", he concludes. "demonstrates the relative 
importance of the three factors: 
... 
the demand index 
... 
the supply Index 
... 
and 
... 
the coal price on the 
calculated freight rate". This had actually been the 
purpose of the investigation namely to determine the 
sensitivity of freight rates to these three factors. We 
think however it is also useful to use W) in order to 
relate the estimated coefficients of e,, e2. e3 to the 
parameters of (1). since the latter can be conveniently 
interpreted as elasticities. Tinbergens' estimates imply 
the following values for a, 13,7: 
a-0.94, ß-0.23,7 - 0.59 
The estimated value for a, which is the elasticity of 
supply with respect to the fleet, is 0.94 which seems to 
be close to the theoretical value of 1. The coefficients 
for both 13 and 7 are positive as expected a priori. The 
1 
The regression Is applied to the annual differences of 
the S year moving averages of the levels of' the 
variables. 
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former indicates the elasticity of supply with respect to 
fuel prices and the latter the elasticity with respect to 
freight rates. It can be seen ihat supply is fairly 
inelastic both with respect to rates and bunker prices. 
In another article which antedates his empirical work 
on freight rates, Tinbergen (1931) considered a 
theoretical model of the shipbuilding cycle. A dynamic 
equation for the evolution of the fleet Is derived by 
considering several dynamic relationships between 
shipbuilding, freight rates and the f leet for given 
values of the exogenous variables. First, a larger f leet 
implies lower freight rates at a given point in time t 
because of the positive effects of an expansion in 
-the 
fleet on supply. This is expressed by equation (5) below. 
The change in the fleet at time t (after allowing for 
scrapping and losses) is related to the amount of current 
deliveries which in turn are related to orders Q at time 
t-, & where 6 Is the lag between ordering and delivery. 
This relationship Is expressed by equation (6), where ý 
indicates the instantaneous rate of change of variable x. 
Thus equation (6) says that the rate of change of the 
fleet k(t), is proportional to orders of new ships at time 
t-0. Finally these orders are assumed to be positively 
related to prevailing freight rates as expressed by 
equation (7). This is because higher rates lead to 
optimism that increases the demand for orders. 
F(t) 
-- PK(t) (5) 
K(t) 
- 
Q(t-0) 
t-o) 
- 
AF( t-, &) (7) 
Various other variables should also be allowed of course 
to enter these equations. Shifting (5) backwards by 0 
time units and substituting this into (7) and the result 
Into (6) we obtain (8) which Is 
k(t) 
- 
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where 
am Xp 
Tinbergen calls the parameter a as 'the intensity of 
reaction. It depends on the sensitivity' of -freight rates 
to the fleet and of orders to freight rates. Equation (13) 
is a differential equation which the author solves to 
determine the equilibrium time path of the fleet. It is 
found that the solution of (8) for plausible "values of 
the parameters exhibits cyclical behaviour as represented 
by a mixture of sine waves. One of the sine waves has a 
period which is at least equal to 20 and for plausible 
values of the parameter a it is greater than 40. For the 
most likely values of ix and 0, the system exhibits an 
endogenous damping cycle with a periodicity of about 7.5 
to 8.7 years. Tinbergen then uses this theoretical model 
in order to make two year ahead predictions of 
shipbuilding deliveries and. f Inds ' that these are quite 
acceptable and can even 'sometimes foresee various turning 
points. He also carried out' an ex ante twelve year 
forecast based on the theoretical model and Initial 
conditions and f Inds that this also tracked actual 
developments quite well and even foresaw a turning 'point 
which lay about six years ahead. ' 
Most of the subsequent models of the shipping markets 
incorporate' a set of relationships such as (5), (6) and 
(7) which generate similar cyclical behaviour. Of course 
Tinbergen " considered a rudimentary shipping cycle 
focusing on the endogenous interactions between rates, 
shipbuilding and the size of the fleet while keeping the 
exogenous variables out of the picture by treating them 
as constants. Existing econometric models of the shipping 
markets allow for a much richer set of instantaneous or 
lagged exogenous and endogenous influences. However the 
basic forces which generate the cyclical behaviour in 
such models are broadly similar to those explored by 
Tinbergen. 
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During the same period Koopmans (1939) investigated 
the behaviour of tanker freight rates. The main body of 
the book Is an exhaustive theoretical analysis of the 
determinants of supply in the freight market supported by 
some statistical investigations. Other parts of the book 
deal with the demand side of the freight market but 
little attempt ý is made at modelling mathematically the 
demand for freight because of the complexity of the 
issue. Some attention is also given' to the shipbuilding 
market but no additional theory other than that of 
Tinbergen is rigorously examined. The freight market 
section of the book is partly concerned with providing an 
explanation of why there seem to be periods of prosperity 
when tanker freight rates become extremely volatile 
fluctuating around a very high level while there are 
other longer periods of depression when rates are stable 
at a low level. The author attributes that to the 
interaction between an inelastic demand f or ton-miles 
with a peculiarly shaped supply function. At a very - low 
level of freight rates supply is extremely elastic so its 
shape is almost horizontal while at a high- level of 
freight rates it becomes very inelastic taking up a 
vertical shape. Vhen demand meets supply at the elastic 
region then even wide fluctuations In demand will have 
little impact on rates. On the other hand, when the 
inelastic demand crosses the supply function at its 
inelastic region then even small f luctuations in 
transportation requirements or the size of the fleet can 
lead to big changes in rates. 
The elasticity of supply during periods of prosperity 
I. e when the fleet is highly utilized is estimated from 
semi-annual data covering the. period from 1920 to early 
1930s. He assumes that supply of ton-miles is directly 
proportional to the size of the fleet while the supply 
generated by a unit of capacity depends on the ratio of 
freight rates to an index of bunker prices and other 
operating costs. Taking into account that in equilibrium 
demand must equal supply, the following relationship 
between rates, fleet, demand and costs is specified 
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q= K(FlPb)7 
This is identical with specif Ication (1) implicit in 
Tinbergen, however, , here there are some a priori 
constraints imposed on the parameters and Pb should be 
reinterpreted as an index of both fuel and other costs 
and where, in addition, a time trend effect has been 
allowe& The parameter 7 is estimated from the data and 
it is found to be equal to a value of about 0.15, 
suggesting that supply does indeed become very inelastic 
as lay-up falls. 
2.3 Norship, An integrated model of the tanker and bulk 
carrier market 
The Center for Applied Research of the Norwegian 
School of Economics and Business Administration has 
published a considerable volume of theoretical and 
empirical work on the shipping markets. These and other 
studies applied to post World War II data, have confirmed 
the results of Tinbergen and Koopmans regarding , the 
elasticity of supply of freight services. In contrast to 
the supply s Ide of the freight market where a 
considerable amount of empirical work has been 
undertaken, there have as yet been very few attempts at 
modelling the demand side of the market. This reflects 
the practical difficulties involved In such a study. To 
quote Koopmans (1939), "... a quantitative analysis of the 
demand factors of the tanker freight market is a task 
which far surpasses the limits Imposed by practical 
considerations. 
... 
It would imply an analysis of the 
conditions of supply and demand of oils in a large number 
of countries, and of the strategy of the world oil 
markets. " Similar problems appear when the dry cargo 
demand for freight is modelled. 
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The demand for bulk services 
- 
Eriksen (1977) 
One of the few studies of the possible influence of 
freight rates on demand is that of Eriksen (1977). He 
considers the pattern of seaborne trade for various 
individual dry bulk goods in terms of the seaborne trade 
th 
matrix. The Ij element of this matrix shows the 
quantity of goods transported by sea, from export area I 
to Import area J. By multiplying the quantities 
transported in various routes by the distances involved 
the actual ton-mile demand can be derived. The actual 
average distance is then given by dividing the total 
ton-mile figure by the total volume of seaborne exports. 
Eriksen computed the theoretical ton-mile demand that 
would arise if the historical pattern of seaborne trade 
in each year had been such as to minimize total 
transportation costs subject to the constraint that total 
exports from, and Import requiremets into, each area 
being equal to their historical values. He then computes 
an index of efficiency of transportation defined as the 
ratio of the computed theoretical "cost transportation 
minimizing ton-miles" to actual ton-miles. This is done 
for various years. He then finds that the efficiency of 
transportation moves in line with the level of freight 
rates. This reflects the fact that when freight rates are 
high more trade is undertaken in the short haul routes 
rather than in the long haul routes in order to economise 
on freight costs. These results suggest that the demand 
for freight services varies Inversely with freight rates. 
Norbulk 
Another study of the aggregate demand for freight is 
that of Wergeland (1981). The author estimated an 
aggregate model of the world dry bulk freight market 
(NORBULK). The model consists of aa supply function of 
freight which is identical to (1) as well as a demand for 
ton-miles f unction which, following the results of 
Eriksen (1977), is hypothesized to be positively related 
to the level of world trade T and negatively to freight 
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rates as in (10). 
T sjý-c 
Both 
-3 and c are expected to be positive with 3 being 
possibly equal to one. Data for the period 1965 
- 
1974 
have been used for estimating the unknown parameters. 
Equations (1), (10) are estimated by 2SLS and FIML in 
log-linear form giving the following results under FIML 
q-1.379T - 0.077F 
(0.036) (0.02) 
s qm0.486K + 0.266F 
- 
0.120Pb (12) 
. 
(0.034) (0.062) (0.060) 1 
and these are very similar to the results derived by two 
stage least squares. The fIgur; s in the' parantheses are 
the standard errors of the estimated coefficients. It can 
be seen that most of these are well determined with the 
sign and magnitude of the coefficients conforming to a 
priori expectations and the results derived by other 
empirical studies. The demand for freight Is estimated to 
be very inelastic with respect to freight rates. The 
price elasticity of demand is calculated to be 
-0.077. 
Supply of freight services Is also calculated to be 
fairly inelastic with respect to freight and fuel prices. 
These calculated coefficients do not seem to differ 
signif icantly from those estimated by Tinbergen or 
Koopmans and others. The only unusual result Is the 
coefficient on the fleet size in the supply function 
which is significantly lower than Its theoretical value 
of 1. 
In order to simulate the model, Wergeland constrains 
the coefficient on the fleet to equal its theoretical 
value of 1 while the elasticity of demand with respect to 
freight rates is set equal to -0.4 and after some other 
minor changes to the other estimated coefficients the 
model is used In order to carry out ex post forecasts of 
freight rates over the period 1974 - 1978. For these 
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purposes the form of the supply function is appropriately 
adjusted to take account of the option of lay-up. Uhen 
rates are above the level at which ships will enter Into 
lay-up supply is given by (1) while at the lay-up rate 
supply becomes completely horizontal and Is no longer 
determinýd by (1). The simulations results track the 
actual developments with a high degree of accuracy. 
- 
The low coefficient on the f leet size is very 
puzzling since the a priori belief that the elasticity of 
supply with respect to the fleet Is 
,1 is very strong. 
Most studies including our own, 
, 
do indeed constrain this 
elasticity to be equal to 1 so these disturbing results 
might cast some doubt on whether this is appropriate. It 
might suggest for example that there is some important 
omitted variable affecting the supply and which is 
correlated with the 
- 
variables usually included in the 
regressions causing a bias in the results. We have 
reproduced the results of Wergeland and it turns out that 
the demand data Is not compatible with that used for the 
fleet. The data for demand used in the study refers, to 
total shipments of goods 
-in dry bulk form while the data 
for the fleet refers to the bulk carrier fleet. However 
the demand data includes shipments in bulk which have not 
been transported by, bulk carriers but by other dry cargo 
tramp ships. The supply equation is meant to represent 
the freight services offered by,. the bulk carrier. f leet. 
This is not equal to the demand Index used since the 
latter includes a sign if Icant amount of bulk goods 
transported by other dry cargo tramp ships. The market 
share of 
_ 
the other dry cargo 
, 
ships in total 
-bulk 
shipments, was falling very rapidly over the estimation 
period. This is a period of considerable structural 
change as the bulk carrier fleet expanded rapidly from a 
very low market share in. mid sixties, and eventually 
dominated the market by the mid seventies. The rapid 
growth of the bulk carrier fleet Is not reflected in the 
data for bulk shipments used since other dry cargo ships 
were rapidly leaving this market over the period. This 
results in a downward bias on the coefficient of the 
95 
fleet. The results therefore do not cast doubt on the a 
priori expectation regarding the effect of the fleet on 
supply nor does it suggest the presence of omitted 
variables in the supply function. 
Nortank 
Norman and Wergeland (1981) developed a theoretical 
model of the freight market for large tankers (NORTANK). 
Large in this case refers to tankers over 200,000 DWT. 
The model Is quite disaggregated distinguishing between 4 
different large types of tankers. Unlike most other 
models of the shipping markets NORTANK is not estimated 
econometricaly but uses micro data on the technology of 
the four ship types in order to derive the theoretical 
supply of ton-miles generated by each ship type. Then the 
total supply in the market for large tankers can be found 
by simply adding 'up the supply generated by the 
individual types. 
The theoretical determination of optimum speed Is 
considered in a context which takes account of various 
real world features which are usually ignored in 
aggregated models. A representative round trip is 
considered which Involves carrying oil over a particular 
distance. A production function which relates ton-miles 
(which is an index of fixed distance voyages performed) 
and fuel consumption to the speed of ships is Implicitly 
spec if ied. The specif Ication takes into account the 
waiting time in port, the capacity utilization of ships' 
space and other complications. Revenues are proportional 
to voyages performed which in turn mirror the speed of 
the f leet. Fuel (variable) costs depend on speed. The 
technological relationship between , speed and fuel 
consumption is derived from micro data. Prof Its are then 
maximized with respect to speed and this implies that the 
optimum speed Is a function of freight rates, fuel prices 
and other operating costs. Thus the mathematical 
relationship between speed and prices embedded In the 
freight market model Is derived theoretically from a 
priori knowledge of the production function rather than 
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econometrically from aggregate ton-mile and price data. 
This relationship is derived separately for each ship 
type and then the total market supply is defined as the 
sum of the individual ship type supplies. The prof it 
maximization problem can lead to corner solutions. This 
is because the speed of the ship Is physically 
constrained to lie between a minimum value of around 9 
miles per hour and a maximum of around 15 miles per hour. 
This is then reflected in the shape of the individual 
ship type supply functions. There Is a minimum rate below 
which all ships belonging to a particular type will move 
into lay-up and thus supply will be equal to zero. At 
that minimum rate the shipowner is indifferent between 
lay-up and operating the ship. Thus supply Is perfectly 
elastic at that point. A small increase in rates will 
lead to all ships breaking lay-up which is now the more 
costly option. There is a range above the lay-up rate 
where ships will run at the minimum speed and thus supply 
Is completely inelastic in that region. Above this range, 
supply becomes elastic as Increases in rates cause the 
ships to run faster. This is until rates increase to a 
level which induces the ship to run at full speed. Thus 
above this rate supply again becomes completely inelastic 
as speed cannot be further increased. Thus there are 
three kinks in the supply curve generated by an 
individual ship type. 
The demand for freight services of large tankers Is 
assumed to be completely inelastic with respect to rates. 
This reflects both the fact that demand for oil is 
inelastic at least in the short run and also the fact 
that in recent times freight costs have constituted a 
small percentage in the final price of oil. The 
equilibrium freight rate for large tankers can be 
determined by setting the total market supply equal to 
the exogenously specified level of demand for large 
tankers' freight services. 
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Price determination in the time charter and second hand 
markets - Strandenes, (1984) 
Strandenes (1984) reports the results of an 
investigation into the determinants of time charter rates 
and second hand prices. A time charter hire contract 
stipulates that for a given period of time T, control of 
the ship Is passed over from the shipowner to the 
charterer. In return, the charterer must pay a rent which 
is a negotiated fixed amount of money per period known as 
the time charter rate HT. The time charter rate will 
normally vary with the duration of the contract T. The 
contract also stipulates that fixed operating costs such 
as wages are paid by owners while the variable costs 
(fuel and port charges, canal dues etc. ) are paid by the 
charterer. According to the efficient markets theory the 
present value of a time charter contract should be equal 
to the expected present'value of the spot market profits 
(before fixed operating costs) over the duration of the 
contract, after allowing for risk. In shipping 
terminology, the flow concept of profits before operating 
costs ; 'is, for' obvious reasons, called the time charter 
2 
equivalent (TCE) 
We can distinguish between various time charter 
contracts and associated time charter rates depending on 
the duration of the contract. For short term time charter 
contracts it Is mainly the short term TCE earned on the 
spot market that should theoretically determine the 
associated time charter rate. For long term time charters 
however the expected longer term TCE of the spot market 
should be more relevant for determining the corresponding 
time charter rate. 
One of the objectives of the study is to determine 
the actual importance of short term and longer term 
2 
In other words the accounting relationship between 
profits 7r, time charter equivalent and operating costs 
OC Is the following: 
M OC 
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expected TCE on the level of various (short or long term) 
time charter rates. To do this the following relationship 
is specif ied 
= p(T)[a ;+b it L 
TtTt 
where 
(13) 
t 
time charter rate on aT year contract arranged 
at time t 
xt= current (short term) time charter equivalent 
-L 
irt a expected long term time charter equivalent 
and where p(T) is meant to represent a risk premium 
factor that might vary with the duration of the contract. 
If p(T) n1 and at+ bt =I then there is risk neutrality 
while if p(T) <1 this would Imply that owners are 
prepared to accept lower profits on a safe time charter 
than from the expected profits to be earned on the more 
risky spot operations. Since the riskiness of the 
alternative spot strategy increases with the length of 
time T, it might be expected that p(-0 is also a 
decreas ing function of T. The author constructs 
measurements of the short term and long term expected TCE 
of the spot market and uses these to estimate the 
parameters of (13) by OLS. The model is estimated 
separately 
. 
for bulk carriers, medium size tankers and 
large tankers. Data covers the period from the late 1960s 
up to early 1980s. The results for medium size tankers 
reported by the author are reprinted on table 2.1. These 
are representative of the results derived for the other 
sectors as well. In row 1 the effect of the short term 
TCE on charters of various duration is shown. It can be 
seen that a $1 increase In short term TCE leads to a 60 
cents increase in the short term time charter while the 
long term charter rate increases by only 26 cents. Row 2 
shows the effect on the time charter rate of an increase 
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Table 2.1 
Medium Size Tankers 
Sensitivity of time charter rates to changes in 
short term and long term expected TCE 
Charter Duration (T) 
0- 12 13 
- 
36 over 36 
months months months 
Estimated effect 
on F' of: 
$1 Increase In 
,ýI., I 
short term TCE 600,1 470 26t 
$1 increase in 
long term TCE 440 510 700 
$1 increase in 
both the short 
and Iong term 
TCE 1040 980 961: 
Source: Strandenes S. P. (1984), page 24 
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in the long term TCE. It indicates that a $1 Increase in 
the long term TCE leads to a 70 cents increase In the 
long term time' charter while the short term time charter 
increases by only 44 cents. By comparing the figures in 
row 1 and row 2 for different charter lengths It can be 
seen that short term time charters are more sensitive to 
expected short term TCE than to the long run TCE while 
the opposite is true for long term ones, as we expected. 
Row 3 is the sum of the two other rows and It 
therefore represents the total effect on the time charter 
rates of a permanent increase in both the short term and 
long term TCE. If there is risk neutrality the 
theoretical entries' in this row should be equal to $1. 
Because of the small size of the sample the estimated 
effect is subject to some margin of random error but 
perusal of the similar' results reported by the author for 
the other sectors in addition to the ones-reprinted here 
indicates that the risk premium Is probably small while 
its magnitude Increases with the , length of' the charter. 
The small size 'of the risk" premium is indicated In Table 
2.1 by the fact that the entries in row 3 are close to 1. 
The conclusion that the S Ize of the risk premium 
increases with the length of the charter rests on the 
fact that the size of the entries in row 3 decrease as 
the duration of the contract increases. This Is true not 
only for the medium'size tanker sector figures, reported 
in table 2.1 but also 'for the other tables 'reported by 
the author concerning the other sectors. 
In the same article Strandenes investigates the 
sensitivity of ship prices to short term and long term 
expected prof Itability. The following relationship 
between ship prices P' short term prof Its it 2 and long tt 
term profits nL are spec If led: t 
Pt = k((a/(r+d))n: + (bl(r+d) )XL) (14) t 
and where d is the depreciation 'factor, r Is the 'return 
on capital while k Is a nuisance accounting ' constant 
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whose value Is known a priori. We might expect that the 
sum of the coefficients a, b should equal 1. Equation 
(14) can be written as 
pt = k(U? r a+ VWL tt 
where 
u= al(r+d) 
v= bl(r+d) IýII 
Because the economic lifetime of ships is very long we 
expect that the effect of short term profits on prices to 
be small while the effect of long term profitability 
should be much larger. In terms of equation (15) this 
implies that u should be small relative to v. The 
coefficients u, v of (15) are estimated econometrically 
using data for the period covering the late 1960s up to 
the early 1980s. Separate estimates are 
-reported for the 
bulk carrier, medium size and large tanker sectors. These 
results are reprinted In Table 2.2. It can be seen from 
the table"Ahat the estimated coefficient on long term 
profits is in general much higher than the coefficient on 
short term profitability. This indicates that the effect 
of long term profitability on prices Is much higher than 
the effect of short term profits. Only the prices of 
large tankers seem to be more sensitive to short term 
profitability than to the level of long term profits. The 
hypothesis that 'the response of prices to profits is 
dynamic was tested by introducing lagged values of the 
variables in the regression. For the bulk carrier and 
medium size tanker sector the static equation (15) could 
not be improved upon by an extended dynamic version. In 
the case of large tankers however it was found that the 
inclusion of lagged short term prof its led to a 
sign if icant improvement in f It. The t- statistics 
reported In the last row of the table are relevant for 
testing the hypothesis that a+b-1. The tests support 
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Table 2.2 3 
Sensitivity of ship prices 
to short term and long term profits 
Dependent, variable: Second hand prices of 
Panamax Bulk Medium Size Large 
Carriers Tankers Tankers 
Estimated 
effect of: 
no ýý 22.99 , 17.14 34.31 t 
(4.67) (3.56) 
25.25 
(3.54) 
xL 77.27 57.48 30.26 t (6.20) (15.83) (5.84) 
Test of restricting 
(a +b= 1) 
t- value 1.98 -1.06 
--0.52 
Source: Strandenes S. P. (1984), page 40 
Standard errors In parentheses. 
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the hypothesis on the sum of the coefficients a. b in the 
case of the medium size and large tankers. In the case of 
the bulk carrier market, however, the hypothesis was 
marginally rejected. 
Norship II 
The freight market models, Norbulk, Nortank and the 
results of Strandenes (1984) together with other research 
on the shipbuilding and scrapping , markets have been 
integrated by' the authors into a model of the bulk 
shipping markets. The structure of this integrated model 
(Norship) Is explained in Strandenes (1986). The model 
consists of a freight, second hand, shipbuilding and 
scrapping market. It distinguishes between two main 
sectors which are the tanker and bulk carrier sector. The 
tanker and bulk ýcarrier fleet are further divided into 
large and small vessels 
Supply in the freight market is modelled along 
similar lines as in Norbulk and Nortank. Here, the 
behaviour of combined carriers 
4 Is taken into account. 
The combi fleet is assumed to move from the tanker 
freight market to the dry bulk freight market so as to 
maximize profits from trading. Thus the proportion of 
combis in, the one market is likely to depend on the 
relative 'profitability of the two markets. In addition 
the bulk carrier and tanker fleet have been disaggregated 
into small 'and 'large vessels. Thus a separate supply of 
ton-miles 
, 
function has been, specified for each vessel 
type. Total supply in the bulk carrier market Is then the 
sum of the supplies generated by the small, the larger 
bulk carriers and the combis in dry. This must equal the 
demand for dry bulk transportation services. Similarly, 
supply' In the tanker market Is the sum of the supplies 
from the tanker frelghl 
vlce versa. 
These are versatile dual purpose vessels that can switch 
market to the dry bulk market and 
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generated by the small, large ships and the combis in 
oil. This must also equal the total demand for tanker 
transportation services. 
For each type of vessel the time charter rate for a 
contract of duration of T years is assumed to be a 
weighted average of the short term and long term time 
charter equivalent. As in Strandenes (1984) the weights 
depend on the duration of the charter with relatively 
more weight given to short term expectations when T Is 
small while the oppos Ito is true for longer term 
charters. To determine the long term profitability wL and 
the associated time charter equivalen t ;L the following 
argument is used. At equilibrium and in perf ectly 
competitive markets the return on a newbuilding must 
equal the return on capital r. This implies the following 
relationship between long term TCE (; L), long term 
operating 'costs OC and newbuilding prices Pn 
Ph OC) (16) 
r+d 
and this allows ;L to be determined in terms of Pn, - r, d 
and OC. II 
Second hand prices are determined, in a similar way as 
in Strandenes (1984). Thus second hand values are assumed 
to be a weighted average -of short term profits, no and 
long term prof Its wL as in (15). 
. 
The accounting Identity 
that defines the time , charter equivalent determines the 
relationship between ;L and RL (see footnote 2). 
In the scrapping market the supply of ships for scrap 
SI generated by the I 
th 
ship type Is assumed 
-to be a 
function of the ratio of ship values to scrap prices Ps 
as follows 
Sk1 (Ps/P k2 (17) 
In the shipbuilding market demand and supply 
functions for new ships of each type are specified. 
Demand for new ships Is assumed to be negatively related 
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to the price of newbuildings Pn and positively related to 
the discounted stream of profits V anticipated over the 
5 lifetime of the ship using the pro f Itability of a 
perpetual time charter as the relevant expected net 
income of the ship 
1 
Jc ý (HO - OC) ý, (18) 
+d 
where k is a time dependent constant. that controls for 
the effect of the time of delivery lag on the value of 
the newbuilding contract. Demand for new ships of type i 
DN is then assumed to be given by the following 
relationship 
DN, 
- 
k, (V, lPn, ) 
where k' is the, elasticity of demand of new vessels. 
The marginal cost of building an extra ship Is 
assumed to be positively related to the amount of total 
construction of all types of ships relative to, the 
available maximum capacity. At equilibrium the marginal 
cost (net of subsidy) equals , the newbuilding price. The 
time of delivery lag, which affects the value of 
- 
the 
newbuilding contract is positively related to the amount 
of ships on order relative to the available capacity. The 
newbuilding 'market clears by means of changes in the 
level' of newbuilding prices. Shipbuilding capacity Is 
treated as exogenous. 
In table 3 of Strandenes (1986) the author reports 
the simulated path of the endogenous , variables under a 
reference base run set of exogenous assumptions. Then the 
level of bunker prices is reduced by 36% from year 2 of 
the simulation onwards and a new forecast is generated 
under this new set of assumptions. These results- are 
Thin can be assumed 
, 
to be around 15 years or no. 
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reported in Table 4 of Strandenes (1986). Our Table 2.3 
reports the percentage differences in the time path of 
selected endogenous variables that arise as a result of 
such a bunker-price shock. It has been constructed by 
taking percentage differenes of the simulated time paths 
of the system, before and after the shock, as reported by 
Strandenes (1986) int the relevant tables. 
As can be seen from Table 2.3 a drop In the bunker 
price leads to significant drops in the level of tanker 
and dry bulk freight rates. This drop In freight rates Is 
permanent. Because tankers spend relatively less time in 
port and more time steaming than dry bulk carriers, the 
percentage of fuel costs out of the total Is higher. This 
also makes the supply of tanker freight services more 
sensitive to the price of bunkers than the supply of dry 
bulk transportation services. As a result supply of 
tanker ton-miles expands more than the supply of dry bulk 
ton-miles so that there is a tendency for tanker rates to 
fall much more than dry bulk rates. This tendency is 
however partly 
- 
cancelled by the f act that combined 
carriers will tend to switch from oil to dry should such 
a gap in relative rates occur. It can be seen from the 
table that combined carriers do indeed switch to the dry 
market following the drop in the bunker price. This makes 
the drop in the tanker freight smaller than would 
otherwise have been and that of the dry bulk carriers 
higher. 
The effect of the drop in the price of bunkers on 
profitability depends on the elasticity of demand. It can 
be seen that on the one hand costs decrease as a result 
of the drop in the bunker price but on the other hand 
freight rates also decrease and this has a negative 
effect on profitability which can completely outweigh the 
positive direct effect of the drop in the fuel costs. 
Whether the positive direct effects of the drop In costs 
outweigh the negative Indirect effects of the drop in 
rates crucially depends on the elasticity of demand. If 
demand is perfectly elastic with respect to freight rates 
the equilibrium freight rate remains unchanged following 
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Table 2.3 
Simulated effects of a 
36% Decrease in Bunker Prices 
(Percentage Changes) 6 
Year Tanker Dry Bulk Tanker Dry Bulk Combined 
Freight Freight Fleet Fleet Carriers 
Rates 'Rates in Oil 
1 0.0 0.0 0.00 0.00 0 
2 
-20.9 -19.2 0.00 0.00 -13 
3 
-20.3 -15.7 -0.19 -0.05 0 
4 
-19.3 -16.7 -0.16 0.00 -5 
5 
-22.5 -17.1 -0.42 0. '25 -25 
6 
-22.6 -14.6 -0.74 -0.29 -22 
7 
-21.3 -14.3 -1.08 -0.37 -19 
Large Tankers Small Dry Bulk Carriers 
Year Time Charter Second Time Charter Second 
Equivalent Hand Equivalent Hand 
Price Price 
1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
2 0.0 
-4.5 -11.9 -6.4 
3 0.0 1.7 
-5.2 -0.8 
4 
-5.3 -6.3 -7.8 -5.2 
5 
-15.8 -9.7 -9.2 -3.8 
6 
-16.3 -10.4 -6.8 -3.2 
7 
-12.6 -9.1 -7.2 -4.5 
Source: Strandenes S. P. (1986), calculated from Tables 
3,4 in pages 31,33 
6 Combined carriers In oil: changes In percentage rate 
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the drop in the fuel price and the consequent shift' In 
supply. This then implies that shipowners collect all the 
benefits (costs) of a decrease (increase) in fuel prices. 
ýhen, however, demand Is very Inelastic, as is the-case 
here. the change in the fuel price leads to significant 
changes in the equilibrium freight rates as Ahe supply 
shif ts. In this case shippers bear all the costs 
(benefits) of an ' Increase (decrease) in the price of 
bunkers. Freight rates drop significantly following the 
drop in the fuel price, and this leads -to a decrease in 
the prof itability of spot market operations. This is 
shown in Table 2.3 by the fact that the time charter 
equivalent drops. 
The drop In profitability tends to be corrected In 
the longer term as lower profits imply lower prices which 
cause the fleet to' respond. The drop in the second hand 
value of ships leads to an increase in the supply of 
ships for scrap and the drop in profitability leads to a 
decrease in the demand for new ships. This causes the 
f leet to contract' in the long run and' this helps to 
improve the profitability of the spot norket. 
2.4 Hawdon's integrated model of the tanker market 
Hawdon (1978) develops a model that determines tanker 
freight rates in the short run and -in the long run. In 
the short run the fleet Is fixed and freight rates'can be 
determined by simply, considering the freight market. In 
the long run however the fleet changes with market 
conditions and thus the markets for ships must be 
considered explicitly. Hawdon's model consists therefore 
of a freight market, a shipbuilding market and a scrap 
market. The model is estimated using data for the period 
1950 
- 
1973. A reduced form equation for -freight rates 
which in - spirit is similar to equation (3) is specified. 
This Is estimated by regressing tanker rates on the right 
hand side variables 'of (3) I. e demand' per- unit of 
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capacity, f uel prices and in addition some other 
exogenous and endogenous variables have been included. 
This list of other variables includes the level of dry 
cargo freight rates the price of new tankers, wages of 
seamen, the average size of ships and various dummies. 
There is no theoretical suggestion that the price of 
tankers can influence the supply of freight services in 
the short run given the fleet, and thus not surprisingly 
Hawdon f inds that this variable is not statistically 
significant for explaining the f luctuations in tankers 
rates. 
Labour is an input in the production of 
transportation services and thus we theoretically expect 
that they should have a negative impact on the supply of 
freight services and a positive effect on rates. The 
inclusion of the average size as an additional 
explanatory variable possibly reflects the idea that 
large tankers are considered to be more efficient than 
small ones. 
Perhaps suprisingly Hawdon finds that the wages of 
seamen and the average size of tankers is also not 
statistically significant for explaining rates. The idea 
behind the inclusion of the dry cargo freight rate as an 
explanatory variable in the reduced form for tanker rates 
is that over the estimation period a part of the tanker 
fleet was engaged in the dry cargo routes. These have 
been the tankers in grain and the combined carriers in 
dry. Wen the dry cargo freight rates increase we expect 
that a higher number of tankers is likely to be employed 
in the dry cargo trades leading to a reduction of supply 
in the tanker freight market and an increase in rates. In 
practise the possibility of tankers switching between oil 
and grain is very limited while the combined carrier 
fleet, which is more versatile, constitutes only a small 
proportion of the total supply, especially over the 
estimation period. Thus not surprisingly Hawdon finds no 
statistically significant evidence of a dry cargo freight 
rate influence on tanker raýes. Similarly he also finds 
no evidence of a tanker freight rate influence on dry 
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cargo rates. However as in other studies the Influence of 
demand relative to the f leet and of fuel prices on rates 
turns out to be statistically significant. These results 
should be treated with caution because again here an 
incorrect index of transportation demand has been used. 
Demand has actually been measured in tons of oil 
transported by sea instead of in ton-miles. The former 
does not take into account changes in the average 
distance which over the estimation period had been 
increas ing. 
Hawdon's reduced f orm equation relates equilibrium 
short run tanker freight rates to the prevailing level of 
demand, f leet and fuel prices. At a point in time the 
size of the f leet is given. In order to explain the 
dynamic evolution of rates over a longer term period 
Hawdon explicitly considers shipbuilding and scrapping of 
tankers. In the shipbuilding markets "shipowners are 
assumed to order new capacity if the volume of oil trade 
increases, if the freight rate increases, or if the price 
of new ships falls". Thus Hawdon estimates a demand for 
new tankers by regressing orders on prices of new ships, 
freight rates and the volume of oil trade. The results 
indicate that demand for orders increases with the volumý 
of trade. However the estimated coefficient of prices 
turns out to be positive which is contrary to what was 
expected while the coef f ic ient on freight rates Is 
statistically ins Ign If icant. These results strongly 
suggest that Hawdon has actually estimated a supply 
schedule rather than demand. The estimated coefficient on 
prices ref lects the positive effect of new sh ip values on 
supply. At the same time the trending oil trade variable 
acts as a proxy f or the also trending shipbuilding 
capacity variable which would appear in a newbuilding 
supply function. This strong correlation between the two 
variables causes the oil trade variable to pick up the 
positive effect of capacity on supply. This view also 
explains the insignificance of the freight variable since 
this is not theoretically expected to appear in the 
newbuilding supply function. 
ill 
To complete the shipbuilding market Hawdon does not 
specify an explicit supply function", for new tankers, but 
substitutes the supply function into the demand f or 
orders and solves for the reduced-form newbuilding price 
which is expressed as a function of those variables that 
can shift either the demand for orders or the supply. The 
supply is hypothesized to depend negatively on the price 
of steel which- Is an input to the shipbuilding process. 
Thus newbuilding prices are regressed on freight rates 
and the price of steel among other variables. Freight 
rates and steel prices turn out to have a positive 
effect on prices as was expected. This part of the model 
determines equilibrium newbuilding prices and orders. 
Deliveries are then hypothesised to depend on lagged 
orders. Deliveries are therefore regressed on orders and 
the results indicate that orders have a positive effect 
on future deliveries. 
The important factor for determining scrapping Is 
assumed to be the expected future stream of profits of 
old ships. The latter is implicitly assumed to be 
projected on the basis of recent levels and trends In 
freight rates and the level of demand. The supply of 
ships for scrap Is also likely to be proportional to the 
size of the f leet. Thus scrapping is regressed on freight 
rates, the level of demand and the size of the f leet. All 
estimated coefficients turn out to have the correct sign. 
Thus according to the empirical estimates freight rates 
and demand have a negative impact on scrapping while the 
fleet has a positive effect on the supply of ships for 
scrap. Finally in order to close the model the change in 
the size of the fleet Is given by the difference between 
deliveries and scrapping. 
The estimated model is then simulated and its 
response to various shocks is considered. This Is done by 
solving the model for a given set of exogenous 
assumptions. Then an exogenous variable is changed by a 
fixed percentage amount and the new solution Is computed. 
The two solutions are then compared. The main simulation 
results are shown on Table 2.4. The model simulations 
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Table 2.4 
Impact and long run elasticities of endogenous variables 
Trade Bunker price 
Shock Shock 
Year 0606 
Endogenous 
Variable 
Freight rate 3.1 0.6 -0.6 1.7 1.9 1.9 
Orders 2.0 1.7 1.7 * -0.2 0.0 0.0 
Deliveries 0.0 1.3 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Scrapping 
-1.2 0.3 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Fleet 0.1 0.7 1.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 
Source: Hawdon D. (1978), page 215 
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imply that a 10% permanent Increase in trade leads to a 
31% increase in freight rates in the first year. This 
also increases the demand for orders and reduces 
scrapping thus the fleet expands in the following years 
bringing rates down. Thus after six years the Increase in 
freight rates is only 6% and in the long run It becomes 
negative. The fleet rises by 1% initially, 7% by year 6 
and in the long run by 12%. The effects of an Increase in 
fuel prices are also considered. A 10% permanent increase 
in the price' of fuel leads to a 17% 1 increase in freight 
rates initially and a 19% increase in the long run. The 
fleet is constant initially but rises in the long run by 
1% suggesting that an increase In bunker prices leads to 
permanent slow steaming. 
2.5 Charemza and Gronicki pisequilibrium model 
. 11 1 Charemza and Gronicki (1981) also cons ider an 
integrated model of the shipping markets which consists 
of a freight market a shipbuilding market and a scrap 
market. The model is applied to both the dry cargo and 
the tanker markets. The distinguishing f eature of the 
model is that 'it allows for the possibility of 
disequilibrium in the freight market and the markets for 
ships. Thus demand in' a market does not necessarily equal 
supply In every time period and prices are not perfectly 
responsive to changes in either supply or demand. Since 
in such models prices do not move to clear the markets, 
the equilibrium price cannot be determined by assuming 
equality of supply and demand. Therefore a different rule 
must be specified that describes the sluggish adjustment 
of prices to excess demand or supply. The usual 
assumption of disequilibrium models, which the authors 
also make, Is that the change In price is directly 
proportional to the level of excess demand. The other 
assumption that is made In disequilibrium models is that 
the actual quantity exchanged in the market Is not equal 
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to supply and demand but to the minimum of the two. 
Agents on the long side of the market are rationed. 
The model consists of a freight market section and a 
shipbuilding and scrapping block. The determination of 
time charter rates on long term contracts Is also 
considered. In the freight market demand is determined 
exogenously by world trade and is completely insensitive 
to freight rates. Supply of freight services depends on 
the size of the f leet and freight rates. Supply In the 
current period is not necessarily equal to demand since 
the response of rates to excess demand is sluggish. The 
actual change in the freight rate is assumed to be 
proportional to this level of excess demand. The long 
term time charter Is hypothesized to respond with lags to 
the level of spot rates and to the level of demand in 
relation to the fleet. 
The freight market model is estimated using data for 
the period f rom 1961 up to the early 1980s. The 
estimation procedures must take account of the fact that 
'the actual quantities exchanged and observed are not In 
general equal to supply and demand but to the minimum of 
the two. In some disequilibrium models, and also in this 
one, the price adjustment rule enables the econometrician 
to infer what the excess demand Is and allows him to 
estimate the unknown parameters of the demand and supply 
equation. Because the model is formulated in linear 
rather than log-linear the estimated coefficients cannot 
be interpreted as elasticities. The t-statistics reported 
however do indicate that the freight market supply in the 
tanker and dry cargo market is indeed influenced by 
changes in the size of the fleet and freight rates. The 
long term time charter is, according to the results, 
positively affected by 
, 
freight rates and the level of 
demand in relation to the fleet. 
The theoretical structure of the shipbuilding and 
scrapping blocks is not explicitly presented in the text 
so discussion of this part of the model must rest on the 
reported estimated equations., This prevents us from 
comparing the actual results with an explicitly specified 
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theoretical structure. In the shipbuilding block the 
demand for tonnage is estimated to depend negatively on 
the level of prices and positively on the level of demand 
for freight. This is a demand for existing tonnage and 
not for new ships and thus It might be interpreted as an 
asset demand for ships although the authors do not 
suggest such an Interpretation. A separate demand for 
new orders is also estimated to be positively related to 
the level of demand and the long term time charter and 
negatively related to the size of the fleet. On the 
supply side of the newbuilding market the model 
distinguishes between new orders for ships, ships 
commenced, ' launches' and deliveries. ihips commenced 
represent the amount of newbuilding tonnage on which 
construction was initiated during the period. Launches 
can differ from deliveries because in many cases a ship 
is launched as soon as the main body is ready and while 
there is still work to be done on it before it Is 
delivered. Supply of new orders is assumed to depend 
positively on the price of ships and to a proxy of 
shipbuilding capacity. The market for new orders Is not 
assumed a priori to clear Instantaneously and the price 
of ships Is assumed to respond sluggishly to the excess 
demand or supply in that market. By partly solving the 
model it can be seen that deliveries eventually are 
indirectly determined by a distributed lag formulation on 
past orders. The detailed specification of the model 
assumes that deliveries are a function of current and 
lagged launches. These in turn are a function of current 
and lagged commencements of new ships. The latter are 
finally specified to be determined by current and lagged 
new orders. 
The scrapping of tonnage Is estimated to be 
positively related to the size of the fleet and 
negatively to the level of the long term time charter. 
Finally the change of the fleet Is simply the difference 
between deliveries and scrappings. 
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2.6 Dynamo, an Integrated model of the tanker market 
Rander (1984) summarizes the main structure of a 
version of the Dynamo tanker model., This model consists 
of 
.a 
tanker freight market, a shipbuilding and scrapping 
market. One of the distinguishing features of the freight 
market sector of the model is that the fleet Is 
disaggregated into tankers that operate in the spot 
market and tankers that operate under a time charter 
contract. The specified supply of ton-miles generated by 
a unit of capacity differs depending on whether the 
vessel under consideration is time charter free or not. 
According to the model the response of spot vessel supply 
to freight market conditions is immediate while, 
according to the authors, time chartered vessels 
. 
are 
locked into contracts which possibly do not replicate the 
incentives for profit maximization and the consequent 
spot market behaviour that this generates. ýhen the ship 
is on time charter there is no incentive for the owner to 
maximize profits by trading the ship efficiently since 
this does not affect his earnings which are determined by 
the the prearranged time charter rate and fixed operating 
costs. Thus the response of the supply generated by the 
time chartered fleet might be more sluggish than the 
response of the spot vessels. 
In contrast to this approach adopted by, Dynamo, most 
other models do not distinguish between time charter free 
and spot vessels. This Is because the time charter market 
resembles a futures market which, as is well known, Itends; 
to be peripheral to the spot market. A time charter 
contract will reduce both the spot demand and spot supply 
by exactly the same amount leaving the equilibrium spot 
rate unaffected. Thus, although the futures markets 
' 
are 
affected by expected developments in the spot markets 
they do not in turn affect the spot market itself. This 
is indeed the prevalent view among participants in the 
freight market. Because the charterer pays for the 
voyage (variable) costs and controls the utilization 
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(fuel consumption and time in port) of the vessel. the 
incentive of efficient trading is infact maintained. 
According to these arguments the vessels' utilization 
will be the same whether the ship is on the spot market 
or whether , it is time chartered by either a shipper or a 
speculator. The fact that operating costs such as wages 
have to be paid by the owner even, when the vessel Is 
under time charter, does not affect the outcome of the 
decision. Although there would no, longer be an incentive 
to employ the optimal amount of labour' and those other 
factors that are associated with 'operating costs this 
does not make any difference simply because these are 
fixed factors. It Is thus 'seen that a time charter is a 
fully efficient contract in many ways. On the one hand it 
stipulates that 'operating fixed costs and factors are' for 
owners' account. Because these are fixed, the decision of 
profit maximization with respect' to fixed factors Is 
simply that of finding' the cheapest 'available on the 
market. For this the owner -is 'likely to have an advantage 
since this Is part of his ordinary business and he thus 
probably has ,a better knowledge of 'the various 
alternatives available, and lower contracting costs. On 
the other hand because variable costs are for charterers' 
account, the incentive 'of profit maximization In a free 
spot market -' which usually contributes to ' efficient 
allocation of resources- Is fully replicated. 
There is another argument which is used to suggest 
that spot and time - chartered vessels might generate a 
different quantity of supply , at a given point In time.. 
This is that tankers are mainly time chartered by big- oil 
companies so the hired vessels then become part of their 
efficient -integrated system of transportation. Thus 
tankers on time charter might spend less time In port 
waiting for a cargo to load than spot vessels and might 
perform shorter ballast trips. Even if this Is true It 
does not however Imply that the response of the time 
chartered fleet to market conditions Is not Immediate. 
In the freight market block as well as In other parts 
of the model, ' behaviour of economic agents is assumed to 
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be influenced by the projected freight rate rather than 
the current spot rate. This represents the expectation of 
a future freight rate. A whole range of projected freight 
rates is defined by changing- the projection horizon. In 
some - relationships it is 
- 
the short term projected rate 
that enters and In some others a longer term one. This 
expected freight rate is roughly speaking modelled as a 
projection of long term 
- 
trends through the latest 12 
month average rate. The long term trend is estimated by 
f itting a line through two points. 'The f irst point is the 
latest annual average and the second point Is another 
average over a longer term historical period. 
The freight market is assumed to clear 
instantaneously so freight rates are-, determined by the 
condition that demand must equal supply. A large part of 
the freight market model Is concerned with analyzing the 
determinants of the short term and longer term 
fluctuations in demand for tanker freight. Since we are 
here only interested on the impact of 'a given, time path 
of demand on the shipping markets and not on the prior 
causes of such 
- 
shifts in transportation requirements. we 
here only concentrate on commenting on the modelling of 
supply. This does not imply that the analysis of demand 
shifts, like the one embodied in Dynamo, is not 
interesting in itself. , In passing we note that Dynamo 
like other models treats demand as completely inelastic 
with respect to freight rates. 
-ý- In the freight market supply is Identically equal to 
the size of the tanker f leet minus the laid up ships 
times the vessel, utilization rate as in equation (20). 
The utilization rate Is the number of transportation 
services generated by a trading ship. It is actually 
defined by equation (20). 
K(1-; k)u 
where 
A fraction of ships laid up 
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(20) 
u u'utilization rate 
Both 
-A and u are positively related to freight rates. The 
utilization rate 1. e the number of transportation 
services produced per trading ship can change by- either 
Increasing the speed of the ship or by reducing the time 
in port or the number of days under repairs. The fraction 
of ships in lay up should be obviously related to the 
profitability of the spot market relative to the costs In 
lay up. - 'Wen rates increase and profitability Is high, 
only a very small proportion of ships Is expected to be 
laid- up. On' the other hand when rates are low and 
profitability of the spot market becomes negative, then 
losses might be minimized by laying up. More ships are 
then expected to be laid, up. Since however there are 
costs of moving in and out of lay up the relationship 
between lay up and freight rates should, be dynamic with 
expected- freight., rates also inf luencing the current 
decision. 'Thus current lay up Is specified to depend on 
the projected freight rate and lagged lay up. 
The utilization rate u is Identically equal - to a 
weighted average of the spot and time chartered fleet 
utilization rates with the weights - being proportional to 
the percentage of 
- 
ships operating In the spot market and 
under time charter contracts. As in - other freight market 
models the utilization of spot vessels Is assumed to 
depend on current 'freight rates ý relative to voyage, costs. 
The response of the time chartered fleet utilization rate 
to market conditions Is assumed to be more sluggish. The 
change in the utilization rate of the time chartered 
fleet is assumed to depend on the projected freight rate. 
The model also consists of a shipbuilding and 
scrapping block. For the purposes of determining 
scrapping the fleet Is disaggregated into new (less than 
10 years old) and old (over 10 years old) ships. No ships 
under 10 years old are aýsumed to be scrapped and this 
allows the evolution of this age profile of the fleet to 
be determined from knowledge of the history of deliveries 
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I 
and scrappings. The annual change in the size of the old 
fleet is equal to the amount of deliveries of new ships 
10 years ago minus the current scrappings. The proportion 
of the old f leet scrapped Is assumed to be a function of 
the projected freight rate. 
The shipbuilding block is more complicated. 
Deliveries of new tankers are assumed to depend on the 
amount of tanker construction initiation T years ago, 
where T is the time It takes to construct a tanker. 
Construction initiation is assumed to be proportional to 
the tanker construction capacity and the fraction of 
tanker capacity in use. The latter is a function of the 
order backlog relative to the tanker construction 
capacity where here by order backlog we shall mean the 
amount of tankers on order but as yet not under 
construction. The change in the order backlog Is 
identically equal to the amount of contracting of new 
vessels minus cancellations minus construction 
initiation. Cancellations are a function of the projected 
freight rate and the future tonnage needed relative to 
the tonnage on the order backlog. Contracting of new 
vessels is assumed to depend positively on the amount of 
new tonnage needed and to the projected freight rate and 
perceived scrapping. Perceived scrapping is determined by 
a lag distribution on actual scrapping. New tonnage 
needed is positively related to the projected level of 
demand relative to the perceived supply at normal 
7 designed utilization It is also negatively related to 
the order backlog. The projected level of demand is 
7 
The author specifies the now tonnage needed function in 
term of the projected loading capacity ' relative to the 
perceived loading capacity. The former Is proportional to 
the level of demand with the factor or proportionality 
being the average length of the voyage while the latter 
Is proportional to the supply with the constant of 
proportionality being the normal utilization at the 
designed speed and time In port. 
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determined In exactly the same way as the projected 
freight rate. The perceived supply at normal utilization 
is determined 'by a lagged distribution on actual normal 
supply. 
2.7 Martinet, a disaggregated model of the tanker freight 
market 
Martinet is " to our knowledge Ahe most 'disaggregated 
model of the tanker freight market. It is Indeed not a 
model of just the tanker freight market but of the 
international oil transportation network. it 
distinguishes between 10 tanker sizes which are further 
disaggregated by flag '-of ' registration and for each type 
of tanker it determines the equilibrium freight rate. 
Since the markets for ships ' are not modelled, 
Martinet can only be used for short term forecasting with 
the size of the fleet of various tanker types being input 
exogenously. ' The set of exogenous variables of the model 
In addition includes the level of consumption of 26 
importing regions and the level of production of 31 
producing regions. It also incorporates a detailed 
description of the world oil transportation network. Thus 
the 'length of 460 tanker routes is specified as well as 
the existing pipeline capacities, transhipment 
facilities, canal and terminal restrictions as well as 
canal and terminal tolls. 
The model determines the equilibrium fob and cif 
crude oil prices and the equilibrium freight rates for 
tankers of various sizes. The equilibrium oil flows among 
the various regions as well as the types and amount of 
tankers employed in each route are also calculated. It 
does this by assuming that in equilibrium there should be 
no possibility for an oil trader to make an arbitrage 
profit by simply buying oil from one region and selling 
to another. It also assumes that at equilibrium the 
employment pattern of the tanker fleet should 'be such 
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that no ship could increase its prof Its by trading on 
another route. 
The, optimal speed and employment pattern of ships- is 
determined subject to various constraints. Thus large 
tankers are excluded from trading -in those routes where 
the draft restrictions prevent these ships from entering 
either the, loading , or discharging port. They are also 
excluded from passing through canals if the draft 
restriction does not allow It. However it might be 
possible for a tanker to go through the canal unloaded 
but not loaded. These possibilities are also considered. 
Thus large, tankers can make ýa, return trip , from the 
Persian Gulf 
, 
to Western Europe, with the f irst leg of the 
journey being via Cape and the ballast leg via Suez. The 
model also considers 
- 
the possibility of part loading. 
Thus It might be 'more profitable for a large tanker to 
load a part cargo from the Persian Gulf so as to enable 
it to transit the Suez Canal both on its 'way to Western 
Europe as well as on the return trip. The capacity lost 
because of the weight of theýfuel bunkers that have to be 
carried Is also taken into account as well as the time in 
port needed to' load and unload cargo. The optimum speed 
is determined I theoretically by utilizing the 
technological relationship , between - fuel consumption and 
speed. The relationship between fuel 'consumption and 
speed Is- roughly cubic, , and knowledge of this 
technological relationship allows the optimum speed, to be 
determined theoretically , for 'each ship type, as in 
Nortank. 
2.8 Criticism of. existtng theories 
2.8.1 Freight Market Consensus View 
We have reviewed various past attempts to model the 
behaviour and Interactions of the shipping markets. All 
123 
these models, beginning with the pioneering efforts of 
Tinbergen and Koopmans down to the most recent ones, have 
very. similar freight market structures., This is derived, 
explicitly or not, 
_ 
from the assumption of prof it 
maximization of ships and instantaneous market clearing. 
Optimising behaviour implies that supply Is proportional 
to the size of the f leet and is positively related to 
freight rates relative to fuel prices and operating 
costs. 
The results of Tinbergen and Koopmans when compared 
with more recent freight market studies, indicate that the 
empirical estimates of 
- 
the elasticity of supply with 
respect. to these variables are surprisingly stable over a 
time period of a hundred years. These empirical estimates 
also conform to the theoretical estimates derived from a 
priori knowledge of the production function of ships. 
Thus supply Is considered to be very elastic at low 
levels of lay up while it becomes perfectly inelastic as 
lay up drops to zero and ships run at full speed. 
Dif f erences between 
, 
the various empirical freight 
market models 
.,. 
are not due to theoretical dif f erences. 
They rather ref lect the level of aggregation chosen and 
other practical difficulties of taking 
-into account the 
effect on supply of other factors such as the waiting 
time in port and the length of the ballast trip. These 
factors are of minor 
-importance since they are much less 
volatile over the cycle, so that at one extreme their 
effect on supply can be treated as a, constant. On the 
demand side the common assumption Is made that it Is 
basically predetermined by factors exogenous to shipping 
and in most cases is assumed to be completely inelastic 
with, respect to freight rates. The other common 
assumption made is that the freight market clears 
instantaneously. An Isolated exception to this is 
Charemza and Gronicki (1981). 
These widely held theoretical beliefs regarding the 
freight market structure, which are supported by the 
empirical evidence, leads to the following consensus view 
about the short term behaviour of freight rates. Freight 
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rates depend positively on the freight market balance; 
that is the level of demand relative to the f leet. An 
increase in fuel prices or operating costs causes a shif t 
of the supply curve to the left and this increases the 
equilibrium freight rate. During periods of depression, 
intersection between demand' and' supply occurs at the 
elastic region of the supply curve, then even wide 
fluctuations in demand will fall to have a significant 
impact on rates 'but they will mainly affect lay-up. 
During boom periods however " where the inelastic demand 
meets supply In its inelastic region, even small changes 
In demand or the determinants of supply will lead to 
s Ign if Icant changes in freight rates and very little 
change in lay up. 
2.8.2 Ship markets' diverging views 
In contrast to the freight market, ' there Is as yet no 
consensus view regarding the behaviour and interactions 
of the ship markets among themselves and with the freight 
markets. Thus the dynamic response of ship prices, 
shipbuilding, scrapping and consequently freight " rates, 
to anticipated and unanticipated fluctuations in external 
factors Is still a controversial issue. The lack of 
consensus is illustrated by the fact that there exist 
considerable dif f erences in the the second 'hand, 
shipbuilding and scrapping market structures, among the 
various models 'examined in this chapter. 
There are two basic reasons for this multiplicity of 
alternative structures. The f Irst is that, in the 
majority of cases and in contrast to freight market 
modelling, the econometric specifications are not always 
consistent with optimizing ' behaviour. The second reason, 
which can be thought of as a particular manifestation of 
the f irst, is the arbitrary treatment of expectations of 
future market developments. In the case of shipping these 
are expected to' be particularly important since 'the 
economic lifetime of ships can, depending on market 
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conditions, exceed 20 years. Thus decisions in the second 
hand, shipbutlding and scrapping markets are expected to 
be strongly influenced by both short term and long term 
views. 
The treatment of the demand for new and second-hand ships 
Concerning the lack of theoretical foundations, this 
Is particularly true for the demand side of the 
shipbuilding 
- 
and second-hand markets. In almost none of 
the existing econometric models is the specified demand 
for new 'or second-hand ships' derived either implicitly or 
explicitly as the solution of a constrained optimization 
problem by agents. 
Yet, the fluctuations In the demand for new, ships and 
its response to market- conditions is generally considered 
to be one of the fundamental causes of the cyclical 
behaviour of shipping markets. This 
-is embodied in the 
existing models of the shipping markets where, ever since 
Tinbergen's (1931) contribution, ' the demand for new ships 
has occupied a central -position in the whole theoretical 
mechanism which simulates cyclical behaviour. Given its 
central position, any weaknesses in this part tof, fthe 
model will considerably affect the validity of Its whole 
structure. This problem is compounded by the fact, that 
demand is affected by expectations the treatment of which 
has been inadequate. 
Typically 
- 
with the exception of Norship - there is 
no proper modelling of the interactions between second 
hand prices and expected profits and capital,. gains which 
determine the return on shipping Investment. The latter 
Is likely to be the major factor determining the demand 
for ships in the second hand market. Again here this 
problem is compounded by the fact 'that expectations are 
of crucial Importance. There has also been little work 
done on the interactions between the second hand and 
newbuilding markets. 
We also find that there are material differences in 
the specified supply of ships for scrap by the various 
models. The only area - apart from the freight market - 
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in which there Is more or less widespread agreement Is 
that of the supply of newbuildings. This is commonly 
specified to be proportional to the existing shipbuilding 
capacity and to move in line with the ý price of 
newbuildings relative to the price of factors used as 
inputs in the shipbuilding process. 
Theýtreatment of expectations 
In cases where market expectations of ,a future 
variable, say freight rates, are believed to affect the 
supply or demand, these expectations have been typically 
- 
again here Norship is an exception 
8 
_, assumed to be 
generated by an extrapolation mechanism of current and 
recent trends in various variables (including past rates) 
that would normally help 
- 
to predict the future level of 
freight rates. This creates a schizophrenic situation 
- 
in 
which the model's own predictions will in general not 
agree with those generated 
, 
by the extrapolative 
forecasting mechanism Imbeded 
- 
In the model. This suggests 
that such models are likely to be unstable since if they 
purport to have explanatory and forecasting ability. the 
market would then tend to use the model's theoretical 
structure in order to form expectations and thus abandon 
the extrapolative mechanism which the model assumes it 
has been using. But in that case the model would no 
longer be valid as the expectations generating mechanism 
will have changed and will not be the same as the one 
imbeded in the model. 
Yet, such models which assume that people forecast 
the future level of freight rates, profits and other 
variables by extrapolating recent trends or by using some 
other ad hoc backward looking forecasting rule, are 
capable of, simulating shipping cycles. For example, an 
increase in demand will typically lead to an Increase in 
freight rates and a 
-reduction In lay-up which will then 
be projected to last for some time leading to an 
8 See however our commients In the last paragraphs. 
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investment boom. This raises the growth rate of the f leet 
but while this lags behind the growth rate 'of demand, 
rates will be rising and the market will be becoming 
increasingly optimistic. This will reinf orce the 
investment boom until suddenly the fleet expands faster 
than demand and freight rates begin to recede. This leads 
to a period 'of recession characterized by increasing 
levels of lay-up and falling levels of freight rates and 
prices. Pessimism returns to the market and investment 
begins to fall. As long as the growth rate of the fleet 
is maintained above that of demand, rates and prices 
continue to f all. That is, until the depression In 
shipbuilding brings the growth rate of the f leet down -and 
rates stabilize or even begin to Increase. 
During this hypothetical cycle " we f Ind that shipping 
investors consistently and predictably overestimate 
future freight rates during the boom while the opposite 
happens at the bottom of the depression. This leads to a 
parallel predictable cycle' of excessive positive returns 
during the upturn followed by negative returns on 
shipping investment as the market moves into the 
recessionary phase. This 'suggests that such models are 
likely - to be unrepresentative of the real world since 
investors' behaviour should normally eliminate 
predictably high or low returns. In such models investors 
fall to foresee the effects of a shipbuilding 
boom/depression on future market conditions even though 
the writing is on the wall. 
A 'new' theory of shipping markets 
Chapter . 3' presents a theory of shipping markets which 
contains some features which are new to the modelling 'of 
the shipping industry and which should therefore be 
pointed out. We attempt to remedy the' above mentioned 
defects in the specification ' of demand for new and 
existing ships and the treatment of expectations. 
Regarding the former we utilise the suggestions of 
capital theory In order to model the behaviour of 
investors in the market for' new and second hand ships. 
128 
Thus new ýand existing ships are treated as capital assets 
the portfolio demand for which varies in line with the 
expected 'return on shipping Investment relative to the 
return on other investments. The expected return on ships 
consists, of course, of expected profits and capital 
gains. 
Our assumption of economic rationality will also 
apply to the use of available information. It shall thus 
be assumed that expectations are rational. Thus 
speculation is ascended to a primary role. The assumption 
of rational expectations and forward looking behaviour 
generates ýa richer set of dynamics and speculative 
behaviour which do not appear in the conventional models. 
Rational 
- 
expectations mechanisms, create strong , links 
between the current level of prices and assumed future 
impulses 
, 
from , the environment, as informed speculation 
causes investors to take evasive action or bullish 
positions in order to eliminate the likelihood of 
excessive capital losses/gains. Thus the system does not 
only 
. 
respond to current and past movements in the 
exogenous variables 
- as in conventional models - but 
also to perceived changes in the future level of the 
external factors. Such speculative" behaviour, which Is 
believed to be a central feature of the real world. does 
not appear in the models that have been reviewed. 
Existing 
- models cannot distinguish between anticipated 
and unanticipated movements and generate identical 
forecasts 
-whether the path of the exogenous variables is 
foreseen or not, something which is unlikely to be true 
in practise. 
It shall be seen that the rational expectations model 
Is capable of simulating cyclical- behaviour in freight 
rates, 
- 
lay-up, ship prices and fleet growth which does 
resemble the real world shipping cycle and In a way which 
is consistent with the assumptions of optimizing 
behaviour. A central position in this theoretical 
mechanism which generates the cyclical patterns. Is 
occupied by the ef f Ic ient speculative actions of 
investors. Thus booms In price and shipbuilding do not 
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ref lect belated and myopic response to current and lagged 
profits as in existing models. They rather reflect the 
forward looking behaviour of investors who immediatelly 
bid-up the value of ships and in the process cause an 
expans ion in the supply of new ships, until the 
expectation of excess return is eliminated. 
It will be seen that some aspects of our theory are 
very similar to that embodied in Norship ' and this calls 
for some additional comments and comparisons. Indeed our 
modelling of newbuilding and scrapping supply Is very 
similar to that of Norship. In addition, both models 
assume that second hand and newbuilding prices reflect 
market's expectations of the future stream of profits. 
However there 
- 
are crucial differences in the 
treatment of these - 'expectations as well as in the 
treatment of the demand for newbuildings. The differences 
In the latter will become clear in chapter 3 where the 
demand for newbuildings is analysed theoretically. Our 
rational expectations approach to the modelling of 
expectations of future profits say, Is to endogenelse 
these by equating them to the model's prediction of 
future profits. Intuitively this should be a consistency 
requirement which reflects the fact that In a rational 
enviroment the forecasts of a correctly specified model 
- 
which purports to have explanatory and predictive ability 
- 
and the market's expectation should be the same. The 
loss of money that mistakes in expectations imply, create 
real world forces which should tend to equate market's 
expectations with those of a correctly specified model. 
On the other hand Norship has modelled expectations 
of future profits in a different way but in the process 
has argued in circles. Expectations of long term profits 
can be calculated from the price of newbuildings the 
demand and therefore the price of which reflects expected 
long term profits. According to our model these 
relationship are valid but one of them is reduntant when 
newbuilding demand Is correctly specified. In this case 
one of the relationships can be derived from the other by 
simply rearranging terms from the LHS to the RHS of the 
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equation. We close the model by using the rational 
expectations assumption thereby creating speculative 
forward looking links by equating the expectation of long 
term profits with the model's prediction of the future 
stream of profits. On the other hand in Norship, the 
model is closed by specifying a theoretically flawed 
demand for newbuildings function. By partly solving the 
above relationships of Norship, it can be seen that at 
the end of the day the expectations of the model are 
backward looking. This Is Illustrated by the simulations 
of Norship reported in Table 2.3. Whereas - following the 
shock in bunker prices - profitability is lower from year 
3 onwards, paradoxically prices are 1.3% higher in that 
year which is inconsistent with the model's prediction of 
a drop in future profitability. 
131 
CHAPTER 3 
THE THEORY OF SHIPPING MARKETS 
3.1 Introduction 
3.2 Methodology 
3.2.1 Micro and Macro aspects of the theory 
3.2.2 Summary of model structure 
3.3 M icrofoundat Ions of the theory 
3.3.1 Freight Market 
3.3.2 Second Hand Market 
3.3.3 Shipbuilding Market 
3.3.4 Scrap Market 
3.4 Long Run Analysis 
3.4.1 Steady State 
3.5 Discrete Time Model (Analytic 
-Solution) 
3.6 Continuous Time Model 
3.7 Unanticipated Shocks 
3.7.1 Permanent unanticipated increase in the 
level of demand 
3.7.2 Permanent unanticipated increase in the 
growth rate of demind 
3.7.3 Permanent unanticipated increase in bunker 
prices 
3.7.4 Permanent unanticipated increase in 
shipbuilding costs (or scrap prices) 
3.7.5 Permanent unanticipated increase in 
alternative returns to capital 
3.7.6 "Speculative Bubble Burst" 
3.8 Anticipated Shocks 
3.8.1 Permanent anticipated Increase in the 
growth rate of demand 
3.8.2 Permanent anticipated Increase in bunker 
prices 
3.8.3 Permanent anticipated increase in 
shipbuilding costs (or scrap prices) 
3.8.4 Permanent anticipated increase in 
alternative returns to capital 
3.9 Concluding Remarks 
132 
This chapter presents a 'new' theory of the shipping 
markets. Novel features of this theory is the treatment 
of ships as capital assets as well as the assumption of 
rational expectations. Section 2 presents the 
methodological approach to the problem of formulating 
- 
the 
theory and give a short description of the theoretical 
model. Section 3 analyses the optimisation problem of 
various agents In various markets and derives the 
theoretical demand and supply curves which constitute the 
building blocks of the model. 
The long run behaviour of the system Is analysed in 
section 5. Section, 6 presents a discrete time formulation 
of the model which Is solved. Section 7 presents a 
continuous time formulation of the model. This is used in 
section 8,9 in order to study both the short term and 
long run response of the markets to various types of 
anticipated and unanticipated shocks. 
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3.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter we reviewed past attempts to 
model the behaviour, of the shipping markets. It was seen 
that there exist no substantial differences among the 
various freight market structures embodied In the various 
1 
models 
. 
In contrast to the freight market consensus, 
modelling of the markets in vessels has been a 
controversial subject. This Is particularly true in the 
area of the demand for new and existing ships and of the 
role of expectations. It was argued that, typically, 
modelling of the markets for ships has been inconsistent 
with the assumption of rational optimizing behaviour. 
In this chapter a 'new' theoretical model of the 
shipping markets Is developed which is explicitly derived 
from assumptions of optimizing economic behaviour. This 
assumption will also apply to the treatment of 
expectations which will be endogenised so as to be 
consistent with the predictions generated by the model 
itself, as along the lines of the rational expectations 
hypothesis. Ships will be treated as capital assets the 
demand for which varies in line with the expected return 
on ships relative to the return on other assets. The 
return on ships consists of profits and capital gains. 
Section 3.2 describes the methodological approach to 
the formulation of the model and gives a brief overview 
of the model. Section 3.3 looks at the microfoundations 
of the theory. It considers the objectives and 
constraints 
, 
that various market participants face. It 
then analyses how their behaviour responds to changes in 
the environment as they aim to attain their objective. 
This constitutes the micro side of the theory. By 
aggregating the reactions of individual agents, total 
1 
This Is true except for the Isolated case of' Charemza 
and Gronicki (1981). 
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market demand and supply curves are derived. These 
constitute the building blocks of the macro system. 
Sections 3.4 to 3.8 consider the macro behaviour of 
the model. Section 3.4 considers how the system reacts in 
the long run to changes in the external environment. This 
ignores short term reactions and the path that the system 
follows in order to reach a new long run equilibrium. 
The short term behaviour of the model is considered 
in sections 3.5 to 3.8. The model will be formulated both 
in continuous time and in discrete time. Section 3.5 
presents a discrete time version of the model. The 
discrete time model will be solved analytically In order 
to derive an explicit reduced form expression that 
relates ship prices to current, lagged and expected 
future movements in the external factors. 
Section 3.6 presents a continuous time version of the 
model. The continuous time model will be used in order to 
study the response of the shipping markets to both 
anticipated and unanticipated changes In the external 
factors. This analysis relies on the use of phase 
diagrams. The effects of unanticipated shocks are 
considered In section 3.7. It will be seen that freight 
rates, prices, shipbuilding and scrapping tend to 
overshoot their long run equilibrium values In response 
to demand or bunker price shocks. In contrast freight 
rates, prices and scrapping tend to undershoot their long 
run level in response to a shipbuilding cost shock while 
shipbuilding again overshoots. ýhen a returns to capital 
shock occurs then prices, shipbuilding and scrapping 
overshoot while freight rates undershoot the long run 
equilibrium. 
The effects of anticipated shocks are analysed in 
section 3.8. It will be seen that the shock has similar 
long run effects as if it had been unanticipated. 
However, the short term response is different. 
The effects of these anticipated and unanticipated 
shocks will be analysed by means of theoretical 
simulations of the model which show how the market will 
react to various shocks from the external environment. 
The simulated paths exhibit cyclical patterns. Section 
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3.9 not only summarizes the results but also considers 
whether the simulated cycles resemble the empirical ones 
that were discussed in chapter 1. 
3.2 Methodology 
3.2.1 Micro and macro aspects of the theory 
The model presented in the following sections Is a 
mathematical representation of demand and supply 
relationships and equilibrium conditions In the various 
shipping markets. The model distinguishes between four 
different but interdependent shipping markets. These are 
the freight, second hand, shipbuilding and scrap market. 
The last three, markets will be collectively referred to 
-as the markets for ships. It alms to explain how freight 
rates and time charter rates, lay-up, optimum speed. new 
and second hand prices, shipbuilding and scrapping are 
determined in terms of various external factors that can 
operate directly either through the freight markets or 
the markets for ships. The external factors include the 
darrand for freight. fuel prices, operating costs, 
laying-up costs, alternative returns to capital. 
shipbuilding costs, scrap prices etc. 
The methodology of the theoretical approach is the 
following. Each of- the four shipping markets is 
considered 
. 
in turn with regard to a representative 
individual agent. Given his objectives, the variables 
under his control and the constraints ý he faces. we 
calculate how his behaviour will change with market 
conditions assuming he always wishes to attain his 
objective. For example, on the supply side of the freight 
market, the ship manager alms to maximize profits. Given 
his production function, freight rates and bunker prices, 
he varies the speed of the ship and other parameters 
under his control in order to achieve maximum profit. 
Similarly on the supply side of the shipbuilding market, 
the shipbuilder aims to maximize the present value 
-of the 
yard, given the level of ship prices, shipbuilding costs 
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and his production function, by choosing the optimum 
output level and the best combination of factors of 
production. On the supply side of the scrap market and 
the demand side of the newbuilding and second hand 
markets, the investor aims to achieve the best 
risk/return combination by varying the amount of ships 
and other assets in his portfolio, given the correlations 
and expected returns on each investment. 
The analysis of the behaviour of individual economic 
agents is the micro side of the theory and this is 
presented in section 3.3. By aggregating the Individual 
demand/supply generated by each agent. a set of 
interacting aggregate supply and demand functions in each 
market is derived. The way these interact in order to 
determine the equilibrium level of prices and quantities 
constitutes the macro side of the theory and this 
analysis Is presented in sections 3.4 - 3.8. 
3.2.2 Summary of model structure 
A proper model of the shipping markets should at 
least distinguish between the tanker and dry cargo 
sectors. It is simpler however to begin the theoretical 
analysis by considering a simple model of a hypothetical 
shipping industry in which there exists only one ship 
type. This hypothetical industry will still consist of a 
freight, second hand, shipbuilding and scrapping market. 
We ignore all the inessential detail in order to 
facilitate understanding of the key interactions among 
these four markets, which give rise to the observed 
f luctuations and 'comovements In rates, ' prices, f leat 
growth etc. during the cycle. These keý interactions also 
appear in identical form In the more complicated cases 
where there is more than one ship type. However in the 
latter case there are also important interactions among 
the various sectors that can lead to spillover effects 
from the one sector to another. These spillover effects 
cannot of course be studied in the one sector model 
presented in this chapter. They will be analysed by means 
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of computer simulations in the following chapters were 
the econometric model Is presented. This is based on a 
theoretical model which Is really an extension of the 
simple model that Is developed in this chapter, to the 
case were there is more than one ship type. The basic 
micro features and some of the implied macro 
characteristics of the simple model are the following: 
Freight Market 
The supply of freight services is directly 
proportional to the amount of ships trading multiplied by 
average speed after allowing for some inef f iclency 
parameters such as Iwalting 
time in port and time spent in 
ballast or repairs. The technology of the ship is such 
that speed varies directly with fuel consumption. It will 
be assumed that the shipping company maximizes profits 
and It will be shown that this implies that optimum speed 
varies directly with freight rates relative to fuel 
prices. Thus the total freight market supply derived by 
aggregating over Individual supplies Is directly 
proportional to the size of the fleet and Is positively 
related to freight rates but negatively related to bunker 
prices. 
Demand on the other hand will be assumed to be 
completely inelastic with respect to freight rates and 
therefore It will be treated as exogenous. The freight 
market clears by means of freight rate adjustments so 
that demand always equals supply. 
Second Hand Market 
Investors can choose among various assets. 
ýPortfollo 
demand-for ships varies directly with the expected return 
on ships relative to the return on other 'assets. The 
return on ships consists of the profit rate and the 
capital gain. 
)Since 
asset demands are sensitive to small 
changes in expected returns, Investors will be prepared 
to hold ships at equilibrium, only if the return on ships 
is similar to the expected return on other assets 
adjusted for risk. 
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Shipbuilding Market 
Shipbuilders will be assumed to maximize profits in 
the current period. This is consistent with present value 
maximization if there is no intertemporal trade off 
between profits in different periods. This will imply 
that the supply of new ships depends on the ratio of 
newbuilding prices to the prices of the variable factors 
used in the production process. If. as is expected to be 
true in practice, there are costs of adjustment, then 
profit and present va lue___MaxýtrqIzation_ are.. 
-no 
t- equ Iva lent-; ---- 
Although our focus here is on profit rather than present 
value maximization, the conclusions are similar in both 
cases, namely, that supply of now ships depends on the 
ratio of newbuilding prices to the price of shipbuilding 
inputs. However, in the case of present value 
maximization there are some dynamic 
, 
complications 
introduced. The latter however are not essential to the 
understanding of the interactions of the 
-markets and the 
cyclical behaviour that they generate. Thus in this 
chapter we deal with the easier static case where there 
are no adjustment costs and so shipbuilders are assumed 
to maximize profits in each period. 
Newbuildings and second hand ships are similar assets 
that should therefore command similar prices after 
allowing for time of delivery and vintage considerations. 
Newbuildings are ships for future delivery, and thus their 
prices may be assumed to be determined in the same way as 
prices in futures markets. In this market there are not 
only producers and/or buyers of the product willing to 
hedge the risk of an unexpected change in the price but 
also speculators who can earn a return If the current 
futurfs price deviates from the expected future spot 
"price$(ýpeculation on newbuilding (futures) prices should 
guarantee that the newbuilding price cannot deviate from 
the expected future second hand (spoi) prices, after 
adjusting for age and vintage effects, by more than a 
risk premium. 
1) 
The fact that little secondary trade in 
newbuilding contracts takes place - the speculator Is 
usually the eventual owner (buyer) of the ship - does not 
invalidate the theory's Implications. 
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Scrap Market 
A ship is scrapped when it Is worth more dead rather 
than alive. Its scrap value is determined by the given 
amount of metal in the ship times the scrap price. Its 
second hand value moves In line with the general level of 
second hand values - and it is a decreasing function of 
age. The supply of ships ' for scrap should therefore 
depend on ýthe age, profile and the ratio of ship prices to 
scrap prices. ' 
Market Structure 
Perfect competition in all markets will be assumed 
throughout this and the following chapters. Conditions 
akin to the theoretical ideal of perfect competition are 
widely believed to prevail in the major sectors of the 
shipping 'markets except the liner services and possibly 
some minor specialized sectors. No shipowner controls a 
signif icant proportion of the total fleet 
2 
and this 
contributes to active competition in freight, second 
hand, shipbuilding and scrap markets. Shipowners and 
shippers compete actively for ý cargoes In the freight 
markets and rates can oscillate widely In very short 
periods 
- 
of time should the underlying determinants of 
demand or supply' change. There Is also very active 
competition in the second hand market were prices also 
change very rapidly. On the supply side of the the 
shipbuilding , market there *are a large number of 
shipbuilders each controlling a small portion of 
capacity. Similar - conditions prevail in the scrap 
markets. 
The geographical mobility of ships also contributes 
2 
In the tanker market 
a ignif Icant portion* 
capacity controled by 
sufficiently small so 
that aim to Inc 
collusion among players. 
the major oil companies do control 
of the available capacity. The 
an Individual company however In 
as to sake supply manipulationt 
reaso price, non-profitable without 
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to the establishment of an environment conducive to 
perfect competition. This mobility makes entry into the 
market easier as governments are forced to compete in 
order to attract not only new but also existing shipping 
capital. This competition leads to lowering of taxes on 
shipping capital and other barriers 'to entry. On the 
other hand, International competition 'for existing 
capital is usually impossible in the case of physically 
immobile assets where governments can hinder entry or 
exit and create ' local markets by following narrow 
nationalistic policies. Even entry into the shipbuilding 
market is considered to be easy relative to the size of 
the capital costs involved. Indeed many developing 
countries choose entry into the shipbuilding market as an 
easy step towards industrialization. 
The following section develops In more detail and 
rigour the model structure that has just been briefly 
described. 
3.3 Microfoundations of the theory 
In this section we take 'a very close look at the 
behaviour of market 'participants 'in 'a simple hypothetical 
shipping industry. To handle analytically the theoretical 
model a number of simplifying assumptions will be made. 
It has already been mentioned that there is going to be 
only one ship type in the 
- 
hypothetical shipping industry. 
In reality of course there are various ship types, e. g 
tankers, dry bulk carriers, combined carriers, general 
cargo ships, containers. 1 iqu if led gas carriers, car 
carriers, passenger ships etc. Within each category ships 
can be further distinguished according to their size, 
age, propulsion technology, cargo handling technology 
etc. In this chapter all these differences shall be 
ignored and not only shall It be assumed that there Is 
only one ship type but also that all ships are Identical. 
In particular it will be assumed that ships do not 
deteriorate with age so that old, younger and new ships 
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are also- identical. It 'shall also be assumed that there 
is perfect competition in the , freight market, as well as 
in the markets for ships both on the demand and supply 
sides. 
These and other numerous simplif ications do not 
distort the theoretical insights that we develop. What we 
aim at in 
. 
constructing this 
- 
theoretical model of the 
shipping industry, is to strip away detail and so develop 
a simple framework, that will 'allow us to grasp the 
general principles and forces at work , which 'would have 
been obscured but by no means invalidated, by the 
inclusion of detail. Thus the, exclusion of detail does 
not affect in any way the fundamental conclusions of thlsý 
chapter regarding the key interactions- among the various 
markets. Instead, they facilitate. a quick and rigorous 
derivation of the main results. Indeed - it is our , belief 
that too much attention to detail , in past work has 
hindered the development, of, an integrated theoretical 
model. In the same spirit we shall work with simple and 
concrete , log-linear- functional, forms rather than - more 
abstract and difficult to- handle mathematical demand and 
supply curves. 
However, in the following chapters where we aim, 
-to 
develop a real world econometric model, the effects of 
factors that for analytical convenience - and clarity are 
here, ignored, will be taken into' account where, we deem 
this to be relevant. 
3.3.1 Freight market 
Our hypothetical freight market- has the following 
characteristics. First ships are able to load and unload 
their cargo instantaneously so thatl, the waiting time in 
port is zero. Then the carrying capacity of ships Is 
constant and does not vary with weather and sea 
conditions or port draft restrictions. Ships are also 
assumed to be able to choose any speed from zero to 
inf inity I. e. there are , no technological restrictions 
which set a limit to the maximum and minimum speed other 
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than that already specified. Finally ships find a full 
cargo at the port of discharge so that there is no time 
wasted in ballast. We assume that costs In lay-up are 
always prohibitively high so that this 
, 
option is never 
considered. These simplifying assumptions will 
effectively imply that the output of the f leet Is 
directly proportional to its speed. 
The supply side 
The supply 
- 
side of the freight market Is considered 
f irst. Ships produce transportation services measured in 
ton-miles which are sold for a price which is the freight 
rate measured in units of currency per ton-mile. The 
output of the individual firm is measured in ton-miles 
per unit time period. Since the carrying capacity of the 
ship cannot be varied the output of the firm is directly 
proportional to the speed. In reality of course the 
inputs requ Ired for the production of transportation 
services are fuel, labour, port services, maintenance 
etc. In the hypothetical Industry port services are 
ignored. The only variable Input will be fuel. Labour and 
other Inputs will be treated as fixed. up. Total costs 
consist of variable costs and fixed costs. Of these, 
variable costs consist purely of bunker costs while 
wages, costs of maintenance etc. constitute the fixed 
(operating) costs. Fuel consumption will be assumed to 
vary with speed according to following formula: 
o' 
a (1) 
where 
B- Bunker(fuel) consumption in tons per unit time 
period 
o- - Speed in miles per unit time period 
a- Technological constant parameter (a > 
The functional form of (1) is not only simple enough to 
handle analytically but it is also an accurate 
representation of the real world relationship between 
fuel consumption and speed, as has been determined from 
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micro data. The assumption that a>1 (which effectively 
implies that, we have decreasing returns to- 
-scale) is 
theoretically necessary for the maximisation problem to 
have a finite solution. If a<I then we would typically 
f Ind that it would pay to increase speed without bound 
and so there would not be a determinate solution to the 
profit maximisation problem. Again this assumption Is not 
at all unrealistic -as the engineering micro data suggests 
that a=3*" 
Within a particular time period a ship earns a 
freight revenue which Is equal to its output (as measured 
in ton-miles) times the freight rate per ton-mile. Since 
output is proportional to speed, freight revenue per unit 
time period can be written as follows 
R- Ar (2) 
where 
Freight Revenue per unit time period 
F- Freight Rate in units of currency per ton-mile 
Profit is the difference between revenue and costs and 
therefore it can be written as 
x- Fo- 
- 
PbB 
- 
OC (3) 
where 
Pb 
- 
Price of bunkers 
OC 
- 
Fixed Costs (operating costs) 
The time charter equivalent Is defined as profits 
before fixed costs or revenue minus voyage costs and It 
is therefore given by the following expression 
w-; 
- 
oc 
or 
i- Ar 
- 
PbB 
Since B is a function of cr, (3) can be written as 
x- Ar - Pw4 - OC (4) 
144 
The objective of the shipping manager Is to maximize the 
profit of the ship which is equivalent to maximizing the 
time charter equivalent since operating costs are fixed. 
Because of perfect competition, the Individual firm 
treats freight rates and bunker prices as given so that 
prof it maximization in this case is consistent with 
setting the derivative of (4) with respect to a- to zero. 
The derivative of (4) is 
dn 
a-I 
-nF- aPbw (S) 
ds 
Setting this equal to zero it can be seen that the 
optimum speed is given by the following relationship: 
., o- - (FlaPb) 1/(a-1) (6) 
Hence. prof It maximizing behaviour Implies that speed 
varies directly with the ratio of freight rates to bunker 
prices. When freight rates increase It pays to increase 
the speed of the ship and incur the extra fuel costs 
since these will be more than compensated by the extra 
revenue. On the other hand when fuel prices increase it 
pays to reduce speed and economise on fuel costs because 
It more than compensates for the loss of freight revenue. 
Substituting expression (6) into (4) Implies that maximum 
profit is related to freight rates and bunker prices 
according to the following formula: 
it - k(F'*'r)I(Pb7) - OC (7) 
where the constants 7, k can be expressed in terms of a 
as follows 
'r - 1/(a-1) 
a 
Using (3') and (7) we find that the maximum time charter 
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equivalent is 
i- k(Fl*l')1(Pb7) 
The amount of ton-miles supplied by the I th Individual 
ship is equal to its carrying capacity times the speed. 
1. e 
Ki ol 
where 
qj - Ton-miles supplied by the i th sh Ip 
th Ki= Carrying capacity in dwt of the I ship 
To obtain the aggregate market supply we sum over all 
ships to derive the following relationship 
s K(r 
where 
qSEq, Total market supply 
I 
Ki E Ki Total carrying capacity of the fleet 
I 
Substituting (6), into (8) gives 
qs- K(FlaPb) 
or by simply using the definition of v 
s K(FlaPb)7 (9) 
Thus the freight market supply function has been derived. 
It can be seen that it is directly proportional to the 
size of the f leet and moves in line with the changes in 
the ratio of freight rates to fuel prices. In the more 
realistic case were the proportion of time spent in port 
or' in ballast Is nonzero we would obtain a similar but 
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more complicated relationship than (9). The main result 
derived here though would still hold, namely that speed 
is positively related to freight rates and negatively 
related to bunker prices. 
The demand side 
Perfect competition will be also assumed on ' the 
demand side of the market. Additionaly and in line with 
previous models of the freight markets, demand (q) will 
be treated as being completely inelastic with respect to 
freight rates so that it can be considered to be 
exogenous. There would be no analytical complications in 
incorporating a downward sloping demand curve into the 
model at this stage. However, the effects of bunker price 
shocks crucially depends on the elasticity of demand 
relative to that of supply. Allowing for the more 
general, elastic demand case would produce some ambiguity 
in the results of the following sections. In particular. 
following a change in bunker prices, prof Its might 
increase or decrease depending on whether and to what 
extent demand is elastic or not. It Is preferable to deal 
only with the non-ambiguous and empirically relevant, 
inelastic demand case. 
Freight Market Equilibrium 
Freight rates will be assumed to be flexible enough 
so that the freight market clears within -the selected 
time period. The equilibrium freight rate Is then given 
by the intersection of the inelastic demand curve with 
the upward sloping supply curve. 
qs 
-o q- K(FlaPb) 
1/(a-1) 
3.3.2 Second Hand Market 
Portfolio theory typically assumes that investors 
prefer higher returns to lower ones but they also prefer 
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less risk to more. If however returns on individual 
assets are uncertain and not perfectly correlated it 
would normally pay to diversify and hold assets that 
might offer lower expected returns but which can make the 
overall portfolio less risky. Sharpe (1964) proved that 
under such circumstances the equilibrium rate of return 
on a risky asset is equal to the return on a riskless 
asset plus a risk premium. In the case of shipping this 
suggests that: 
rr+ risk premium (11) 
where 
rs = expected return on shipping 
r= expected return on other Investments 
This section looks at three different hypothetical worlds 
each involving progressively more uncertainty and risk. 
Case I: Zero uncertainty perfect foresight case 
Case 1, will be the perfect foresight, zero 
uncertainty case. Here investors will only be prepared to 
hold ships if they offer a return which is at least as 
big as the return offered by other assets. On the other 
hand they will only be prepared to hold other assets If 
they offer a return which is at least as big as the 
return on ships. Since equilibrium in the asset markets 
requires that the demand for each asset equals the 
available supply and there will only be some demand for 
an asset if it offers a return which Is at least as big 
as those offered by other ones, then there can_only be an 
equilibrium when the returns on all assets are equal. 
This implies that the following simple relationship 
between r and rs should be true 
S 
z- -r (11') 
The actual return on an asset is def ined as the 
prof it rate plus the percentage increase in Its value. 
Thus the return on ships at time t Is defined as follows 
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t+l 
p 
t+l 
pt 
rt 
p 
t 
where 
Pt Price of ships at time t 
and where we have taken end of the period ship prices. 
Substituting (12) in (11') gives 
t+l t+l 
pt 
rt 
p 
t 
which can be written as 
t+l +p t+l 
I+rt 
This gives the equilibrium price which must be 
established, In order to bring the return on ships In 
line with the return on other Investments, given also the 
market's expectations regarding the future level of 
profits and prices. Of course, in the perfect foresight 
case the market's expectations and the actual future 
outcomes coincide. 
Case 2: Uncertain environment with risk neutrality 
In the slightly less restrictive case where there Is 
uncertainty regarding the actual returns obtained but 
where returns on all assets are either perf ectly 
correlated or where investors are not risk averse. there 
Is no scope or desire for diversification. Again there 
will only be some demand for an asset if Its expected 
return is at least as equal as the expected return on 
other assets. ' We therefore obtain a similar relationship 
to (13), but because in this case actual and expected 
outcomes might differ It should be written as follows: 
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t t+l t t+l 
pt 
rt 
p 
t 
where EtX 
t+k 
denotes the expectation at time t regarding 
the value of variable X at time t+k. The above 
relationship can be written as 
E+EP 
t t+l t t+l 
+rt 
which is similar to (14). 
Case 3 Uncertain environment with risk averse 
investors 
In the most general case were returns are uncertain 
and not perfectly correlated while the usual assumptions 
regarding the investors attitude towards risk and return 
are still valid, It pays to diversify among various 
assets in order to reduce risk at the cost of losing some 
expected return. Given some idditional assumptions It can 
be shown that the proportion of their wealth that 
investors would wish to hold in ships would be a function 
of the return on ships relative to the return on other 
assets. Mathematically this can be expressed as follows: 
dd 
+ 
AK 1W 
- 
F(rs, 'r) 
where 
W- Wealth 
Xd 
- 
Stock demand for ships 
and where a plus or a minus over a particular variable 
indicates the sign of the partial derivative with respect 
to that variable. If (15) Is solved for rS gives: 
s 
r at F(r, PKIW) (16) 
where we have made use of the fact that at equilibrium 
the stock demand for ships Kd must equal the available 
iso 
supply K. This looks like (11) but there is a variable 
risk premium which can change with the size of the fleet. 
Thus investors will demand a higher risk premium in order 
to hold more ships. We can substitute the definition of 
rS into (16) and solve for Pt to obtain: 
pt- F( Wt IK 
t, 
Et Ir t+l , 
ýtPt+l r t) 
This indicates that starting from an Initial equilibrium 
situation, an increase in expected future prices or 
profits which tend to raise the return rS and create an 
excess demand for ships, wi ll have to be associated at 
the new equilibrium with a higher current ship price 
which will bring the return rS back into line with the 
return on other investments r, so as to eliminate the 
excess demand. On the other hand an increase in the size 
of the f leet will requ ire, at the new equilibrium, 
investors to hold portfolio s which are more heavily 
weighted towards ships and this requires a higher risk 
premium. Given the expected future profits, prices and 
other returns this can only b e achieved by a reduction in 
the current price. 
Fundamentals and 'bubbles' 
We have looked at the various cases starting from a 
hypothetical world of zero uncertainty and moving on 
progressively to cases involving more uncertainty and 
risk. Case 1,2 are really special cases of 3. They all 
boil down to a relationship like (14) or (14') or (14") 
which mathematically are very similar. Both (14), (W) 
or (14") are first order difference equations in Pt. An 
econometric version of equation (14") will be finally 
Incorporated into our econometric model. 
Since this is new to the area of econometric 
modelling of shipping markets and one of the 
distinguishing features of our models it deserves a 
closer look. Even though we shall in the future work with 
(14"), here we investigate some of its properties by 
looking at (14). because it Is simpler while at the same 
151 
time it is mathematically similar and Incorporates the 
same economic ideas. It can easily be shown that if we 
treat n t+k as given and 
If It is assumed for simplicity 
that r Is constant over time, then a possible solution of 
(14) is the following 
t+l t+2 t+3 t+4 
P= 
-+-+-+-+ t 1+r (1+r )2 (I+r) 3 (I+r) 4 
which is a well known result. However this is not the 
only possible solution that will satisf y (14). There 
exist an infinity of solutions which are all of the form 
v 
t+l 
7r 
t+2 
w 
t+3 
x 
t+4 
P A(I+r) t+-+-+-+-+ 
t. 1+r 
- 
(1+r) 2 (I+r)3 (I+r) 4 
(18) 
where A can be any real number. Equatiom (17), is a 
special case of (18) derived by setting A-0. Thus, there 
seems to be a problem of non-uniqueness of solutions. If 
A*O then the solution diverges to plus or minus infinity. 
However, If the additional assumption Is made that real 
asset prices can only fluctuate within finite bounds (as 
is obviously the case) the initial condition A-0 must be 
imposed. Accordingly we obtain a unique solution which is 
(17). Indeed (17) is the only solution that expresses 
prices purely as a function of economic fundamentals 
while cases where A*O have been interpreted to correspond 
to "speculative bubbles". 
, 
Take for example an asset that gives zero profit for 
ever. Mathematically Its price can still be positive but 
since it gives no profit its price must keep growing at 
the rate r indefinitely in order to give a return In 
every period. The only stable solution Is for Its price 
to be zero for ever as (17) would Indicate. We shall come 
across these unstable solutions later on but the theory 
of "Rational Expectations" suggests that these unstable 
solutions can be ignored and that the system has a unique 
stable solution. 
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3.3.3 Shipbuilding Market 
Supply of new ships 
Shipbuilders are assumed to maximize profits per unit 
time period. This is consistent with present value 
maximization If there is no Intertemporal trade off 
between profits over different periods. Shipbuilding will 
be assumed to be a perfectly competitive market and thus 
each shipbuilder will treat the value of newbuildings Pn 
as given. The constraint that each shipbuilder faces is 
the production f unction which is a mathematical 
representation of the relationship between the amount of 
various inputs used (such as labour, metals, energy, land 
etc. ) and the volume of output obtained. Maximising 
prof it subject to the production function can be shown to 
imply that the optimum level of shipbuilding output will 
be related positively to the price of new ships and to 
the amount of fixed factors employed but negatively to 
the price of variable inputs. This relationship can be 
represented mathematically by a function of the following 
form: 
D- F( PnIP1, Pn/P2,..., Pn/pn; ZD) (19) 
where 
D= Shipbuilding output 
Pn 
- 
Price of newbuildings 
and where P1, P2, 
.,., 
Ps denote, the prices of the 
variable inputs required in, the shipbuilding production 
process, and ZD is a vector of exogenous variables that 
influence the supply of new ships. For example In the 
simple case were there is only one variable factor say Xi 
and where Xi Is. related to D according to the following 
inverted production function 
Xt 
-kDb (20) 
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where 
kIb- technological constant parameters 
then in this case the profit maximizing level of output 
Is related to Pn, Pi as follows: 
D- k2(Pn/Pi)d (21) 
where 
d 
k2 (11(k 
I 
b)) 
If there are diminishing returns to the variable factor, 
i. e. b>1, (22) Implies that the supply of newbuildings 
varies directly with their relative price. 
Newbuilding Prices 
The way newbuilding prices are determined Is now 
considered. A distinction should be made between quoted 
newbuilding prices and 'ef f ective' newbuilding prices. 
Very often shipbuilding contracts are clouded in secrecy 
so that the quoted newbuilding prices are not the same as 
the 'effective' price that the owner pays. Various terms 
in the shipbuilding contract, 0. g cheap f inance or 
subsidy, might actually reduce the P ef f ective' 
newbuilding price paid by the owner below that quoted by 
the builder. It Is the sometimes unobservable 'effective' 
price that is here considered to be the newbuilding price 
that the investor pays and which the builder receives. 
-It 
is this that affects market behaviour. and not the quoted 
price. 
Empirically we can observe a close correlation 
between newbuilding and second hand prices. This Is not 
surprising s ince newbuildings and existing sh Ips are 
similar assets once allowance is made for vintage, age 
and delivery. In the extreme case were ships do not 
deteriorate, new and second hand ships are identical. Let 
us distinguish between new ships and newbuildings. New 
ships will be considered as those ships which have just 
been produced and therefore they are immediately 
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available to trade. They can be sold at a price which Is 
the same as the second hand price since new and old ships 
are Identical in our hypothetical shipping industry. 
Newbuildings on the other hand are not for Immediate 
delivery but they can only be delivered after the 
construction period has elapsed. For the purposes of the 
analysis newbuildings are new ships for forward delivery. 
We shall consider two cases. First we shall look at 
the case were newbuildings can be delivered 
instantaneously and then we shall look at the case were 
newbuildings can be delivered only after a non zero 
construction period has elapsed. 
Case 1: Instantaneous delivery 
In the first case where the construction period is 
zero and where - newbuildings can be delivered 
instantaneously there Is effectively ' no dif f erence 
between newbuildings and new ships. Thus the price of 
newbuildings must equal - the price of new ships. The 
latter however are Identical to, and are sold at the same 
prices as, second hand ships. Thus in this extreme case 
the price of newbuildings Pn must equal, the second hand 
price P. 
Pn 
-P (22) 
Case 2a : Mon zero construction period in perfect 
foresight enviroment 
Let us now look at the case were newbuildings are 
strictly for future delivery. Lot us say it takes k years 
to deliver a ship. Assume an order is arranged for the 
newbuilding at time t and the price agreed to be paid on 
delivery is Pn t. 
Assume also that there Is perfect 
foresight and zero uncertainty regarding the future level 
of ship prices. Then Pn t must 
be equal to P t*k , that Is 
the newbuilding price must equal the perfectly foreseen 
price of second hand ships (which are Identical to new) 
at time t+k. This is because if Pn t 
is higher than P 
t+k 
then the investor could do better by waiting k years and 
buying an identical ship from the second hand market. 
iss 
Thus investors will never accept prices higher than the 
correctly f oreseen future price of ships P 
. 
On the t*k 
other hand if Pn is less than P there will be an t t+k 
infinite demand for newbuildings since buyers could then 
make a guaranteed capital gain at time t+k by paying Pn t 
to the shipbuilder and reselling for P at the second t+k 
hand market. There can only be an equilibrium therefore 
when newbuilding prices are equal to the perfectly 
anticipated future value of new ships. Thus newbuilding 
prices are related to the second hand values by the 
following formula: 
Ph 
t0 
Pý+k (22') 
In the previous paragraph it was seen that the demand 
f or new ships is inf initely elastic at the correctly 
anticipated future price of second hand ships. An 
analogous result holds for case 1 were delivery is 
instantaneous. There demand for newbuildings Is 
infinitely elastic at the point were newbuilding prices 
are equal to second hand values. This explains why past 
attempts to estimate downward sloping newbuilding demand 
curves have failed as for example in the case of Hawdon 
(1978). Demand for assets tends to be infinitely elastic 
at the equilibrium price. It will take a small change In 
price above or below the equilibrium level to turn the 
asset from being expensive into a bargain. These small 
price changes create massive market Inflows and outflows 
guaranteeing 
- 
that all the newbuildings supplied will be 
absorbed at the competitive price. 
This ' simple' analysis revolutionises the specification 
of''the demand for new ships. This has been one of 'the 
weakest and'-, ' theoretically least satisf ying part of 
existing models. A downward-s loping demand for new ships 
does not exist and cannot therefore be estimated. 
Instead, demand is infinitely elastic at' the equilibrium 
newbuilding price. Production of new ships (or In other 
words investment) 
- 
is determined from the supply side in- 
terms of the amount yards wish to supply at the 
equilibrium price, which Investors are prepared to pay. A 
iss 
small discount in price will create massive demand for 
the cheap asset. Thus all the supply Is absorbed by the 
infinitely elastic speculative demand. 
Case 2b Non zero construction period in an uncertain 
environment with imperfect foresight 
Let us look now at a further case where there Is 
still a non zero construction period and where In 
addition there 'is some uncertainty so that foresight is 
not perfect. Here too, ' speculative considerations should 
ensure that newbuilding prices arranged at time t cannot 
deviate from the current expectation regarding second 
hand prices at time t+k by more than a risk premium. 
Higher prices than this 'will lead to massive withdrawal 
of investors from this market while lower prices will 
bring a massive increase in the demand for newbuildings. 
This suggests that in the more general case where 
newbuildings are strictly for future delivery and where 
there Is some uncertainty, demand for newbuildings will 
be almost inf Initely elastic at the expected future 
second hand price minus the risk premium. We therefore 
obtain the following relationship between newbuilding and 
expected second hand prices. 
Pn 
t-EtP t+k +%I, 11 
(22 ") 
where 
k3- risk premium 
our theoretical view is therefore that newbuildings' 
prices are set in a similar way as if there were fully 
efficient futures markets where 
- 
builders, end users and 
speculators could buy and sell newbuilding contracts. 
Thus newbuilding contracts or orders are considered as 
instruments that efficiently allocate the risk of an 
unexpected drop in the price of ships from a single 
company (the shipbuilder) to the various investors who 
have agreed to buy the newbuildings. The fact that very 
little 
, 
secondary trading in existing newbuilding 
contracts seems to take place does not necessarilly deny 
157 
the existence of market forces that move 
, 
newbuilding 
prices to the level suggested by the theory. All that is 
required for the theory to hold is that when the outlook 
regarding the future market prospects and future second 
hand values changes, every investor changes his selling 
or buying price for newbuildings according to the new 
expectations. Thus newbuilding prices at which deals can 
be made change even though no actual trading takes place. 
Everybody agrees that newbuildings are now worth more or 
less and any new sales will have to be made at the new 
prices. 
We rarely observe shipbuilders building a ship 
without having first secured an order contract for it. It 
Is conceivable (and It occasionally occurs) that ships 
are build 'on spec' without a contracted order. Wen 
ready they are simply sold in the market for a price 
similar to that at which relatively new ships are 
exchanged for in the second hand market. This again 
emphasises the ýutility of estimating newbuilding demand 
functions. New ships can be built without orders. 
ýhen production is undertaken on a speculative basis. 
the shipbuilder faces the considerable risk of an 
unexpected drop in the price of ships. Given the long 
gestation lag inherent to shipbuilding the chances of 
such an event are considerable. The cost of an unexpected 
fall in values would be enormous. Under conditions of 
such risk, futures markets are likely to emerge that help 
to diversify these risks. It Is natural therefore that 
shipbuilders should try to share some of these risks with 
other investors by arranging order contracts. It is 
perhaps due to the fact that the word 'order' has demand 
connotations that there have been misguided attempts in 
the past to estimate downward sloping newbuilding demand 
curves. 
Finally, in this second case where delivery Is not 
instantaneous, equation (19) has to be modified slightly 
in order to take account of the delivery lag. Equation 
(19) was derived from an analysis which assumed that 
ships can be delivered within the unit time period. Here 
however where there is a delivery lag, Pn t affects the 
iss 
planned future supply of new ships 1. eD t+k . Similarly 
current deliveries are determined by past plans which 
were based on the price. Pn t-k* where 
k Is the delivery 
lag. Thus for the particular case where it takes k year 
to deliver a ship (19) should be written as 
Dt- F( p 
nt-k 
/Pi 
t-k ,..., 
Pnt_, /Pot_ ZD) (19") 
3.3.4 Scrap Market 
A ship is scrapped when its scrap value exceeds its 
trading value. Its scrap value Is determined by the 
amount of metal in the ship times the scrap price per 
ton. Its trading value depends on the expected 
profitability of ships and thus moves in line with the 
general level of second hand values. The supply of ships 
for scrap Is hypothesized to move In line with the ratio 
of scrap prices relative to second hand values. The 
supply of ships for scrap should also depend on the age 
profile but for the present we abstract from such 
considerations. Thus we propose that the supply of ships 
for scrap is of the following form: 
SIK 
- 
F(PsIP) (23) 
where 
S- Dwt of ships scrapped 
Ps = Price of scrap 
Finally, the following identity is needed to close the 
model. The change in the fleet is simply the difference 
between shipbuilding deliveries and scrappings. 
Kt-K 
t-I +Dt-St 
or 
AK 
t-Dt-St 
(24) 
where AX t Is shorthand notation 
for Xt-X 
Our models will consist of versions of equations (7), 
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(9). (10), (14'), (19), (22')ý, (23) and (24). 
3.4 Long Run Analysis 
In this section the behaviour of the system at the 
long run steady state is analysed. This is a state where 
all the endogenous variables grow at a constant rate. In 
particular the fleet grows at the same rate as demand 
while real prices, freight rates and prof Its are 
constant. The analysis considers how the steady state 
long run equilibrium is affected by permanent changes in 
the exogenous variables. The steady state would 
eventually arise in the hypothetical case where all 
exogenous variables have stabilized or grow at a constant 
rate. Of course the system is never at a steady state 
because the exogenous variables continuously fluctuate, 
sometimes unpredictably. The analysis also limits Itself 
to changes in the long run equilibrium that arise from a 
permanent change In an exogenous variable. For the 
present we do not however discuss how the market moves 
towards the new long run equilibrium. Thus Its scope Is 
quite limited for studying shipping cycles because as 
shown in the following sections major fluctuations are 
short run In character. However the long run analysis is 
simpler to analyse because the system becomes recursive. 
In addition the analysis Is useful for analysing where 
the system is likely to settle following a major change 
in an exogenous variable which can be considered more or 
less permanent. It can be used for comparing the average 
state of the market across different decades or longer. 
3.4.1 Steady State 
The steady state is a state where all variables grow 
at a constant rate. In particular some variables such as 
real freight rates and prices might grow at a zero rate 
i. e. they are constant at the steady state. It would 
160 
eventually arise when all 
the 
_ 
growth of demand, 
shipbuilding costs, scrap 
to capital have settled 
equations describing the 
f ollowing 
the exogenous variables such as 
the level of I 
fuel prices, 
prices and alternative returns 
at a particular level. The 
stationary system are the 
Aq = AK (25) 
q=K+ TF 
- 
TPb (26) 
rPb (27) 
(28) 
D Pn Pi (29) 
Pn P (30) 
+ 112ps (31) 
-- 
AK 
-D-S (32) 
where all equations are in logarithms and where all time 
subscripts have been dropped from all variables since 
they are constant in the steady state. The f irst equation 
states that at the steady state the growth rate of the 
f leet equals the growth rate of demand. The second 
equation is equation (9) where we have substituted q for 
q on the left hand side since at equilibrium the two are 
equal. The third equation is simply equation (7) in log 
linear form where we have here and in all remaining 
equat ions dropped all nuisance constants In order to 
simplify the notation. Equation (28) has been derived 
from equation (13) by setting P t+1 -Pt-0. which is true 
in the steady* state. and then simply taking logarithms. 
Equations 29), (31) are log linear versions of equations 
(21) and (23). It is assumed for simplicity that 
equations (29) and (31) pertain to deliveries and 
scrappings expressed as a percentage of the existing 
161 
f leet. Thus here and for the rest of this chapter D and S 
represent the delivery and scrapping rates. This allows 
us to derive (32) from (24) 9 (29). (31). Equation - (30) Is 
the long run version of equation (22). 
The system of equations (25)-(32) Is recursive. To 
determine the level of ship prices In the long run 
substitute (30) into (29) which gives 
DP Pi (33) 
Use (33) and (31) to substitute for D, S in (32) to 
derive the following 
AK 
-pIP-p1 Pi +p2P-p2 Ps 
- 
(34) 
By using (25) to substitute for 
- 
AK In ý (34) and then 
solving for P gives 
(1/(ji +p »äq + (p /(p + ji-»Pi + (p /(P + JA »Pß , 12112212 
This Is the reduced --form solution for the long run 
equilibrium second hand price. It - can be seen that the 
long run growth rate, of demand, shipbuilding costs and 
the price of scrap have a positive affect on the long run 
value of ships. A, higher, growth rate of demand in the 
long run Implies a higher growth rate of the 'fleet. The 
latter can only be achieved by an expans ion in 
shipbuilding and a reduction in scrapping. These however 
require higher ship prices. Thus - prices must rise In the 
long run. On the other hand if either shipbuilding costs 
or scrap prices increase this has a negative influence on 
the growth rate of the f leet. However in the long run the 
f leet must grow in line with demand. This requires 
compensating increases in ship prices that will cancel 
the restraining effects of a higher Pi or Ps on the 
growth rate of the fleet. These ideas are expressed by 
equation (35). 
It can be seen that fuel prices and alternative 
returns to capital do not Influence the price of ships in 
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the long run, although as shall be shown later, they do 
in the short run. In order to derive the reduced form f or 
the long run level of prices, no use was made of 
equations (26), (27) and (28). The first two equations 
represent the supply of freight services and the 
relationship between maximum prof Its and market 
conditions. These are implied 
- 
by prof It maximization and 
reflect the technology of, transportation by ships. 
Equation (28) reflects investors' behaviour. These three 
equations play no role in the determination of the long 
run level of prices. Freight market supply shocks and 
interest rate shocks have significant- effects on short 
term fluctuations of prices. In the long run, however, 
such shocks have no impact on values as the fleet 
adjusts. 
To determine the level of prices In the long run. It 
is merely sufficient to know the 
-long run growth in 
demand and the position ofý the shipbuilding and scrapping 
supply functions. Equilibrium prices are then determined 
by the requirement that the fleet must-grow in line with 
demand. Values must move to that level which will induce 
sufficient newbuilding supply and scrapping reductions so 
that f leet and demand grow in parallel to each other. 
In turn prof its in the long run tend to the level 
that will allow investors to earn 
,a competitive return 
(r) at the equilibrium price. In order to calculate the 
profitability we use (35) to substitute for P In (28). 
This gives 
- 
(110A 
I+ 11 2 
))Aq + (IA 
I 
I(JA 
I+p2 
))Pi 
+ (JA 2 /(P 1+ 11 2 
))Ps +r (36) 
It can be seen that profitability Is Positively affected 
in the long run by the growth rate of demand. the cost of, 
shipbuilding inputs, scrap prices and alternative returns 
to capital. We have- already shown that the first three 
factors cause higher prices in the long run. Investors 
will only pay these higher prices If' prof Itability 
increases. A higher r cannot affect prices In the long 
run but will increase prof its eventually so as to raise 
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the return on ships to the competitive level. 
In turn this higher profit rate will only be achieved 
If freight rates increase. To derive the long run freight 
rate use (36) to substitute for it in (27). Then solve for 
F and this will give 
I+ tu 2)) Aq + (p I /(#1 1+p2 
))Pi 
2 
/(11 
1+ 11 2 
))Ps + rl + (v/(I+y))Pb (37) 
It can be seen that long run freight rates are positively 
related to the growth rate of demand, cost of 
shipbuilding inputs, scrap prices, alternative returns to 
capital and fuel prices. The first four factors imply 
higher profits in the'long run as (36) shows. The fuel 
price does not affect prices or profits in the long run. 
But it brings a change in short term profitability that 
will require compensating changes in the freight market 
balance so as to bring the return on the long run price 
back to competitive level. To derive the long run freight 
market balance (which has , been defined , as the ratio 
between demand and the fleet and 'which indicates the 
extent of slow steaming) substitute (37) into (26) and 
solve for q-K. 
Km1+A2 ))Aq + (ju 1 /(; 1 1+A2 ))Pi 
2 
/(A 
I+p2 
))Ps + rl (. r2/(1+7))pb (38) 
Thus the ratio between demand and the f leet which we call 
the freight market balance Is positively related in the 
long run to the growth rate of demand. cost of 
shipbuilding Inputs, scrap prices, and alternative 
returns to capital but negatively related to fuel prices., 
An increase in any of the first three factors requires a 
higher level of prices so as to keep the growth rate of 
the fleet in line with that of demand. Higher prices 
however require higher profits and thus freight rates, 
For given fuel prices this can only be achieved by 
improvements in the long run freight market balance. A 
higher r implies higher x which also , requires an 
improvement in the freight market balance. On the other 
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hand an increase in fuel prices reduces the freight 
market balance in the long run but leaves prof Its 
unaffected. This is because the higher fuel price 
produces an Independent tightness in the freight market 
by restraining supply and this tends to raise freight 
rates and prof Its. The negative ef fect of the lower 
freight market balance on prof Itability Is exactly 
cancelled out by the positive effect of the higher fuel 
price thus leaving profits the same in the long run. 
It can be seen that in order to determine the long 
term market equilibrium the system becomes recursive. The 
shipbuilding and scrapping equations determine the price 
level that will keep the growth rate of the fleet equal 
to that of demand. Then the portfolio balance equation 
determines the long run profit rate consistent with 
yields on competitive assets. The profit f unction 
determines the level of rates that will ensure that these 
profits will be earned. Finally the freight market supply 
function determines the freight market balance 
competitive with this equilibrium freight rate. It should 
be mentioned that the system of equations which are used 
in order to determine the long run equilibrium, would no 
longer be recursive if a more general version of equation 
(28) had be used which allowed for risk premia that could 
vary with the size of the f leat. The system Is recursive 
only if there is zero risk or if investors are risk 
neutral or if the risk premium were constant. The real 
system however is likely to be close to being recursive 
since in reality and especially in the long run, changes 
in the risk premium brought about by endogenous changes 
in the size of the f leet are likely to be small. 
The same ideas can be easily analysed in terms of 
four simple diagrams. Fig. 3.1 shows the various long 
run relationships. In quadrant I we depict the 
relationship (line SS) between the long run growth rate 
of the fleet and ship prices exactly as suggested by 
equation (33). The curve Is drawn for given scrap - prices 
and shipbuiding costs. An increase in either of the two 
will shif t the curve to the right. In quadrant II we 
depict the relationship (line OR) between profits and 
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Fig. 3.1 : Lýong'run relationships 
Fig. 3.2 : Effect of an increase in demand, growth rate 
7-r 13 
prices in the long run and for a given r exactly as 
suggested by equation (28). Quadrant III shows the 
relationship (line OK) between profits and freight rates 
for given bunker prices as expressed by equation (27). 
Finally quadrant IV shows the relationship (I ine OL) 
between freight rates and freight market balance in the 
long run for given fuel prices. 
Given the values of the exogenous variables the 
positions of the various curves are completely 
determined. The system Is recursive. To find the solution 
of the system we make use - of the fact that In the long 
run the growth rate of demand Aq equals the growth rate 
of the fleet. Let point A represent this long run growth 
rate on Fig. 3.2. The long run values of the remaining 
variables can be determined by starting from point A and 
moving alternately horizontally and vertically in 
anticlockwise direction. Thus B Is the long run 
equilibrium level of ship prices which will cause the 
f leet to grow in line with demand. Cý Is the long run 
level of profits which the market will have to offer In 
order for investors to be prepared to pay the price 08. 
D is the long run level of freight rates and E Is the 
long run level of the freight market balance which will 
be consistent with a profitability OC. Notice that an 
increase in demand from A to A' will eventually increase 
ship prices to B', prof Its to C', freight rates to D' and 
the f reight market balance to E'. 
The effect of an increase in other exogenous 
variables can be determined in a similar way after 
repositioning the curves in the quadrants that have 
shifted as a result of the exogenous change. Thus an 
increase in the cost of shipbuilding or scrap prices will 
shift the position of the curve In quadrant I of fig. 3.3 
to the left from SS to S'S'. Fig. 3.3 shows the new long 
run equilibrium that arises following such an exogenous 
shock. 
The curve S'S in quadrant I represents the new long 
run relationship between M and P. after the Increase in 
costs or scrap prices. The long run growth rate of the 
fleet is the same, being equal to the unchanged long run 
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Fig. 3.3 : Effect of an increase in shipbuilding costs 
Fig. 3.4 : Effect of an increase in returns to capital 
Fig. 3.5 : Effect of an increase in bunker costs 
level of demand growth rate. However, because the higher 
shipbuilding costs or scrap prices have a negative effect 
on the growth rate of the f leet, this requ ires 
compensating increases in long run values. In turn this 
necessitates higher long run profits, and thus higher 
freight rates and an improved freight market balance. 
In a similar way the effects of other exogenous 
shocks can be determined. An increase In r for example 
will shift the position of the curve in quadrant II 
downwards from OR to OR' say, as in Fig. 3.4. This will 
not have any impact on long term ship values but will 
raise long term profitability, rates and market balance. 
An increase in bunker prices will shift the curve In 
quadrant III to the right from OK to OK' and the curve In 
quadrant IV to the lef t from OL to OL', as shown on Fig. 
3.5. This, will not affect the long run level of prices 
and prof Its, but will lead to an increase in rates from D 
to D' and a fall in freight market balance from E to E. 
In order to maintain profitability 
. 
where prices will be 
firm enough to. raise the fleet in line with demand, long 
run freight rates must increase from D to D' so as to 
offset the increase in costs. Because of higher bunker 
prices there is increased long run slow steaming and this 
manifests as a reduction in the freight market balance 
from E to E'. 
3.5 Discrete time model (Analytic solution) 
-, 
In this section a discrete time model Is formulated 
using the theoretical ideas developed in section 3.3. 
This can be used in order to determine the short run 
fluctuations of prices and other variables. This dynamic 
model consists of the following discrete time versions of 
equations (7), (9), (10), (14'), (19). (22"), (23) and 
(24). 
s qt - qt (39) 
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s qtKt+ TF t TPb t (40) 
7rt (1+7)Ft 7Pbt (41) 
Pý a llrt + CtAjýt+l -a3rt (42) 
Dt A1 Ph tI 
Pi 
t 
(43) 
Pnt E 
t-1 
pt (44) 
St A+ 11 2 
ps 
t 
(45) 
AKt Dt-st (46) 
where E t_1 
P 
t-j denotes the expectation formed at time t-I 
of , P, All variables are expressed as natural t+j 
logarithmss unless otherwise indicated. Equation (39) Is 
identical to (10) 
- 
and represents , the equilibrium 
condition in the freight market which Is that supply must 
be equal to the completely 
-. 
inelastic, and exogenously 
determined, 
-demand for- freight services. Equation (40) Is 
the log linear version of equation (9). It Is the supply 
of, ton-miles 
, 
function which relates the amount of 
transportation services offered to the prevailing freight 
rates and bunker prices. It is also directly proportional 
to the size of the fleet. The third equation is equation 
(41) which has been derived from equation (7) by taking 
logarithms and assuming that fixed costs are zero. It 
relates the maximum profit that can be obtained by the 
ship (when running at the optimum speed) to the 
prevailing freight rates and bunker prices. The fourth 
equation Is equation (42) which Is a log linear 
approximation of (141 with a 1' a 2' a3 being constants 
appropriately chosen so as to give a good approximation. 
It also slightly differs from equation (14') because in 
the above version ir t 
has replaced the term EtV t+1 
In the 
original. This Is simply because here we look at 
beginning of the period prices whereas in (141) we were 
looking at end of the period values. The equation has 
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been derived by considering the behaviour of investors in 
second hand markets. It states that investors, given the' 
expectations of future profits, capital gains and returns 
on other investments, will bid prices up or down to that 
level which will bring the expected return on that asset 
in line with the return on other assets adjusted for 
risk. In the most general case It was seen that this risk 
premium might slightly vary with the size of the fleet 
but here we abstract from such considerations. 
Equations (43). (44), (45) are log linear versions of 
equations (20). (22"), and (23). The first of these 
equations Is the supply of newbuildings which under 
conditions of perfect competition' depends on the price of 
new ships relative to the cost of shipbuilding. Equation 
(44) is-, the relationship between *newbuilding and second 
hand prices while (45) " Is , the relationship between 
scrapping and second hand values relative to * scrap 
prices. As in the long run analysis we assume that the 
variables D and S represent deliveries and scrappings as 
a percentage of the total fleet. This allows as to derive 
(46) which Is the growth rate version of (24). 
In order to derive (43), (44) It has been implicitly 
assumed that it takes a year to deliver a ship. It has 
also been assumed that shipbuilding, scrapping and second 
hand markets are open at the beginning of the period 
only. Thus in the beginning of the period owners decide 
how many ships should be supplied for scrap on the basis 
of ship values and scrap prices ruling at that time. 
These ships are then immediately withdrawn from the 
market. At the beginning of the period new ships are 
delivered whose construction began in the beginning of 
the previous period. These are immediately added to the 
existing stock of ships. At the same time shipbuilders 
decide how many ships to begin to construct for delivery 
in the next period. As already shown, the relevant price 
for this decision Is the newbullding price which should 
reflect expectations of future second hand prices. 
In order not to overburden the notation we have 
dropped all those constants, representing risk premia, 
technology and other nuisance effects which do not affect 
169 
the analysis. Equations (39) '- (46) constitute our 
discrete time model. They have been derived from 
microeconomic considerations that have been fully 
described in the previous section. To solve the model we 
can substitute first equation (39) into (40) which gives 
qt - )ýt- + 71ý - TPbt (47) 
We may solve this for the equilibrium freight rate to 
obtain (48) 
Ft- (11, j)(q t -K t)+ Pb t (48) 
Implying that equilibrium freight rates are positively 
related to the level of demand and negatively related to 
the size of the , fleet. , Moreover because demand Is 
inelastic an increase in fuel prices is completely passed 
over to shippers. If this expression Is substituted into 
(41) we obtain the following expression 
Rtm lg(qt-Kt) + Pbt (49) 
where f 
9- (1+7)/y 
It can be seen that an increase in demand tends to raise 
the profitability of ships by Increasing freight rates 
while the opposite happens following an expansion in the 
size of the f leet. An increase in the fuel price will 
eventually raise the profitability of shiýS even though 
its direct effect is to reduce prof Itability by 
increasing costs. However because a fuel price increase 
leads to a proportionate increase in freight rates, the 
latter more than compensates for the increase in costs. 
Thus profits Increase. This result Is not general however 
but crucially depends on the fact that demand for 
transportation services is completely inelastic. 
Substituting expression (49) into (42) implies the 
following: 
ptnaI P(q 
t -K t)+a1 Pb t+ ce 2EtP t*l - cc 3 rt (50) 
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Substituting (43), (45) into (46) implies 
Mt 
I 
Ph 
t-1 1 
Pi 
t-I 
+p2Pt2 Ps 
t 
Use (44) to substitute for Ph t-I in (51) to produce (52) 
AKt np1E t-1 
Pt- Al Pi t-I + 11 2Pt- 11 2 
Ps 
t 
(52) 
We are lef t now with two equations (50) and (52). These 
involve two unknowns which are Pt and Kt, plus 
expectations involving these two variables. We can 
substitute for Kt in order to solve for P To do this we 
can take f irst differences of (50): 
AP 
t-aI j3(Aqt-AKt) + alAPbt + 4X 2 AE tP t+l -a3 Ar t (53) 
Now use (52) to substitute for AK t In (53) so that we got 
the following: 
Aýt 
-aI IgAqt - al9plEýjt - 411811 2pt+ 4X11901plt-l 
+a1 ßil 2 
Pe 
t+a1 
Apbt + «26Eýpt+I - a, 'ärt 
(I+a 
1 
ßil 
2 
)pt pt-1 + (a2+4ylßjll)'Eý-Ipt 
m ty 1 
ßäq 
t+ alßg, 
Pit_I + a113g2 pe t+ a1,61>bt - 4x 3, 
är 
t 
which can be written as 
lp Ipt* 9Vt-l * VA-Ipt + 94Vt+1 w 2t 
(54) 
where 
lp, W 1+a 10112 
1)2 m-1 
'F3 a 012+041 9A I 
V4 'ff 
-a2 
and where zt Is defined as 
t 
är 
t 
zt m alßäqt + oClßjjlplt-1 + 4XIßg2pat + gy '61>b 
171 
and is therefore a weighted average of the growth rate of 
demand, bunker prices, changes in interest rates and the 
level of shipbuilding costs and scrap prices. Equation 
(54) involves only lags. leads and expectations of Pt on 
the lef t hand side and zt on the right., We can anticipate 
a result that we shall derive later which is that any 
influence of the exogenous variables on the dynamics of 
prices arises purely through Its ef f ect on zt and 
expectations regarding future ztfs, therefore zt is 
sufficient to determine the time path of prices. To solve 
(54) first take expectations at time t-l across both 
sides of equation (54). 
EP+ (p EP+(z 1 t-I t2 t-I t-I PA-lpt+ VJý-Ipt+lm Eý-l t 
pIE t-1 
P 
t-I p2 t-I 
Ptp3 
t-I 
P 
t+l t-I t 
(55) 
where 
p1 92 
p 2 f+ 1 P3 
P3 94 
Equation (55) is mathematically much simpler that (54) 
since the latter is a dynamic equation in two endogenous 
variables, that is I actual prices 
Pt and rational 
expectations E t-j P t-j+l of - next period prices. On the 
other hand (55) involves only the expectations of prices 
and thus the dimension of the problem has been halved 
following this operation. Equation (55) is a second 
order difference equation in E t-1 
P 
t+k . 
It is convenient 
to make use of the lag operator L and Its inverse; the 
forward shif t operator FC Equation (55) can thus be 
written as 
(p 
12pLp3 
)E 
t-1 
p 
t+l wE t-I zt 
(56) 
The characteristic polynomial corresponding to this 
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equation is: 
P3ý 2 ,ý+ P2' PI (57) 
This second order polynomial has two roots AI, A2 so that 
(56) can be written as 
z p3 (1-A1L)(1-A2L)Et_1 Pt+1 M Eý (58) 
_, t 
It can be shown that one of the roots of the polynomial 
(57) lies within the unit circle IX 1<1 while the other 1 
root lies outside 1A 1>1. The former Is the stable root 2 
while the latter is the unstable root. To obtain stable 
solutions the unstable root must. be solved forward. To do 
this first notice that by multiplying, both sides of (58) 
by FL 
- 
1 the equation can be written alternatively as 
follows 
P3(1-; k, L)(l-; k2L)FLEt_, P I- Eý_Jz t* t 
or 
L)(F-X )E PP '1 2 t-l'ý - ý-I't 
or 
A 
20C2( 1-A, L)(1 -(I /; k2 
)F)Et_, Pý 
- 
Eý_, zt . 156) 
where in the last stop we have made use of the fact that 
p3n-OY Multiplying both 'sides of (58') by the inverse of 
(1-(I/; k 2 )F) we obtain 
A Ot 1-7tL)Et_, P - (1-0 )F)-'Et + At 2 2( t 
/; k2 
-Izt 2 
Z + (1'/(>*2ý2»E (" 
2 t-1 t+I 
AA 
t 
jt m >lýt-1 
1-0 
(59) 
If A*O then the last term of (59) dominates the solution 
eventually and prices diverge to minus or plus infinity. 
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A non zero value for A corresponds to speculative bubble 
solutions. Assuming that the market moves on the basis of 
economic fundamentals requires A-0 in which case (59) 
becomes 
(591) 'z Vt t-lpt ' 
-1+(l/"2*C2"E 
(1/#12) Eý-l 
t*l 1=0 
This states that given P prices at time t will 
reflect expectations of future zt which Is a weighted 
average of the exogenous variables. Using the definition 
of zt it can be seen from (59') that second hand prices 
are positively related to expectations regarding the 
future level of the growth in demand. the growth rate of 
bunker prices, the level of shipbuilding costs and scrap 
prices but negatively related to changes in the return to 
capital. Let us denote the last term In the above 
expression as 't-l 1. a 
co i (1/(; k 
2a2 
))1: OA 
2)E t-I z t+l 1-0 
t_, 
is a weighted average of current and expected Thus v 
future demand, bunker prices, alternative returns to 
capital, shipbuilding costs ',, and scrap ' prices with 
positive weight given to all these factors except the 
return on capital. The term Vt Is Important for the 
analysis since given P t-1 ,V t-1 completely determines 
prices Pt. as (59') Indicates. Since v' Is a weighted 
average of expected developments In external factors 
which determine the value of ships, we shall say that 
"expectations are bullish" If v happens to be high. On 
the other hand we shall say that "expectations are 
bearish" if v happens to be low. 
Finally in order to solve for Pt use (59') to 
substitute for E t-1 
Pt and EtP t*1 
in (54). This gives 
lpi pt+f2P t-1 
+ (PP'lpt-l + Vt-lý + 94('N Pý +Vt)a zt 
((p 
1+'p4"1)pt + 
(( ;k- v4vt 
- 
T3 v 
t-I 
Yf: ý dpt-I w 2t 
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(60) 
which is of the form 
OP 
- 
op 
-z-'- 93't-I 0tI t-1 t 
p4l't 
with solution 
co (1/ + BA t VE ( 1/%)'(Zt-I PIIVt-I (p3Vt-1-1 1 two (62) 
where BA t Is -a constant that reflects the initial 1 
conditions and which tends to 0 as t4m and can 
therefore be ignored. Since V. ma2+a 1191111 while V. 
-a2, (62) can be written, after Ignoring the last term. 
as follows 
00 (*/, 0 1Zav VI: 1 0) 1 t-1 +J t-1 
IMO 
Collecting terms in v t-I this can be written as follows 
E (0, /%) Zt-I 
1=0 
l(o (64) 
I 
/, & 
O)a 2- OC2 + "1'61111 v t-I + OC2 vt
We can define C as 
C-- [(iü 
1 
/0 
0)a2 - (K2 OLIßgl 
1C 
so that (64) can be written as 
01 Co 
ee ) Icv +a pt- (1/, e 0)[E (0 1/%) Z t-1 -, ý, (0, ýo 0 t-1 2vt 
1-0 
(65) 
This is the f Inal reduced form for ship prices which 
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relates second hand values to the actual history of the 
exogenous variables, the past expectations regarding the 
exogenous variables and the current expectations of these 
variables, as represented by the first, second and third 
terms respectively, in the square brackets of (65). 
The last term in the square brackets of (65) 
indicates that prices are positively related to current 
expectations regarding future growth of demand, bunker 
prices, shipbuilding costs and scrap prices and 
negatively related to expected changes in the returns to 
capital. The more bullish the current expectations the 
higher the price while bearish expectations imply lower 
prices. 
The middle term of (65) indicates that' the more 
bullish are past expectations, the lower the current 
price. This is Intuitive since bullish expectations in 
the past contribute positively to past prices which 
reduce past scrapping and raise past deliveries and thus 
the current fleet. Moreover bygones are bygones so that 
past expectations are immaterial for generating current 
projections which are based on the expectations embodied 
in the last term vt, which captures the current mood of 
the market. The larger fleet generated by previous 
bullish expectations has negative implications for future 
profits and thus through rational expectations for 
current prices. 
It can also be seen that past values of zt have a 
positive effect on prices. Cons Ider the individual 
components of z. Higher past growth rates in demand and 
bunker prices, which are the first two elements of z, 
imply a higher level for current demand and bunker 
prices. Rational expectations of future levels of these 
variables are generated by projecting from the current 
levels, the future expected growth rates embodied In the 
last term of (6S), vt. The higher the current level the 
higher the future level implied by these growth rates. 
Since higher expected demand and bunker prices imply 
higher expected profits this raises the current level of 
ship values. A similar argument can be used in order to 
interpret why higher changes in past returns to capital 
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have a negative impact on prices, given the other 
elements of (65). The last two components of zt are the 
shipbuilding costs and scrap prices. The larger the 
values of these variables in the past the greater will 
have been the restraint on the past growth rate of the 
f leet. This Implies a smaller current fleet size which 
has positive implications about future prof its and 
current prices. 
Equation (65) establishes the importance of past and 
current expectations of exogenous variables for 
explaining the f luctuations in ship values. Moreover 
since prices are the primary determinants of scrapping, 
shipbuilding and thus changes in 
-the f leet, they are also 
of paramount importance for explaining fluctuations in 
shipbuilding, demolition, fleet size and consequently 
freight rates. 
3.8 Continuous time model 
In this section a continuous time version of. the 
simple model is developed. It will be used to carry 
simulations which show how ship prices, the f leet. 
freight rates, prof Its etc. respond to anticipated or 
unanticipated changes in external factors such as the 
level of demand, fuel prices, alternative returns to 
capital, shipbuilding costs and scrap prices. The 
external factors operate directly either through the 
freight market or through the second hand, shipbuilding 
or scrapping market. However, because of the numerous 
interactions between these markets. a change In an 
external factor will in general Inf luence all the 
remaining markets. 
Because our model incorporates rational expectations 
we can distinguish between 
' 
anticipated and unanticipated 
shocks to the external factors. Naturally, as It will be 
shown, shocks of identical magnitude can lead to 
significantly different responses depending on whether 
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they have been anticipated or not before their occurence. 
In this section, the response of the system to 
unanticipated changes to the external factors will be 
analysed. Unanticipated shocks are changes that come as a 
complete surprise to the market and are only realized 
when they eventually occur. In the following section, the 
response of the 
-market to anticipated shocks will be 
considered. Unanticipated shocks are changes to , the 
external factors which the market realizes before- they 
occur. These theoretical simulations enable us to derive 
some qualitative results regarding the time pattern of 
the system's response to various shocks. 
- 
In the next chapters, the same type of analysis is 
carried out by means 
-of computer simulations of. the 
estimated econometric model. These will corroborate the 
qualitative results derived here but in addition they 
will also give some idea regarding the order of magnitude 
of the response. Moreover they will also throw some light 
on the spillover effects among the various ship types 
which cannot be Captured by the single ship type model 
considered here. 
The continuous time model consists of a continuous 
time version of the same set of equations. These are the 
following: 
qs q (66) 
s qK+ TF TPb (67) 
(l+7)F Tpb 
p-a1 ir, +a2P-a3r (69) 
jip 
-- 
jiji - ii3Pe (70) 
where X denotes the time derivative of X. The first 
equation is the equilibrium freight market condition. The 
second one is the supply in the freight market. The third 
one Is the relationship between maximum prof Its and 
freight rates and fuel prices. The fourth equation gives 
the equilibrium price In the second hand market as a 
function of the Instantaneous profitability, the expected 
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capital gain and the alternative returns to capital. The 
f inal equation has been derived by combining the 
newbuilding supply function, the scrapping equation and 
the identity that describes the evolution of the fleet. , 
It is assumed here that delivery of new ships Is 
instantaneous thus it is not necessary to distinguish 
between new and second hand prices which are in this case 
Identical. The constant p in equation (70) therefore 
represents a composite positive effect of ship prices on 
fleet growth. It not only represents the positive effect 
that higher ship prices have on the fleet growth through 
stimulating shipbuilding but also the positive effect 
that'arises through the restraint on scrapping. , 
It Is convenient to Introduce a new endogenous 
variable x defined as 
x-q-K (71) 
that is x is the logarithm of the ratio between demand 
and the fleet I. e. of the freight market balance. The 
Introduction of such a variable like x Is standard 
practice in dynamic economic models, were It Is more 
convenient to carry out the analysis in terms of 
transformations of the endogenous variables which are 
likely to be constant in the long run. Thus even though 
the fleet might be continuously growing in line with 
demand the freight market balance will be stable at the 
steady state, as the long run analysis has shown. Here, 
the analysis will be carried o ut on the x, P space which 
will be divided into four regions. By combining equations 
(66) to (70), the equations of motion of P and x shall be 
derived. These will be used to determine the direction 
towards which P, x will be moving, when the system 
happens to be in one of the four particular regions. To 
do this substitute (66) into (67) which gives 
K+ 7F - 7Pb 
-* 
K) + Pb (72) 
which. using the definition of x, can be written as 
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Fm (117)X + Pb (73) 
This equation simply says that the equilibrium freight 
rate increases when either the freight market balance or 
fuel prices Increase. Using (72) to substitute for F in 
(68). gives 
Ný JSX + Pb (74) 
where 
is - (1+7)/7 
Substitute the above expression in (69) to get (75) 
below. 
aI JSX +a1 Pb +a2P- cc 3r (7S) 
By substracting the growth rate of demand ý from both 
sides of equation (70) we get the following equation 
i-ý- 
tup +AI pi + 112ps (76) 
where use has been made of the f act that ý-ý-k. we 
are left now with the two equations of motion which are 
(75) and (76). These involve only two endogenous 
variables x, P and their time derivatives. From (76) it 
can be seen that at some point in time the freight market 
balance will be constant (i - 0) If and only If prices 
are at a level P* determined from 
ý- tLp + Al pi +A2 ps -0 (77) 
m 
and this constant level of prices P is thus equal to 
P* 
- 
(Illi)q*+ (IA 
I 
/A) p+ (A 
2 
/, I)Pn (78) 
In the x, P space we can draw a vertical line through 
this point P; * as in figure 3.6. The vertical line through 
P* is the ý--O locus. If at a point in time (77) holds 
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x 
Fig. 3.6 : The ; c=O locus 
x 
r 
pw 
0 
Fig. 3.7 : The P=O locus 
then ý must be momentarily equal to zero. Intuitively 
this' is because if prices happen to be at this level, 
then they stimulate shipbuilding and they restrain 
scrapping just enough in order to keep the growth rate of 
the fleet 'equal to the growth rate of demand. So the 
freight market balance remains constant. 
If 'on the other hand at some point in time', the 
system happens to be to the right of this locus I. e P>Pý*, 
then by simply looking at (76) it can be seen that x must 
now be falling. Intuitively this is because at a point 
such 'as A prices are higher than PýN. , Given the level of 
scrap 'prices and shipbuilding costs there Is now more 
shipbuilding and less scrapping. Thus the growth rate of' 
the f leet will now be higher than that of demand so the 
freight market balance must be deteriorating I. e. x must 
be failing. This is indicated by the arrow through point 
A. ' 
If on the other hand the system happens to be 'to the 
left of this locus, " I. e. if P<P then the ' analogous 
argument implies that the growth rate of the f leet must 
be slower "than that of demand, so x must be rising as 
indicated by'the'arrow through B. 
The position of 'the locus Is' determined by equation 
(77) 1 and'it' can'-'be seen from this that changes to either 
Pi or Ps will shift the position of the locus. In 
particular' the locus will shift to the right whenever q. 
Pi or ' Ps increase. This is natural s Ince higher 
shipbuilding costs or scrap prices have a negat ive effect 
on the growth' rate of the f leet and thus will require a 
higher price *P* in order to compensate for this, so as to 
bring back the growth rate of the f leet in line with that 
of demand. A higher ý also requires higher prices in 
order to maintain the freight market balance. 
Similarly, (75) can be used in order to f Ind the 
locus of 'points in the x, P space where 0. By looking 
at (75) this will be true only when 
Pwa1 jsx +aI Pb 
- gx 3r 
(79) 
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This equation determines a new set of points on the xP 
space which are represented In fig. 3.7 by the upward 
slopping line. This line represents the h*O locus. %vben 
x, P are such that system happens to be on that locus, 
then prices will be momentarily constant. 
Intuitively this Is because the freight market 
balance is such that together with the given bunker price 
it determines a particular profitability for ships. This 
profitability in relation to the current price P is such 
that there are no capital gains or losses needed in order 
to bring the return into line with that of other 
investments, adjusted for risk. In other words the 
profitability Is such that on its own without any change 
in values will just give a sufficient return. 
From equation (75) It can be seen that if we move to 
the south east of this locus, say at a point such as D 
then prices must be rising (h > 0). This Is because at 
point D prices are higher while x Is lower which means a 
worse freight market balance. The latter implies a lower 
prof itability. Given that prof Itability is lower and 
prices are higher, investors will now be prepared to pay 
these higher prices only If there are positive capital 
gains that will raise the return in line with that on 
other assets. Thus for the system to be at equilibrium at 
at a point such as D were prof its we lower and ships are 
more expensive, prices must be rising. 
On the other hand to the north west of the locus, say 
at a point such as B, prices are lower while x Is higher 
which which means a better freight market balance. The 
latter implies higher profits. This lower price therefore 
can only be an equilibrium price If values are falling in 
order to keep the return down into line with the return 
on other assets. 
By putting the two loci together as in f igure 3.8, It 
can be seen that they determine four different regions in 
the x, P space. To the lef t of the ý-O locus, z will be 
rising while to the right it will be falling as already 
explained. Similarly to the south east of the h-0 locus P 
will be rising, while to the north west P will be 
falling. Through every point in any region two arrows can 
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Fig. 3.9 : Solution Paths 
Fig. 3.8 Phase Dynamics 
be drawn Indicating the instantaneous direction of change 
of x, P when the system happens to be at that point. The 
direction of the arrows can be determined by simply 
noting the position of the point In relation to the two 
loci. Thus, at points above the k locus, such as A. B in 
regions I. IV prices must be falling, while below this 
locus e. g D, C in II, III prices must be rising. To the 
left of the ý-0 locus e. g C, B In III, IV x must be 
rising while to the right it must be failing. The 
intersection of the two loci, I. e point L, Is the steady 
state point were the system remains at rest. 
By starting from any point and following the 
direction of the arrows we can trace the evolution of the 
system over time given Its initial position. The various 
possibilities corresponding to the dif ferent initial 
positions are shown in figure 3.9. Starting from any 
point of departure,. the evolution of Ahe system can be 
traced by following the arrows. We can first note some 
qualitative features of the various paths. Thus when the 
system happens to be on the boundary between regions III 
and IV, the direction of movement should be momentarily 
vertically upwards. In the boundary between regions I and 
II the direction of motion should be vertically 
downwards. Similarly on the boundary between II and III 
the direction is horizontal to the right while between A 
and IV it is horizontal to the lef t. 
It can be seen that the system obeys the saddle path 
property. Thus by taking all solutions that, cross either 
from III into IV or from I into IV and separating them 
from those that cross from I into II or from III into II 
we get two curves which converge asymptotically to the 
steady state point L. This is a saddle path curve 
represented in figure 3.9 by the upward sloping line 
-SP 
which passes through L. Similarly be separating all those 
paths that cross from III into IV from those that cross 
from III into II and those that cross from I into IV from 
those that cross from I into II we get another pair of 
curves that pass through the steady state point L but 
which are unstable. The latter two curves are represented 
in figure 3.7 by the downward sloping dotted line through 
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point L. 
Should the system happen to be on these unstable 
paths then it diverges along the direction of the arrows. 
All other paths are ultimately unstable and they 
asymptotically move onto one of the two 
- 
unstable paths 
through L. Thus when the system is initially at a point 
such as C1 or C2 or BI then it eventually diverges and 
asymptotically approaches from below the unstable saddle 
path curve. On the other hand if the system Is at point 
A1 or A2 or B1 then it eventually diverges and 
asymptotically approaches from above the unstable saddle 
path curve. Similar unstable paths can, be derived by 
starting from any other point in any region. - Only if the 
initial x, P point-happens to be on the saddle path curve 
SP which passes through point L (e. g points A, C), will 
the system converge to the long run equilibrium. 
This might suggest that the system is unstable, that 
it is in general it will diverge. One might say that only 
if by chance we happen to be on the saddle path curve 
initially, will the system be stable. There Is an 
alternative interpretation however which makes the system 
globally stable. , All the -divergent solutions correspond 
to speculative bubble paths. The bubble free solution Is 
however unique and-, is represented by the saddle path 
route. At a particular point in time, x is given by the 
exogenous level of demand and the historically determined 
size of the fleet. The price of ships however Is a free 
variable which can instantaneously jump to any level the 
market determines. 
Thus in Fig. 3.10 the initial x, P point will have to 
lie some where on the horizontal line through this given 
value f or x, which is denoted by xI in f igure 3.10 below. 
On the other hand the ship price P is free to move to any 
level. If the system follows the 'bubble' free dynamics 
then it has to move to the level that will set the system 
on the saddle path. In terms of figure 3.10 this implies 
that the initial equilibrium is at point I wti Ich Is 
determined by the intersection of the horizontal line 
through the historically given level of x, that is xr, 
and the saddle path line. 
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'The system moves over time In the direction of the 
arrows from "the initial point. ' that Is It converges to 
the long run equilibrium L. Starting from any other point 
on the horizontal curve through x the system will 
eventually diverge. The assumption that' prices can jump 
instantaneously in order to set the system on the 
convergent saddle path is not an arbitrary one. ' All the 
unstable solutions are 'bubble' paths. They are analogous 
to the unstable solutions of equation (14) which are 
given by (17). These appear when we set the undetermined 
coefficient A 'to some value other than 0. On the other 
hand the 
- saddle path solution Is the solution that 
ass6mes that there are no 'bubble' elements In the 
development of ship prices. In terms of equation (17) It 
corresponds to the case were A-0. It was seen in section 
3.4 when the possible solutions of equation (14) were 
studied, that the 'no bubble' solution is the solution 
that expresses prices purely as a function of the 
economic fundamentals only. Unstable solutions differ 
from the the stable one by an arbitrary time dependent 
constant A(I+r) t which has no economic inte rpretation. 
Moreover this term if nonzero will eventually explode to 
minus or plus Infinity and thus it will dominate the 
price path. The 'empirical evidence clearly shows that 
ship prices do not diverge. This implies that either 
bubbles do not appear at all or if they do they 
eventually- "burst. The latter implies economic loss and 
this provides an economic rationale for assuming that the 
system follows the bubble free saddle path. 
3.7 Unanticipated Shocks 
. In this section, the phase diagram Is used In order 
to consider how the system responds to various shocks. 
First, an arbitrary set of assumptions regarding the 
initial conditions (such as the size of the fleet) and 
the future path 
-of the external factors Is made. These 
generate a- particular equilibrium base run path which the 
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system would follow in response to the assumed base run 
external influences. Then a change In the assumed path of 
one of the exogenous factors or one of the Initial 
conditions is introduced and the new path that the system 
would follow in response to this change, Is calculated. 
The two paths are then compared and the simulation 
results are summarized by calculating the deviation of 
the new path from the base run path. 
Since the base run assumptions are arbitrary we might 
as well chose the simplest possible ones. Thus it will be 
assumed that all external factors such as the growth rate 
of demand, fuel prices, alternative returns to capital, 
prices of shipbuilding inputs and scrap prices are 
constant forever. This means that on the phase diagram 
the positions of the two loci remain constant and thus 
there is a unique long run equilibrium at point L. It 
will also be assumed that the initial value of x Is the 
one which corresponds to point L. Thus In the base run 
the system is at point L at time zero and remains at this 
point forever. 
We can now calculate the path that the system would 
follow should there be a completely unexpected change in 
one of the external factors. To carry out the analysis, 
it is sufficient to look at the two loci and how their 
position will change following an external shock. By 
keeping the system on the 'no. bubble' new saddle path the 
new solution can be derived. 
3.7.1 Permanent unanticipated Increase in the level- of 
demand 
Let it be assumed that while the system is at rest at 
point L. there is suddenly, at time 0, an unexpected 
permanent increase in the level of demand. To follow the 
market movements we can use the phase diagram of fig 3.10 
and also the diagrams of fig 3.11 which are a translation 
of the phase diagram's system movements on a time axis. 
In terms of the phase diagram the change in the level of 
demand does not affect the position of the two loci but 
iss 
---------------------- 
pi p 
Fig. 3.10 : Unanticipated increase in the level of demand 
9 rT 
-------------- 
III 
time time 
Fig. 3.11 
- 
System's response to demand shock 
it will instantaneously change the initial value of x, 
that is the freight market balance will immediately 
improve. Thus x increases Instantaneously to some level 
say xI in figure 3.10. The new long run equilibrium of 
the system is again the same as in the bass run, point L, 
since the position of the two loci is unchanged. 
The initial equilibrium however Is given now by the 
intersection of the horizontal line through XI and the 
saddle path curve SP through L. The Intersection occurs 
at point 1. Thus prices jump Initially from the point 
represented by L to the point represented by I. 
The evolution of the system over time can be traced 
by moving along the saddle path In the direction of the 
arrows. The system will traverse along the segment IL. 
Fig. 3.11 shows how the freight market balance, 
profits, ship prices and the fleet growth rate will move 
over time as the system will be traversing along IL in 
f Ig. 3.10. Fig 3.11 shows four diagrams. Diagram I 
depicts the time path of the freight market balance W. 
diagram II shows the path of profits W, diagram III 
shows the evolution of ship prices M and f Inally 
diagram IV depicts the time path of the f leet growth rate 
(k). The horizontal dotted line on each diagram shows the 
time path of the variable under the base run scenario 
were the system is at rest at point L. Thus in the base 
run freight market balance is constant at a level XL. 
prof its at wL, prices at PL and f leet growth rate at KL. 
The solid line in each diagram represents the new path 
that the variable would follow in the case of the 
unexpected shock. Alternatively and more generally it can 
be thought off as representing the deviation of the 
system's shocked path from an arbitrary base run path. 
At time 0, when the shock occurs, the system moves to 
point I in f Ig. 3.10. At that point both the freight 
market balance and prices are higher. In terms of f ig. 
3.11 this Is indicated by the fact that In diagram I, x 
moves instantaneously from the base run level xL to the 
new higher level x 1* At time 0, prices also jump from PL 
to PI as shown in fig. 3.11 (IV). Because of the freight 
market tightening, profits jump from the base run level 
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9 to a higher level w as fig 3.11 (11) indicates. LI 
Because of the higher prices scrapping decreases while 
shipbuilding expands. Thus, at time 0 and as fig. 3.11 
(IV) shows, the growth rate of the fleet instantaneously 
increases from KL to K I' 
Because of the higher prices the growth rate of the 
fleet rises above the base run level. The higher prices 
imply that there Is more shipbuilding and and less 
scrapping which causes the fleet to grow at a faster rate 
than demand. Thus the freight market balance. although at 
a high level initially, begins to fall gradually towards 
the base run level. There will be sometime before the 
market balance and consequently rates and prof Its, 
approach the base run level, as the f leet can only 
respond with af Inite speed. In the meantime prof Its will 
remain above the, base run level even though they will be 
dropping continuously towards ir L as the increase in the 
f leet begins to eat away the initial improvement in 
market balance. This temporary freight market boom, makes 
room for the Initial speculative increases in ship 
values. The initial speculative jump caused by the 'news' 
regarding the higher level of demand, Is limited, by the 
fact that the higher values will raise the growth rate of 
the fleet. This will tend to restrain future rates and 
profits. Equilibrium is achieved at a price level where 
the future expected prof its that are likely to be 
generated by the external shock and the response of the 
system are just sufficient to earn a return on the 
initial price. 
The system exhibits the overshooting property. Market 
balance, profits, prices and fleet growth rate overshoot 
the long run level at which they eventually settle. In 
the short term the f leet is f Ixed. This helps to create a 
temporary freight market shortage and market balance 
Improves causing an Increase In rates and prof its. 
Inspite of the expected return to normality, the Increase 
in profits justif ies a speculative jump in values. 
Subsequently the f leet responds and overtime the market 
moves towards the base run level. At time 0 the market 
anticipates the oncoming recessionary phase and thus the 
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increase in prices is less than proportionate to the 
Increase in profits. This raises the yield on ships and 
this is needed in order to compensate for the anticipated 
future capital losses caused by the tendency to return to 
normality. 
The above simulation results as well as the ones 
discussed below, are not meant to be entirely 
presentative of what actually happens in practice. This 
reflects the f act that a number of simplifying 
assumptions have been made in order to allow quick 
derivation of the results without at the same time 
signif icantly distorting the real world picture. For 
example it has been assumed that shipbuilding supply 
responds immediately to current prices. In reality supply 
of newbuildings Is predetermined In the short run by 
decisions taken in the past and only the future supply 
can respond to unexpected changes In prices. If this 
construction lag had been taken Into account, then the 
timing and magnitude of the system's fluctuations would 
have differed somewhat. Inspite of that, the simulations 
presented do capture the broad features that a more 
realistic model would have generated. This neglect of 
some real world features is justified on the grounds that 
their incorporation, into the theoretical model would have 
considerably complicated the theoretical analysis without 
materially altering týe results. At the same time 
simulations of more realistic hypothetical models could 
conceal the importance and the work Ings of the 
fundamental forces that we have already taken into 
account, by bringing Into the picture less essential 
details. In any case, this problem of some lack of 
realism is considerably remedied in the following 
chapters were computer simulations of the more realistic 
econometric models are presented. 
3.7.2 Permanent unanticipated increase in growth rate of 
demand 
The effects of an unanticipated increase in the 
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growth rate of demand from a level g to a higher level 
g', are shown of f Ig. 3.12 and f 1g. 3.13. In terms of the 
two loci the shock will have the effect of shif ting the 
i=O locus to the right while the position of the P-0 
locus is not affected. Mathematically this can be seen by 
looking at equations (77), (79) that determine the 
positions of the two loci. Intuitively the x=O locus 
shifts because now that the growth rate of demand is 
higher, a higher level of ship prices is needed in order 
to stimulate shipbuilding and suppress scrapping so as to 
raise the growth rate of the f leet in line with that of 
demand. 
Fig. 3.12 shows the position of the loci before and 
after the shoýk. The vertical line ý-O: ý-g through the 
point PýN denotes the position of the ý-O locus before the 
shock when demand growth Is at the low level g. Following 
the increase In demand to g', this locus shifts to the 
right, to a now position Indicated by the vertical line 
ý=O: ý-g' through the point I'm The h-0 locus does not 
shift. Following the shift In the ý-O locus there Is a 
new long run equilibrium established at point L' to which 
the market will eventually move to. 
There is also a new saddle path curve S'P' through 
the point L'. Initially the market moves to point I which 
is determined by the intersection of the horizontal line 
through the fixed and historically determined freight 
market balance and the new saddle path curve S'P'. Over 
time the market will move from point I to point L' as the 
arrows indicate. 
Fig. 3.13 translates these phase diagram movements on 
a time scale. It can be seen that freight market balance 
Is initially unchanged and so are profits. They gradually 
begin to increase however and In the long run they settle 
to a level xL, and xL, respectively. Prices and the 
growth rate of the f leet immediately jump to a level P 
and KI and begin to climb towards the long run level P 
and K L' respectively. 
The initial level of demand Is not changed by the 
shock. Thus freight market balance and prof Its are 
initially unchanged. However the rate of change of demand 
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and thus its future level has increased. These news lead 
to the speculative jump in values from PL to r P This 
causes an expansion in the growth rate of the fleet, 
through increased supply of newbuildings and a reduction 
In scrapping. Informed speculation implies that the jump 
in prices will be sufficiently restrained to a level Pr 
so as to hold down the increase in the growth rate of the 
f leet to a level KI lower than g'. Only then will the 
fleet lag behind demand so as to allow future profits to 
I increase and thus repay the higher initial price P 
Higher/lower prices than PI arel rejected by the market 
since they imply higher/lower fleet growth rate which In 
turn through its effect on prof Its will Imply an 
insufficient/excess return to be earned. As time passes 
by, investors are prepared to pay higher prices for ships 
since they are faced with a higher discounted profit 
prof I Ia. The progressive Increase In prices, leads to 
further increases in the growth rate of 
-the 
fleet which 
tends to move closer to g' and thus there is a 
decelaration In the rate of Increase of market balance 
and profits. Eventually profits and prices increase to an 
extent that fleet growth catches up with that of demand 
(g' ) and thus the market settles to a new long run 
equilibrium. In the mean time the f loot growth has lagged 
behind that of demand which Implies permanent 
improvements in market balance. These are supported by 
the long run fundamentals of the market. The higher long 
run balance is needed to raise prof Its and prices 
permanently so as to bring up the f loot growth in line 
with that of demand. 
3.7.3 Permanent unanticipated increase in bunker prices 
A permanent increase in the level of Pb from a level 
say a to a higher level a' will shift the P-0 locus to 
the right while the position of the ý-O locus will not be 
affected. Mathematically this can be seen by, looking at 
equations (77). (79) that determine the Positions of the 
two loci. Intuitively the locus h=O shifts because now 
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for a given value of x the implied profitability is 
higher. Thus a smaller capital gain Is needed in order to 
maintain the return at the equilibrium level. The Impact 
effects of an increase In the fuel price on freight rates 
and profits can be derived by considering equations (73) 
and (74). These suggest that for a given freight market 
balance an increase In the price of fuel will increase 
equilibrium freight rates and prof Its by a 
proportionately identical amount. T his effect of a fuel 
increase on prof itability crucially depends on the 
assumption of a completely inelastic demand that we have 
made. Should the demand be elastic the Impact effects of 
fuel price increases on profits could very well be 
negative, If the elasticity of demand was sufficiently 
high. However, here where demand is assumed to be 
completely inelastic. most of the increase in costs Is 
passed over to shippers thus rates and profits Increase. 
The new positions of the two loci before and after 
the shock are shown in fig. 3.14. The shock shifts the 
i--O locus to the right. The h=O: Pb-a line through point L 
indicates the position of this locus before the shock. 
Af ter the shock, it moves to the right to a now position 
indicated by the k-O: Pb-a' line through point L. There 
is a new long run equilibrium at point L' and a new 
saddle path SP' through this new steady state. 
Initially the market moves to point I where prices 
are higher but freight market balance is unchanged at the 
historically determined level. Over time the market 
begins to move from point I to the new long run 
equilibrium point V as Indicated by the arrows. 
Fig. 3.15 shows the fluctuations of x, ir, P. k caused 
by the Increase in the bunker prices. The initial freight 
market balance is not affected by the shock. Inspite of 
that prof its immediately increase from 11L to it 
I 
as the 
increase in fuel costs creates an artif Icial freight 
market shortage through the incentive to slowsteam. The 
f leet cannot respond immediately and the freight 'market 
boom is expected to last for some time. This causes a 
speculative increase In values from PL to Pr. This in 
turn leads to an expansion in the growth rate of the 
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I f leet from KL to K as scrapping decreases and 
shipbuilding expands. The size of the speculative jump in 
values is limited by the fact that It will tend to 
restrain 
-future profitability through its positive effect 
on the f leet. The expansion in the growth rate of the 
f leet implies that over time 
, 
the freight market balance 
begins to deteriorate and thus profits begin to fall from 
their high initial level. Prof its however still remain 
above the base run level as the positive effect of the 
bunker price increase, outweighs the negative effects of 
the deteriorating market, balance. Overtime values fall as 
investors are progressively faced with a lower profit 
profile. Thus prices return towards the base run level 
and so does the f leet growth rate. In the mean time the 
fleet has grown, faster than demand thus eventually market 
balance, falls to a level XL. 
, 
This drop In market balance exactly outweighs the 
positive effect of higher bunker prices on prof Its. 
Prof its and prices and consequently f leet growth return 
to the 
' 
base run level. The freight market balance 
, 
however, drops permanently and this reflects permanent 
slowsteaming. The shipbuilding boom raises the 
. 
size of 
the f leet which lowers x. The given level of demand is 
now satisfied by more ships running at slower speed. 
This indicates the ef f Iclency of free shipping 
markets from a welfare point of view whereby the system 
reacts Ao the shock by building more ships the 
construction costs of which are unchanged and by 
economising on expensive fuel. 
3.7.4 Permanent unanticipated increase in shipbuilding 
costs (or scrap prices) 
This section considers what happens in the case where 
there is a permanent unanticipated inc rease in the price 
of shipbuilding inputs. The qualitative effects of such a 
shock are Identical to those arising 
, 
from an 
unanticipated increase in the price of scrap which here 
is treated as exogenous. In what follows it shall 
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therefore be assumed that there has been an unanticipated 
permanent increase in the level of shipbuilding costs, 
having in mind that exactly the same results are obtained 
when an increase in the price of scrap occurs. 
Both an increase in the price of the shipbuilding 
input or In the price of scrap have the effect of 
shifting the ý-O locus to the right. This Is because an 
increase in shipbuilding costs will tend to reduce the 
supply of new ships at a given level of ship prices and 
it will thus require higher prices in order to keep the 
growth rate of the f leet in line with that of demand. 
Thus the ý--O locus moves to the right. On the other the 
position of the h=O locus is not affected. 
Fig. 3.16 shows the position of the loci before and 
after the increase in shipbuilding costs from a level say 
a to a higher level a'. The position of the ý-O locus 
prior to the shock, is represented by the vertical 
ý=O: P 
1 =a 
line through P*. The position of this locus 
after the shock is indicated by the vertical line 
i--o: PI 
-a' through point P". The position of the h-0 
locus Is not affected. There Is a shift in the long run 
equilibrium from point L to point L'. The initial 
equilibrium is determined by the intersection of the 
horizontal through point L and the new saddle path S'P. 
This is point I in f Ig. 3.16. From time 0 onwards the 
system moves in the direction of the arrows from point I 
to the new long run equilibrium point V. 
Fig. 3.17 shows the f luctuations in the system's 
variables following the shock. - There is no impact effect 
on the freight market balance or on the profitability as 
the level of demand, bunker prices and fleet are 
initially unchanged. However, the news regarding the 
permanent Increase in the level of shipbuilding costs 
generate speculation in the second hand markets which 
causes the ship price to jump from PL to PI in 
anticipation of the restraining effects of the shock on 
the f leet growth rate. The Increase in values would tend 
to expand the supply of new ships and thus partly cancel 
the 
-restraining effect of the Increase In costs. This is 
indeed true but the speculative jump in values Is 
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proportionately smaller than the increase In costs. Thus 
prices relative to shipbuilding costs do drop Initially 
and this causes the growth rate of the f leet to fall to 
K This result does not depend on any assumptions we 
have made regarding various elasticities. 
From time 0 onwards, the freight market balance and 
thus prof Its begin to improve as the fleet growth drops. 
As the fleet growth continuously lags behind demand, 
freight market balance improves further and thus profits 
also continue to increase. Investors begin to pay 
progressively higher prices for ships as with the passing 
of time a higher profit profile lies ahead of them. This 
is thanks to the fact that the drops In the fleet size 
are accumulated over time. The higher prices however lead 
to further cancelling of the restraining effects of the 
higher costs on the newbuilding supply. Thus the fleet 
growth picks up and tends to return towards the base run 
level. Eventually profits and prices rise by an amount 
which completely cancels the restraining effects of the 
shock on the f leet. Thus the market settles to a new long 
run equilibrium where the fleet growth rate returns to 
the base run level. Thus eventually the fleet moves in 
line with demand. In the , meantime - the accumulated 
cutbacks in fleet growth has led to a permanent 
improvement in freight market balance, prof its and 
prices. These are necessary in order to raise the long 
run growth rate of the f leet to equal that of demand. 
There Is also permanent reduction In slow steaming as the 
higher x implies higher freight rates and thus speeds. 
Again the efficiency of the free market mechanism Is 
indicated by these movements. The system reacts to the 
shock, by cutting back the 'more costly production of 
ships and satisf ying the given demand by higher 
utilization of the remaining f leet through higher speeds 
and higher consumption of fuel the price of which has not 
changed. 
It can be seen from f Ig. 3.17 that this shock leads 
to prices undershooting their new long run equilibrium 
level whereas the f leet growth overshoots. 
iss 
3.7.5 Permanent unanticipated increase in alternative 
returns to capital (r) 
An increase In r from a level say a to a higher level 
a' will shift the h--O locus to the left leaving the ý-O 
locus unaffected. This Is because at a given x. P point 
stronger capital gains will now be needed in order to 
raise the return on ships closer to the new, higher value 
of r. Fig. 3.18 the position of the various loci before 
and after the shock. The position of the h-0 locus prior 
to the shock is indicated by the upward sloping line 
P--O: 
r--a through L. There Is a new long run equilibrium at 
point L'. There is also a new saddle path curve SP' 
through this point. 
Following the shock the Initial equilibrium is 
determined by the intersection of the horizontal through 
L and the new saddle path curve. This Is point I of f Ig. 
3.18. From then on the system begins to move in the 
direction of the arrows towards point L'. 
Fig. 3.19 shows the system's fluctuations against 
time following the change in r. There is no impact effect 
on the freight market balance and profits as initially 
the level of demand, the fleet and bunker prices are 
unchanged. However in the second hand markets there Is a 
tendency for investors to switch to other assets in order 
to earn the higher return. At equilibrium, ships must be 
willingly held in investors' portfolios and this requires 
an immediate drop in values from PL to P This helps to 
raise the return on ships. The drop In values leads to 
increased scrapping and reduced supply of newbuildings 
thus the fleet growth rate immediately drops down to K 
This in turns helps to raise future profits and this 
restrains the initial speculative drop in values. 
Because of the drop in the f leet growth rate the 
freight market balance begins to improve and thus so do 
prof Its. This In turn helps to bring a gradual increase 
in prices. This is also reflected In the partial recovery 
of the f leet growth. However the f leet growth 
continuously lags behind that of demand, even though the 
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gap is continuously closing. The former implies that the 
freight market balance and profits continue to improve. 
The latter implies that the improvement begins to 
decelerate. The recovery In profits. leads to a recovery 
In prices and thus in the Increase of the f leet. 
Eventually prof its increase to an extent that prices and 
fleet growth return to the base run level. Meanwhile the 
previous slowdown in fleet growth leads to a permanent 
improvement in market balance and profits but not prices. 
This is because the higher profits are now more heavily 
discounted. 
Again here prices and fleet growth rate, initially 
overshoot their long run equil ibrium level. 
3.7.6 "Speculative Bubble Burst" 
It shall now be assumed that Initially ship prices 
are at a different level than the one required to set the 
system on the saddle path. In our base run the stable 
equilibrium requires that the system should be initially 
at point L with prices at a level in f Ig. 3.20. Given 
the base run assumptions, this will imply that the system 
will remain at rest for ever at point L. 
Let It be assumed that because of some irrationality 
prices are initially higher than as at time 0 the 
system finds Itself at point A. This higher price brings 
down the yield. Thus investors will pay this high amount 
of money only if prices are rising strongly at A In order 
to maintain the return at a competitive level. Because of 
the higher prices there Is more shipbuilding and less 
scrapping so the fleet is growing more rapidly than 
demand. The latter implies a worsening freight market 
balance and lower profitability in the next period. The 
high price together with the drop in prof Itability 
therefore requires even higher capital gains in the next 
period in order to keep the return at the equilibrium 
level. This implies even higher fleet growth rate and 
lower profits in the following period and so on. Thus an 
unstable exploding path emerges if the initial 
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overpricing is to be justified. In fig. 3.20 this Is 
represented by the curve through point A. 
It can be seen that along the bubble path ship prices 
explode to infinity without regard to profitability. ' The 
latter collapses as the fleet explodes in line with ship 
values. The initial overpricing can only be justifiable 
to investors if prices follow this exploding path. The 
system should move from point A towards point B and then 
continue towards the south east direction as 'the arrows 
indicate, unless the bubble bursts. Loosely speaking, 
such a path can be Interpreted as a case were investors 
believe that ship values have acquired an accelerating 
momentum and a life of their own which allows a return to 
be earned because of the strong capital gain component 
and in spite of , the resulting ins Ignif Icant 
prof Itability. If investors believe this path will be 
followed then It can become a self fullfiling prophesy as 
the capital gains keeps every Investor satisfied. 
In the previous sections the system's behaviour was 
analysed assuming that 
- 
there are no 'bubbles'. It , Is 
debatable whether 'bubbles' appear in actual practice. In 
the real world ship values seem to fluctuate 'within 
finite bounds 
. 
and eventually they return to the level 
suggested by the underlying long run freight market 
prof itability. This suggests that even though 'bubbles' 
might appear in the short run, they do not last for long 
I. e they eventually burst. Let us therefore consider the 
time of path of the system when a speculative' bubble 
develops which is followed by a burst that sets the 
system on the convergent path. 
Let us say therefore that the system begins initially 
from point A and travels along the unstable path through 
A until at some point the bubble bursts. The latter 'is 
assumed to happen at some point in time t when the system 
reaches point B. To set the system on the convergent path 
the market must move to point C which Implies a collapse 
in ship values as the system moves from B to C which lies 
on the saddle path SP. 
At C ship values are lower than at L or B and thus so 
is shipbuilding, while scrapping Is higher. Thus the 
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initial overpricing at A and the excessive f leet growth 
that occurs, while the system moves from A to B must be 
followed by a correction phase were prices collapse and 
this chokes off shipbuilding and stimulates scrapping. 
This Is needed in order to cancel the speculative 
increase in the f leet so as to move the system back ot 
the long run equilibrium point L. As the system moves 
from C to L, with values always lower than at the long 
run level, the excess fleet size which was build up 
during the bubble period is eliminated during 
depression phase. This allows the market to approach Its 
long run equilibrium. The collapse in values from B to C 
implies a loss of money for investors who hold ships at 
that time. 
In mathematical terms the second hand market 
equilibrium condition breaks down temporarily at the 
moment of the correction. The big capital losses made at 
that moment provides us with an economic rationale for 
assuming that investors will 
_ 
avoid the development of 
such bubbles for fear of a burst. This Is, the assumption 
that was made in the previous sections. 
Fig. 3.21 translates the phase diagram movements onto 
a time scale. It can be seen that initially the bubble 
increases prices to the unsustainable level PA This 
also increases the growth rate of the f leet to KA As a 
result the freight market balance and prof Itability 
worsens. As long us the bubble lasts. prices continue to 
increase and so does the fleet growth. This causes the 
freight market balance and profits to fall further. At 
time t the bubble bursts and prices collapse from a level 
PB to a lower level PC. The f leet growth also drops 
instantaneously from an all time high level of KB to an 
all time low KC. As a result the market balance and 
prof Its begin to improve. As prof Its rise. prices begin 
to recover from their lows. There is thus a deceleration 
in the speed with which the freight market is 
, 
Improving. 
Eventually x, ir, P, k return to the base run level and 
the effects of the bubble disappear in the long run. 
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3.8 Anticipated Shocks 
In this section the system's reaction to shocks which 
are anticipated by the market before they occur will be 
considered. An identical base run will be used for the 
purposes of the simulations. Thus under the simple base 
run the system is in long run equilibrium with the fleet 
growing at the same rate as demand and profits, market 
balance and prices are constant. Then the system's 
equilibrium path Is calculated under the assumption that 
at time t (t*O) there Is a change in one of the exogenous 
variables similar to the ones considered In the previous 
section. Here however the shock Is not unexpected but the 
market is assumed to foresee It at time 0. Again 
'bubbles' are ignored throughout the whole of this 
section and it is assumed that prices are set purely on 
the basis of economic fundamentals. The convergent stable 
solution of the system will be calculated under the base 
run assumptions and subsequently under the assumption of 
the shock. Use will be made of the fact that near the 
intersection of the two loci the speed of motion becomes 
very slow while further away from this point the speed of 
motion becomes faster. 
3.8.1 Permanent anticipated increase in growth rate of 
demand 
In the previous section It was seen that an increase 
in the growth rate of demand from say some level g to a 
higher level g' shifts the ý-O locus to the right. Here 
the shift occurs at time t when the shock occurs. However 
the market reacts at time 0 when the shock Is realized., by 
the market. Fig. 3.22 shows the position of the 
ý-O locus 
before and after the anticipated shock. The vertical line 
ý--O: ý-g through L represents the position of this locus 
before the shock while at time t this shifts to the 
position indicated by the line 
ý=O: ý-g' through L'. There 
is also a new saddle path S'P' curve through L'. 
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Fig. 3.22 : Anticipated increase in demand growth rate 
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Wen the shock was completely unanticipated (I. e t=0) 
the initial market equilibrium was at point 1. Now that 
the shock is, anticipated the market can react before the 
actual increase In 4 'takes place and this dampens the 
future effects of the shock. In addition there Is 
discounting of the future benefits of the shock. Thus 
initially the speculative jump in 
- 
values is smaller 
. 
than 
in the anticipated case. Thus at time 0 the system moves 
to some point in between L and I such as N. This 
-implies 
a smaller initial jump in ship values. 
The direction of motion of the system at some point 
in the x, P can be determined by Its relative position to 
the two loci. Up to time t it is the two loci through 
point L that are relevant while af ter time t the phase 
dynamics are determined by the two loci through point L'. 
Thus up to time t the system moves along the NH segment 
in the direction of the arrows. At time t the market 
f Inds Itself at point H which lies on the new saddle path 
through L. Indeed the initial equilibrium at point N Is 
determined by this requirement that at time t the market 
should f Ind Itself on the new saddle path. From time t 
onwards the market moves along the segment HL' in the 
direction of the arrows. 
Fig. 3.23 translates the comovements; of x, it, P, k 
onto a time axis. It can be seen that at time zero when 
the market learns about the future shock, prices jump 
from a level PL to a level PN. The growth rate of the 
fleet also responds in the same way as the higher prices 
bring forward a higher newbuilding supply and at the same 
time they restrain scrapping. Thus the fleet begins to 
grow faster than demand. The increase in the growth rate 
of 
-demand has not as yet occurred and thus the freight 
market 
-balance and profits begin to drop. The increases 
in the fleet are accumulated and thus market balance 
falls further with the passing of time. As time moves 
closer to t there are further speculative gains In prices 
as the turning point in freight market becomes more 
Imminent and is thus less heavily discounted. This 
further increases the size of the fleet and depresses the 
freight market. Thus the freight market is at an all time 
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low just before the occurrence of the shock because of 
the accumulating continuous Increases in the size of the 
fleet that have taken place. 
From time t onwards the f leet continuous to grow at a 
high rate but now demand growth rises to an even higher 
level g' and thus the freight market gap created during 
the initial speculative build up, begins to close. 
Freight market balance and prof Its begins to recover. 
This causes prices and f leet growth to rise futher. These 
changes are supported by the higher demand growth which 
runs faster than that of the f leet. At some point in time 
after t, market balance and prof Its rise above the base 
run level and this is what justif ies the initial 
speculative rise in values. The further increases in 
prof its and prices cause an additional increase in, the 
f leet growth which moves closer ' to g. Thus market 
balance continuous to improve but at a slower rate, after 
rising above the base run level. Eventually profits and 
prices rise to such an extent that the fleet growth 
catches up with that of demand and the market settles on 
a long run equilibrium. This long run equilibrium 
Involves higher fleet 'growth (g'). higher prices, higher 
freight market balance and profits. 
3.8.2 Permanent anticipated increase in bunker prices 
An increase in bunker prices from a level a to a 
higher level a' will shift the P--O locus to the right 
without affecting the ý-O locus. Fig. 3.24 shows the 
position of the loci before and after the shock. The 
position of the P--O locus prior to the shock Is 
represented by the P; O: Pb-a line through L while after 
the shock its new position Is represented by the 
P--O: Pb--a' line through L. There Is a new saddle path 
through L' which is denoted by SP'. 
It was seen in the previous section that If the shock 
Is unanticipated the initial equilibrium will be poin t 1. 
Now that the shock is anticipated the fleet will react 
before the increase in bunker prices takes place and this 
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Fig. 3.25 : System's response to bunker price shock 
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will dampen the effects of the change. In addition there 
is discounting of the future effects which further 
restrains the Initial speculative jump In values. Thus 
the system will initially move at a point in between L 
and I such as N. 
From time 0 up to time t the system will be moving 
along the segment NH. At time t the system moves to point 
H which lies on the new saddle path. From then on the 
market moves in a different direction as the shift in the 
h--0 locus changes the phase dynamics. The market begins 
to move from point H towards point L' In the direction of 
the arrows. 
Fig. 3.25 translates the phase movements onto a time 
axis. It can be seen that initially prices jump to PN and 
parallel to that the f leet growth moves to KN. The f aster 
increase in the size of the f leet causes a deterioration 
in the freight market balance. Bunker prices have not 
increased yet and thus profitability falls In line with 
x. Prices increase further as time passes by and this 
causes further expansion of the fleet and deterioration 
of the freight market balance. The increases In the fleet 
are accumulated and thus the freight market profitability 
reaches an all time low just before the occurrence of the 
shock. 
At time t, bunker prices increase and this induces an 
incentive to s low steam. This creates an artif Icial 
freight market shortage. Because demand is completely 
inelastic the increase in costs Is completely past over 
onto the shippers and thus prof Itability increases. 
Indeed at time t the profitability jumps from its all 
time low level x. to an all time high ir,,,. The increase 
in fuel prices causes profits to increase above their 
base run level in spite of the speculative increase in 
the size of the f leet. This pattern does not depend on 
any other assumptions about elasticities. Wen 
speculation is informed, any tendency for the fleet to 
grow too fast, causing a bigger restrain In profits, 
leads to speculative, corrections in prices that prevent 
this from happening. From time t onwards, the higher 
prices cause a further increase in the size of the fleet 
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and thus a further drop in x. Thus prof Its begin to 
recede from their all time high level. This causes a 
turning point In prices and fleet growth. Prices are at 
an all time high at t where the prof it prospects are at 
their best. After time t the increase in fleet size bring 
profits and prices down towards the base run level. This 
also helps to bring the growth rate of the f leet down 
towards the base run level. Freight market balance 
continuously drops until the system moves to a new long 
run equilibrium. The effects of the bunker shock on 
profits, prices and fleet growth disappear in the long 
run. There is however a permanent drop in x which 
reflects permanent slowsteaming. Because of the temporary 
shipbuilding boom there are more ships to satisfy the 
given level of demand. 
3.8.3 Pennanent anticipated increase in shipbuilding 
costs (or scrap prices) 
An increase In shipbuilding costs or scrap prices 
have similar effects on the time path of the system. Thus 
the analysis will be carried assuming an increase in 
shipbuilding costs from a level a to a higher level a' 
has taken place having In mind that similar time paths 
would arise If there had been an increase in scrap 
prices. The effect of an Increase in Pi Is to shift the 
ý=O locus to the right. In Fig. 3.26 the position of this 
locus before the shock Is represented by the ; r-O: Pi-a 
line through L while its position after the shock is 
represented by the ý=O: Pi-a' line through L'. 
If the shock is unanticipated the system moves on to 
point I initially. Wen the shock Is anticipated the 
initial speculative increase in values is lower as the 
system has time to react and as the effects of the shock 
will be mainly felt In the more distant future which Is 
more heavily discounted. Thus at time 0 equilibrium will 
be established at a point such as N which lies in between 
L and 1. 
From time 0 onwards ý the system will move from N 
204 
Fig. 3.26 : Anticipated increase in shipbuilding costs 
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towards H in the direction of the arrows. It will reach 
point H which lies on the new saddle path SP' at time t 
when the shock occurs. The increase in shipbuilding costs 
at t will cause a shift in the ý-O locus which affects 
the phase dynamics at any point including H. Thus after 
time t the system changes direction and begins to move 
from H towards the long run equilibrium point L' in the 
direction of the arrows. 
Fig. 3.27 shows the fluctuations in x, w, P, k6efore 
and after the shock. The realization of the shock leads 
to an initial speculative increase in values from PL to 
PN. This causes the growth rate of the f leet to expand 
since shipbuilding costs have not 'as yet risen. As a 
result the f reight market becomes depressed. This 
depression deepens over time as the increases in the 
fleet size are accumulated. As time t is approached and 
the market moves closer to the point where the higher 
costs will restrain the fleet size there are further 
speculative gains in values. This further depresses the 
freight market. 
At time t the increase in costs occurs and the 
shipbuilding, supply Immediately contracts. As a result 
the growth' rate of the fleet collapses from its all time 
high level -KH to an all time low K W. The Increase in 
costs completely cancels the positive effects of the 
higher ship values on the supply of new ships and the 
fleet growth drops below the base run level. This implies 
that the freight market and profits begin to turn at time 
t. Eventually they Increase above the base run level and 
this is what justifies the initial speculative increase 
in prices. This makes room for further gains in values as 
the fleet' growth remains below that of demand. However as 
long as this lasts there are continuous improvements in 
market balance and profits which eventually raise prices 
to such an extent that fleet growth rate recovers to the 
base run level. From t onwards the fleet lags ' behind 
demand to such an extent that It completely cancels out 
the gains in fleet size that were achieved before time t. 
This causes a permanent increase in freight market 
balance, profits and prices. These are needed In order to 
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cancel the permanent restraint of the higher costs on the 
supply of new ships so as to raise the f leet growth back 
into line with that of demand. 
The efficiency of the system can again be be seen 
from the time pattern of the fluctuations. Initially and 
while costs have not increase the system builds more 
ships while they are still cheap. When costs increase, 
expensive construction Is held back and future demand is 
satisfied with a lower fleet size and higher speed and 
consumption of fuel the price of which is still the same. 
3.8.4 Permanent anticipated increase In alternative 
returns to capital (r) 
An increase in returns to capital r from a level a to 
a higher level a' will shift the ihxO locus to the right 
while at the same time it will leave the position of the 
x--O locus unaffected. These movements are shown on fig. 
3.28. Prior to the shock the position of the ilý-O locus Is 
indicated by the upward sloping line ihcO: r-a line through 
point L. Wen the increase occurs this shifts to the 
right to a new position Indicated by the line il'-O: r-a' 
through point L'. 
In the case were the shock was unanticipated the 
initial equilibrium was at point 1. Now that the shock is 
foreseen the speculative drop in values Is necessarily 
lower so the system moves to a point such as N which lies 
in between I and L. 
Fig. 3.29 shows the fluctuations in x, x, P and k 
that arise as a result of this shock. There is an initial 
speculative drop in values from PL to PM as the positive 
effect of the future profitability is more than cancelled 
by the more heavy discounting. This drop Is restrained by 
the fact that the lower price will lower the fleet growth 
which implies higher future profits. Indeed the fleet 
growth drops initially from the base run level KL down to 
KN. This causes the freight market balance and profits to 
improve. As time t Is approached the discounting of 
future profits becomes even more heavy as there Is less 
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time left before the increase in r "materializes. This 
cancels out the positive effects of the improvements In 
the profit profile outlook and thus prices drop further. 
This causes a further drop in the fleet size and thus 
additional freight market improvement. 
At time t, r increases and discounting reaches Its 
heaviest point and remains at that level from then 
onwards. Thus there is no additional negative effect on 
prices from further increases In discounting and thus 'the 
further improvements in prof itability cause a gradual 
improvement in ship values. Thus t is the turning point 
for prices and the fleet growth. The latter however still 
remains below base run level and thus there are further 
gains In market balance and profits. These help prices to 
recover closer to the base run level. In the long run the 
cutbacks in the size of the fleet cause profits to 
increase to such an extent that prices return to the base 
run level and so does f leet growth. There Is no long run 
ef f ect on prices and f leet growth. However there are 
permanent increases in freight market balance 'and 
prof Its. ' 
3.9 Concluding remarks 
In this chapter a simple theoretical model' of a 
hypothetical shipping industry was developed. For this 
purpose the behaviour of economic agents at the micro 
level was analysed first. This was used in order to 
derive demand and supply curves in the various markets. 
These were the building blocks of the macro model. The 
model was used in order to analyse how equilibrium rates, 
prof its, ship values, shipbuilding and scrapping ' are 
determined in terms of a set of external factors which 
Includes the level of demand, fuel prices, returns to 
capital, shipbuilding costs and scrap prices. A central 
position in the theoretical model Is occupied by the 
behaviour of investors whose expectations are assumed to 
be rational. Thus investors can take speculative 
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positions in response to future expected Impulses and 
this affects the current state of the market. Speculative 
changes in prices will then force the fleet to respond 
through changes in the supply of new ships and 
scrappings. The supply of new ships Is then absorbed by 
an infinitely elastic demand for assets. This mechanism 
differs significantly from 'the one embodied in existing 
models ' of the shipping markets. There the size of the 
fleet Is mainly driven by oscillations in a downward 
sloping demand for new ships which responds in a rather 
ad hoc backward looking way to trends in demand for 
shipments and freight rates. 
Sections 3.6 
- 
3.8 analysed the effects of changes in 
the external factors on the equilibrium path of the 
system by means of simulations of the theoretical model. 
It can be seen that the simulated cycles exhibit various 
patterns that differ according to the type of external 
shock to which the market is subjected. Chapter I 
considered the correlations and patterns exhibited by 
actual historical cyclical episodes. The stylized facts 
of a representative historical cycle, which Is normally 
generated by a sudden and unexpected spurt in demand. 
were found to be the following. 
The increase in demand Is associated with an 
Improvement in the freight market balance which Is 
followed by significant reductions in lay-up and strong 
increases in freight rates, time charter rates and 
profits. This also coincides with a signif icant 
improvement in second hand and newbuilding prices. 
Scrapping decreases immediately and the order book 
expands. Because the extra orders can not be delivered 
immediately, the increase In freight rates lasts for some 
time. After a few months months however the growth rate 
of the fleet expands rapidly as the new orders become 
deliveries. This leads to a period of recession where 
freight, time charter rates and profits are falling while 
lay-up Increases. Ship prices also fall and this is 
followed by an increase in scrapping and a recession in 
shipbuilding. 
It can be seen from Fig. 3.11 that these broad 
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patterns of a real world cycle can be reproduced by the 
model's simulations of the effects of an unanticipated 
demand shock. The simulations reproduce positive 
correlations between market balance, rates, profits, 
prices, shipbuilding and fleet growth and the negative 
correlation of these factors with scrapping rates that 
are observed during a real cycle. This provides some 
support for the validity of the theory as a tentative 
explanation of the cyclical behaviour of the industry. 
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The theory of chapter 3 is used as a basis in order 
to specify and estimate an econometric model of the world 
dry cargo market. The empirical results are consistent 
with a priori expectations regarding, the, signs and values 
of various elasticities of supply and demand curves. 
The estimated model Is used in order to simulate the 
market's , response to various anticipated and 
unanticipated shocks. Historical simulations 
- 
of, the 
freight market submodel are also presented and It is 
found that these track actual developments 
.. 
quite 
accurately. 
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1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter we presented a theory of 
shipping markets based on the 'assumption of optimizing 
behaviour of economic agents in each market. In this 
chapter the theory is used as a basis to 'develop an 
econometric , model of the dry cargo market. Econometric 
versions of the theoretical equations 'derived in ' the 
previous chapter are specified. The unknown parameters of 
these equations are estimated using data from the post 
World War II period. ' In * the next chapter'the 'same' theory 
is applied to the tanker sector and an econometric model 
is estimated using data 'from the same period. In chapter 
6 an econometric model of the world shipping market Is 
developed by linking the two individual models of the dry 
cargo and tanker markets. 
The theoretical model analysed in the previous 
section, captures the fundamental endogenous- interactions 
between the freight market and the markets for ships. In 
order to add explanatory and forecasting power to the 
model, certain simplifying assumptions made In the 
previous chapter must be relaxed. Thus the model is 
extended to take account of additional exogenous 
inf luences In each market as well as dynamic 
complications. - It Is also desirable to dissagregate 
slightly and distinguish between various dry' cargo ships 
either by type or, age. The extensions introduced and the 
level of aggregation chosen reflect a balance between, on 
the one hand, the likely Improvements that would follow 
from this and, on the other hand, the 'wish not to 
complicate the model unnecessarily. 
Some of these modifications do not simply of consist 
of adding a few additional exogenous and lagged variables 
into the equations already specified in chapter 3. Adding 
realism to the model ýnecessitates the specification of a 
new set of equations which capture completely new aspects 
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of behaviour which up to now have been Ignored. For 
example the determinants of lay-up, time charter rates, 
fleet age profile and length of the order book have not 
yet been considered. 
Plan of chapter 4 
Section 4.2 contains an overview of the underlying 
economic theory and the associated system of equations. 
econometric versions of which are to be estimated 
subsequently. The underlying theory is really an 
extension of the one presented in the previous chapter. 
The theoretical overview places particular emphasis on 
those aspects of behaviour that have up to now been 
Ignored while theoretical issues that have already been 
dealt with are only briefly summarised. Section 4.3 
introduces the econometric methodology used and then 
presents and discusses the econometric estimates. In 
section 4.4 the econometric model is used in order to 
s imu late the effect of various anticipated and 
unanticipated shocks and thus its dynamic multipliers are 
derived. Finally section 4.5 presents historical 
simulations of the dry cargo freight market model. 
4.2 Overview 
The dry cargo model consists of a freight market, 
second hand, newbuilding and scrap market. It solves for 
the equilibrium level of freight rates, time charter 
rates, second hand and newbuilding values, orders and 
deliveries, scrapping, the age profile and the size of 
the fleet. This section presents the theoretical 
specification to be estimated which Is derived from the 
theoretical analysis of chapter 3 after being 
appropriately modified to take account of additional real 
world phenomena. 
The theoretical specification of the model Is listed 
on Table 1. 
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Table 4.1 
Model Listing 
q* -FI (Kv, F1PbP 2ý) (1) 
Kv'- (I-X)K +M (2) 
A- F2(F, Pb, OC, LC) (3) 
q- q" (4) 
ir k(FI+7)/(Pb7) - oqt t (5) t t 
InHt (1+, r)ýtlnFý 
+1 - jEýInPbt+l + 11 
(6) 
Pt F4( Wý/Kt, Etirt. 1, EtPt+,, rt) (7) 
Q- Fs( Ph, Pn', Pi, Pl'; ZQ) (8) 
D w Q (9) t-I t I 
Pht Et pt. 
I+k 
(10) 
S. 
- 
F-( P/ps) i-3,4,5 (11) 
A3s3+A4s4+As ss (12) 
S- Ks 
A 2, t 
Kt A 1, t-5 
K 
t-5 
A 
ilt 
Kt 
t-j jzo 
55 
A 
1, tKtA I-I't-5 
K 
t-5 
(1/2)E 
I-l, t-j) jml jnl 
1- 3,4,5 (14 
Kt Iýt_l +D t_l - St_, (15) 
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4.2.1 Freight Market 
supply 
Supply in the freight market given the technology 
depends on the size of the f leet trading in the dry cargo 
markets, the speed of the 
-fleet and various Inefficiency 
parameters such as waiting time in port and the 
proportion of time spent in ballast or repairs. The speed 
of the f leet depends on the ratio of freight rates to 
unit-voyage costs which are a weighted average of the 
price of bunkers and port charges. Hance: 
- 
F, (Kv,, FlPb, Zq 
where 
qM Supply of dry cargo ton-miles 
Kv Fleet trading in the dry cargo market 
F- Dry cargo voyage freight rate 
Pb 
- 
Index of unit voyage costs 
z Vector of exogenous variables that might q 
additionally influence the supply of ton - miles 
Our notation Is the same 
, 
as in the previous chapter. The 
size of the fleet trading in the dry cargo freight market 
excludes the dry cargo ships that are laid up but 
includes combined carriers In dry. Thus 
Ky m(I -A) K+ PdKc (2) 
where 
A- Proportion of dry cargo ships laid up 
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,, 
K= Dry Cargo Fleet 
Pd Proportion of combined carriers in dry 
Kc 
-' Combined carrier f leet 
Combined carriers are versatile ships which can, carry 
either oil , or dry bulk cargo. They switch between', the 
tanker and the dry cargo -, freight market according to the 
relative profitability of trading In, these markets. 
Lay-up is hypothesized ý to depend on the profitability 
of the spot market relative to the costs in lay-up. This 
is because a laid-up ship forfeits the net revenues that 
it, would earn on the high seas. Optimal behaviour implies 
that at the margin , the costý in lay-up - is equal -, to !, the 
cost of operating the vessel on the high seas. -The latter 
depends, on the level of freight rates, voyages costs and 
operating costs. This , theory suggests that A may be 
hypothesized as follows: 
X-F2(F, Pb, OC, LC ) (3) 
where 
LC '- Costs in iay-up 
Thus supply is modelled in two stages. The f Irst stage Is 
equation (1). It captures the effect of Increases in 
freight rates on' the supply that arise through changes In 
optimum speed and possibly lower turnaround time In ports 
and generally more intensive utilization of the existing 
trading f leet. This equation treats lay-up and thus the 
trading f leet KY as given and ignores the effects of 
freight rates on supply that arise through changes in the 
employment rate. This Is modelled In a second stage which 
is equations (2), (3). To derive the market supply 
function, equations (2), (3) should be used to substitute 
for Kv in equation (1) 
- 
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Demand 
In theory demand should vary inversely 
- with freight 
rates because higher freight rates will create an 
incentive to use other forms of transportation and to 
import more from areas closer to the market. In practise 
the scope for substitution and such economies Is limited. 
Indeed, we have been. unable, to discover a negative 
relationship between 
- 
demand and freight rates. 
Consequently, as in previous freight market models, 
demand, will be considered to be completely, inelas tic with 
respect to freight rates and therefore It will be 
considered to be given at an exogenous level q. 
Equilibrium 
Freight rates respond rapidly enough to changes in 
market conditions and thus the freight , market will be 
assumed to clear within the unit time period which in our 
case is a year. Thus supply always equals demand, hence: 
a 
where 
(4) 
q- Demand for dry cargo transportation services 
measured in ton-miles 
Profits 
The maximum prof Its generated 
runs at the optimum speed are 
freight rates, bunker prices and 
relationship was derived In section 
and is reprinted below as equation (5) 
by the ship when , it 
related to prevailing 
operating costs. This 
3.3 equation 3.3.7 
7tt m k(F'+7)1(Pb7) - tt ocý (5) 
The coefficient -y reflects the technological relationship 
between fuel consumption and speed and Is equal to the 
price elasticity of freight market supply. 
217 
In the freight market we shall not distinguish dry 
cargo ships either by size or type or age because they 
are highly substitutable. Indeed the tramp freight rates 
of the various types are highly correlated as would be 
expected in a market where all ships provide similar 
services. These are the usual reasons for aggregation. 
The dry cargo market largely consists of a highly 
competitive tramp market in which freight rates are 
highly f lexible and respons Ive to changes in the 
underlying determinants of demand or supply. It also 
consists of a liner sector where rates are set by 
conferences and which are less responsive to demand or 
supply shif ts. Data limitations prevent us from 
distinguishing between liners and tramps. This is likely 
to be of little consequence because typically ships can 
move from the one market to the other depending on the 
relative profitability and also because the liner market 
is relatively small. Because of the predominant role of 
the tramp market we estimate the model subject to a 
market clearing restriction (which turns out to be 
empirically acceptable). 
4.2.2 Time Charter (Rental) Market 
Equations (1). (2), (3), (4) determine the equilibrium 
freight rate in terms of the level of demand, the size of 
the f leet, fuel prices, combis in dry and other 
predetermined variables. This rate Is a voyage or spot 
freight rate. 
Shipowners can rent their ships out, under a time 
charter hire contract. The time charter contract is 
arranged between the sh ipowner and the 'charterer'. The 
charterer usually happens to be a shipper but it can be a 
speculator who hires out the ship with a view of either 
releting it for a higher rate or trading it in the spot 
market. In such cases the charter is in practise 
characterised as being a purely speculative time charter. 
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In reality time charters are always as much speculative 
whether the charterer Is a shipper or not. 
The time charter contract stipulates that over the 
duration of the contract control of the ship passes over 
to the charterer who is then entitled to the profits made 
out of its operation. For compensation the shipowner 
receives from the charterer a prearranged rent H per 
month known as the time charter rate. An important 
standard clause of the contract Is that any voyage costs 
such as bunker costs, port charges or canal dues incurred 
during the duration of the contract will have to be paid 
by the charterer while all the operating (I. ef Ixed) 
costs are for owner's account. On the other hand when 
operating in the spot market the shipowner has to pay all 
the costs. 
Speculation on time charters should ensure that the 
expected prof itability of the spot market over the 
duration of the contract should equal the expected 
prof itability derived from the alternative policy of 
arranging a time charter contract after allowing for a 
risk premium. Otherwise, if for example, the former were 
much higher than the latter there would be extreme 
speculative demand for charters that would raise time 
charter rates until equality was restored. If, on the 
other hand, the inequality happened to hold the other way 
round, there would' be extreme speculative withdrawal of 
charterers from the market that would again tend to 
restore the equality. 
Time charter contracts can be distinguished according 
to their duration. At one extreme there are very short 
term charters where the ship is rented for af ew weeks 
while at the other extreme ships can be rented for more 
than 10 years. For a one year time charter, arranged at 
the end of time to and which pays a time charter rate R to 
the expected profitability E 7r' is t t+1 
E ir, mH-E oc (51) t+I tt t+I 
where the inclusion of the Et OC t+1 
term reflects the fact 
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that even when the ship, Is on hire the owner still has to 
pay for the fixed operating -costs incurred. Therefore the 
expected profitability is simply the difference between 
the guaranteed fixed time charter rate and the expected 
operating costs which as already mentioned are 
- 
for 
owner's account., 
-, 
.,, 
'1'-, 
-1 1ýII 
On the other hand the profitability of the voyage 
market depends on the spot rate, voyage costs and 
operating costs as In (S). Thus the expected 
prof itability Et ?rt 
+'I ýof the alternative strategy of 
operating on the spot market is given by leading equation 
(S) once and taking 
-expectations at time t which gives 
ExwE (F l+T lPby )-E OC (so 0) 
t t+I t t+I t+I t t+I 
According to the theory the expected profitability E X, t t', 
of the time charter contract as given by expression (5') 
should equal the expected profitability Et it t+1 
in the 
spot' market over the duration of the contract as given by 
(5" ). Thus equating the right hand side of equation (5') 
with that Of (5") and taking 'into account 'a risk premium 
ji gives 
Ht m (F l+T IPJ ) gEt t+I t+I 
which in logarithms can be written as 
InHý, 
- 
(1+7)EtInFt+l 7EtlnPbt+, +, A 
- 
(6) 
The time charter market is completely peripheraU- to 
the rest, of -the model. A time charter contract ý between a 
shipowner and a shipper reducesý the spot supply-exactly 
by the same amount -as the, -, spot demand leaving , the 
equilibrium spot rate unaffected. Time ý charters are 
s imply instruments ý for , pass ing on the,, entitlement to , spot 
market prof its over the - contract duration to another 
investor. The underlying determinants of spot market 
rates are , thus not affected. They are considered here. 
both for reasons of completeness (a, lot of business - -is 
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undertaken on a time charter basis) but mainly because It 
s imp I if les certain econometric estimation problems. The 
next section shows that expected profits affect the 
portfolio - demand for ships. The time charter rate can 
provide us with an accurate market index of. otherwise 
unobservable, expected profits (before fixed costs) as 
equation (5) suggests. I- 
t 
4.2.3 Second Hand Market 
Ships, are capital assets and the portfolio demand for 
ships should depend on their relative return I. e., 
l(d1Wý) 
-f( Eýnt+I/Pto EtPt, /Pt, rt) 
-, tt 
where all variables and expectations are taken at the end 
of the year. Ship prices and the Ifleet are of 
the 
year values while,, 'týi 
- 
denotes thel accumulated profits 
over the whole year. The above equation can be solved for 
Pt and this implies 
P Ft W IK 
,E ir i, EýPt,,, rt) (7) t4ttt t+ 
When expected profits or future, prices increase this 
raises the -expected return on ships. There Is -then a 
tendency for capitalý to flow Into. "-shipping and this 
raises the values of ships and brings the--return down 
until the excess- demand is eliminated. The-, opposite 
happens when the return on other assets increases. An 
increase in the size of the fleet implies that in 
equilibrium investors should hold a portfolio which is 
more heavily weighted- towards , ships. - This ý loss of 
diversification increases risk which requires a reduction 
in prices. On -the other hand some of Ahe, Increase in 
demand for assets associated with an overall increase in 
wealth Is likely , to spill over Into ships,, and' this 
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increases prices. 
4.2.4, Shipbuilding Market 
The supply of new ships is hypothesized to depend on 
the ratio of newbuilding prices to shipbuilding costs as 
suggested In chapter 3. Modelling the shipbuilding market 
introduces two new complications. One arises from the 
fact that shipbuilders can build other ship 
-, 
types In 
addition to dry cargo vessels. The other arises from the 
fact that the time between ordering, and delivery Is not 
constant as the simple model of chapter 3 assumed, -but 
varies with market conditions. 
Joint production of dry cargo and tanker newbuildings 
The first complication, reflects the jointness of the 
production process. Shipyards' resources--can be employed 
not only in the construction of new dry cargo ships but 
also in the construction of tankers. The -theory of the 
firm in the case of, joint products is relevant here. This 
suggests that the supply of new dry cargo ships depends 
positively 
- 
on dry cargo newbuildings' prices and 
negatively on the prices of shipbuilding costs, as 
- 
was 
also the case in chapter 3. In addition, however. the 
supply of dry cargo newbuildings will be also affected by 
the profitability of bu i Id ing tankers. If prices of 
tankers increase, shipyards will tend to divert 
-. 
resources 
towards the construction lof tankers which would adversely 
affect dry cargo newbuilding. Thus. in, addition, supply 
of now dry cargo ships depends negatively on the price of 
the. alternative tanker product. 
The order book 
We use the order-book to represent the Intended supply 
of new ships. The second complication reflects- the fact 
that the time between order ing and delivery and thus the 
length of the order-book, varies. The size of the 
order-book can be thought of as the product ofý two 
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factors. The first is the length of the order book which 
is the length of time over which current orders are 
planned to be depleted from the book. The second factor 
is the rate at which shipyards intend to deliver ships 
from the order-book. Obviously the theory developed in 
the previous chapter pertains to this second factor while 
no consideration has yet been given to the factors that 
determine the length of the order-book. This would not 
matter at all in a perfect foresight eniviroment. The 
theory developed in chapter 3, would suffice in this 
case, to explain the fluctuations in deliveries while the 
length of the order-book could be Ignored. However In an 
uncertain environment and where cancellation of an order 
is very expensive for the investor, the length of the 
order-book would matter in those cases where there are 
major unanticipated changes in the values of ships. 
Theoretically the length of the order-book depends 
upon the various risk premia that investors require in 
order to sign orders and also on attitudes of the 
shipbuilder towards risk. ý-Uncertalnty increases with the 
time horizon and thus these risk premia are likely to 
increase as , the time , of- promised delivery ý Is extended 
further into the future. This will set an upper bound to 
the period of time over which, shipyards and investors 
will come to terms. The theory suggests that apart from 
unobservable attitudes to , risk - the - length of the 
order-book will vary with' newbuilding prices. Wen prices 
are strong, builders can offer - large discounts needed, for 
attracting orders for distant deliveries and still leave 
room for profit. %, hen however prices-are weak It will'be- 
difficult--for buildeýs to offer -heavy discounts and at-, 
the same time leave room for profit. Thus in the latter 
case, owners and yards -will be able to come to terms only 
for deliveries 
-in the Immediate future and so the length 
of the order-book will contract. - This ý theory thus -implies: 
that the length of the order-book, depends on exactly the 
same factors that affect the delivery rate as analysed In 
chapter 3. Thus this complication does not, after all, 
require any modif ications of the econometric 
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specif ication. 
Our proposed specification for the order-book which 
reflects our theoretical views pertaining to the first 
and second f actor, that is the length of the order book 
and the delivery rate, is the following: 
F5( Pn, Pn', Pi, Pl'; ZQ 
where 
Pn = Newbuilding prices of dry, cargo ships 
Pn' = Newbuilding prices of tankers , 
Pi 
- 
Dry cargo shipbuilding cost Index 
PI' = Tanker shipbuilding cost index 
ZQ= Other variables that might influence 
Thus we have included newbuilding prices and costs of 
shipbuilding inputs as determining factors. The effect of 
own prices reflects two phenomena. First higher prices 
tend to increase the planned delivery rate and second 
they are positively related to the , length of the 
order-book. In addition the prices and costs of building 
tankers have been included because typically shipbuilders 
can also build tankers and they will increase their 
supply of new tankers (at the expense of dry cargo 
newbuildings) if they f Ind It more prof itable as 
explained above. This Is one of, the ways in which the 
tanker market can influence the dry cargo market. 
The estimated equation Is a dynamic, 
- 
version of 
equation (8) where the lags have been , determined 
empirically. Deliveries are hypothesized to be a function 
of lagged orders. 
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m 
Dt WQt_l (9) 
This reflects the fact that a ship once on the order-book 
will very rarely not' be delivered since cav; cellations ' are 
costly f or the Investor especially if construction has 
already begun. The positive effect of prices on 
deliveries is ý already embodied In the order-book 
equation. 
Newbuilding prices 
The theory suggests that newbuilding prices reflect 
the expectations at the time of ordering regarding the 
second hand values at the time of delivery. Assuming that 
on average there is, a one year lag between order and 
delivery this implies 
Pht 
- 
ýtPt. 
l 
k 
where 
kw risk premium on newbuildings 
4.2.5 Scrap market 
As in the previous chapter it is assumed here that 
scrapping is affected, by the level of second hand prices 
relative to the price of scrap which is treated as 
exogenous. In chapter 6 where the dry cargo and tanker 
models are linked, the price of scrap is endogenised. In 
chapter 3 no account was taken of the likely influence of 
the age profile on aggregate scrapping. The scrapping 
rate should be higher among older ships than among 
younger ones. Thus when the average age of the fleet 
increases scrapping should also Increase. During the post 
World War 11 period there have been significant changes 
in the age profile of the fleet which has considerably 
influenced the overall scrapping rate. It was therefore 
considered desirable to disaggregate dry cargo ships by 
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age in the scrap market. Thus 5 age groups 
- 
have been 
distinguished and accordingly individual scrapping supply 
equations have been estimated for each age group. The 5 
age groups are 0-5 year old, 5-10,10-1S, 15-20 and 20 
years and over. In light of the empirical evidence we 
have assumed that there is always zero scrapping within 
the first two age groups. For the remaining age groups it 
has been assumed that scrapping yaries inversely with the 
ratio of second hand values to scrap values. Thus we, have 
Fi( P/Ps) I-3,4,5 0 1) 
13 
sIE1, - 1,2 (111) 
where the f ive age groups have been indexed by i- 
1,2,3,4,5. For example, i-I stands for age group 0-5,1-3 
stands for age group 10-15 'and 1-5 stands for the age 
group of over 20 'year old ships. Thus sI represents the 
scrapping rate in age group i. The aggregate scrapping 
rate is a weighted average of the individual scrapping 
rates within each age group where the weights are the 
proportion of ships within each age group. Hence: 
A3s3+A4s4+A5s5 
where 
s= Aggregate scrapping rate 
A, = proportion of ships In age group I 
Total scrapping is then given by 
Ks 
4.2.6 Age Profile 
The age prof ile 'of the f leet is obviously endogenous 
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and historically there have been significant fluctuations 
in it. The dynamic evolution of the age profile is 
Identically determined f rom suf f iciently detailed 
knowledge of the age distribution and the annual 
scrappings of ships of various ages. If for simplicity we 
assume that the age distribution of the fleet within 
subdivisions of a particular age group was uniform and, 
in addition, the scrapping rate was constant within these 
subdivisions, then the dynamic evolution of the fleet 
would be given by the following identities 
AK 
1, tt 
Al_,, 
t_BK t-5 
(I- (112)E slpt_j (112)E s 1-1 0 t-J 
(14) 
Jul Jul 
for i=3,4,5- 
,II 
and since there is zero scrapping in the f Irst two age 
groups the above simplifies to: 
KAK 
1, tt I-Itt-s t-S 
f or i=2, and 
(14') 
4 
I't tE t-j ý imo 
for age group 
In other words equation (14) says that the number of 
ships in age group i at time t Is equal to the number of 
ships in age group 1-1 5 years ago minus the number of 
ships that have been scrapped. Equation (14') is ' similar' 
to equation (14) but here there Is no 'need Oto allow for 
ships scrapped since there is no scrapping in the first 
two age groups. Equation (14") determines the amount of 
ships in age group I and these are simply the total 
number of ships that have been delivered from the yards 
in the last five years. 
Equations (14) which refer to age groups 3,4. and 5 
have been derived theoretically based on the assumption 
that the fleet is distributed uniformly within age 
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subdivisions of a particular age group plus the 
assumption that the scrapping rate is identical within 
those subdivisions. Obviously both assumptions are not 
strictly true although this should not matter greatly. 
There is little that can be done, to correct for the f irst 
assumption short of collecting information regarding the 
distribution of the f leet and scrapping within 
subdivisions of the age group. This information is not 
available. But, we can easily correct for the second 
assumption. It is obvious that scrapping should be lower 
within the younger subdivisions of our age groups. This 
suggests that the scrapping rate of the younger age group 
in equation (14) should be given relatively more weight 
than the 
- 
scrapping rate In the next age group. 
- 
Thus our 
chosen specification for the dynamic evolution of the 
fleet in age groups 3,4,5 is 
AK 
1, tt 
A 
I-I't-S 
K 
t-S 
(3110)E SI't-j (7/10)E s, 
_, 
't_, ) 
iml J-1 
(14 ) 
The weights have been' chosen so as to give the best f It 
over the historical period. Indeed they give an excellent 
fit as should be expected from an equation that is almost 
an identity. 
Evolution of the fleet 
Finally the size of the f leet at the end of year t Is 
given by the size of the f leet in the previous year plus 
the new deliveries minus the ships scrapped within the 
year. Thus 
Kt-K 
t-1 +D t-I 
"+S 
t-I 
5 Equations (1) 
- 
(15) solve dynamically for q, F, Kv, A, 
7r, 'H, P, Pn, Q, D, s,, s, S, Ai, K in terms of q, Pb, OC, 
LC, pc p Kc pZq, W, r, Pn' , P1, P1', ZQ, Ps. 
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4.3 Estimation 
The model consists of equations M-OS) and these 
are listed in Table 4.1. Equations (2), (4), (12), (13), 
(14) and (15) are either identities or equilibrium 
conditions which involve no unknown parameters. 
Data on actual profits Wt are not available. Thus 
equation (5) cannot be estimated. Equation (7) also 
involves a term in expected profits and cannot be 
estimated as it is. Prof Its do not appear in any other 
parts of the system. To solve this problem we could 
substitute out the prof It ý, term in (7) by its determinants 
as given by the RHS of equation (5). Even better, we can 
use relationship (5') to substitute directly the expected 
prof it term in terms of the time charter rate and 
expected operating costs. This is valid since, as already 
explained, the expected profitability of any chartering 
policy (spot or time charter) should be equal. This 
substitution implies: 
P-F(V 1K, H'- E OC' ,EP, r 
t4tAtt1. t+i' t t+l" t 
Thus the actual system to be estimated consists of 
equations (l)-(15) except for equation (5) which has been 
omitted and equation (7) which has been replaced by 
equation W). 
4.3.1 Econometric methodology 
Our approach to estimating the model' s unknown 
parameters is purely econometric. That Is, the 
coef f Icients of the model 'are es timated from the 
empirical data taking Into account various theoretical 
cross equation restrictions but without making use of any 
other prior information regarding the likely values of 
the unknown parameters. This is, of course, quite 
standard. however it contrasts with non-econometric 
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modelling in shipping a. g. the Nortank and Martinet 
models that were analysed in chapter 2. In many cases 
estimates were based on a priori information rather than 
the data. For example, the freight market supply function 
was often derived from knowledge of the technology of the 
ships Le the production function. Each approach has its 
advantages and disadvantages. The approach adopted here 
has the disadvantage of Ignoring any-, prior information. 
However such information is usually 
-vessel-specific. 
A 
priorism has therefore only been utilized in 
disaggregated models. These have been limited to 
modelling. freight market movements since disaggregation 
has been,, an obstacle to- integrating, the 
'freight 
market 
with the ship markets. 
In our aggregated model It is not appropriate to 
adopt a representative ship type because- of the variance 
In size, age, technology etc. among the various types. On. 
the other hand the aggregate econometric approach has the 
advantage that it is relatively easy to integrate not 
only the freight market and the ship markets but also the 
various major sectors such as tankers and dry cargo. 
Data for the post World War II period are used in 
order to estimate the simultaneous relationships 
described in the previous chapter. The estimation methods 
chosen reflect a balance between, on the one hand, the 
desirability of increasing 
, 
the efficiency 
'of 
estimation 
and on the other the computational costs that this 
incures. Efficiency requires that the econometric methods 
chosen should ref lect simultaneity. expectations 
generating mechanisms as well as any coef f icient 
restrictions. Estimation can be s imp I if ied without 
sacrificing efficiency by taking into account the block 
recursiveness of the system. Still, the most efficient 
method would be computationally very demanding. Single 
equation methods have therefore been utilized In addition 
to system estimation procedures. 
Equations (6). (7) and (10) invo lve unobserved 
rational expectations' of endogenous variables. 
Equations involving frational expectations' can pose 
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estimation problems that are 'not, always ý encountered in 
other cases. This is because observations on 'expectations 
are not normally available. There are various ways of 
estimating , equations involving rational expectations see 
e. g. Wallis (1980) and Wickens - (1982). One " way, - that 
eliminates all the peculiar problems is to 'use exact 
measurements of the rational expectations variables. ' ý In 
thisý case the R. E. variables can be treated as any other 
variable in the equation and the standard estimation 
procedures can be applied. This method Is the most 
des irab le ý since it allows the coef f icients to be 
estimated with maximum efficiency. -Unfortunately it is 
least likely , to be feasible since, as, already indicated 
it requires observations of the market's expectations 
which are rarely available. 
, 
Another method is the, "substitution method", see e. g. 
Wallis (1980). The model 
-is used to generate forecasts of 
the rational expectation variables. These - forecasts are 
complicated functions , of ' -the models' parameters, the 
parameters of the stochastic processes that describe the 
evolution of the exogenous variables and the Information 
set on -which expectations are conditioned.. The stochastic 
processes of the exogenous variables have to be 
specif led. They are usually modelled as vector 
autoregressive, moving average process. The VARMA process 
is augmented to 'include all variables'-, that, are relevant 
for f orecasting the future level of the exogenous 
variables. 
The VARMA process is incorporated to the' main model 
and the whole -, system Is solved -by maximimising the 
likelihood function with respect to '' the unknown 
parameters of the model. This ' provides ef f Iclent 
estimates' but the method is unlikely to be robust. 
M isspec if ications will in general, lead to , biased 
estimates for all the system's coefficients. In addition 
the method is computationally demanding. - It also involves 
the specification and estimation of an auxiliary - model 
that describes the evolution of the exogenous variables. 
This increases the chances of misspecification. In our 
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case the substitution method would require specifying 
models f or world trade, oil prices, Interest rates, 
prices of metals etc. in addition to the factors that are 
relevant for predicting these variables. Matters are 
complicated by the structural break that occured in 
1973/1974 with the advent of OPEC and the effect of Its 
policies on not only oil prices but also trade, 
inflation, world interest rates, commodity prices etc. 
Another method for estimating equations with rational 
expectations and which is computationally much simpler Is 
the "errors in variables" method, see e. g. Wickens 
(1982). This simply replaces the expectation' with the 
actual reallsed value for the variable. This introduces 
an errors in variables problem since 
. 
in an uncertain 
environment the actual value will differ from the 
expected one by a random f orecasting error. This 
measurement problem can be handled with standard 
instrumental variables methods. The instruments used are 
a subset of the Information set which are relevant for 
predicting the future value of the variable. This method 
gives consistent estimates s Ince the measurement 
(forecast) error is uncorrelated with these Instruments 
by construction. In addition this method is more robust 
wee e. g. West (1986), but not as efficient as the 
substitution method in cases, such as ours, where 
expectations of future endogenous variables are involved. 
Freight Market Block 
Equations (l)-(G) constitute the freight market 
block. This set of equations Is block recursive with 
respect to the ship markets' block which consists of 
equations M-05). This is because the fleet size which 
affects the supply of freight Is predetermined by past 
events in the scrapping and shipbuilding market. In 
addition there are no cross equation restrictions between 
the freight market and the ship markets block so the 
freight market block can be estimated separately without 
loss of efficiency. The block to be estimated consists of 
the following equations 
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q-FI( (I-A)K+p 
c 
Kc, FlPb, Zq) (11) 
X- Jý( F, Pb, OC, LO (3) 
lnHý 
- 
(I+r)EýInFý.,, + vEýlnPbt., + JA 
where W) has been derived by using the Identities (2) 
and (4) in order to substitute for q8 and Kv In (1). As 
already mentioned equation (5) has been taken out of the 
system. Equations W), (3) and 
' 
(6) are estimated jointly 
by 3SLS. There is no simultaneous Interaction between 
equation (6) and the remaining part of the freight market 
block. However as was shown In chapter 3 the coefficient 
in (6) must equal the elasticity of freight market 
supply in W). Thus efficiency requires that these 
equations should be estimated jointly with the 
coefficient restriction Imposed. 
Equations (1, and (3) jointly determine the 
equilibrium level of freight rates and lay-up in terms of 
the predetermined variables which include the level of 
demand q, the size of the f leet K. bunker prices Pb etc. 
The latter are used as instruments in the 3SLS procedure. 
Equation (6) involves unobservable expectations of 
freight rates and bunker prices. The expectations are 
substituted by their actual forward values 
. 
and the 
disturbance term of the equation is redefined to Include 
the forecast error of rates and bunker prices. The 
forward values should be Instrumented by a subset of the 
current information set which is relevant for predicting 
rates and fuel prices. Conveniently, the variables 
already used for instrumenting current freight rates and 
lay-up are the relevant ones for,, predicting rates and 
fuel prices. In addition lagged demand and the current 
order book has been included In the instrument list. 
Ship Markets Block 
The ship markets block consists, of equations 
M-05). These are estimated by single equation methods. 
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Equation (7) involves expectations of two endogenous 
variables. These are significantly correlated and thus 
dif f icult to instrument separately given the 
unpredictability and volatility of the shipping markets. 
Fortunately direct observations on these expectations can 
be f ound. In (7' ) the time charter 
-rate 
minus operating 
costs has already been used to substitute for expected 
prof its. As equation (10) suggests the observable 
newbuilding price reflects expected future second hand 
prices and it can therefore be used as an index of these 
expectations. Using 
' 
(10) to substitute for, EtP t+1 in 
terms of the observable newbuilding price gives 
F4(Wt IK 
t, 
Ht-. EtOCt. 
1, 
Pnt, rt), 
Strictly speaking there is an "errors in var lab les 
problem here too. This Is because of the appearance of 
the term E OC in MI. However this term can easily t t+1 I be instrumented s ince OC Is basically a trending 
variable. The other variables do not have to be 
instrumented. Consequently, this is almost equivalent to 
performing OLS given the accuracy with which expectations 
are observed and the fact that expected operating costs 
can be easily instrumented. 
We began with the original equation (7) which 
presented an awkward estimation problem due to the 
appearance of the two unobservable, volatile and highly 
correlated expected profit and price terms that were very 
difficult to instrument separately. Fortunately. by using 
other relationships In the model, we were able to 
transform this into equation W") which can be estimated 
by a procedure almost equivalent to carrying out OLS on 
(7) with exact measurements on the expectation terms. The 
efficiency of the latter is much higher than carrying out 
an "errors in variables" instrumental procedure on (7) 
which indeed gave very poor results. 
Alternative estimation methods of (7") were tried. 
As already mentioned the selected procedure only uses 
Instruments for the expected operating cost term while 
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the endogenous time charter and, newbuilding price terms 
are not instrumented.,, Alternative procedures in which the 
endogenous, time charter and newbu, ilding pricel terms were 
instrumented gave very similar results. This Is because 
the link between the disturbance terms and these 
endogenous expectation variables is 
-weak. 
In turn this is 
due to the 
, 
fact 
. 
that these endogenous terms ref lect 
expectations of 
. 
future variables the forward values of 
which are. only to a small extent affected by the current 
disturbance term. Moreover, significant. exogenous shocks 
over the sample period reduced the proportion of the 
variance 
, 
of. 
_ 
endogenous movements attributed to the 
disturbance term. Thisl reduces the bias and the variance 
of our procedure. It might 
"even 
render it preferable to 
the alternative procedure 
_ 
of instrumenting 
. 
the 
expectation measurements,... since it might be desirable to 
trade off some bias for the reduced variance of our 
chosen estimation method. 
Equation (10) involves only an unknown constant which 
reflects a risk premium on newbuildings and the 
depreciation factor on second hand ships. In addition 
because our data for newbuilding prices and second hand 
values are indepedently based indices, the constant in 
this case should reflect the arbitrary basing of the 
indices. A change in the base will introduce an arbitrary 
change in the constant. Thus the estimated constant does 
not have any economic interpretation. The actual future 
second hand price, will 
, 
deviate, from its expected value by 
a random forecast error 
-, 
u tP t+1 
EtP 
t+1 which 
is 
uncorellated 
. 
with any current Inf ormation and in 
particular with Pn t when . -expectations are rational. 
Thus 
equation (10), can be written as 
p 
t+l 
k+ Ph 
t+ "U t 
and because of, the correlation properties of, u tv 
the 
nuisance constant k can now be off Iciently estimated by 
OLS. 
The 
, 
scrapping equations (11) are also estimated 
., 
by 
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OLS. This 
, 
theoretically will introduce 
', 
some 
, 
bias since 
second_ hand values and scrapping. are jointly determined. 
An instrumental variables method has also 
. 
been used and 
has given very similar 
, 
results. The, bias of the OLS 
estimates', is likely to be so small as to 
, 
make it more 
reliable than a two stage least squares, estimation, 
procedure in a small sample such as ours. The 
-variance of 
the 
. 
latter is 
, 
higher and 
, 
depends on the quality of the 
instruments. The 
, 
bias of the OLS estimates arises from 
the fact that the error term in the scrapping equation 
might be correlated with second hand values which is one 
of the regressors. The size of the bias depends on the 
extent to which fluctuations In ship values over our 
sample period 
, 
are attributed to the 
, 
error term in 
comparison with those that are attributed to exogenous 
influences. ý The , of fect of the disturbance term of an 
individual scrapping equation on the general level 
- 
of 
ship values is likely to,,,, be so small as.. to be dwarfed by, 
the effect of exogenous factors, especially since 
scrapping within, an age, class constitutes a very small 
proportion of the total fleet. 
Equations 
. 
(8), (9) have also been estimated by OLS. 
This is because equation (9) involves only predetermined, 
lagged endogenous variables on the right hand, side. Thus 
OLS is expected- to give efficient estimates as 
, 
long as 
the error term Is not autocorrellated. In equation (8) 
there is likely to be some correlation between the error 
term and newbuilding prices. This however Is, expected to 
be quite. small for the same reasons as for the scrapping 
and asset demand equations. Newbuilding prices reflect, 
future profitability and, not- the current disturbance. Two 
stage least squares gave similar results. 
A model should explain the systematic movements in the 
data, so that what remains Le the residual should be 
random. If residuals. are autocorrellated th Is 
, 
may 
indicate misspecif Ication such as the exclusion of an 
important variable or dynamic misspecif Ication. The 
presence of 
. 
autocorrellation reduces the efficiency of 
the chosen estimation, procedures and may'. induce, bias and 
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inconsistency in the estimates of the parameters, the 
standard errors and the test statistics. We test for 
autocorellation by computing the f irst four sample 
autocorellations of the residuals and the associated 
Box-Ljung statistics. 
. 
The latter 
, 
are portmanteau 
statistics calculated as a weighted average over the 
correlogram of the residual, with weights chosen so as to 
give a, better approximation to the asymptotic X2 
distribution In small samples such as ours. 
4.3.2 Results 
The econometric estimates of the behavioural equations 
of the model are presented in Table 4.2. To assist 
comprehension the estimated equations have been numbered 
in the same way as the corresponding theoretical ones. 
Thus equation (1) corresponds to the estimate of equation 
(1) and so on. 
Equation (1) has been solved for'F after taking q to 
the right hand side and 'the transformed inverted supply 
equation has been estimated jointly with equations (3), 
and (7) to take account of cross equation restrictions 
and simultaneity. Equation (1) captures the effect of an 
increase in freight rates on the supply that arises 
through more intensive 6tilisation of the trading fleet 
while keeping lay-up f ixed. It becomes the supply 
function only when lay-up hits zero and therefore cannot 
be reduced any more. Thus equation (1) indicates that 
when lay-up is close to zero a 10% increase in the 
freight market balance will Increase freight rates by 
42.2%. The coef f icient 4.22 multiplying the freight 
market balance term q-K in (1) is the inverse of 7. It 
implies a value' for 7 'equal to 0.24 'which' Is the 
estimated elasticity of supply at very small 'levels of 
lay-up. At low levels of lay-up however the elasticity of 
supply can become much higher as an -increase in rates 
will s Ign if Icantly Increase the employment rate in 
addition to the utilisation rate of the trading fleet. 
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TabIe 4.2 Econometric Estimates 1 
Freiqht Market & Time Charter Rates 
3SLS 1962 
- 
1985 
s lnF = 6.05 + 4.22(lnq - lnKv) + lnPb - 6.60lnLH 
(12.8) (9.47) (-19.2) 
k2- 0.956, S. E-0.134, D. W-2.05 
AR 1= -0.049, AR2 - -0.204, AR3 - 0.069, AR4 - -0.153 
BL(2) 
- 
1.24, BL(4) 
- 
2.12 
ln(; k/(l 
-; 0) 
16.36 + 0.301n(X/(I-X))_ 3.041n(FI(Pb+OC)) 
(2.47) (2.47) (-7.15) 
- 
1.381n(FI(Pb+OC)) 
- 
7.89lnAS 
(-2.59) (-6.96) 
k2 
- 
0.871, S. E 
-0.360, D. W-1.85 
AR 1-0.060, AR2 - -0.164, AR_, - 0.026, AR4 - -0.092 
BL(2) 
- 
0.86, BL(4) 
- 
1.14 
lnH 
t-0.27 + 
1.24ýtlnFt, 
I-0.24EýlnPbt.,, 
(-2.75) 
A2 
- 
0.723, S. E-0.323, D. W-1.60 
AR 1-0.106, AR2 - -0.168, AR3 - 0.112, AR 4ý 0*089 
BL(2) 
- 
1.11, BL(4) 
- 
1.73 
Figures In parentheses are t-statletics for testing the 
null hypothesis 
. 
that the true value of the coefficient Is 
zero. AR(J) to the autocorrelation of the residuals at 
lag and BL(J) Is the Box-Ljung statistic which takes 
account of the residual autocorrelation UP to and 
including lag J. 
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Second Hand Market 
Instrumental Variables 1960 
- 
1985 
lnP 
t 
'= 
- 
0.54 + 0.091n(W t IK t 
(-2.92) (1.98) 
0.271n((H 
t- 
gtoqt. 
l 
YO + rd + 0.731n(Pnt/(l+rt)) 
(5.87) (15.87) 
(7) 
k2 
= 0.975, S. E-0.082, D. W-1.77 
AR 1 =, -0.043, AR2 - -0.277, AR3 - 0.137, AR4 - 0.096 
BL(2) m 2.38, BL(4) - 3.29 
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Scrappina 
OLS 1960 
- 
1985 
ln(s 3 /(I-s 3 8.91 - 2.351n(PIPs) - 2.77DUMs 3 
(-17.08)-(-4.02) (-4.38) 
k2 
= 0.632, S. E=0.616, D. W-2.33 
AR 1= -0.255, AR2 - 0.228, AR3 - 0.165, AR4 - -0.170 
BL(2) = 3.48, BL(4) - 5.30 
in(s 
4 
/(I-s 
4-2.84 + 
0.6111n(s 
4 
/(I-s 
4 
(-3.18) (4.43) 
1.371n(PIPs) 
- 
1.71DUMs4 
(-2.58) (-3.18) 
k2 
= 0.660, S. E-0.519, D. W-1.77 
AR 1=0.077, AR2 - -0.201, 
AR3 
- 
0.040, AR4 
- -0.309 
BL(2) m 1.39, BL(4) - 4.60 
1.06 + 0.801n(s, I(I-s 5 (-2.44) (5.29) ' 
- 
0.671n(PIPs) 
k2 m 0.52 1, S. E-0.347, D. W-1.73 
AR 1m0.127, ýAR2 - 0.139, AR3 - -0.199, AR 4- -0.017 
BL(2) 
- 
1.05, BL(4) 
- 
2.31 
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Shipbuilding 
OLS 1952 
- 
1986 
lrzQt 0.70 + 0.80lnQt_l 
- 
0.551nlý_, + 0.541n(Pn /Pi t (1.52) (3.29) (-2.01) (3.51) 
0.121n(Pn't/Plt)ý+ 0.51lnCPt_, 
(-1.04) (2.66) 
R2 0.89 1, S. E 0.177, D. W 1.51 
AR 0.217, AR2, = -0.135, AR. 3, - -0.173, AR4 0.1046 
BL(2) = 2.50, BLM - 3.80 
InLý 0.61 + 0.34MLý_ + 0.591nQ 0.061nQ t-I t-I 
(-4.26) (4.32) (8.24), (-2.59) 
+ 0.20lnCP -- (9) t (1.85) 
k2 
= 0.973, S. E 0.096, D. Wý, - 1.11 
AR 1=0.264, AR2 -0.023,, AR3. - -0.078, AR 4, w -0,010 
BL(2), = 2.67, BL(4)1-12.91 
Newbuildinc: PCices 
OLS 1960 1985 
lnpý+, 0. IS + lnpnt (10) 
(-2.57)-, 
R2 0.517, S. E 0. ý56, 'D' W 1'. '25 
AR 1 0.374, AR2 -0.180, 
AR3 
-0.125, AR 4 -0.005 
BL(2) = 5.06, BL(4) - 5.55 
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0 
Our estimate of 7 is not significantly- different from 
that reported by Tinbergen (1934), Koopmans (1939) and 
Wergeland (1981). 
The average length of haul UH) was ý specified In 
equation (1) as an additional exogenous variable 
af f ecting the utilization of the trading f leet. The 
reason for this Is that when ships undertake longer 
voyages then the proportion of unproductive time spent in 
port falls, which ý increases supply. Its effect on supply 
can be estimated by dividing the coefficient 
-of LH by 
minus the, coefficient of q! This implies a 1.56 
elasticity of supply with respect to LH which is positive 
as expected. 
The estimated lay-up equation (3)- Is dynamic and 
reflects the significant costs in moving ships in and out 
of lay-up. Theoretically , such costs will introduce 
dynamic complications in the response of lay-up - to 
freight rates and costs. It can be seen from 
6)- that the 
long run response of employment to 
- 
changes in 
-market 
conditions is stronger than the response In the short 
run. The average size of ships (AS), was also specified 
to af f ect ý the lay-up - rate. This , Is , because large ships 
are more efficient, and can profitably trade-, at rates 
which are uneconomic for the smaller ones. Thus an 
increase in size is expected to reduce lay-up at given 
freight rates. , The econometric estimates indeed suggest 
that lay-up is Inversely related to size. ý 
The time charter rate equation has been 11 estimated 
jointly with the freight market equations to reflect 
cross equation restrictions. The coefficient on expected 
freight rates is constrained to equal 1+y which Is equal 
to 1.24 while the coefficient on unit voyage costs Is 
-7, 
that is, 
-0.24. It indicates that at low ý levels of lay-up 
a 10% improvement of the freight market balance will 
increase profitability before fixed costs by S2%. 
The regressions of the freight market block are 
characterised by high k2S 
. 
The relatively lower figure 
for the time charter rate equation Is not indicative of 
the validity and the explanatory power of the equation. 
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This is because this equation contains unobservable 
expectations , of volatile and unpredictable freight 
- 
rates 
and fuel prices. Thus a low A2 reflects the fact that the 
unobservable expectations cannot be proxied accurately. 
Had accurate measurements on expectations been available 
the A2 could have been much higher. 
Equation (7) is the empirical version of equation 
(7). It relates the equilibrium second hand price to 
expected one year profitability, expected second hand 
prices, alternative returns and a risk premium that 
varies with the size of the f leet in relation to 
investors' wealth. Since ships are assets with an 
economic lifetime that can extend over 20 years it should 
be expected that the elasticity of prices with respect to 
expected short term profits 'should be much smaller than 
the long term profitability elasticity. The latter Is 
incorporated in the expected future second *hand term. 
Indeed the coef f ic ient on the expected short' term 
prof itability is 0.27 while the estimated coefficient of 
the expected future price Is 0.73. Thus, --"a short'term. 
10% Increase in expected one year profitability leads to 
a 2.7% Increase in prices while a 10% Increase in long 
term profitability and thus future second hand-'values 
leads to a speculative increase in current prices of 
7.3%. This Is in order to eliminate the possibility of 
excessive. - anticipated capital gains. The sum of the two 
coefficients has been constrained'to equal to 1 so that a 
permanent 10% increase In profits leads to a 10% increase 
in prices. The unconstrained regression gave very similar 
results and did not reject the constraint. 
In spite of, the high volatility of ship prices, the 
estimated inverted asset demand equation (7) is 
characterised by a very high A2 and a low standard error. 
These are Indicative of the very satisfactory goodness of 
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f It. In addition the estimated 
- 
coefficients are 
2 
consistent with a priorl views 
. 
Thus, ' we might say. that 
the empirical results give strong support to our capital 
asset approach. 
Considering the difficulties and poor results 
- 
which 
are mainly due to the problem of unobservable 
expectations - that -are normally encountered in the 
estimation of asset demand functions, these satisfactory 
results are pleasantly surprising. In turn this largely 
ref lect the fact that we 'were able to f Ind accurate 
measurements of otherwise unobservable expectations 
allowing the equation to be estimated with max imum 
ef f iciency. 
Equations (11)' are the estimated scrapping supply 
equations. The results are similar for all three 
equatigns and they indicate that ship prices relative to 
scrap values have a negative effect on scrapping In all 
age classes. As expected, scrapping increases 
, 
as we move 
to older age groups. This 'is , indicated in the three 
scrapping equations by the fact that the size of the 
constant of the regression divided by the sum -of, the 
coef f Icients of the lag polynomial of the dependent 
variable increases as we move down the estimated 
equations. They indicate that if the ratio of ship prices 
and scrap values were to stabilize at its historical 
average then the long run scrapping rate in the age class 
over 20 years old would be around 8%, that of the 15-20 
years old ships would be 1.2% while that of the 10-15 
years old would only be 0.2%. 'It can be seen that the 
scrapping rate in the younger age groups becomes less 
significant. However during depressions when ship values 
2 The low t-statistic on the wealth variable to not 
urprining. This coefficient Is actually expected to be a 
Mall number and Indeed Its theoretical value In zero In 
the case of risk neutrality. Naturally, given our small 
ample size, the effect of wealth cannot be easily 
Iscerned In the data. 
: 
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fall by more than scrap prices, the scrapping rate In the 
younger age groups can Increase significantly. 
Equation (8) is the empirical version of equation (8). 
It shows that an increase in prices of new dry cargo 
ships has a positive impact on the order-book. The long 
run elasticity of the, order-book with respect to prices 
after taking into account the long run effect of orders 
on deliveries and the feedback to orders is 0.77. This 
does not represent the long run increase in the supply of 
new ships 
, 
since part of the increase in the order-book 
reflects the lengthening effect of prices on orders. 
Tanker prices are shown to 
, 
have a negative. ef f ect on dry 
cargo orders, but this Is not statistically significant. 
The term CP is a measurement of shipbuilding capacity. 
Theoretically It is expected that an Ancrease in capacity 
should have a positive effect on the supply of orders. 
Equation (il) estimates the lagged response of deliveries 
to orders. The long run 
. 
effect of a 10% increase In the 
order-book is to increase deliveries by 9.2%. This is 
because part of the increase In the order-book reflects 
the lengthening process and not an intended increase , In 
the supply of new, ships per year. ýThe tanker order-book 
is estimated to have a negative Impact on dry cargo 
deliveries ý as It diverts capacity , towards tanker 
construction. 
Equation (10) is the relationship, between newbuilding 
prices and expected future second hand prices. The 
, 
two 
are equal 
-up to a constant which ý in our case does not 
only reflect risk premia on newbuildings but also the 
arbitrary basing of the two indices. 
, 
Thus the estimated 
constant has no economic interpretation. 
Overall the 
, 
empirical estimates conf orm 
, 
to 
-our a 
priori views regarding their signs. The diagnostic 
statistics which test for autocorrelation in the 
residuals are also reported in Table 4.2 underneath each 
equation. All the Box Ljung statistics are Insignificant 
although in a very few case, this 
. 
is marginally so. All 
the estimated autocorellations are also insignificant at 
the 5% level except the AR, value for equation (10). 
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This is one significant autocorrellation out of the 40 
estimated ones which can 
, 
easily 
. 
be due to random 
sampling. Thus these tests do not cast any significant 
doubts on our, specification although It 
, 
Is still 
possible that there are Inconsistencies that these tests 
have not been able to detect. 
4.4 Simulations 
In chapter 3- the properties 
-of the. theoretical model 
were investigated by subjecting it to various anticipated 
and unanticipated 
-shocks. By using, the phase diagram the 
time pattern of 
-the market's response -to a change In the 
external environment 
, 
was derived-, Here the same 
simulations are performed using the -estimated econometric 
model of the, dry cargo market. Since the econometric 
model is based on the same theory, the qualitative 
features 
-of the simulations carried-out here are broadly 
similar to those investigated in chapter 3. In addition, 
however, the simulations considered here can determine 
the order of magnitude of the response as well. The 
results reflect the estimated elasticities of the model. 
If the system is elastic in the 
, 
sense that Ahe price 
elasticities of the freight market, newbuilding and 
scrapping supply/demand functions are high, then there 
should be little change An the time path of equilibrium 
prices and a, big change in, equilibrium quantities 
following a shock. In addition, the. adjustment towards 
the new long run equilibrium is rapid. If, however, the 
system is price. inelastic, prices become very sensitive 
to exogenous shocks while quantities are less responsive. 
Moreover. the system's adjustment towards a new long run 
equilibrium, after a shock, becomes much slower. 
The empirical estimates indicate that the supply of 
freight is very inelastic at high levels of employment at 
least. However. at the same time the supply of new ships 
is rather more elastic. Thus freight , market shocks are 
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expected to have significant Impact effects on rates and 
prices but these would then tend to adjust quickly 
because of the rapid response of the fleet. Real world 
shipping cycles are also characterized by such behaviour. 
Simulations of the econometric model also exhibit sýme 
qualitative features that the theoretical model cannot 
reproduce. This reflects the relaxation of some 
unrealistic assumptions on which the simple model was 
built. The main qualitative differences in the results 
arise from the fact that in the econometric model the 
construction lag is no longer assumed to be zero as well 
as from the introduction of a new set of equations which 
describe the dynamic evolution of the age profile. 
Since the model is non-linear the solutions are 
necessarily state dependent. That is the magnitude of the 
response to a shock will differ, depending on the state 
of the market In the base run. If the base run is 
depressed a given change, say, in demand will mostly 
affect lay-up with little impact on freight rates, ship 
values and thus shipbuilding and scrapping.. If, on the 
other hand, the freight market in the base run Is tight, 
the shock will greatly affect rates, prices and the 
fleet. The simulations have been carried our with respect 
to a base run In which extreme values of the state 
variables have been intentionally removed in order not to 
distort the pattern of the simulations. 
As is well known, see e. g. Wallis et al (1986), the 
simulation of rational expectations models necessitates 
the specif ication of 
terminal 
conditions in order to 
achieve unique and stable saddle-path solutions. One 
possibility is to impose equilibrium (long run) terminal 
conditions. However, If the time horizon of the 
simulation is relatively short and if this equilibrium is 
not expected to be achieved within this time period, 
equilibrium terminal conditions will distort the 
simulations. Another possibility, which Is adopted here. 
is to require that the rate of change of the state 
variables in the terminal period Is unchanged. This and 
other terminal conditions have been examined numerically 
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by Wallis et al (1986) who conclude that our choice is 
more robust. However, the solution values as the terminal 
date is approached become distorted. These distortions 
propagate backwards in a damped way. For these reasons 
the model 'is simulated over a period of 3S years even 
though we only report the results for the first twelve 
years. Our algorithms are similar to Wallis' and Iterate 
on the basis of conventional Gauss-Seidel inner loops to 
solve for the state variables and an outer loop that 
solves dynamically for the rational expectations 
variables us Ing the terminal conditions already 
described. 
Since the model incorporates rational expectations we 
can distinguish between anticipated and unanticipated 
shocks. The former are assumed to be realised by the 
market four years before their actual occurrence. A base 
run set of assumptions is fed Into the system and the 
equilibrium time path of the endogenous variables is 
calculated by solving the model. To carry out an 
unanticipated shock, the exogenous variable is changed 
from year 0 onwards and the new time path of the system 
is estimated. The new solution and the bass run solution 
are then compared by calculating the percentage 
dif f erences In the endogenous variables between the two 
solutions, at various points In time. To carry out an 
unanticipated shock the exogenous variable is changed 
from year 4 onwards and the market is allowed to 
speculate on' the 'basis 'of this, from year 0. The new 
solution is calculated and It is again compared to the 
base run by calculating the percentage differences in 
endogenous variables. 
overview of model behaviour 
Because the model incorporates rational 
expectations, shocks to exogenous variables may cause 
overshooting in prices. rates and other variables. These 
features and other model properties will become more 
apparent in the following simulations of the empirical 
model. Nevertheless, even at this stage an overview of 
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the model is most probably useful for understanding the 
following sections. 
Various dynamic interdependencies between freight 
rates, prices and the size of the f leet exist. On the one 
hand, a smaller f leet implies higher freight rates. On 
the other hand higher rates imply higher prices. In turn 
higher prices imp ly a higher f leet because of the 
positive effect of prices on the supply of newbuildings 
and the negative effect on scrapping. 
Because of these interactions, the impact of an 
exogenous shock, such as an increase in demand, that 
tends to raise current and expected future freight rates, 
will be moderated by the positive effect of higher rates 
on values and consequently on the growth rate of the 
f leet. 
One way of interpreting the way the model calculates 
the equilibrium price and other variables Is the 
following: Given the assumption of 
, 
say, a higher level 
of demand for freight the model will allow prices to jump 
immediately. This jump reflects rational speculation of 
an upward pressure of demand on future rates and profits 
but also reflects the moderating impact of the likely 
endogenous response of the fleet to the higher demand. 
Indeed, the size of the equilibrium speculative jump in 
prices is limited and also determined by the fact that 
higher values will raise the growth rate of the fleet 
which will generate a downward pressure on future freight 
rates which creates a danger that a competitive return 
might not be earned on the initial high price. At 
equilibrium, values just rise to that level where the 
higher exogenous demand in conjuction 'with the higher 
fleet 
- 
caused by the endogenous boom In ship values and 
shipbuilding - will lead to such a freight rate and 
profit path which will just allow a competitive return to 
be earned on the initial price. 
Higher prices than the equilibrium one are rejected 
by the model because they imply even larger shipbuilding 
expansion and scrapping reduction which will generate 
further downward pressure on rates which in conjuction 
249 
with the higher initial price will not allow a sufficient 
return Ao be -earned. ý Similarly, lower price than the 
equilibrium one are also rejected because of speculation 
that this will restrain shipbuilding and raise scrapping 
so that the implied higher freight rate and profit path, 
in conjuction with the lower initial price. will lead to 
an excess return. 
Thus the dynamics of the model are materially 
different from those exhibited by conventional models 
which embody backward looking adaptive expectations 
mechanisms. In the latter case, booms in ship values and 
shipbuilding reflect belated and irrational reaction to 
lagged profits and rates. Here, however, booms in ship 
values and shipbuilding rather reflect a forward looking 
reaction to anticipated future external events, as 
investors rush to take speculative positions In new and 
second hand ships, and in the process alter their values 
and the newbuilding and scrapping supply, until 
shipping investment is just expected to reallse a 
competitive return, given the assumptions. This 
speculative bidding of values ref lects both external 
events but also the expected endogenous reaction of 
shipbuilding and scrapping to changes In prices which Is 
imbedded in the model 
. 
Itself. Hopefully, these 
relationships will become clearer in the following 
sections. 
4.4.1 Demand Shocks 
Table 4.3 shows the response of the system to a demand 
shock which raises the level of demand permanently by 
10%. The table distinguishes between the cases where the 
shock is anticipated or not. Columns with an *A" heading 
refer to the results of an anticipated shock while those 
with a "U" heading ref er to the results of an 
unanticipated shock. 
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Table 4.3 
SIMULATED EFFECTS OF A 10% INCREASE IN THE LEVEL OF DRY 
CARGO DEMAND3 
Year Time Freight Lay-up Ship prices 
Charter Rate (Z) 
Rate 
A U A U A U A U 
0 
-0.2 42.3 -0.2 33.4 0.01 -1.24 8.1 44.7 
1 
-1.1 38.5 -0.9 29.9 0.06 -1.09 12.0 34.0 
2 
-3.0 31.6 -2.6 24.7 0.15 -0.94 19.2 26.6 
3 
-6.2 24.5 -5.3 19.3 0.32 -0.81 32.9 20.0 
4 30.6 18.6 23.9 14.7 
-0.63 -0.71 24.8 15.0 
5 23.6 13.8 18.6 11.0 
-0.58 -0.62 18.6 11.3 
6 17.7 10.3 14.1 8.2 
-0.52 -0.53 14.0 8.8 
7 13.3 7.8 10.5 6.3 
-0.46 -0.46 10.6 7.1 
8 10.0 6.2 8.0 5.1 
-0.41 -0.40 8.4 6.1 
9 7.8 5.3 6.2 4.3 
-0.36 -0.35 6.8 5.5 
10 6.2 4.6 4.9 3.7 
-0.31 -0.31 5.8 5.0 
11 4.9 4.1 3.8 3.3 
-0.27 -0.26 5.1 5.0 
12 4.0 3.8 3.0 3.0 
-0.22 -0.23 4.8 5.1 
Year Fleet Deliveries Scrapping (Z) 
A u A u A u 
0 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.0 
-0.14 -0.65 
1 0.3 1.3 3.7 10.1 
-0.29 -1.00 
2 0.9 2.7 9.0 16.7 
-0.46 -1.04 
3 1.9 4.2 16.3 17.1 
-0.67 -0.94 
4 3.2 5.5 18.6 14.1 
-0.81 -0.83 
5 4.6 6.6 16.4 10.4 
-0.90 -0.82 
6 5.8 7.4 12.6 7.4 
-0.85 -0.69 
7 6.8 8.1 9.1 5.5 
-0.77 -0.57 
8 7.6 8.5 6.5 4.3 
-0.63 -0.43 
9 8.2 8.7 4.9 3.7 
-0.55 -0.36 
10 8.6 8.9 4.0 3.2 
-0.53 -0.36 
11 8.9 9.1 3.4 3.1 
-0.47 -0.33 
12 9.2 9.2 3.2 3.1 
-0.42 -0.31 
3 
percentage changes. 
Lay-up, Scropping: changes In percentage point. 
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Unanticipated increase in demand 
Wen the shock is unanticipated there is a tightening 
of the freight market in year 0 wfilch causes freight 
rates to increase by 33.4%. This in turn causes an 
increase in the time charter rate of around 42.3%. The 
increase in current profitability has a positive effect 
on values. In addition, the positive impact of demand on 
the freight market balance is expected to last for some 
time as the fleet can respond with a finite speed only. 
This makes room for further speculative Increases in 
prices. The increase in prices is not proportional to 
short term profitability because it also depends on the 
anticipated increase In longer term prof Itability. The 
latter is less than the former because, of the anticipated 
response of the fleet. 
The equilibrium speculative jump In values Is 
constrained by the fact that higher prices tend to raise 
the growth rate of the f leet and this tends to bring down 
freight rates and prof its in the longer term. The 
equilibrium jump in ship values in year 0, when the shock 
is realized, Is 44.7%. This reflects the fact that over 
the longer term the fleet is expected 
. 
to respond and 
rates will come down. Indeed the increase in ship values 
immediately reduces scrapping. On the other hand 
deliveries cannot respond in year 0 since they are 
predetermined by decisions taken in the past. 
Nevertheless. the fleet still rises by 0.3% in year 0 
because of the drop in scrapping. 
The higher values anticipated over the future. raise 
the prices of newbuildings. This leads to an updating of 
plans regarding the future supply of newbuildings. The 
planned future supply of newbuildings increases and the 
construction of new ships to be delivered in the future 
is immediately increased. This raises deliveries in the 
next year by 10%. Scrapping Is also lower in the next 
year by 1 percentage point and this raises the fleet by 
1.3%. In year 2 deliveries rise even further to 16.7% as 
the shipbuilding industry fully adjusts to the new 
conditions. Scrapping also f alls by 1.04 percentage 
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I 
points in year 2. The cumulative effect of these changes 
in deliveries and scrappings is to raise the fleet by 
2.7%. 
This increase in the fleet size together with the 10% 
permanent increase in demand implies that In year 2 the 
freight market balance is 7.3% higher relative to the 
base run. The market balance begins to moderate from its 
full 10% initial increase in year 0 when the fleet was 
f ixed. The f leet response continuously reduces the 
initial gains in freight market balance and gradually 
brings freight rates down. In anticipation of these 
trends and the realization that the Increase in profits 
is short term, prices also begin to ease but still remain 
above base run levels. The latter implies higher 
shipbuilding and lower scrapping. Over the next few years 
the increase in the fleet is even higher even though 
prices are already receeding. This only reflects the fact 
that the initial response Is small due to the lag between 
ordering and delivery. The response of shipbuilding 
reaches its maximum In year 4 when deliveries are 17.1% 
up. 
Over time the changes In f leat size are accumulated 
and cause the fleet to grow continuously higher and rates 
to come down. This reduces prices even further which 
tends to moderate the Increase in the fleet such that the 
system makes a soft landing to long run equilibrium. In 
this equilibrium the accumulated changes in scrapping and 
deliveries cause the fleet to increase by almost as much 
as demand thus bringing rates down to their base run 
level. Because of this prices also come down to their 
bass run level and there are no more changes to scrapping 
and shipbuilding. The situation Is now stable with almost 
no long run change In prices, fleet growth rate, and 
freight rates. However the fleet is permanently higher by 
a level which Is similar to the Increase In demand in 
percentage terms. 
Anticipated increase in demand 
In the anticipated case the permanent increase in 
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demand takes place in year 4. However the market reacts 
in year 0 when the shock Is f Irst expected. , In the 
anticipated case similar long run responses, to the 
unforeseen case are 'implied. However , the short term 
reactions of, ý the- market are very 'different. Prices jump 
in year 0 in anticipation of the positive effects of the 
shock on future profitability. The size of the, jump is 
smaller than in the unanticipated case. This is both 
because the future benefits lie in the more distant 
future 
- and thus - they are more' heavily discounted but also 
because of the fact that in the meantime the fleet is 
likely to 'respond. This will, cushion the eventual impact 
of, the shock. Thus ship prices initially jump by 8.1%. 
The increase, in prices causes an , immediate reduction in 
scrapping 'and an expansion in the supply of - new ships as 
measured by the order-book. The latter is translated into 
higher deliveries in the following years. However, demand 
has 
- not risen as yet so ' the -larger - fleet -cause a 
deterioration of 'freight market balance and so rates 
drop. Before 
, 
the shock, ' the " fleet continues to rise 
further and rates drop even more. These movements can be 
seen in table 4.3. ' 1 
Because of the immediate reduction in scrapping the 
fleet initially increases by only 0.1%. The shipbuilding 
industry also begins , to adapt to the new outlook of 
higher expected future prices and shipbuilding, deliveries 
increase in the first few years before the shock, except 
for year 0 when they are predetermined. From year 0 
onwards the fleet increases even further so that by year 
3 the increase is 
- almost - 1%. As, 'a result of these 
speculative developments in the ,s Ize of ' the - fleet, 
freight rates and time charter rates begin , to f all 
because the increase In demand has not yet occurred. They 
reach an all time low at year 3 just - before the 
occurrence of the shock when the accumulated increase in 
the fleet size pushes the freight market balance to its 
lowest level. 
Inspite of the drop in rates, prices increase further 
as the market realizes the temporary nature of the drop. 
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As the date of the shock Is approached the drop in rates 
caused by the speculative increase in the fleet becomes a 
thing of the past while the positive effects of the 
increase in demand now lie in the more immediate future 
and thus are less heavily discounted. Ship values reach 
an all time high of 32.9%, just before the occurrence of 
the shock when the expected profit profile Is at Its 
highest. This figure is less than-the maximum Increase of 
44.7% when the shock was unanticipated because the 
speculative increase in the fleet has moderated future 
increases in prof its. 
When the shock f inally occurs in year 4 it raises 
freight rates by 23.9% and time charter rates by 30.6%. 
This is less than the maximum increase in the 
unanticipated case and it Is due to the fact that the 
speculative increase in the fleet, before the shock 
moderates the effect on rates. Ship values are at an all 
time high just before the shock when the profit outlook 
is at its highest. Because the increase in values has 
been anticipated ever since year 0 there has been plenty 
of time for shipbuilding to respond. Shipyards take 
advantage of this expected peak In prices and the peak in 
the supply of new ships occurs about the same time. In 
the unanticipated case shipbuildingý supply could not 
respond to the initial unexpected boom in-prices and it 
was 
. 
therefore at Its lowest when prices where at their 
highest. 
Thereafter, the system follows a very similar path as 
in the unanticipated case. The higher demand- causes and 
improvement in the ý freight market balance and its 
positive effects last for some time as the fleet responds 
with f inite speed. Prices begin to ease from their high 
level as the f leet response lowers the prof it prof Ile. 
This In turn induces a deceleration in the rate of 
increase in the fleet size and the system makes a soft 
landing to the new long run equilibrium. 
- 
This involves 
little change in the system's variables except the fleet 
itself which has risen by almost the same amount as 
demand. 
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Comparing the two shocks we f Ind that In the 
unanticipated case the peaks in all variables except 
deliveries are higher than in the anticipated case. 
Because the response of deliveries to unanticipated 
changes in prices is sluggish, scrapping becomes 
relatively more important for raising the fleet when the 
shock comes as a compl ete surprise. When the shock is 
foreseen the fleet can respond more fully and deliveries 
now become re latively more important. 
4.4.2 Bunker price shocks 
We now consider the effect of a change in the price of 
f uel. The price of fuel affects the supply of 
transportation services in the freight market through the 
incentive to slowsteam. In the recent past changes in the 
price of fuel have resulted from OPEC policies that 
changed the price of oil through manipulation of supply. 
The oil shocks were followed by a world recession that 
reduced the level of demand in the shipping freight 
markets. Here we investigate purely the effects of the 
change in the price of fuel by keeping demand f ixed at 
the base run level. The simulations performed here should 
not therefore be expected to replicate the effects of the 
oil shocks of the seventies. This Is because these shocks 
involved both a change in the price of fuel and a change 
in the level of demand for freight. The latter depressed 
the market. Here we isolate the effects of the former by 
keeping everything else. Including demand, constant. It 
will be seen that a hypothetical increase in fuel prices 
will ceteris paribus lead to a boom in the shipping 
markets through its restraining effects on supply. 
Unanticipated increase in bunker prices 
Table 4.4 shows the effects of a doubling of the fuel 
price on the dry cargo market. The results are quite 
similar to the demand shock case. This is because an 
increase in the fuel price will create a shortage in the 
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Table 4.4 
SIMULATED EFFECTS OF A 100% INCREASE IN BUNKER PRICES 4 
Year Time Freight Lay-up Ship prices 
Charter Rate W 
Rate 
A u A u A u A u 
0 
-0.3 65.6 -0.2 67.9 0.01 -1.10 11.1 65.4 
1 
-1.5 58.7 -1.2 60.7 0.08 -1.15 16.8 50.5 
2 
-4.1 47.5 -3.3 51.5 0.21 -1.07 27.5 38.3 
3 
-8.3 36.6 -6.7 42.5 0.45 -0.99 48.4 28.7 
4 47.1 27.5 51.2 34.8 
-0.41 -0.93 36.1 21.6 
5 35.3 20.4 41.4 28.7 
-0.57 -0.87 26.8 16.4 
6 26.0 15.0 33.5 24.0 
-0.62 -0.81 19.9 12.7 
7 19.0 11.2 27.5 20.7 
-0.63 -0.76 14.8 , 10.1 
8 14.0 8.5 23.2 18.4 
-0.63 -0.72 11.2 8.3 
9 10.5 6.9 20.2 16.9 
-0.62 -0.69 8.6 6.9 
10 7.9 5.6 17.9 15.8 
-0.61 -0.66 6.7 6.1 
11 6.0 4.7 16.2 15.0 
-0.58 -0.62 5.5 5.6 
12 4.6 4.1 15.0 14.5 
-0.55 -0.59 4.9 5.4 
Year Fleet Deliveries Scrapping Rate 
(Z) 
A u A u A u 
0 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.0 
-0.18 -0.87 
1 0.5 1.7 5.1 14.0 
-0.39 -1.30 
2 1.2 3.6 12.5 23.4 
-0.61 -1.35 
3 2.5 5.6 23.1 24.0 
-0.89 -1.23 
4 4.3 7.4 26.6 19.7 
-1.07 -1.11 
5 6.2 8.9 23.4 14.6 
-1.19 -1.10 
6 8.0 10.1 17.9 10.5 
-1.13 -0.95 
7 9.4 11.0 12.9 7.8 
-1.04 -0.81 
8 '10.5 11.7 9.2 6.2 
-0.86 -0.62 
9 11.3 12.1 6.8 5.2 
-0.75 -0.52 
10 11.9 12.4 5.2 4.5 
-0.71 -0.51 
11 12.3 12.6 4.2 4.1 
-0.62 -0.45 
12 12.7 12.8 3.5 3.8 
-0.53 -0.39 
4 
percentage changes. 
Lay-upp Scrapping: changes In percentage points. 
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freight market through its restraining effect on supply. 
Because demand Is completely inelastic this will raise 
freight rates to such an extent that profits will also 
increase. 
Thus the impact effect of the bunker shock on 
profitability is the same as the effect of an increase in 
demand. Moreover the freight market affects the ship 
markets only through changes In prof itability. In 
addition demand or fuel prices do not affect the ship 
markets directly but only indirectly through their effect 
on profits and this implies that demand shocks and bunker 
shock will alio have similar effects on the ship markets. 
Thus the dynamic effects of a bunker shock will also be 
similar to that of a demand shock. This can be seen from 
a comparison of tables 4.3 and 4.4. Therefore. in order 
to avoid repetition, the discussion here is very brief as 
the analysis of thel previous section also applies to this 
case. 
When the shock is unanticipated freight rates Increase 
by 67.9% in year 0 as the increase In fuel creates an 
incentive to slow steam. Time charter rates increase by 
roughly the same amount while prof Its increase even more. 
Prices increase by 65.4% The Increase in prices is 
moderated by the expected response of the fleet. Indeed 
scrapping immediately falls by 0.87 percentage points 
while deliveries are predetermined in year 0. Second hand 
values are expected to be higher in the future and this 
raises newbuilding values and causes an expansion in the 
planned supply of new ships. Thus the following year 
deliveries increase by 14% and scrapping drops by 1.3 
percentage points. Deliveries reach a maximum at year 4 
and by that time the f leet has grown by S. 6% bringing 
rates down. The anticipation of these developments causes 
prices to fall continuously from the initial high point 
and this tends to restrain the expansion of the fleet. 
The process stops when the fleet responds fully and 
this brings profits almost down to their base run level. 
As a result prices also come down to their base run 
level. Freight rates however are permanently higher. 
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Higher rates are needed ' In order to cancel the adverse 
effects of bunker price on profits. The latter Is 
required to support prices at the level which will enable 
the f leet to grow in line with demand. The f ]eat also 
increases in the long run by about 12.8%. Because demand 
is the same this implies that there is permanent slow 
steaming. 
Anticipated increase in bunker prices 
When the shock is anticipated to occur in year 4, a 
11.1% speculative increase in prices occurs in year 0. 
This raises the fleet and brings rates down because as 
yet bunker prices have not increased. Scrapping 
immediately drops by 0.18 of a percentage point which 
reflects the strengthening of prices. The order-book 
immediately expands and this causes an increase in 
deliveries from year 1 onwards. Deliveries increase by 
5.1% in year 1,12.5% In year 2 and 23.1% In year 3. As 
the fleet is increasing and rates drop, prices continue 
to make speculative gains. This reflects the approach of 
the shock and bullish profit expectations as the drop in 
rates caused by the speculative increase in the fleet 
becomes a thing of, the past. 
Freight and time charter rates reach an all time low 
just before the occurrence of the shock when the 
accumulated increases in the fleet size have depressed 
the freight' market balance. Prices are at that point In 
time at their maximum as the shock is Imminent and the 
future profit profile is at its highest. Because the peak 
in ship values Is anticipated. shipbuilding also peaks at 
around the same time. ýhen the shock actually occurs 
freight rates increase by 51.2% and time charter rates by 
47.1%. This is less than the maximum increase In the 
unanticipated case. This is because the increase In the 
fleet has dampened the eventual increase in rates. From 
then -on all the variables, with the exception of 
shipbuilding, ý follow a similar path to the unanticipated 
case. The fleet continuous to grow and prices fall until 
they return to 'the base run level. This arrests the 
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process of fleet increase and the market settles. 
By comparing the two cases we again f ind that the 
peaks for all variables except deliveries are higher in 
the unanticipated case than in the anticipated case. In 
the former case reductions in scrapping become relatively 
more important for raising the fleet rather than 
increases in deliveries the response of which Is 
sluggish. In the latter case where shipbuilding can 
respond more fully to the anticipated changes, deliveries 
play a bigger role in raising the fleet. 
4.4.3 Shipbuilding Cost Shock 
This section considers the effects of an increase in 
shipbuilding costs on the equilibrium time path of the 
system. The results are shown in Table 4.5. Prices of 
shipbuilding inputs affect directly the supply curve in 
the shipbuilding market. An increase in prices tends to 
reduce the supply of new ships at a given level of ship 
values. This makes room for higher ship prices. 
Unanticipated increase in shipbuilding costs 
An unexpected increase in shipbuilding costs leads to 
an immediate speculative jump in values. The shock is 
expected to restrain the growth rate of the fleet and 
raise future profits. Table 4.5 shows that an unforeseen 
50% increase in the general level of building costs 
causes an immediate increase in values of 4.7%. This 
reflects the expected increase In future profits caused 
by the drop in future deliveries which in year I fall by 
10.4% followed by a 15.4% in year 2. This causes a slight 
increase in rates during those years. However in year 0 
rates drop. This is because in year 0 deliveries are 
predetermined by past decisions and cannot respond to the 
unexpected change in prices. Scrapping on the other hand 
drops immediately following the rise in prices. This 
increases the fleet and causes the initial drop in rates. 
From year 1 onwards however deliveries begin to adjust to 
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Table 4.5 
SIMULATED EFFECTS OF A 50% INCREASE IN SHIPBUILDING COSTS 5 
Year Time Freight Lay-up Ship prices 
Charter Rate W 
Rate 
A u A u A u A u 
0 
-0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.00 0.01, 0.6 4 
.7 
1 0.1 0.1 
-0.1 0.1 0.01 0.00 0.8 6.5 
2 
-0.2 1.1 -0.2 0.9 0.01 -0.05 1.3 8.3 
3 
-0.5 2.4 -0.4 1.9 0.02 -0.10 2.3 9.8 
4 
-0.9 3.7 -0.7 2.9 0.04 -0.14 3.8 10.8 
5 
-0.7 4.6 -0.6 3.6 0.03 -0.18 5.8 11.5 
6 0.5 5.2 0.4 4.1 
-0.01 -0.20 7.7 11.8 
7 2.0 5.5 1.6 4.4 
-0.06 -0.21 9.1 12.1 
8 3.4 5.8 2.7 4.6 
-0.10 -0.22 10.2 12.2 
9 4.5 6.1 3.5 4.8 
-0.14 -0.23 10.9 12.3 
10 5.1 6.2 4.0 5.0 
-0.16 -0.23 11.3 12.3 
11 5.5 6.3 4.3 5.0 
-0.17 -0.23 11.6 12.3 
12, 5.7 6.3 4.5 5.1 
-0.18 -0.22 11.8 12.4 
Year Fleet Deliveries Scrapping (Z) 
A u A u A 'U 
0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 
-0.01 -0.08 
1 0.0 0.0 0.3 
-10.4 -0.02 -0.12 
2 0.1 
-0.3 0.6 -15.4 -0.04 -0.16 
3 0.1 
-0.7 1.1 -16.3 -0.05 -0.20 
4 0.3 
-1.0 1.9 -15.5 -0-09 -0.24 
5 0.2 
-1.2 -9.5 -14.4 -0.11 -0.32 
6 
-0.1 -1.4 -15.2 -13.6 -0.15 -0.35 
7 
-0.5 -1.5 -16.6 -13.2 -0.20 -0.37 
8 
-0.9 -1.5 -16.0 -13.0 -0.24 -0.35 
9 
-1.1 -1.6 -14.9 -13.0 -0.29 -0.36 
10 
-1.3 -1.6 -14.0 -13.0 -0.36 -0.41 
11 
-1.4 -1.6 -13.6 -13.1 -0.40 -0.42 
12 
-1.4 -1.7 -13.4 -13.1 -0.43 -0.46 
5 
percentage changes. 
Lay-up, Scrapplng: changes In percentage points. 
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the shock and this reduces the f leet. 
The main impact of the shock on rates, values, the 
fleet size and scrapping is felt in the long run. The 
ongoing cutbacks in deliveries cause a continuous 
reduction in the, fleet and a parallel Improvement in 
market balance, rates and values. In the long run time 
charter rates increase by 6.3% while prices rise by 
12.4%. The latter causes a partial recovery in deliveries 
and a sufficient cutback in scrappings so that the fleet 
reduction is halted. In the meantime however the fleet 
size has fallen permanently by 1.7%. Higher prices will 
partly offset the negative impact of higher costs on the 
supply of new ships, while in addition they will reduce 
scrapping. Thus the partial recovery of deliveries and 
the reductions In scrappings will raise the growth rate 
of the fleet back to its base run level. The freight 
market balance will however Improve permanently, as In the 
mean time the fleet growth rate has remained below the 
base run level. 
Anticipated increase in shipbuilding costs 
ýhen the shock Is anticipated. - similar long run 
changes are implied. Here too there Is an initial 
speculative increase In values at time 0 when the market 
realizes the future shock. In the short term, however, 
there is a more significant drop in rates and market 
balance. This reflects the fact that the increase in 
values reduces scrapping which tends to raise the fleet. 
In addition, because shipbuilding costs have not as yet 
risen, the supply of new ships expands following the 
increase. in values. 
There is a speculative build-up In the size of the 
f leet up to year 4. Prices continue to move upwards In 
spite of the drop in rates as the market moves closer to 
the time when the shock will occur. Af ter year 4 
deliveries begin to drop sharply as higher costs restrain 
the supply of new ships. The drop in deliveries quickly 
cancels the initial speculative increase in the fleet 
size. This occurs in year 6 when the market balance and 
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rates rise above their base run levels. Further gains In 
balance, rates and prices are achieved In the following 
years as deliveries remain at a low level. Eventually 
this helps the recovery of profits and prices which 
permanently reduces scrapping and causes a partial 
recovery In shipbuilding such that the fleet stabilizes 
at a permanently lower level. 
4.5 Historical Simulations 
Conventional econometric models which contain no 
forward looking rational expectations variables can be 
used for the purpose of historical simulations. These can 
be used in , order to construct measures of the 
"explanatory power" of the model, e. g. root mean squared 
errors (RMSE), based on the deviation of the simulated 
path of the system from the actual path. The deviation 
reflects possible misspecification and the net effect of 
disturbance terms which in turn reflect the influence of 
factors that have not been taken into account. The 
smaller these deviations are, the higher the explanatory 
power of the model. 
Rational expectations models can also be simulated 'in 
a rather more complicated way. Because expectations of 
future exogenous variables appear In the final reduced 
form of rational expectations models, a historical 
simulationý_of -the whole model can only be performed If 
measures of such expectations are available. In our case 
this could be 'done by using the actual forward values of 
these variables as proxies for theý expectations. In this 
case however the deviation between the simulated and the 
actual path would not just ref lect possible 
misspecif ication or disturbances in structural equations 
but also the deviations between unobservable market 
expectations of exogenous variables and the proxies being 
used. Although such simulations might be usefUl for 
determining the stability and other properties of ' the 
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model, the use of RMSEs as measures of Ahe explanatory 
power would be an unfair test of the model. This is 
because the simulation is conditioned on proxies rather 
than actual market expectations of exogenous. variables 
and thus large deviations and inf lated RMSEs, might 
reflect deviations between the proxies and the variables 
they intend to measure and not the quality of the model. 
However, our freight market block Is recursive with 
respect to the rest of the model and In addition it does 
not contain any forward looking rational expectation 
terms. Thus it, can be simulated like other conventional 
econometric models with the predetermined fleet treated 
as an exogenous variable as in Wergeland (1981). 
The freight market block consists of equations (1), 
(2), (3) 
, 
and (4). These equations solve for the 
equilibrium level of freight rates (F), trading f leet 
(Kv), lay-up 00 and supply (q a) In terms of a set of 
exogenous variables, which includes the level of demand 
(q), unit voyage costs (Pb) and operating costs (00 and 
also in terms of the size of,, the fleet K which Is 
predetermined by historical movements in shipbuilding and 
scrapping. 
The econometric versions of equations (1). (2). (3). 
(4), reported in Table 4.2, have been used to calculate 
the dynamic simulation of the freight market submodel. 
According to the theory the level, of freight rates and 
lay-up should reflect the demand for freight relative to 
the size of the fleet as well as other factors such as 
bunker prices and operating costs that might have an 
influence on supply. The historical dynamic, simulations 
performed here calculate the model's predictions on rates 
and lay-up that would have been generated conditional on 
information regarding the path of the exogenous variables 
such as demand, fuel and operating costs as well as the 
size of the f leet. Historical simulations 
. 
Indicate the 
extent to which a model broadly tracks the past. 
Certainly a model 
, 
which Is claimed to be,, useful for 
forecasting purposes should be able to track the past 
movements with some accuracy. The reverse however, Is not 
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true. Good historical tracking Is a. necessary but not 
sufficient condition for forecasting ability. 
The simulation results of the freight market submodel 
are shown on Fig. 4.1 and 4.2. The former shows the 
actual and simulated paths of the nominal freight rate 
while the latter does the same for lay-up. It can be seen 
that the model tracks the actual historical movements 
quite accurately. 
Root mean square errors, the Theil inequality 
coefficient and other standard criteria that can be used 
to evaluate the simulation model are reported in Table 
4. S. The f irst row of the table reports the correlation 
coef f icient between the historical and the simulated 
series and partly indicates the tracking ability of the 
model. This should ideally be equal to 1. The correlation 
for the freight rate is equal to 0.97 while for the 
lay-up it is slightly lower at 0.927. 
Row 3 reports the Root Mean Square percentage error 
and this Is 10.58% for the freight rate and 5.65% for the 
lay-up. These figures are quite acceptable given also the 
volatility of the two series (Figs 4.1 - 4.2). 
The f Igures reported in rows 2,4,5 are not very 
informative on their own. They can be more revealing If 
compared with the mean of the historical series which Is 
reported at the bottom of the table. The mean freight 
rate is 68.94 while lay-up, which is expressed as a 
fraction of the fleet, has averaged out at 0.01562 over 
the sample period. Comparison of the elements in rows 2, 
4 with the corresponding mean of the series also Indicate 
that the tracking of the simulation Is acceptable as has 
already been Indicated by the RMS percent error. 
Comparing the Mean Error reported in row 5 with the mean 
of the series suggests that there Is little bias in the 
simulation. 
Row 6 reports the regression coefficient calculated 
from a regression of the actual on the simulated series. 
It can be seen that this is very close to the ideal value 
of 1. 
The following rows report the Thell inequality 
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Table 4.6 
Results of historical simulation 
Freight Lay-up 
Rate (z) 
Correlation coefficient 0.970 0.927 
Root-mean-squared error 7.332 0.005 
RMS percent error 10.58Z 5.65Z 
Mean absolute error 5.988 0.004 
Mean error 0.228 0.001 
Regression coefficient 0.993 1.051 
Theil's inequality coeff 0.0095 0.0635 
Fraction of error due to 
Bias 0.0009 0.0230 
Different Variation 0.0097 0.0954 
Different Covariation 0.9894 0.8816 
Mean 68.94 0.0156 
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coef f ic ient and its decomposition. The calculated 
coefficient is quite small and very close to the Ideal 
value of 0, especially in the case of freight rates. The 
decomposition between bias, dif ferent variation and 
different covariation Is also good and close to the 
ideal 0,0,1 distribution. This is again especially true 
for freight rates, while in the case of lay-up the f igure 
for different variation is rather more important but 
still quite small. This result indicates that, unlike in 
the case of freight rates, the simulated lay-up series 
cannot replicate entirely the volatility of the actual 
series. 
These results are encouraging for the aggregate 
approach we have adopted. By using a simple framework, 
the significant oscillations in rates and lay-up have 
been explained in terms of basically three main 
variables; freight market balance (q1K), unit voyage 
costs (Pb) and operating costs (OC). 
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5.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter we developed an econometric 
model of the dry cargo market using the theory of chapter 
3 as a basis. In this chapter an econometric model of the 
tanker market is developed based on the same theory. The 
model consists of a freight, second hand, shipbuilding 
and scrapping market. Again here the level of aggregation 
reflects a- balance between on the one hand the likely 
improvements that this would imply and on the other the 
costs of carrying out such an extension. As in the dry 
cargo market, 
-aggregate demand and supply equations for 
freight, second hand, shipbuilding and scrapping markets 
are estimated. There is some disaggregation in the scrap 
market only, where separate scrapping supply functions 
are estimated for each age group. 
There is some evidence that the smaller and larger 
tankers are not perfectly substitutable In the freight 
market and consequently in the second hand, shipbuilding 
and scrapping markets as well. This Is due to the fact 
that there is a number of routes which - because of port 
and canal draft restrictions - cannot accommodate large 
vessels. This can cause the freight rates of the various 
tanker vessels to be less than perfectly correlated. In 
spite of this however the individual freight rates have 
historically f luctuated very closely together. Because 
the large vessels have only appeared relatively recently 
it would be difficult to estimate econometrically a 
separate model of the large tanker sector because of the 
limited degrees of freedom that the small sample of 
observations implies. There are also , numerous links 
between the small and large vesselsl through the. demand 
and the supply sides of the markets that makes it 
difficult to disaggregate the two both in theory and from 
the data. For example taking the demand side of the 
freight market, a shipper can, instead of chartering a 
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large vessel, use a number of smaller vessels and in 
actual practise this will depend on relative freight 
rates. On the supply side now large vessels can carry 
part cargoes and thus can operate as if they were smaller 
ships. The decision to carry part cargo will again depend 
on the relative freight rates. These widely available 
substitution possibilities will not allow the various 
freight rates to diverge very much. 
In the light of the above arguments and in spite of 
the fact that 
-there are some good reasons for 
distinguishing between tankers of various sizes, we have 
chosen not to disaggregate further. 
The theoretical specification of the model and the 
econometric methodology used in order to estimate its 
structure, Is almost Identical to that used for the 
construction of the dry cargo model presented in the 
previous chapter. In section 5.2 therefore the 
theoretical specif ication to be estimated is brief ly 
reviewed. In section 5.3 the econometric methodology is 
explained and then the empirical estimates are presented 
and discussed. Finally in section 5.4 the model's dynamic 
multipliers are calculated by 
-, 
simulating its response to 
various anticipated and unanticipated shocks. 
5.2 Overview 
This section presents the theoretical specification 
of the tanker model. This Is almost Identical to the one 
used in the previous chapter for the construction of the 
dry cargo model and thus the presentation Is brief. The 
theoretical specification is based on the theory which 
was presented in chapter 3. The theory of chapter 3 is 
extended in order to take account of not only additional 
dynamics and exogenous influences but also aspects of 
behaviour that have up to now been ignored. 
The complete specification of the model is given by 
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Table S. 1 
Model Listing 
9 qmF1 (Kv, FlPb, Zq) (1) 
Kv 
- 
(1-X)K + pKc 
- 
ST (2) 
X-F2(F, Pb, OC, LC) (3) 
q, - qlg (4) 
ut m (F 1 
+T /pb7) 
- 
OC (S) 
ttt 
InHt w (1+y)E t lnF t+l - rE t lnPb t+l + (6) 
Pt 
-F 4( WtlKt, Etnt+,, EtP t+i' rt (7) 
Q- Fs ( Pn, Pn', Pi, Pl'; ZQ (8) 
Dt =E wlQt-t (9) 
Pnt w Etýt+l +k (10) 
S, - Fý( P/ps) (11) 
sw ý3s +As+ Asss (12) 344 
Sm Ks (13) 
A 
2, tKtA1 t-A-S 
(14') 
5 
A I't KtED t-j i= 
A 
I't 
Kt5 
A 
I-I't-5 
K 
t-S 
(1- (7/10)E s (3110)E s 
Jul Jul I-I't-j 
i-3,4,5 (14 
+ Dý t 
-1 
(15) 
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equations M-05) listed in Table 5.1. Some of these 
equations contain unknown parameters which in section 5.3 
are estimated from the data while others are either 
identities or equilibrium conditions. 
The notation is the same as the one used in the 
previous chapter only for the fact that, here, variables 
refer to the tanker market rather than the dry cargo 
market. A ""' over a variable indicates a dry cargo 
variable. 
Equations M-W constitute the freight market block 
which is recursive with respect to the remaining system. 
Equation (1) captures the positive effects of freight 
rates on supply which arise out of the incentive to 
utilize trading ships more ef f ic iently when rates 
increase. It is derived from the assumption of profit 
maximization of the ship in a perfect competition 
environment. Equation (2) is an identity that simply says 
that the total fleet trading in the tanker market 
consists of tankers not laid up plus combis in oil minus 
tankers in storage ST. The latter is treated as 
exogenous. Equation (3) relates the optimal level of 
lay-up to freight rates and other prices. It assumes that 
at the margin costs in lay-up are equal to the cost 
(losses) of operating the vessel in the spot market. 
Equation (4) states that the freight market clears within 
the unit time period. 
Equation (5) relates the maximum amount of profits 
earned by trading the ship at the optimum speed to the 
prevailing freight rates, unit voyage costs and operating 
fixed costs. 
Equation (6) determines the equilibrium time charter 
rate on a one year time charter hire contract arranged at 
the end of time t. This is a rent which Is paid to the 
owner by the charterer in return for assuming control of 
the vessel and for the entitlement to the income 
generated by the ship while on hire. In theory the rent 
reflects the expected profitability of the asset over the 
duration of the 'contract. Because of the special nature 
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of this charter contract whereby the charterer pays for 
only part of the costs while the owner pays for the fixed 
operating costs, the rental rate must now equal the 
expected profits of the ship before fixed operating 
costs. In shipping terminology profits before fixed costs 
is referred to as the time charter equivalent and this Is 
equal to the f irst term of the LHS of equation (5). 
Equation (6) equates the time charter rate to 
expectations regarding this term after allowing for a 
risk premium. 
Equations M-05) represent the ship markets block 
of the model. Equation (7) relates the equilibrium price 
of ships, to the expected profits, next period prices and 
alternative returns to capital. Wen expectations 
regarding future profits or prices Increase then capital 
tends to flow into shipping and this raises the value of 
ships until the expectation 
. 
of excess return is 
eliminated. The equation also allows, for a variable risk 
premium which at equilibrium moves in line with the ratio 
of wealth to the total fleet. 
Equation (8) is the theoretical 
_ 
supply ýof 
newbuildings as measured by the order book. The order. 
book is the product of the stretch of time over which 
contracts have been arranged and the planned delivery 
rate that is the amount of ships Intended to be delivered 
per period. The latter depends positively to the 
newbuilding price relative to shipbuilding costs. The 
former also depends on the same factors. 
, 
Since 
shipbuilders can, also produce dry cargo vessels the 
supply of tankers should be negatively related to the 
price of dry cargo newbuildings. Equation (9) assumes 
that deliveries are determined by a lagged distribution 
on past orders. We assume a one year average lag between 
order and delivery and this implies that the price of 
tanker newbuildings should reflect expectations of next 
year's equilibrium second hand values as equation (10) 
indicates. 
Equation (11) Is the theoretical supply of tankers 
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for scrap generated by the Individual age groups. There 
are again 5 age groups. These are the 0-5,5-10.10-15, 
15-20 and 20 years and over. These are indexed by i 
1,2,3,4,5. In the light of the empirical evidence we 
assume that there is zero scrapping in the first two age 
groups. In reality there has been some scrapping of 5-10 
year old tankers during the recent depression. However 
this has been very small and an isolated event In the 
long term history of the market. For the remaining age 
groups we assume that the supply of tankers for scrap 
depends on the second hand values of tankers relative to 
demolition prices. 
Equation (12) is an identity which says that the 
aggregate scrapping rate Is a weighted average of the 
specific age group scrapping rates with the weights being 
equal to the proportion of ships within each age group. 
Equation (13) is also an identity which simply says that 
total scrappings are equal to the aggregate scrapping 
rate times the size of the f leet. Identities (14'), 
(14") and (14.. ) describe the dynamic evolution of the 
age profile. Equation (14") simply says that the number 
of tankers in the f irst age group is equal to the sum of 
tanker deliveries over the last 5 years. Equation (14') 
says that, since there is zero scrapping in the first two 
age groups, the number of tankers in the second age group 
must equal to the number of tankers In the f irst age 
group 5 years ago. Equations (14... are almost 
identities that relate the number of ships at age group i 
to the number of ships in age group 1-1 5 years ago, 
depreciated by a factor which Is a weighted average of 
scrapping rates in these two age groups over the last 5 
years. Finally identity (15) simply says that the change 
in the f leet is equal to the dif f erence between 
deliveries and scrappings. 
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S. 3 Estimation 
The econometric estimation methods used are similar 
to the ones discussed in the previous chapter section 
4.3. The specification presented in section 5.2 above, Is 
the one that is derived from the extended theory analysed 
in section 4.2. This specification cannot be estimated as 
It is because data on current profits is not available. 
Thus equation (5) cannot be estimated. This presents no 
special problems however. Profits appear only In one 
other equation. This is the inverted asset demand 
equation (7). The time charter rate H Is the rent f or t 
hiring a ship on a time charter basis and this, as 
already explained, should ref lect profits before 
operating costs. 
Ht-Etw 
t+l -Et 
oc 
t+l 
Thus the unobservable prof it term in (7) can be 
eliminated by using (14) to substitute for EtW t+1 in 
terms of H and OC to give the following 
pt =F4(wt IK t, Ht-Et oc t+l' Pn t, rt) 
The system to be estimated consists now of the same set 
of equations M-03) except for (5) which has been 
omitted and (7) which has been substituted by W). 
5.3.1 Econometric Methodology 
Freight Market 
The freight market block Is recursive with respect to 
the ship markets since the fleet is predetermined. In 
addition the parameter 7 in equation (6) Is equal to the 
elasticity of supply in equation (I). The recursiveness 
of the model implies that the freight market block can be 
efficiently estimated separately from the rest of the 
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system. The cross equation coefficient restrictions on 
the other hand suggest that the freight market equations 
should be estimated jointly. Thus the parameters of 
equations (1), (3), (6) are jointly estimated by 3SLS. 
This joint estimation takes advantage of the fact that 
there might be contemporaneous correlation across the 
disturbance terms of these equations while it also 
imposes the cross equation restrictions between (1), (3) 
and (6). This cross equation restriction arises from the 
fact that the freight rate elasticity 7 of (1) is related 
to the parameters of (6). 
Equation (6) involves unobservable expectations of 
future freight rates and bunker prices. We have used the 
error in variables method to estimate this equation 
jointly with (1). (3). The future values of the 
expectation variables have been used as proxies for these 
unobservable market forecasts and the disturbance term 
has been redef ined to be a sum of the original 
disturbance term plus the forecast errors. To do this let 
us f irst def ine the one step ahead forecast errors of 
freight rates ur and bunker prices ub as tt 
f F 
t+l -EtF t+l 
ubw Pb -E Pb t t+l t t+l 
Using these definitions, equation (6) can be written as 
follows 
lnHt = (1+7)lnF - rlnPb + (1+7)u r+ 7u b t+l t+l tt 
(6') 
The terms F 
t+1 and 
Pb 
t+1 are proxies of 
the current 
market expectations regarding these variables. Because 
these terms are correlated with uc and ub we have to use tt 
instruments for them. The instruments must be 
uncorrelated with the u terms in equation (6') in order 
for the estimates to be consistent. Efficiency also 
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requ ires that the instruments should be as highly 
correlated as possible with the proxies. Our instrument 
list is a subset of the current information set. These 
are valid instruments since the forecast errors ur and ub tt 
are by construction orthogonal to the current information 
set. In small samples a few good instruments might give 
better results than if a wider set is used. 
We estimate the unknown parameters of (1), (3) and 
(6) by carrying out 3SLS on the system of equations (1). 
(3) and (6). We also need instruments for the current 
freight rate and lay up which are endogenous variables 
included as regressors in equations (1), (3). The 
instruments chosen for current freight rates and lay up 
are the exogenous and predetermined variables of (1), (3) 
where the fleet is also treated as predetermined and used 
as an instrument because of the block recursiveness. 
These same variables are used as instruments for the 
future freight rate. which enters in equation (6'), but 
in addition the current order book has also been included 
since this is part of the information set and Is relevant 
for forecasting the future fleet and thus freight rate. 
The current bunker price Is used as an instrument for Its 
future value. 
Ship Markets 
The Inverted asset demand equation (7) involves two 
expectation variables, that is Etnt.,,, and EtP t+1 . 
As 
- 
it 
Is this equation cannot be estimated even by the error in 
variables method because data on actual profits Is not 
available. This problem can be remedied by using (7) 
instead of (7)'. The other estimation problem is_ caused by 
'the appearance of the unobservable EtP t+1 
term. 
Fortunately, as equation (10) suggests. the newbuilding 
price can be used as an index of expected future second 
hand prices in which case W) becomes 
pt =F4(Wt IK t, Ht-Et oc t+i' Pn t, rt). (7") 
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This involves 
, only one unobservable expectation term 
Et OC 
t+1 which can 
be easily instrumented even by a simple 
trend variable. Equation (7") is thus estimated by the 
errors in variables method. -- The only variable that has to 
be Instrumented is the OC 
t+1 
term and the Anstruments 
used are a subset of the current available information 
which is particularly relevant for forecasting the future 
level of operating costs. These costs consist mainly of 
wages. Current operating costs, fuel prices and interest 
rates. have been used as instruments for OC t+1 while 
the 
remaining variables are used as instruments of 
themselves. 
- 
This method is expected to give much better estimates 
than if the original equation had been estimated by the 
errors In variables method assuming that data on profits 
was available. This Is because of the unpredictability of 
profits and second hand prices as well as the high 
correlation between these two variables, which would make 
it very difficult to instrument them 
-separately. Moreover 
the variance of the error term would, be inflated by the 
addition of the forecast errors to the original 
disturbances implied by the error in variables method. 
Using 
- 
the newbuilding price as a direct observation of 
expected future second hand price the variance of the 
error attributed to the dif f iculty of instrumenting 
prices is eliminated. In addition the substitution of the 
expected prof it term by the observable time charter rate 
and the easily instrumented expected operating cost, also 
eliminates most of of the variance in the estimates that 
would 
. 
be attributed to the difficulty of Instrumenting 
profits. This method is almost equivalent to carrying out 
OLS since operating costs can be Instrumented very 
easily. 
Equation (9) can be estimated efficiently by OLS. 
Equation (9) involves only predetermined variables since 
the current order book is excluded from the right hand 
side of (9) both because of theoretical and empirical 
reasons. The current. order book should have no Influence 
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on current deliveries because of the lag between ordering 
and delivery. 
Equation (10) involves only an unknown constant which 
reflects 
- 
risk premia but also the arbitrary bas Ing of the 
two Indices. If we denote the ship price forecast error 
by, up I. e. t 
UP =p- EP t t+l t t+l 
then equation (10) can be written as 
Ph mP+k- up t t*l t 
or 
P Pn 
-k+ up t+l tt 
(10') 
The unknown parameter k of (10) can be estimated 
efficiently and without bias by carrying out OLS on 
(101). 
The disturbance term in the scrapping equations (11) 
were found to be highly autocorrelated. We thus assume 
that the disturbance term ut follows af irst order 
autoregressive process, that is 
ut = pu t-I +et 
where et is uncorrelated. We treat the regressors in (11) 
as fixed and estimate the unknown parameters by maximum 
likelihood. This is asymptotically equivalent to the 
traditional Cochrane-Orcutt method but can be more 
efficient in small samples since it takes account of the 
first observation rather than dropping It. Instrumental 
variable estimates of these equations with correction for 
serial correlation gave similar results. 
5.3.2 Results 
Table 5.2 shows the econometric , estimates. Figures in 
parentheses are t-statistics which test the hypothesis 
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Table S. 2 Econometric estimates 
Freiaht Market & Time Charter Rates 
3SLS 1962 
- 
1985 
lnF 
- 
0.47 + 3.25(IMIO 
- 
InKv) + InPb 
- 
2.28]nLH 
(1.06) (17.59) (-8.52) 
k20.872, S. E 0.28, D. W-1.62 
AR, 0.121, A% 
-0.143, -AR 3-0.089, 
AR 
4- -0.071 
BL(2) = 0.90, BL(4) - 1.26 
7.98 + 0.341n(X/(I-X))_, 
- 
4.62in(FIOC) 
(5-52) (3.16) (7.64) 
- 
1.211n(FIOC)_, + 1.421n(PblOC)+ 0.371n(PblOC)_, 
(2.05) (3.21) (2.75) 
- 
10.761n(LCIOC) (3) 
(-7.08) 
k2 m 0.922, S. E-0.77, D. W-1.74 
AR, m 0.132, A% - 0.17 1, AR3 - 0.124, A% - -0.093 
BL(2) 
- 
1.20, BL(4) 
- 
1.87 
lnHý 
- 
-3.40 + 1.3lEtInFt.,, - 0.3lEtlnPbt., (6) 
(-35.44) 
S. E-0.48, D. W-2.56 
AR 
1- -0.195, 
A% 
- 
0.065, AR3 
- -0.145, A% - -0.113 
BL(2) 
- 
1.06, BL(4) 
- 
2.00 
1 
Figures In parentheses are t-statletics for testing the 
null hypothesis that the true value of the coefficient 
equals to zero. AR(J) Is the autocorrelation at lag j and 
BL(J) Is the Box-Ljung statlotic which taken account of 
the residual autocorrelation up to and Including lag P 
ts the autoregressive coefficient of the residuals. 
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Second Hand Market 
Instrumental Variables 1968 
- 
198S 
lnPt = 0.32 + 0.021n(lýlKt) 
(0.56) (0.13) 
0.291n((Ht 
-Et OC t+l)/(l + rd) 
(2.74) 
0.71 ln(Pn 
t 
/(l +rt»+0.35DUM (7) 
(6.75 (1.68) 
k2 
_ 
0.813, S. E-0.19 1, D. W-1.36 
AR 1m0.204, AR2 - -0.012, AR3 - -0.059, AR4 - -0.450 
BL(2) 
- 
0.88, BL(4) 
- 
6.17 
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Scrappinc 
Maximum Likelihood and f irst order autoregressive 
disturbances 
1955 
- 
1985 
ln(s I(I-s 
-6.51 - 2.241n(PIPs) + 1.04DUP 33 IS3 
(-4.93) (-3.41) (1.66) 
p=0.904, t- statistic for p- 10.72 
R2 0.642, S. E-0.842, D. W-2.02 
AR 
-0.107, AR2 - -0.147, Alý - -0.021, AR4 - 0.113 
BL(2) 
- 
1.15, BLM 
- 
1.65 
1957 
- 
1985 
ln(s 
4 
/(I-s 
4-4.65 - 
2.341n(PIPs) 
(-10.51) (-4.47) 
pm0.479, t- statistic for p-2.78 
k2 m 0.536, S. E-0.732, D. W-1.33 
AR 1m0.050, AR2 - -0.157, AR3 - 
0.163, AR 4- -0.340 
BL(2) 
- 
0.90, BL(4) 
- 
5.98 
1951 
- 
1985 
3.76 
- 
2.151n(PIPs) 
(-9.45) (-5.12) 
pm0.596, t- statistic for p-4.794 
k2 
- 
0.542, S. E-0.596, D. W-1.65 
AR 1=0.073, AR2 - -0.276, 
AR3 
- 
0.015, AR4 
- -0.086 
BL(2) 
- 
3.19, BL(4) 
- 
3.51 
283 
Shipbuildinct 
OLS 1952 
- 
1986 
inQ t, -2.89 + 0.92lnQt_, - 0.49MLý +A. Illn(Pn t /Pl t) (-4.20) (4.72) (-2.17) (5.74) 
-1 t_, 
) + 0.76lnCPt_l 
- 
0.731n(Pnt' /Pi' 6) 
(-3.51) (3.30) 
A2 0.924, S. E 0.234, D. W 1.52 
AR, 0.252, Alý 0.023, AR3 
-0.043, Alý - 0.067 
BL(2) = 2.44, BL(4) - 2.70 
1nLý 0.81 + 0.341rL[ý_ + 0.52InQt_, 
- 
0.261nQ 
(-3.93) (4.42) (9.75) (-2.48) 
+ 0.501nCP t- 1 
9) 
(3.52) 
k2 m 0.962, S. E'- 0.148, D. W-1.42 
AR, = 0.241, A% - -0.024, A% - 0.043, Alý - 0.021 
BL(2) m 2.23, Bl(4) - 2.33 
Newbuilding Prices 
OLS 1966 1985 
1nPn 
t-0.82 + 
ýt1nPt. 
 
+ 0.43DUMPn (10) 
(5.05) (2.07) 
k2 0.546, S. E 0. '46, D. W-1.75 
AR, 0.093, AR2 
-0.124, AR3 - -0.132, Alý - 0.074 
BL(2) 
- 
0.58, BL(4) 
- 
1.18 
284 
that the coef f icients are equal to zero. For the 
scrapping equations we also report the estimated value p 
of the the autoregressive coefficient In the AR(l) 
specification of the disturbance term. In this case, the 
statistics reported are based on the p transformed 
variables which are generated by passing the original 
data through the filter I-pL. 
To assist comprehension the estimated equations have 
been numbered in the same way as the corresponding 
theoretical ones. Thus equation (1) is the econometric 
estimate of equation (1). 
Equations (1), (3), (S") have been jointly estimated 
subject to cross equation restrictions. The coefficient 
on 1nq InKv in (1) is the Inverse of the elasticity of 
supply 7 when lay-up is kept constant. Its value of 3.2S 
implies a value for 7 equal to 0.31. This is the 
elasticity of supply when lay-up falls down to zero and 
cannot therefore be reduced any more. The estimated value 
of 7 is slightly higher here than In the case of the dry 
cargo market. The elasticity of time charter rates with 
respect to expected freight rates Is (1+7) and this is 
estimated to be 1.31 while the elasticity with respect to 
bunker prices is -y which implies a value of -0.31. The 
average length of haul has been included as an additional 
regressor In the inverted supply equation (1). This Is 
because higher distances imply a lower proportion of time 
spent in port and more productive time in steaming which 
should therefore increase the supply. In the inverted 
supply equation it Is expected to appear with a negative 
coef f icient. 
The lay-up equation (3) is dynamic. This probably 
reflects the fact that there are costs of moving In and 
out of lay-up which usually introduce dynamic 
complications. The results imply that the short term 
response of lay-up to freight rates Is smaller than the 
long term one. 
Equation (7) is the estimated second hand equation. 
It relates prices to expected profits, which can be 
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inferred from the time charter rate after allowing for 
operating costs, and to expected ýfuture second hand 
values. The coefficient on expected profits and prices 
are constrained to sum up to one so that the long run 
response of prices to prof its is one. It can be seen that 
the elasticity of prices with respect to profits is 0.29 
which is almost equal to the estimate for the dry cargo 
market. The elasticity of prices with respect to expected 
future values on the other hand Is estimated to be much 
higher, around 0.71. This Is natural since tankers are 
assets of considerable longevity and therefore the effect 
of short term profits should be much smaller relative to 
the effect of long term profitability as embodied in 
expected future prices. 
Equations (11) are the estimated scrapping equations 
f or the age groups 10 - 15,15 - 20 and 20 years and 
over. The error term In these equations has been assumed 
to follow a first order autoregressive process. Since the 
scrapping rate is a0-I variable the specification for 
these equations is logistic. The estimated coefficients 
on the ratio of second hand prices relative to scrap 
values are negative for all the age groups as expected. 
They are also surprisingly similar to 
. 
each other. The 
value of the constant of the regression Increases as we 
move down from the younger age groups towards the older 
ones. This simply reflects the fact that at a given level 
of prices there should be more scrapping in the old age 
groups rather than in the young ones. The estimates imply 
that on average during the cycle there is 0.6 percent 
scrapping in the 10 - 15 years old age group, 4% 
scrapping in the 10 - 1S years group while for the older 
age group this figure rises to 8.2%. At the bottom of the 
depression. where second hand values fall relative to 
demolition prices these figures rise to 1.9%. 12% and 21% 
respectively for age groups 3,4,5. On the other hand at 
the peak of the boom the estimated scrapping falls down 
to 0.2%, 1.4% and 3.2% respectively. 
Equation (9) is the empirical supply of tanker 
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orders. The estimates imply that supply of tankers rises 
when tanker prices increase. On the other hand there is a 
strong and statistically significant negative effect of 
dry cargo prices on the supply of tankers. This is 
because shipbuilders are expected to supply more dry 
cargo ships when their values rise, at the expense of 
tankers. Current deliveries of tankers have a negative 
effect since they directly reduce the stock of ships on 
order. On the other hand an expansion of shipbuilding 
capacity CP is expected to have a positive influence on 
the supply of ships. Equation (9) is the empirical 
version of (9). It relates deliveries to lagged orders. 
According to the estimates a 10% Increase in the order 
book leads to 5.2% increase in deliveries in the 
following year. The lagged dry cargo order book was also 
included in the regression and it was found to have a 
negative effect on tanker deliveries. This possibly 
reflects the fact that as the dry cargo order book 
expands, shipbuilders divert some of their capacity 
towards fulfilment of these orders at the expense of 
tanker deliveries. Shipbuilding capacity was found to 
have a positive effect since, for a given order book a 
larger capacity implies fewer orders per shipyard which 
allows for the order book to be depleted at a faster 
rate. On 
, 
the other hand a lower capacity implies that 
delivery has to be postponed In the future. 
Equation (10) relates current newbuilding prices to 
future expected tanker prices. These two are equal up to 
a constant which reflects risk premia and vintage 
effects. Because our indices are arbitrarily and 
independently based the constant will change depending on 
the base of the indices and so it no longer has an 
economic interpretation. 
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S. 4 Simulations 
In this chapter the response of the tanker market to 
various shocks in the exogenous variables Is simulated. 
In chapter 3 the dynamic response of the theoretical 
model to various anticipated and unanticipated shocks was 
analysed by means of phase diagrams. The structure of the 
theoretical model is very similar to that of the 
econometric model of the tanker market estimated above. 
Thus similar qualitative results are expected. However, 
there are also some peculiar features in the results 
presented here. These reflect some structular differences 
between the theoretical and empirical model. In 
particular, unlike the theoretical model, the empirical 
version does not assume instantaneous delivery while in 
addition it takes into account the ageing process. 
The simulation method used Is the same as for the dry 
cargo model which Is discussed In more detail In section 
4.4. Thus the model is simulated over a period of 3S 
years even though we only report the results for the 
f irst 12 years. This is because In the case of a rational 
expectations model, the final years of the simulations 
are distorted by the terminal conditions. Our terminal 
conditions assume that at the terminal period the model's 
endogenous variables grow at a constant rate. Because the 
model is non-linear the results are necessarily state 
dependent. We have chosen a base run set where extreme 
values of the exogenous variables have been intentionally 
removed in order not to distort the results. To carry out 
an unanticipated shock the change in the external factor 
is Introduced In the first year of the simulation whereas 
in the case of an anticipated shock the change is 
introduced In the fourth year of the simulation and the 
market is allowed to speculate on the basis of it from 
the first year onwards. 
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5.4.1 Demand shocks 
Table S. 3 shows the response of the system to a 
demand shock which permanently raises the level of demand 
by 10%. The table distinguishes between cases where the 
shock is anticipated or not. Columns with an "A" heading 
refer to the results of an anticipated shock while those 
with a "U" heading refer to the results of an 
unanticipated shock. 
Unanticipated increase in demand 
An unanticipated increase In demand leads to an 
immediate increase in freight rates of around 26%. This 
implies an increase of time charter rates of around 
28.7%. The expected profit profile Improves and thus 
prices increase by 23.5%. This increase In values Is 
restrained by the fact that the higher prices will 
increase the growth rate of the f leet which will bring 
future rates down. Indeed in year 0 scrapping falls by 
almost half of a percent. Deliveries however are 
initially unchanged. In the following years shipbuilding 
begins to respond to the higher values. In year 1 
deliveries are up 9% and by year 4 they are up 15.8%. 
Scrapping drops by 0. 87 of a percent in year 3. This also 
helps to raise the size of the f leet and thus market 
balance, rates and prof its lose some of their initial 
gains. The declining prices cause a deceleration in the 
rate of increase of the f leet size and thus in the long 
run the system makes a sof t landing close to the base run 
level. The shock raises the size of the f leet permanently 
by an amount which Is almost equal to the increase in 
demand. This causes rates, profits, prices and thus 
shipbuilding output and scrapping to return to the base 
run level. 
Anticipated increase in demand 
When the shock is anticipated there is a 4% 
speculative increase In ship values in year 0 when the 
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Table S. 3 
SIMULATED EFFECTS OF A 10% INCREASE IN THE, LEVEL OF TANKER 
DEMAND 2 
Year Time Freight Lay-up Ship prices 
Chart er Rate M 
Rate 
A U A U A U, ý A U_ 
0 
-0.2 29.7 -0.1 26.0 0.00 -1.10 4.0 23.5 
1 
-0.8 23.3 -0.7 20.1 0.04 -0.91 6.3 18.7 
2 
-2.3 19.9 -2.0 17.1 0.08 -0.62 10.7 14.5 
3 
-, 
-5.0- 15.3 -4.4 13.4- -0.16 -0.43 19.2 12.1 
4 23.4 11.9 20.1 10.5 -0.27 . -0.30 14.7 9.9 
5 17.8 10.0 15.3 8.4 -0.33 -0.22 11.4 8.0 
6 13.7 8.7 11.7 6.3 -0.25 -0.18 9.0 6.6 
7 10.5 6.0 8.9 5.5 -0.19 -0.14 7.2 5.3 
8 8.1 5.3 6.8 4.7 -0.15 -0.12 5.9 4.5 
9 6.3 4.2 5.3 3.8 -0.11 -0.10 ý4.9 4.0 
10 5.0 3.8 4.2 3.4 -0.08 -0.09 4.2 3.4 
11 4.1 3.3 3.5 2.8 -0.06 -0.07' 3.6 3.0 
12 3.4 2.7 3.0 2.5 -0.05 -0.06 3.1 2.7 
Year Fleet Deliveries Scrapping' 
A U A U, A U 
0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 . -0.12 -0.48 
1 0.3 1.2 3.5 9.0 -0.29 -0.82 
2 0.8 2.3 9.8 14.3 -0.49 -0.87 
3 1.8 3.3 20.2 15.8 -0-80 -0-80 
4 3.2 4.3 26.4 14.9 -0.95 -0.70 
5 4.7 5.0 27.1 13.5 -0.79 -0.62 
6 6.1 5.8 24.3 11.7 -0.64 -0.57 
7 7.1 6.3 20.2 10.0 -0.51 --0.41 
8 8.0 6.9 16.3 9.2 -0.44 -0.37, 
9 8.7 7.1 13.2 8.4 -0.39 -0.34 
10 9.2 7.6 '10.9 8.0 -0.34 -0.32 
11 9.5 7.7 9.2 7.0 -0.29 -0.29 
12 9.8 7.8 8.0 6.4 -0.26 -0.27 
2 
percentage changes. 
Lay-up, Scrapping: changes In percentage points. 
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news regarding the future higher level of demand come 
out. This causes an immediate reduction In scrapping that 
raises the size of the f leet and so rates go down 
initially. Prices continue to Increase in the next few 
years until they reach an all time high of 19.2% up just 
before the actual increase in demand occurs in year 4. In 
the meantime the higher prices continuously reduce 
scrappings and also cause an increase in deliveries 
except f or year 0 where the increase in prices is 
unanticipated and shipbuilding is predetermined. These 
increases in the f leet are accumulated so that in year 3, 
just before the increase in demand materializes, rates 
are at an all time low. In the next year demand increases 
and this will completely cancel the negative effects of 
the speculative Increase in the fleet. Thus freight rates 
Increase by 20.1% in year 4. From then on prices begin to 
fall towards the base run level. As long as prices remain 
above the base run level the fleet continues to expand. 
This causes a parallel reduction in prices and rates 
until in the end the f leet expands almost as much as 
demand. Thus rates, prof its, prices and f leet growth rate 
return close to the base run level. 
5.4.2 Bunker price shocks 
This section considers the Impact of changes in 
bunker prices on the tanker market. The results are shown 
on Table S. 4. It can be seen that an increase in fuel 
prices leads to a strengthening of tanker prices and 
rates. On the contrary, the oil price increases of the 
seventies were followed by a significant depression. This 
is only because the historical increase in oil prices 
coincided with significant drops in demand, as the price 
increase was engineered by cutbacks in the long haul OPEC 
exports. The negative effects of the big drop In demand 
cancelled out the positive effects of the higher oil 
price and thus the market became depressed. The 
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Table S. 4 
SIMULATED EFFECTS OF A 100% INCREASE IN BUNKER PRICES3 
Year Time Freight Lay-up Ship prices 
Charter Rate M 
Rate 
A U A U A U A U 
0 
-0.3 71.0 -0.3 72.0 0.02 -1.92 8.3 56.7 
1 
-1.7 64.4 -1.5 66.5 0.07 -1.20 12.8 44.0 
2 
-4.6 52.8 -4.0 56.2 0.17 -0.85 21.8 33.2 
3 
-9.5 41.0 -8.3 45.7 0.34 -0.59 40.0 24.9 
4 50.0 30.9 53.9 36.6 
-0.52 -0.41 30.0 18.8 
5 38.1 23.1 43.2 29.5 
-0.41 -0.27 22.5 14.5 
6 28.6 17.5 34.7 24.4 
-0.31 -0.17 17.0 11.5 
7 21.7 13.8 28.5 21.1 
-0.22 -0.10 13.2 9.5 
8 16.9 11.4 24.1 18.9 
-0.15 -0.05 10.7 8.2 
9 13.7 9.8 21.1ý' 17.6 
-0.09 -0.02 8.9 7.3 
10 11.6 8.9 19.1 16.7 
-0.05 0.00 7.9 ý6.8 
11 10.3 8.4 17.8 16.1 
-0.02 0.01 7.3 6.6 
12 9.5 8.1 16.9- 15.8 
-0.01 0.02 7.1 6.5 
Year Fleet Deliveries Scrapping 
A U A U A U 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
0.1 0.6 0.0 0.0 
-0.25 -1.34 
0.6 2.6 7.4 23.6 
-0-56 -1-98 
1.7, 5.3 20.6 46.4 
-0-91 -1-91 
3.6 8.3 43.8 56.2 
-1.41 -1.67 
6.3 11.1 58.3 53.7 
-1.63 -1.40 
9.3 13.5 59.3 44.9 
-1.36 -1.11 
11.9 15.3 51.4 35.3 
-1.11 -0.85 
14.0 16.7 40.8 , 27.1 
-0.89 -0.65 
15.6 17.6 31.1 21.1 
-0.76 -0.55 
16.8 18.2 23.6 16.9 
-0.70 -0.51 
17.7 18.7 18.4 14.2 
-0.62 -0.47 
18.4 19.1 15.0 12.5 
-0.55 -0.42 
18.9 19.3 12.9 11.6 
-0.50 -0.39 
3 
percentage changes. 
Lay-up, Scrapping: changes In percentage points 
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simulations performed here aim to isolate purely the 
effects of the oil price change itself. Thus, as with 
other exogenous variables, the level of demand Is assumed 
to be unchanged after the increase in fuel prices. 
A change in the bunker price affects only the supply 
of tanker freight services. Because supply shifts back. 
an increase in the price of bunkers will Imply an 
increaso in freight rates as well, unless demand is 
completely elastic in which case rates do not change. The 
magnitude of the increase in rates depends on the 
elasticity of 'demand. This has been assumed to be 
completely inelastic. 
In order to analyse theoretically the impact effects 
on rates of a change In bunker prices let us take the 
case where fuel is the only variable input of production. 
This Is not an" unrealistic situation since, , apart form 
port services fuel is indeed the only variable input. In 
this hypothetical 'case * supply depends on the ratio of 
freight rates to bunker prices. Because 'demand is 
actually" considered to be completely Inelastic the 
increase in fuel price leaves the equilibrium real 
freight rate unchanged. At equilibrium, rates must 
increase in proportion to bunker prices so that they 
completely cancel the negative' effects of 'the higher 
price of fuel to bring forward the amount of supply 
required to satisfy the exogenous level of demand. Since 
rates increase by the same proportion as fuel prices, 
then so do time charter rates. Thus. when demand is 
inelastic, an increase in bunker prices leads, through 
its impact' on rates, to an increase in profitability and 
consequently prices. 
Because the freight market affects the ship markets 
only through changes in profitability, while at the same 
time bunker prices do not directly affect the 
-ship 
markets, an increase in bunker prices Implies very 
similar changes in the second hand, shipbuilding and 
scrapping markets as an increase In demand does. 
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Unanticipated increase in bunker prices 
Table 5.4 shows the response of the 
- 
markets to a 
doubling, in the price of fuel. In year, 0 freight and time 
charter rates increase by over 70% for reasons already 
explained above. The freight market boom is expected to 
last for some time since the increase in bunker prices is 
permanent while the response of the fleet to the higher 
profits cannot be immediate. There is thus a 56.7% 
initial speculative increase 
. 
In prices caused by 
- 
the 
increase in the short term prof Itability and the 
anticipated improvement over the longer term future. The 
increase in prices causes an immediate reduction in the 
scrapping rate of about 1.34%. In the following 
-years 
shipbuilding also responds and deliveries increase. 
Shipbuilding peaks at year 3 when deliveries increase by 
53.7%. Thus the fleet continuously increases and this 
implies that rates are continuously receding from year 0 
onwards. In anticipation prices are also losing some of 
the initial gains. This Is until the fleet rises by about 
19% in the long run so that it brings time charter rates, 
profits, prices and fleet growth down towards the base 
run level. In the long run, freight rates are estimated 
to be around 15% higher. This is in order to cancel the 
negative effects of the permanent rise in costs so that 
profits and prices remain in the long run close to the 
base run level. This is required in order for the f leet 
to grow in line with demand. 
Anticipated increase in bunker prices 
Wen the shock is anticipated the market foresees Its 
positive impact on profitability and so prices increase 
before the shock. This considerably reduces the impact of 
the shock on prof its as the f leet also responds to the 
rise in values. In year 1 deliveries are up 7.4%, 20.6% 
in year 2 and 43.8% in year 3. Scrapping drops 
immediately by 0.25%. 0.56% in year 1,0.91% in year 2 
and 1.41% in year 3. The net result of these changes is 
that by the time the shock occurs the fleet has already 
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increased by 6.3%. Thus in year 4 rates increase by only 
50% whereas when the shock Is unanticipated and the fleet 
cannot respond the maximum Increase is about 70%. Prices 
reach an all time high (40% up) at the end of year 3 and 
this is lower than the 56.7% peak in the case of the 
unexpected shock. From year 4 onwards prices begin to 
fall towards the base run value as the fleet continues to 
expand because of the high ship values. This Is until the 
fleet grows by about 19% which sends rates, prof Its and 
prices back to the base run level and the growth rate of 
the fleet moves in line with that of demand. There are 
similar long run changes as in the unanticipated 
scenario. Thus freight rates are 16.9% higher in the long 
run. 
5.4.3 Shipbuilding Cost Shock 
This section considers the effect of an increase in 
shipbuilding costs on the tanker market. The results are 
shown on Table S. S. The direct effect of the shock is to 
reduce the supply of new tankers at a given level of ship 
prices. This restrains the growth rate of the fleet and 
causes an increase In rates and values. 
Unanticipated increase in shipbuilding costs 
When the shock is unanticipated deliveries begin to 
drop from year 1 onwards. In anticipation of this, values 
increase in year 0 and this reduces scrapping. The drop 
in deliveries is however bigger than the drop in 
scrapping and so the fleet falls. In year 0 where 
deliveries are predetermined the f leet actually rises 
because of the immediate drop in scrappings and so rates 
fall. The magnitude of these short term changes are very 
small however. From year I onwards net investment drops 
and the fleet begins to fall by an Increasing amount. 
This process continues so there are further improvements 
in rates and prices. Eventually the fleet drops by 2.4%. 
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Table S. 5 
SIMULATED EFFECTS OF A 50% INCREASE IN SHIPBUILDING COSTS 4 
Year Time Freight Lay-up Ship prices 
Charter Rate (Z) 
Rate 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
A u A u A u A u 
0.0 
-0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.00 0.01 0.5 2.9 
-0.1 0.2 -0.1 0.2 0.00 0.00 0.6 3.8 
-0.3 1.1 -0.2 1.0 0.01 -0.03 0.8 4.6 
-0.6 2.0 -0.5 1.8 0.02 -0.06 1.2 5.2 
-1.0 2.7 -0.8 2.5 0.03 -0.07 2.2 5.7 
-0.8 
- 
3.3, 
-0.6 3.0 0.02 -0.08 3.5 6.2 
0.4 3.9 0.5 3.5 0.00 
-0.09 4.7 6.8 
1.8 4.4 1.8 4.0 
-0.03 -0.09 5.9 7.4 
3.2 5.0 2.9 4.4 
-0.06 -0.09 6.8 8.0 
4.3 5.6 3.9 4.9 
-0.07 -0.09 7.6 8.6 
5.2 6.3 4.6 5.4 
-0-08 -0-09 8.3 9.2 
6.0 6.9 5.1 5.8 
-0.08 -0.10 8.8 9.8 
6.6 7.5 5.6 6.2 
-0-09 -0-10 9.5 10.4 
Year Fleet 
. 
Deliveries Scrapping 
(Z) 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
A u A u A u 
0.0 
-- 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
-0.02 -0.09 
0.0 
-0.1 0.4 -19.2 -0.03 -0.15 
0.1 
-0.4 1.0 -23.4 -0.05 -0.20 
0.2 
-0.7 1.7 -22.2 -0.07 -0.23 
0.3 
-1.0 2.8 -19.4 -0.12 -0.25 
0.2 
-1.2 -17.6 -16.8 -0.13 -0.24 
-0.2 -1.4 -22.5 -14.8 -0.16 -0.23 
-0.7 -1.5 -21.7 -13.4 -0.17 -0.20 
-1.1 -1.7 -18.9 -12.3 -0.18 -0.17 
-1.5 -1.9 -15.9 -11.6 -0.18 -0.14 
-1.8 -2.1 -13.5 -10.8 -0.17 -0.13 
-2.0 -2.2 -11.9 -10.0 -0.16 -0.12 
-2.1 -2.4 -10.6 -9.2 -0.15 -0.11 
4 
percentage changes. 
Lay-up, Scrapping: changes In percentage points 
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This causes freight rates to increase by S. 2% and the 
implied increase in prof itability leads to a 10.4% 
increase in prices. This is sufficient in order to cancel 
the negative effects of the increase In the shipbuilding 
costs on the growth rate of the fleet. Fleet growth 
returns to to the base run level and the system settles 
at a new long run equilibrium. There, the f leet is 
permanently lower and consequently rates and prices are 
higher. Scrapping is also permanently reduced. 
Anticipated increase in shipbuilding costs 
If the shock Is anticipated the f leet actually 
increases in the first few years before the actual 
increase in costs takes place. The market anticipates the 
improvement In prof Its and there is thus an initial 
speculative jump in values. Because costs have not risen 
yet, shipbuilding initially expands. This causes a drop 
in rates. Wen the shock actually occurs deliveries begin 
to drop significantly and this causes the fleet to fall 
below the base run level from year 6 onwards. The 
reductions in net Investment are accumulated and the 
fleet continues to fall. Eventually the fleet falls by 
2.1% and rates increase by about 6%. Prices rise by about 
10%. This cancels the negative effects of the 
higher costs on the fleet growth. 
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This chapter links the individual dry cargo and 
tanker models estimated in the previous chapters. The 
model Is closed by modelling the behaviour of the combi 
fleet and the demand for scrap. The Integration of the 
two sectors allows us to simulate the spillover effects 
from the one sector to the other. 
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6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the dry cargo and tanker models 
previously estimated are linked together in order to 
develop an integrated model of the shipping markets. The 
integrated model mainly consists of the equations 
estimated in chapters 4,5 as reported in tables 4.2 and 
S. 2. However In order to close the model the evolution 
and trading behaviour of the combi f leet has to be 
endogenised by specifying a new set of equations. The 
integration of the two sectors allows us to endogenise 
the price of scrap as well by adding a demand for ship 
scrap to the supply side of the scrap market estimated in 
previous chapters. 
The modelling of each of the major shipping sectors 
in isolation, has prevented the treatment of the 
behaviour and evolution of the combi fleet In an 
endogenous fashion. The combi sector is affected by 
events In both the dry cargo and tanker markets. For 
example, the proportion of combis trading in dry, depends 
on dry cargo relative to tanker rates. The scrap price 
has also been treated as exogenous. This is again because 
the equilibrium scrap price depends on what happens in 
both sectors. In turn, this is due to the fact that the 
total supply of ships for scrap Is that generated by both 
the dry cargo and tanker fleet. 
Like the single ship type models, the integrated 
model can' be simulated in order to determine the impact 
of exogenous shocks on the path of the system. The 
integration allows us to investigate the spillover 
effects from one sector to the other. Thus the effects of 
changes in the dry cargo demand onto the tanker market 
and vice versa can be analysed. 
There are three main links between the dry cargo and 
tanker sectors that lead to the spillover effects. The 
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first one is a freight market link and this arises 
because of the existence of combis. The combined carriers 
are versatile ships which can switch between the tanker 
and dry bulk markets. This decision will obviously depend 
on the relative profitability of the two sectors. Because 
of this link a shock which tends to tighten the dry cargo 
freight market say, will tend to spillover onto the 
tanker sector. The higher dry cargo rates will attract 
combis from the tanker market, reducing the supply there, 
which ýAll consequently cause tanker rates to increase as 
well. 
The second link works through the supply side of the 
shipbuilding market. This link arises because of the fact 
that shipbuilders can switch from the construction of one 
ship type towards the construction of another. The supply 
of new dry cargo ships should, among other things. depend 
on the relative profitability of building various ship 
types. The latter obviously depends on relative ship 
prices. Because of this link, a shock that tends to have 
a positive impact on dry cargo values will spillover to 
the tanker ' market as shipyards will tend to divert 
capacity towards the construction of the more profitable 
dry cargo newbuildings at the expense of tankers. This 
will tend to restrain the tanker fleet growth and thus 
cause a rise in tanker rates and prices as well. 
The third link works through the scrap market. It 
arises because of the fact that the total supply of ships 
for scrap is the sum of that generated by each ship type. 
Thus an external shock that has a direct positive impact 
on the dry cargo sector say, will also tend to spillover 
onto the tanker industry through the scrap market. The 
rise in dry cargo values will lead to a withdrawal of dry 
cargo ships from the scrap market. This will reduce the 
total supply of ships for scrap and thus scrap price's 
will tend to increase. In turn this will tend to have a 
positive effect on the supply of tankers for scrap, thus 
restraining the growth rate of the tanker fleet that 
should cause an increase in tanker values and rates as 
well. Because of these numerous freight. shipbuilding and 
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scrap market links, the two major, sectors of the shipping 
industry are highly interdependent. 
Plan of chapter 6 
The main parts of the integrated econometric model 
have been already presented In the previous chapters. 
Thus section 6.2 focuses on the new aspects of the 
extended model. These are the behaviour of combined 
carriers and the determination of scrap prices. A new set 
of equations is spec if ied which captures these new 
aspects of behaviour. Section S. 3. presents the 
econometric estimates of this new set of equations. The 
dry cargo and tanker sector equations have already been 
presented in sections 4.3 and S. 3. In section 6.4 the 
model's response to various anticipated and unanticipated 
shocks is calculated. The simulated response of each 
sector to a bunker, shipbuilding cost or an own demand 
shock is found to be very similar to the one simulated by 
the individual_ ship type models of the previous chapters. 
Thus the 'emphasis of the discussion Is not on the broad 
f eatures of the simulations which have already been 
considered, but on the extent to which the existence of 
the links tend to dumpen or reinforce the response. In 
addition a new set of results is presented. These are 
contained in Tables 6.3_ and 6. S which show the response 
of the tanker market to a dry cargo demand shock and the 
response of the dry cargo sector to a tanker demand 
shock. 
6.2 Overview 
The integrated model mainly consists of equations 
(1)-(1S) of chapter 4 and equations (l)-(15) of chapter 
S. There the size of the combi fleet and the proportion 
of combis in each sector was treated as exogenous. In 
addition the price of scrap was also treated as 
302 
exogenous. This section introduces the theoretical Ideas 
which describe the evolution of the combi fleet, Its 
trading pattern as well as the determinants of scrap 
prices. Here a superscript ""' indicates a tanker 
variable while a subscript Well indicates a combi 
variable. Thus K, K', Kc Indicate the dry cargo, tanker 
and combined carri er fleet respectively. 
6.2.1, The trading pattern of the combi fleet 
Combis, are versatile ships which can carry either 
oil or dry bulk goods. They switch from the tanker to the 
dry cargo freight market in search for higher profits. 
This. suggests that the proportion of combis in oil should 
depend on the relative profitability of the two freight 
markets. In turn this reflects relative freight rates 
and possibly the level of bunker prices. Thus, 
F, F' 
, 
Pb) (1) 
where 
IP0- proportion of combis in oil 
In turn the proportion of combis in dry pd Is simply one 
minus the proportion of combis In oil. Thus, , 
Pd wI- Po 
6.2.2 The evolution of the combi fleet 
(2) 
In previous chapters it was suggested that the supply 
of newbuildings of a particular ship type should depend 
positively on its own price but negatively on the price 
of alternative types. Thus here, the supply of now combis 
should depend positively on the price of combis but 
negatively on the price of tankers and dry cargo ships. 
In practice it is difficult to operationalize the implied 
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econometric supply function of combi newbuildings. This 
Is not only because data on combi prices Is scant. More 
importantly the equilibrium price of combis is likely to 
be a weighted average of the price of dry cargo and 
tanker ships, since a combi Is "half a tanker", "half a 
dry cargo ship. " Thus even If good quality data was 
available it would be difficult to estimate the effect of 
the various ship prices on the combi supply because of 
multicollinearity in the data. Instead it is assumed that 
at equilibrium the combi order book is proportional to a 
weighted average of dry cargo and tanker orders as well 
as a function of the premium on combis relative to 
tankers and dry cargo ships. The size of the combi fleet 
is quite small so as not to warrant a theoretically fully 
satisfactory specification of its determinants given the 
above data problems. Because of its small size, this 
should make little difference in the results. Thus, 
F2( Qp Q, ý/(K+K')) (3) 
The f Inal term in the above equation Is the size of the 
combi f leet as a proportion of the tanker and dry cargo 
f leet. This is used as a proxy for the unobservable 
premium on combis. This is because the premium on combis 
should vary inversely with the covariance between tanker 
and dry cargo prof Its. In turn this covariance moves In 
line with the above ratio. 
Combi deliveries are assumed to be a function of 
lagged orders, as in equation (4) below. 
Dot wi Qct-l (4) 
lal 
The scrapping rate of combis is assumed to be a 
weighted average of the dry cargo and tanker scrapping 
rates. Thus, 
se -F3(S, S') 
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6.2.3 Demand for Scrap 
In order to endogenise the scrap price we add a 
demand for scrap function. The demand f or scrap is 
assumed to depend negatively on the price of scrap 
relative to the price of metals. In addition it is also 
assumed to vary in line with the existing scrapping 
capacity. Thus, 
gd '_ F4( Pa/PM, Z) 
where 
Demand for scrap 
Pm 
- 
Price of metals 
Z- Scrapping capacity 
(6) 
At equilibrium the demand for scrap should equal to 'the 
supply generated by the dry cargo, tanker and combi 
f leet. Thus, 
Sd 
- 
S+ S, .+: Sc 
S. 3 Estimation 
6.3.1 Econometric Methodology 
(7) 
Equation (1) is estimated by two stage least squares. 
This is because dry cargo and tanker rates which appear 
on the RHS of the equation are endogenous. Moreover the 
link between the disturbance term of this equation and 
freight rates is immediate and its probably strong. This 
is because a change in combi trading pattern immediately 
affects the supply situation in both tanker and dry cargo 
freight markets and thus the equilibrium rates as well. 
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This suggests that the endogenous tanker and dry cargo 
rates that appear in (1) should be instrumented. The 
instruments uses are the predetermined variables in the 
freight market sectors that are likely to be relevant for 
explaining freight rates. These are the level of demand 
and the f leet size in each of the two sectors as well as 
fuel prices. 
Equation (6) is also estimated by instrumental 
variables methods. The variable which is instrumented Is 
the endogenous scrap price. The instruments used are 
predetermined variables of the system which can explain 
the movements in scrap prices. These are the level of 
demand, the predetermined fleet size as well as the 
shipbuilding costs. The exogenous variables of (6) are 
also Included as instruments of themselves as well as of 
the scrap price. 
Equation (4) is estimated by OLS since all the 
variables on the RHS are predetermined. Equation (3) is 
also estimated by OLS since the historical movements in 
dry cargo and tanker orders largely reflect own sector 
specific shocks rather than movements in the disturbance 
term of (3). In addition the size of the f leets which are 
used as proxies of the premium are also predetermined and 
thus do not have to be instrumented. Equation (5) Is also 
estimated by OLS since the historical movements in tanker 
and dry cargo scrapping largely reflect own sector 
specific shocks rather than the minimal Influence of the 
disturbance term. 
6.3.2 Results 
The econometric estimates of the above equations are 
shown on Table 6.1. Equation (1) is the empirical version 
of equation (1). A logistic specification has been used. 
A lagged dependent variable was found to be significant 
and this possibly reflects Costs of moving from one 
sector to the other. It can be seen that an increase In 
tanker rates Increases the proportion of combis in oil. 
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Table 6.1 Econometric Estimates 
ln(pol(I-po)) 
- -6.32 + 0.581n(p 0 I(I-p 0 (2.64) (3.02) 
+ 2.991n(F'lPb) 
- 
1.621n(FlPb) + 1.54SIZE 
- 
1.73DUM, (1) 
(4.62) (-2.98) (2.44) (-3.20) 
k2 
= 0.876, S. E-0.45, D. W-1.82 
lnQc m-1.32 + 0.891nQc_, - 0.351nDc 
(-l. 80) (4.99) (-2.40) 
0.28lnQ' + 0.451nQ 
- 
12.42(Kel(K+K')) (3) 
(2.37) (1.77) (-4.05) 
k2 
- 
0.913, S. E-0.24, D. W-1.43 
inDc 
--0.44 + 0.381nDc_I + 0.251nQc_, + o. 861nQc 
-2 (-2.00) (2.44) (1.41) (3.10) 
- 
0.59 1 nQc 
-3 - 
0.96DUlý (Z) 
(-3.21) (-3.52) 
k2 
_ 
0.915, S. E-0.26, D. W-2.21 
so 0.02 + 1.36s + 0.47s' 
(-2.07) (3.52) (2. ý25) 
7R2 
- 
0.779, S. E 
-0.014, D. W - 1.99 
S=-5.22 + 0.70S 
-1 
- 
1.491n(PsIPm) + 1.301nZ 
(-3.14) (4.59) (-2.89) (3.30) 
k2 
- 
0.816, S. E. 
- 
0.306, D. W. 
- 
1.532 
1 
Figures In parentheses are t-statistics for testing the 
hýypothesls that the true value of the coefficient Is 
equal to 0. 
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On the other hand an increase in dry cargo rates leads to 
a withdrawal of combis from the tanker market. A dummy 
variable was also included in the regression. This takes 
the value of 1 in year 1970. The average size of the 
combi fleet was also included as an additional regressor 
and was found to have a significant positive affect as 
expected. This is because large combis are more suitable 
for oil transportation rather than dry. 
Equation (6) is the empirical vers Ion of the 
aggregate demand for ship scrap. It can be seen that the 
elasticity of demand with respect to scrap prices is 
estimated to be equal to -1.49. The coefficient on 
capacity was also found to be positive as expected. 
Equation (3) is the estimated version of the supply 
of new combined carriers. The coefficient on tanker and 
dry cargo order book was found to be positive. On the 
other hand the coefficient on the proxy for the premium 
was found to be significantly negative as expected. A 
dynamic version of the equation was found to give the 
best f It. 
Equation (4) is the empirical version of equation (4) 
which relates deliveries on lagged orders. The 
coefficients indicate that in the long run deliveries are 
almost exactly proportional to orders. 
Finally, equation (g) is the empirical version of 
equation (5). It relates the proportion of combis 
scrapped to the aggregate tanker and dry cargo scrapping 
rates. It Is found that an increase in either tanker or 
dry cargo scrapping is associated with an increase In 
combi scrapping as well. 
S. 4 Simulations 
This section presents simulations of' the Integrated 
model which show how the system responds to various 
external shocks. The results are similar to the ones 
presented in previous chapters so here the emphasis is on 
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how the links affect the simulations rather than on the 
broad patterns themselves. In addition the integration 
allows us to consider the impact of changes in the level 
of dry cargo demand on the tanker market and vice versa. 
Such an analysis has up to here been prevented by the 
modelling of each sector In isolation. 
6.4.1 Dry Cargo Demand Shocks 
Impact on the dry cargo market 
Table 6.2 shows the ef f ects of permanent changes in 
the level of dry cargo demand on the dry cargo market. 
These results are similar to those shown on Table 4.2 of 
chapter 4 where the impact of demand shocks was analysed 
by simulating the dry cargo model. As in the case of 
Table 4.2, rates, prices, shipbuilding and scrapping 
Initially overshoot their long run equilibrium level. 
Comparing the two tables It can be seen that In the short 
term the impact of the shock on rates, prices and the 
f leet is smaller in this case where the two sectors have 
been linked. 
In the longer term however the Impact on rates and 
prices is stronger here tlýan that shown on Table 4.2. 
This is because of the differing speeds of reaction of 
the combi and shipbuilding links. The combi link works 
immediately while the response of the fleet 
. 
takes more 
time to have an accumulated impact. 
In the short term the higher dry cargo demand leads 
to an increase in rates. As can be seen from Table S. 2 
this attracts more combis to the dry cargo market. This 
in turn cushions the impact effect of the increase in 
demand on dry cargo rates. Thus the short term impact of 
the shock on rates Is smaller here than in the case of 
the single ship type model. 
Over time however the shipbuilding link begins to 
work. The withdrawal of combis from the dry cargo market 
tends 
- 
to strengthen tanker values. In addition the higher 
dry cargo prices also tend to expand the supply of new 
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Table S. 2 
SIMULATED EFFECTS OF A IOX INCREASE IN THE LEVEL OF DRY 
CARGO DEMAND2 
IMPACT ON THE DRY CARGO MARKET 
Year Time Freight Lay-up Ship prices 
Charter Rate M 
Rate 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7, 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
A u A u A u A u 
-0.1 39.0 -0.2 30.5 0.01 -1.18 8.8 40.6 
-1.0 33.6 -0.8 26.2 0.05 -1.03 12.4 31.7 
-2.7 27.2 -2.1 21.4 0.13 -0.88 19.0 24.3 
-5.4 20.9 -4.2 16.7 0.27 -0.76 31.2 18.7 
29.0 15.9 22.9 12.8 
-0.62 -0.67 23.2 14.5 
21.3 12.2 17.1 10.0 
-0.56 -0.58 17.3 11.4 
15.8 9.6 12.9 8.0 
-0.50 -0.5t 13.2 9.3 
12.1 7.8 10.0 6.7 
-0.45 -0.45 10.4 7.8 
9.7 6.8 8.2 5.8 
-0.40 -0.40 8.5 6.8 
8.2 6.1 6.9 5.3 
-0.37 -0.36 7.1 6.0 
7.1 5.6 5.9 4.9 
-0.34 -0.33 6.2 5.6 
6.3 5.3 5.2 4.5 
-0.30 -0.29 5.7 5.4 
5.7 5.0 4.6 4.2 
-0.27 -0.26 ; 5.6 5.4 
Year Fleet Deliveries Scrapping Combis in 
(Z) oil (Z) 
A u A u A u A u 
0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 
-0.12 -0.50 0.0 -7.1 
1 0.3 1.0 3.8 8.9 
-0.25 -0.78 0.2 -10.6 
2 0.8 2.2 9.2 15.5 
-0.39 -0.82 0.7 -12.1 
3 1.7 3.4 16.2 26.0 
-0.56 '-0.75 1.7 -12.4 
4 2.9 4.5 18.3 13.1 
-0.68 -0.67 -3.9 -12.0 
5 4.1 5.5 15.5 9.5 
-0.74 -0.66 -6.4 -11.1 
6 5.2 6.2 11.2 6.7 
-0.69 -0.57 -7.1 -9.9 
7 6.0 6.7 7.6 4.9 
-0.63 -0.50 -6.8 
- 
-8.6 
8 6.6 7.1 5.2 3.9 
-0.53 -0.40 -6.1 -7.5 
9 7.1 7.4 3.8 3.4 
-0.48 -0.36 -5.3 -6.6 
10 7.4 7.6 3.1 3.0 
-0.47 -0.37 -4.6 -5.8 
11 7.7 7.8 2.7 2.8 
-0.44 -0.35 -3.9 -5.1 
12 8.0 8.0 2.6 2.7 
-0.40 -0.33 -3.4 -4.5 
2 
percentage changes. 
Lay-up, Scrapping, Combis : changes In percentage points. 
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dry cargo ships at the expense of tankers. This also has 
a positive impact on tanker values. In table 4.2 the 
tanker price is exogenised while here it is allowed to 
increase following the shock. This increase in tanker 
prices tends to hold back the expansion of the dry cargo 
f leet to a level lower than that in table 4.2 where 
tanker prices are exogenised at the lower base run level. 
Overtime, this restrain in the dry cargo f leet growth 
cancels out the inf lux of combis and thus rates increase 
by 4.2% in the long run against a figure of 3.0% in Table 
4.2. 
These differences are reflected on the long run level 
of time charter rates and prices as well. The restrain 
in shipbuilding causes the fleet to increase by 8.0% In 
year 12 whereas in Table 4.2 the fleet Increase is 9.2%. 
Impact on tanker market 
Table 6.3 shows the effect of the higher dry cargo 
demand on the tanker market. The higher dry cargo demand 
leads to a withdrawal of combis from the tanker market. 
As a result tanker freight rates increase. In addition 
the strong dry cargo values restrain the increase in the 
tanker fleet as builders switch towards the construction 
of dry cargo newbuildings. Finally the scrapping market 
also contributes to a reduction in the tanker fleet. The 
withdrawal of dry cargo ships from the scrap market 
reduces the supply of ships for scrap. This raises the 
equilibrium scrap price. The latter attracts more tankers 
for scrapping and this helps to reduce the tanker fleet. 
ýhen the shock is anticipated the combi fleet moves 
in an opposite direction initially and thus tanker rates 
drop. This opposite movement is due to the fact that the 
shock produces a strong speculative build up of the dry 
cargo fleet which sends combis away from the dry cargo 
market to the tanker market which also becomes depressed. 
Wben finally the- shock occures, the higher dry cargo 
rates attract' the combis back to the dry market so the 
tanker market'also improves. 
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Table 6.3 
SIMULATED EFFECTS OF A 10% INCREASE IN THE LEVEL OF DRY 
CARGO DEMAND3 
IMPACT ON THE TANKER MARKET 
Year Time Freight Lay-up Ship prices 
Chart er Rate (Z) 
Rate 
A U A U AU A U 
0 0.0 2.6 0.0 2.3 0.00 -0.15 1.9 6.8 
1 
-0.1 4.1 -0.1 3.6 0.00 -0.20 2.8 7.1 
2 
-0.3 4.9 '-0.3 4.3 0.01 -0.18 4.0 7.0 
3 
-0.5 5.4 -0.5ý 4.7 0.02 -0.16 5.8 6.6 
4 2.5 5.5 2.2 4.8 -0.04 -0.14 6.5 5.8 
5 4.4 5.3 3.8 '4.6 -0.09 -0.12 6.4 5.0 
6 5.2 4.7 4.6 4.2 -0.10 -0-10 5.9 4.2 
7 5.3 4.1 4.7 3.6 -0.10 -0-09 5.1 3.5 
8 4.9 3.4 4.4 3.1 -0.10 -0.07 4.3 2.9 
9 
-4.3 ý2.8 3.9 2.6 -0.08 -0.06 3.6 2.5 
10 3.7 2.4 3.4 2.3 -0.07 -0.05 3.0 2.2 
11 3.1 2.1 3.0 2.0 -0.06 -0.04 2.6 2.0 
12 2.7 1.9 2.6 1.9 -0.05 -0.03 2.2 1.9 
Year Fleet Deliveries Scrapping 
A U A U AU 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
-0.01 0.00 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
-0.03 -0.06 
0.0 0.0 
-3.9 -7.5 -0.04 -0.12 
-0.1 0.0 -9.0 -11.5 -0.05 -0.18 
-0.3 -0.1 -14.0 -11.5 -0.08 -0.20 
-0.6 -0.2 -14.4 -9.5 -0.11 -0.16 
-0.8 -0.3 -11.9 -7.1 -0.13 -0.14 
-1.0 -0.4 -8.5 -5.3 -0.13 -0.11 
-1.0 -0.4 -5.7 -4.1 -0.11 -0.08 
-1.1 -0.4 -3.7 -3.3 -0.07 -0.04 
-1.1 -0.5 -2.6 -2.8 0.01 0.00 
-1.1 -0.6 -2.0 -2.5 0.01 0.02 
-1.2 , -0.7 -1.7 -2.3 0.01 0.04 
3 
percentage changes. 
Lay-up, Scrapping: changes In percentage points. 
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6.4.2 Tanker Demand Shocks 
Impact on tanker market 
Table 6.4 shows the Impact of a permanent Increase in 
the level of tanker demand on the equilibrium time path 
of the tanker market. This can be compared with the 
results shown on Table 5.2 were the Impact of such a 
shock was analysed by simulating the tanker model In 
isolation. Again here the short term overshooting of 
rates, prices, shipbuilding and scrapping Is evident. 
The integrated model simulates a lower short term 
response of rates and prices than the Isolated tanker 
model. At the same time, here, the simulated long term 
response is higher than in Table 5.2. This again reflects 
the differing speed and magnitude of reaction of the 
combi and shipbuilding link. The combi link works 
immediately. The higher tanker demand attracts combis 
into the tanker market which cushion the positive impact 
of the shock. 
Over the longer term the increase in the fleet size 
is lower than in Table 5.2. This Is because of the fact 
that here the dry cargo newbuilding price has also been 
allowed to respond positively to the shock. This higher 
dry cargo price restrains the expansion of the tanker 
fleet to a lower level than that shown by Table S. 2. This 
cancels out the depressing effect of the influx of combis 
and thus long run rates are higher here. 
Impact on dry cargo market 
The higher tanker demand has positive implications 
about the equilibrium level of dry cargo rates and prices 
as well. Both the combi, shipbuilding and scrapping links 
contribute towards this improvement. The higher tanker 
demand attracts combis away from the dry cargo freight 
market which consequently improves Immediately. The 
higher tanker prices lead to a higher supply of new 
tankers at the expense of dry cargo newbuildings. Thus 
the growth rate of the dry cargo fleet Is restrained 
which further strengthens the dry cargo market. The 
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TabIe 8.4 
SIMULATED EFFECTS OF A 10% INCREASE IN THE LEVEL OF TANKER 
DEMAND4 
IMPACT ON TANKER MARKET 
Year Time Freight Lay-up Ship prices 
Charter Rate 
Rate 
A u A u A u A u 
0 
-0.1 27.4 -0.1 23.4 0.01 -1.05 4.5 20.9 
1 
-0.7 22.0 -0.6 18.9 0.03 -0.85 6.5 16.5 
2 
-1.8 17.7 -1.5 15.3 0.06 -0.57 10.2 12.9 
3 
-3.7 13.9 -3.1 12.1 0.11 -0.39 17.0 10.1 
4 21.8 10.9 19.0 9.5 
-0.26 -0.27 12.1 8.0 
5 15.2 8.5 13.4 7.6 
-0.31 -0.19 9.0 6.4 
6 11.3 6.8 10.0 6.2 
-0.22 -0.15 6.9 5.2 
7 8.7 5.6 7.8 5.2 
-0.17 -0.12 5.4 4.2 
8 7.0 4.8 6.3 4.5 
-0.14 -0.10 4.5 3.6 
9 5.9 4.1 5.3 4.0 
-0.11 -0.08 3.9 3.1 
10 5.2 3.7 4.7 3.7 
-0-09 -0.07 3.5 2.7 
11 4.7 3.5 4.3 3.5 
-0.08 -0.06 3.3 2.5 
12 4.6 3.4 4.0 3.4 
-0.07 -0.06 3.3 2.5 
Year Fleet Deli veries Scrapping Combis in ( Z) oil (Z) 
A u A u A u A u 
0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 
-0.11 -0.44 0.0 8.7 
1 0.3 0.9 3.7 8.3 
-0.24 -0.75 -0.2 13.8 
2 0.7 1.9 9.0 13.3 
-0.39 -0.76 -0.8 16.4 
3 1.5 2.9 16.9 14.6 
-0.61 -0.69 -1.8 17.4 
4 2.6 3.8 19.9 13.7 
-0.71 -0.60 5.8 17.4 
5 3.7 4.6 18.2 12.0 
-0.60 -0.49 9.7 16.6 
6 4.6 5.3 14.6 10.5 
-0.48 -0.40 11.4 15.6 
7 5.3 5.8 11.1 9.2 
-0.39 -0.31 11.8 14.4 
8 5.8 6.2 8.6 8.4 
-0.33 -0.26 11.5 13.2 
9 6.2 6.5 6.9 7.7 
-0.29 -0.24 10.9 11.9 
10 6.5 6.8 5.9 7.1 
-0.26 -0.21 10.2 10.8 
11 6.7 7.0 5.2 6.5 
-0.23 -0.18 9.5 9.7 
12 6.9 7.2 4.8 6.0 
-0.21 -0.16 8.8 8.8 
4 
percentage changes. 
Lay-up, Scrapping. Comble I changes In percentage points. 
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Table S. 5 
SIMULATED EFFECTS OF A 10% INCREASE IN THE LEVEL OF TANKER 
DEMANDS 
IMPACT ON THE DRY CARGO MARKET 
Year Time Freight Lay-up Ship prices 
Charter Rate (Z) 
Rate 
A U A U A U A U 
0 0.0 2.9 0.0 2.3 0.00 -0.16 1.3 7.8 
1 
-0.2 4.6 -0.1 3.6 0.01 -0.23 1.7 7.2 
2 
-0.4 5.0 -0.3 4.0 -0.02 -0.24 2.5 5.9 
3 
-0.9 4.7 -0.7 3.8 -0.04 -0.23 3.9 4.4 
4 1.9 4.0 1.6 3.3 0.06 -0.21 4.1 2.9 
5 3.1 3.1 2.6 '2.6 0.11 -0.18 3.5 1.7 
6 3.3 2.2 2.8 2.0 0.13 -0.15 2.6 0.7 
7 3.0 1.5 2.5 1.5 0.12 -0.12 1.9 -0.1 
8 2.5 1.0 2.1' 1.1 0.11 -0-10 1.3 -0.5 
9 2.0 0.7 1.7 0.9 0.10 -0.09 0.9 -0.6 
10 1.6 0.5 1.3 0.7 0.09 -0.07 0.8 -0.6 
11 1.2 0.5 0.9 0.7 0.07 -0.06 0.8 -0.4 
12 1.0 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.06 -0.06 0.8 -0.1 
Year Fleet Deliveries Scrapping 
A U A U A U 
0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.00 -0.05 
1 0.0 0.1 0.1 1.2 -0.01 -0-10 
2 0.0 0.3 
-0.1 1.4 -0.01 -0.13 
3 "0.0 0.4 
-ýO. 4 1.3 -0.01 -0.13 
4 0.0- 0.6 
-0.4 0.9 -0.03 -0.12 
5 0.1 0.7 0.0 0.4 -0.07 -0.12 
6 0.1 0.8 0.3 -0.2 -0-09 -0-09 
7 0.2 0.8 0.4 -0.7 -0.10 -0.07 
8 0.3 0.8 0.2 -1.1 -0.09 -0.04 
9 0.4 0.8 
-0.1 -1.4 -0.08 -0.02 
10 0.5 0.7 
-0.3 -1.5 -0-08 -0-01 
11 0.5 0.6 
-0.4 -1.4 -0.07 0.00 
12 0.5 0.5 
-0.4 -1.3 -0.06 0.01 
5 
percentage changes. 
Lay-up, ScrappIng3 changes In percentage polnts. 
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scrapping link works through the reduction in the supply 
of tankers for scrap. This reduces the total supply of 
ships for scrap and raises scrap values. This in turn 
causes higher scrapping of dry cargo ships the prices of 
which have not risen as much. 
6.4.3 Bunker Price and Shipbuilding Cost Shocks 
Tables 6.6 and 6.7 show the Impact of bunker shocks 
on the dry cargo and tanker market respectively. These 
results can be compared with the results of Tables 4.2 
and 5.2. The comparison shows that the existence of 
various links between the two sectors, makes very little 
difference to the results. There is again short run 
overshooting of the long run equilibrium of rates. 
prices, shipbuilding and scrapping. 
Tables 6.8 and 6.9 show the Impact of changes in 
shipbuilding costs on the dry cargo and tanker market 
respectively. These results can again be compared with 
those shown on Tables 4.3 and 5.3. The comparison again 
shows that the existence of various links makes little 
difference to the results. Rates, prices and scrapping 
rise to a higher level in the long run. There Is again 
undershooting of the long run level of rates, prices and 
scrapping. The shock raises the price of both tanker and 
dry cargo ships. The supply of newbuildings of a 
particular type is restrained by the increase in the 
price of the alternative output. 
In the single ship type models the price of the 
alternative output was fixed and this restrain did not 
operate. This explains why the system rises to a higher 
level in the long run. In addition the boom in the two 
sectors mutually reinforce each other because of the 
scrap market link. The Increase In the price of one ship 
type reduces the supply of scrap and raises the 
demolition price. This tends to increase the supply for 
scrap of the other ship type. Again this positive 
mechanism does not operate in the single ship type 
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models. 
overall we notice that the existence of various 
freight, shipbuilding and scrapping links, lead to 
spillover effects from one sector to the other. An 
increase in the demand for one ship type is, to a smaller 
extent of course, beneficial for the other sector as 
well. The links, however, are relatively weak. 
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Table 6.6 
SINULATED EFFECTS OF A 100% INCREASE IN BUNKER PRICES 6 
IMPACT ON DRY CARGO MARKET 
Year Time Freight Lay-up Ship prices 
Charter Rate (Z) 
Rate 
A ýU A U A U A U 
0 
-0.3 64.7 -0.2 66.8 0.01 -1.08 12.1 66.5 
1 
-1.3 58.3 -1.1 60.4 0.07 -1.15 18.3 52.4 
2 
-3.6 48.5 -2.9 52.3 0.19 -1.07 29.6 40.5 
3 
-7.3 38.5 -6.0 44.0 0.39 -0.99 50.6 30.6 
4 48.7 29.7 52.4 36.5 
-0.44 -0.94 38.0 22.6 
5 37.1 22.2 42.7 30.1 
-0.60 -0.88 27.9 16.3 
6 27.6 16.2 34.7 24.9 
-0.64 -0.82 20.1 11.5 
7 20.2 11.6 28.4 20.9 
-0.64 -0.76 14.2 8.0 
8 14.5 8.1 23.5 17.9 
-0.64 -0.72 9.6 5.4 
9 10.2 5.5 19.8 15.7 
-0.63 -0.69 6.2 3.6 
10 6.8 3.6 16.9 14.1 
-0.60 -0.65 3.8 2.3 
11 4.3 2.2 14.8 12.9 
-0.57 -0.61 2.1 1.6 
12 2.5 1.3 13.3 12.2 
-0.54 -0.57 1.2 1.3 
Year Fleet Deliveries Scra pping ( Z) 
A U A U A U 
0 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.0 
-0.14 -0.61 
1 0.3 1.2 4.2 10.8 
-0.29 -0.94 
2 0.9 2.6 9.8 16.8 
-0.45 -1.01 
3 1.9 4.1 17.5 16.6 
-0.66 -0.94 
4 3.2 5.4 19.3 13.0 
-0.81 -0.86 
5 4.6 6.5 16.2 8.8 
-0.92 -0.86 
6 5.9 7.3 11.5 5.2 
-0.89 -0.75 
7 6.9 7.9 7.1 2.7 
-0.82 -0.63 
8 7.7 8.3 3.9 1.0 
-0.68 -0.48 
9 8.2 8.5 1.6 
-0.1 -0.59 -0.39 
10 8.5 8.5 0.0 
-0.8 -0.53 -0.35 
11 8.6 8.5 
-1.1 -1.3 -0.44 -0.28 
12 8.7 8.4 
-1.7 -1.5 -0.34 -0.22 
6 
percentage changes. 
Lay-up, Scrapping: changes In percentage points. 
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Table S. 7 
SIMULATED'EFFECTS OF A 100% INCREASE IN BUNKER PRICES 
7 
IMPACT ON TANKER MARKET 
Year Time Freight Lay-up Ship prices 
Charter Rate (Z) 
Rate 
I 
A u A u A u A u 
0 
-0.3 71.2 -0.3 73.7 0.02 -1.93 12.1 67.8 
1 
-1.5 68.8 -1.3 70.4 0.07 -1.22 18.6 56.6 
2 
-4.0 59.8 -3.5 62.5 0.15 -0.88 30.6 47.1 1 3 
-7.9 50.8 -6.8 54.5 0.27 -0.65 53.2 39.1 
4 57.4 42.8 60.3 47.3 -0.55 -0.50 44.7 32.8 
5 49.0 35.9 52.8 41.1 -0.46 -0.39 37.5 27.7 
6 41.5 30.3 46.2 36.0 -0.38 -0.31 31.6 23.7 
7 35.1 25.9 40.3 31.9 -0.32 -0.25 26.8 20.6 
8 29.7 22.3 35.4 28.5 -0.27 -0.20 22.9 18.1 
9 25.2 19.4 31.2 25.8 -0.21 -0.15 19.8 16.2 
10 21.5 17.0 27.7 23.5 -0.16 -0.11 17.5 14.8 
11 18.5 15.2 24.9 21.7 -0.12 -0.08 15.7 13.7 
12 16.2 13.7 22.7 20.3 -0.09 -0.06 14.3 13.0 
Year Fleet Deli veries Scra pping ( Z) 
A u A u A U 
0 0.1 0.5 0.0 0.0 -0.24 -1.05 
1 0.6 2.1 8.0 22.5 -0.54 -1.67 
2 1.5 4.4 15.8 29.0 -0.85 -1.73 
3 3.1 6.8 27.4 29.6 -1.27 -1.65 
4 5.1 9.0 28.9 28.7 -1.52 -1.54 
5 7.3 11.1 28.4 27.8 -1.42 -1.33 
6 9.3 12.9 27.9 26.9 -1.28 -1.15 
7 11.2 14.5 27.5 26.0 -1.14 -0.98 
8 12.9 15.9 27.1 25.3 -1.05 -0.89 
9 14.5 17.2 26.6 24.6 -0.99 -0.84 
10 15.9 18.3 26.2 24.1 -0.88 -0.75 
11 17.2 19.4 25.9 23.7 -0.78 -0.68 
12 18.4 20.3 25.5 23.3 -0.71 -0.62 
7 
percentage changes. 
Lay-up, Scrapping: changes in percentage lx)lnts. 
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Table S. 8 
SIMULATED EFFECTS OF A 50% INCREASE IN SHIPBUILDING COSTS 8 
IMPACT ON DRY CARGO MARKET 
Year Time Freight Lay-up Ship prices 
Charter Rat e 
Rate 
A U A U A U A U 
0 0.0 
-0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.00 0.00 0.8 5.1 
1 
-0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.00 0.00 1.1 7.0 
2 
-0.2 0.9 -0.2 0.7 0.01 -0.04 1.6 9.0 
3 
-0.5 2.2 -0.4 1.8 0.02 -0.09 2.5 10.9 
4 
-0.9 3.6 -0.8 2.9 0.04 -0.14 4.0 12.3 
5 
-0.9 4.8 -0.7 3.8 0.04 -0.18 6.2 13.5 
6 0.2 5.8 0.1 4.6 
-0.01 -0.21 8.4 14.6 
7 1.7 6.6 1.4 5.2 
-0.06 -0.24 10.4 15.4 
8 3.3 7.3 2.7 5.8 -0.10 -0.26 12.1 16.1 
9 4.7 7.9 3.8 6.3 
-0.14 -0.27 13.4 16.6 
10 5.9 8.4 4.7 6.6 
-0.18 -0.28 14.4 17.0 
11 6.8 8.7 5.4 6.8 -0.21 -0.28 15.3 17.4 
12 7.4 8.9 5.9 7.0 
-0.22 -0.28 16.0 17.7 
Year Fleet Deliveries Scra pping ( Z) 
A U A U A U 
0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.01 -0.07 
1 0.1 0.0 0.3 
-8.0 -0.02 -0.11 
2 0.1 
-0.2 0.6 -12.9 -0.03 -0.14 
3 0.2 
-0.5 1.1 -14.6 -0.05 -0.17 
4 0.2 
-0.8 1.8 -14.4 -0.07 -0.21 
5 0.2 
-1.1 -7.2 -13.6 -0.10 -0.28 
6 0.0 
-1.2 -12.9 -12.9 -0.13 -0.31 
7 
-0.4 -1.3 -15.0 -12.3 -0.18 -0.35 
8 
-0.7 -1.4 -14.7 -12.0 -0.22 -0.36 
9 
-0.9 -1.4 -14.1 -11.9 -0.27 -0.39 
10 
-1.1 -1.4 -13.3 -11.9 -0.34 -0.45 
11 
-1.2 -1.3 -12.8 -11.9 -0.40 -0.48 
12 
-1.2 -1.; -12.5 -11.9 -0-44 -0-50 
8 
percentage changes. 
Lay-up, Scrapping: changes In percentage points. 
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Table 6.9 
SIMULATED EFFECTS OF A 50% INCREASE IN SHIPBUILDING COSTS9 
IMPACT ON TANKER MARKET 
Year Time Freight Lay-up Ship prices 
Charter Rat e 
Rate 
A U A U A U A U 
0 0.0 
-0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.00 0.01 0.6 3.4 
1 
-0.1 0.2 -0.1 0.1 0.00 0.00 0.9 4.6 
2 
-0.2 0.9 -0.2 0.8 0.01 -0.03 1.2 5.8 
3 
-0. '5 1.8 -0.4 1.6 0.01 -0.05 1.9 7.1 
4 
-0.8 2.7 -0.7 2.4 0.02 -0.07 3.0 8.3 
5 
-0.6 3.7 -0.5 3.3 0.02 -0.08 4.5 9.5 
6 0.4 4.8 
-0.4 4.2 0.00 -0.09 6.2 10.8 
7 1.7 5.8 1.5 5.2 -0.03 -0.11 7.8 12.0 
8 3.1 6.9 2.8 6.2 -0.05 -0.12 9.4 13.3 
9 4.5 8.1 4.0 7.1 -0.07 -0.12 10.9 14.5 
10 6.0 9.3 5.3 8.1 -0.09 -0.13 12.4 15.7 
11 7.4 10.4 6.5 9.1 -0.10 -0.13 13.8 16.8 
12 8.7 11.5 7.6 10.0 -0.11 -0.14 15.0 17.9 
Year 
- 
Fleet Deliveries Scra pping ( Z) 
A U A U A U 
0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.01 -0.06 
1 0.0 
-0.1 0.4 -14.9 -0.03 -0.12 
2 0.1 
-0.3 0.7 -19.6 -0.05 -0.16 
3 0.1 
-0.6 0.9 -21.0 -0.07 -0.20 
4 0.3 
-0.9 1.3 -21.3 -0.10 -0.24 
5 0.2 
-1.2 -15.0 -21.1 -0.13 -0.24 
6 
-0.2 -1.5 -19.5 -20.6 -0.15 -0.25 
7 
-0.6 -1.8 -20.4 -19.6 -0.17 -0.24 
8 
-1.0 -2.2 -20.3 -19.0 -0.18 -0.24 
9 
-1.5 -2.5 -19.8 -18.1 -0.19 -0.22 
10 
-1.9 -2.8 -19.0 -17.0 -0.19 -0.20 
11 
-2.3 -3.1 -17.9 -16.1 -0.19 -0.19 
12 
-2.6 -3.3 -16.8 -14.8 -0.19 -0.18 
9 
percentage changes. 
Lay-up, Scrapping: changes In percentage points. 
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This chapter tests the assumption of rational 
expectations in shipping markets. Freight futures, time 
charter rates and newbuilding prices should reflect 
expectations of future spot rates, future time charter 
equivalents and future second hand spot prices 
respectively. 
'If 
in addition expectations are assumed to be 
rational then testable restrictions are Implied about the 
stochastic process that describes the evolution of these 
variables. Accordingly, unbiasedness, weak rationality 
and strong rationality tests are carried out for each set 
of data. These could be used in order to appraise the 
validity of the rational expectations hypothesis and the 
underlying economic theory. 
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7.1 Introduction 
Our theory has assumed that market's expectations of 
future endogenous variables are 'rational' In the sense 
of being the same as the mathematical expectations that 
the structural model generates, conditional on the 
assumptions ' regarding the exogenous variables. The 
rational expectations hypothesis Is one of the crucial 
assumptions and a distinguishing feature of the model 
since it generates a dynamic behaviour that conventional 
models cannot replicate. 
The rational expectations ME) hypothesis 'has been 
widely used in theoretical and applied research for 
various reasons, such as: 
1) First, the hypothesis is believed to ' be, more 
consistent with the fundamental economic axiom of 
rationality and optimizing behaviour than its 
predecessors, such as the static or adaptive 
expectations. The latter are usually ad hoc backward 
looking forecasting schemes which in general Imply biased 
forecasts. 
2) Secondly, models which are based on irrational 
expectations generating mechanisms can be structurally 
unstable. This is inspite of the fact that their "reduced 
forms can"be observationally equivalent with that of R. E 
models. The latter implies that both models can simulate 
just as' well the historical experience. However models 
with irrational expectations mechanisms will tend to 
break down when the stochastic process that generates the 
exogenous variables changes. Thus the usefulness of 
conventional models for forecasting purposes is only 
limited to a small set of scenarios which involve 
stochastic fluctuations - In the exogenous variables 
similar to that experienced during the sample period over 
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which the model has been f itted. For forecasting under an 
arbitrary set of assumptions the R. E models might be 
considered to be superior assuming of course that they 
have been correctly formulated and estimated. This has 
been emphasized by Lucas (1976) in his critique of 
econometric policy evaluation. 
3) Finally, the hypothesis is manageable and can 
relatively easily be incorporated into economic models 
thatl can be straightforwardly used in order to analyse 
complex situations. 
The R. E hypopesis is now generally considered to be 
superior to the adaptive and static expectations 
formulations previously used. It is itself however being 
critisized for being based on an extreme set of 
assumptions regarding the economic agents' ability to 
collect and process information, which are unlikely to 
hold in the real world. This however turns out to be true 
f or any set of useful scientif ic assumptions, when 
closely scrutinized. 
Plan of chapter 7 
In this chapter the assumption of rational 
expectations In the shipping markets, is subjected to 
empirical scrutiny in order to examine the extent to 
which it can be considered to be consistent with the 
facts. Our task is to a great extent simplified by the 
fact that there exist a considerable amount of data which 
can, according to various theories, be Interpreted as 
direct measurements of expectations of future variables. 
Using data on these expectations (predictors) and the 
actual outcomes, the forecast error can be calculated. 
Three types of tests are performed. The first is an 
unbiasedness test were the future outcome is regressed on 
a constant and on the observable expectation. Under R. E. 
the estimated constant should not significantly differ 
from zero while the coefficient on the predictor *should 
be statistically close to one. 
32S 
The second test is a weak rationality test. This is 
based on the idea that forecast errors should be 
statistically uncorrelated with past forecast errors 
which are part of the information set. This implication 
can be tested by performing tests on the correlogram of 
the forecast error. Alternatively a regression of the 
forecast error on past errors belonging to the 
information seý can be carried out. Then the joint 
hypothesis that all coefficients are equal to zero can be 
tested. 
The third t est is a semi-strong rationality test. If 
the R. E. hypothesis holds then the forecast error should 
be uncorrelated with any part of the Information set and 
not just the past errors. Thus in a regression of the 
forecast error on any subset of variables which belong to 
the current information test, the hypothesis that all 
coefficients are equal to zero should not be rejected. 
In section 2 data on freight futures is used to 
examine whether their stochastic properties are 
consistent with the implications of the R. E hypothesis. 
In section 3 we do the same with data for long term time 
charter (rental) rates which should in theory be 
predictors of a weighted average of actual short term 
time charter (rental) rates. In section 4 data on 
newbuilding prices which should reflect expectations of 
future second hand prices is used. Statistical 
investigations which test whether the price of the 
newbuilding Is an optimal predictor of the future second 
hand value of spot ships are performed. 
7.2 Freight Futures 
The efficient markets hypothesis (EMH) suggests that 
f 
t, T 
EtnT (1) 
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where 
f 
t, T = 
futures price in time t for delivery at time T 
nT= spot price at time T 
This implies that if expectations are rational then the 
futures price should follow a random walk. 
f 
t+l, T 
f 
t, T t+l 
Moreover the step u t+1 should not only 
be uncorrelated 
with past futures prices but also with any subset of the 
current information set. In this section a number of 
statistical tests are performed which test for the 
validity of various implications of EMH/RE. Each test is 
progressively more stringent as the correlation 
properties of the error term ut with a progressively 
enlarged information subset are Investigated. The f irst 
test investigates whether the futures price follows a 
random walk by considering the following regression 
f 
t*I, T -a+ 
bf 
t, T +e t+l 
(3) 
and testing for a-0 and b-I by calculating a 
Dickey-Fuller (1981) statistic. The second test looks at 
the error term ut of (2) and considers whether this is 
autocorrelated with its past history or not. This can be 
done by calculating the sample autocorrelation function 
of u and the associated portmanteau Q-statistics for 
various lags or by considering the regression 
m 
ut aa+EbIu t-I 101 
and testing for b, =O with an F-statistic. ' The 
third type of test is a semi-strong rationality test and 
considers a regression of next period's change in the 
price of futures on an extended subset of the current 
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information set. This subset includes current and lagged 
futures and spot prices. Accordingly, we specify the 
regression equation (5) as follows 
mm 
ut =a+bIf t-1, T+ cl nt_, 
EMH/RE implies that b1=0 (i-I, W and c, =O (i-1, m). 
This implication can be tested by calculating a standard 
F-statistic that tests for the exclusion of these 
variables. 
The daily price movements of the April, July and 
October 1987 futures contract are separately examined. 
Each contract has been traded for exactly two years 
before expiring. Since the index (T) In the notation f tj 
does not change as the fluctuations in the price of an 
Individual contract are considered, In what follows, this 
index is dropped from the notation. Fig. 1 shows the 
daily f luctuations in the price ft of the various 
contracts. According to the theory these should be 
particular realizations of a random walk process. First 
differences of these series have been taken in order to 
calculate the daily changes Aft =f t-f t-1 in the price of 
the contracts. The resulting series have been plotted on 
f Ig. 2. If ft obeys a random walk process then Af t should 
be a serially uncorellated white noise process. 
7.2.1 Random Valk tests 
Table 1 contains the results of the random walk test. 
The next period's future price has been regressed on the 
current price and a constant as in (2). The hypothesis 
that a=O and b-1 is tested by calculating the 
Dickey-Fuller (1981) 101 statistic. This is a max Imum 
likelihood ratio test and Is calculated as a standard 
F-statistic. However, it Is not distributed as an 
F-variable under the null. The approximate distribution 
for our sample size which consists of around 500 
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Table 7.1 
Random Walk Tests 
Estimation of regression equations 
, 
vt+l =a+ byt 
Contract : April 87 July 87 October 87 
Constant 8.934 4.836 4.423 
Yt 0.990 0.994 0.995 
012.593 0.599 0.420 
Estimation technique: OLS. 01 In the DIckey-Fuller 
statistic estimated as a standard F-statistic but 
distributed an In Table IV of' Dickey-Fuller (1981). 
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observations is given in Dickey-Fuller (1981) Table IV. 
According to this table, the 01 statistic is significant 
at the 10% level If it is larger that 3.79. On the other 
hand the calculated 01 statistics shown on Table 1 are 
considerably smaller that this critical value so the 
random walk implication of the EMH/RE hypothesis cannot 
be rejected on the basis of these tests even at the 10% 
signif icance level. 
7.2.2 Weak Rationality tests 
Figure 3 shows the corellogram of the series Af t 
calculated from the sample au tocorre lat ions r(T). If Af t 
is indeed a serially uncorrelated white noise process 
then all the true theoretical au tocorre lat Ions p(-r), at 
non-zero lags, should be identically equal to zero. 
Because of random sampling the empirical estimates of 
these autocorrelations plotted on fig. 7.3 will show 
random deviations from the actual theoretical values. An 
assessment of whether the estimated autocorrelations show 
a statistically signif Icant deviation f rom the zero 
values predicted by the theory, requires a knowledge of 
their sampling distribution. 
Because of the large number of observations (500), we 
can use an asymptotic result which says that in big 
samples and for T*O the r(T) are, under the null, 
approximately normally and independently distributed with 
a mean of zero and standard deviation of 11. f. " , where N 
is the number of observations. At the 5% level of 
s Ign if icance the null hypothesis that P(T) -0 is 
rejected if 1 N1/2 r(T)l > 1.96. Therefore two horizontal 
dotted lines have been drawn on the corellogram In order 
to carry out this test visually. The first line is drawn 
through the 1.961,1', ' point on the vertical axis and the 
other through the -1.961,1", " point. It can be seen that 
for the April 87 contract all but one of the estimated 
autocorrelations lie well within the acceptance region as 
the EMH/RE hypothesis would suggest. However for the July 
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Table 7.2a 2 
Weak Rationality Tests 
Estimation of regression equations 
20 
ut=a+biu t-L 
Contract : April 87 July 87 October 87 
Constant 0.0294 (0.05) 0.0045 (0.01) 0.3256 (0.46) 
" t-1 0.0223 (0.49) 0.1771 (3.91) 0.1529 (3.34) 
" t-2 -0.0221 (0.49) 0.0152 (0-33) -0.0386 (0.83) 
" 0.0055 (0.13) 0.1416 (0.31) -0.0957 (2.06) t-3 
" 0.0765 (1.86) -0.2103 (0.46) -0.0394 (0.85) t-4 
" 0.0593 (1.43) 0.4045 (0.89) 0.1103 (2.39) t-5 
" 
-0.0435 (1.06) -0.1055 (2.33) -0.0691 (1.51) t-6 
" 0.0310 (0.75) -0.0376 (0.83) -0.1125 (2.45) t-7 
u 0.0139 (0.34) 0.0057 (0.13) 0.0167 (0.37) t-8 
u 
-0.0190 (0.46) 0.0811 (1.78) 0.0320 (0.70) t-9 
u 0.0963 (2.37) 0.1406 (3.14) 0.0900 (1.98) t-I 
F-statistic F(10,479) F(10,478) F(10,472) 
1.375 4.499 4.433 
Marginal 0.189 0.000 0.000 
Significance 
2 Estimation technique: OLS. Figures In parentheses are 
absolute t-statiatics for testing the null hypothesis that 
the coeff Iclent Is equal to zero. F-statistics test for the 
WO joint hypothesis that b Figures below ' the I 
F-statistics refer to the isarginal signif Icance of' the 
test. 
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Table 7.2b 3 
Weak Rationality Tests 
Portmanteau Test Statistics based on the estimated 
P2 
autocorrelations r(j) of the u's : Q(p) =NEr (j) 
J=j 
Contract : April 87 July 87 October 87 
p Q(P) Q(P) Q(P) 
2 1.066 23.916 12.344 
(0.587) (0.000) (0.002) 
5 5.585 24.256 27.178 
(0.349) (0.000) (0.000) 
10 11.004 54.066 51.352 
(0.357) (0.000) (0.000) 
3 
The portmanteau statistic based on the first p 
autoco rre let Ions Q(P), Is asymptotically distributed as 'a 
X2 variable under the null hypothesis that the u's are a p 
white noise process. ý Figures In parentheses denote the 
signitleance level of the Q- statistic- 
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87 and October 87 contracts a significant number of 
autocorrelations lie well outside the acceptance region 
and this evidence is not favourable to the EMH/RE. 
These results are also mirrored in Tables 2a, 2b. The 
hypothesis that ut follows a white noise process is 
tested by estimating the regression equations (4) and 
calculating the F-statistic for the exclusion of lagged 
Ws. These calculations are reported In Table 2a where it 
can be seen that for the April contract the hypothesis 
that u Is a white noise process cannot be rejected while 
for the other contracts the evidence Is unfavourable to 
the white noise hypothesis. 
Table 2b shows the calculated portmanteau statistics. 
These are based on the correlogram and have been 
calculated for various lags. Again the evidence from the 
April contract is consistent with EMH/RE while the 
evidence from the other contracts rejects the null 
hypothesis of zero autocorrelation. 
We have also carried out another non parametric 
procedure in order to test whether the differenced price 
series follows a white noise process. This procedure is 
based on Durbins' (1969) cumulative periodogram test. It 
is a frequency domain alternative to the tests carried 
out above. The test relies on the idea that the 
theoretical spectrum of a white noise process is flat. 
Since the periodogram is an unbiased estimate of the 
spectrum, the cumulative periodogram should therefore 
tend to be a straight line but again we expect some 
deviations due to random sampling. 
The estimated spectra of the series are plotted on 
fig. 4. The estimated spectrum does not seem to be flat 
as the theory would suggest. It also shows a peak at the 
trading week periodicity of 5 days which suggests that 
there might be a 'seasonal' day of the week effect In the 
data. The fluctuations in the estimated spectrum however 
could reflect the effects of random sampling. To carry 
out a rigorous test we use f ig. S. Each diagram shows 3 
lines. The line that passes through the origin Is the 
cumulative periodogram of the differenced price series 
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and the theoretical value of this should be a straight 
45 0 line through the origin, If Af t is indeed serially 
uncorrelated. 
In order to examine whether the estimated cumulative 
periodogram dif f ers by a statistically s Ign If icantly 
amount from the theoretical straight line pattern, we use 
the 
. 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov distribution to determine the 
position of the two other parallel lines In f ig. S. These 
two lines can be used to def ine the acceptance region. In 
our case they have been drawn so as to carry out a visual 
test at the 5% significance level. The hypothesis is 
accepted if the cumulative periodogram lies fully within 
the parallel lines. On the other hand It is rejected It 
it crosses either one of the two f ixed lines. It can be 
seen that for the April contract the periodogram lies 
well within the acceptance region and therefore our 
hypothesis that Af t 
is serially uncorrelated cannot be 
rejected by the test. However for the other contracts the 
cumulative periodogram line crosses Into the rejection 
region and so the white noise implication of the EMH/RE 
cannot be accepted. 
7.2.3 Semi-strong Rationality Tests 
The R. E. hypothesis also suggests that changes In the 
price of futures cannot be predicted from any current 
available information and not just from Its own history. 
Thus in a regression of the next period's change in the 
price of futures on a set of variables that are part of 
the current information set, the estimated coefficients 
should not be statistically different from 0. As in (5) 
we have regressed the change in the price of futures on 
current and lagged spot and futures freight prices which 
can supposedly be used to make projections and estimates 
of cyclical or time trends. According to the theory all 
coefficients should be equal to zero. The results of 
these regressions are shown on table 3. 
The null hypothesis that the coefficients of all 
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Table 7.3 4 
Semi-Strong Rationality Tests 
Estimation of regression equations 
10 10 
Ut=a+E bift-I +EcIn t-i lal 1-1 
Contract : April 87 July 87 October 87 
constant 4.874 (1.13) 5.473 (1.17) 4.692 (0.85) 
r 0.005 (0.09) 0.191 (4.20) 0.165 (3.56) t-I 
r 
-0.021 (0.32) -0.183 (2.57) -0.206 (2.90) t-2 
r 0.032 (0.52) o. 001 (0.01) 
-0.070 (0.99) t-3 ý ý 
r 0.065 (1.04) -0.049 (0.69) 0.067 (0.94) t-4 
0.005 (0.08) 0.082 (1.16) 0.160 (2.29) 
t-5 
-0.129 (1.89) -0.159 (2.24) -0.193 (2.78) 
0.076 (1.20) 0.079 (1.12) 
-0-050 (0.71) t-7 
r 
-0.035 (0.56) 0.045 (0.64) 0.138 (1.97) 
-0.031 (0.50) 0.110 (1.56) 0.030 (0.43) t-9 
r 0.140 (0.32) -0.131 (2.83) -0.052 (1.10) t-10 
n 0.055 (0.44) -0.003 (0.19) -0.003 (0.17) 
n -0.178 (0.80) -0.008 (0.49) 0.001 (0.04) t-2 
n 0.066 (0.29) -0.001 (0.05) 0.005 (0.25) t-3 
n 0.237 (0.10) -0.007 (0.41) 0.004 (0.18) t-4 
n -0.46; (0.21) 0.00ý (0.15) 0.006 (0.28) 
n 0.136 (0.61) -0.010 (0.60) -0.010 (0.51) t-8 
n -0.092 (0.41) -0.024 (1.38) -0.124 (0.63) t-7 
n 0.170 (0. 77) 0.009 (0.50) 0.049 (2.55) t-8 1 , 1 1 
n 
-0.155 (0.73) -0.014 (0.86) -0.032 (1.72 ) 
, 1 
n 0.024 (0.20) 0.046 (2.87) 0.014 (0.08) t-10 
F-statistic F(20,470) F(21. 469) F(20. 463)'- 
0. 703 2. 306 2. 487 
Marginal 0. 824 0. 001 0. 000 
significance 
4 
Estimation . techniquet OLS. Figures In parentheses are 
absolute t-statistics. The F-statistic tests for the joint 
hypothesis that b, = c, = 0, Iml.... 010. 
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variables, except possibly the constant, 'are 0 was tested 
by calculating the F-statistics reported at the bottom of 
the table. The value of the statistic was found to be 
0.703 for'the April contract which is very Insignificant. 
However for the July and October contract the value of F 
was very significant and thus the EMH/RE should be 
rejected at the standard s Ign if icance levels. Similar 
regressions with shorter lags were carried out and 
similar results were derived. 
These results are somewhat mixed. The evidenýce from 
the April contract is favourable to EMH/RE. However the 
evidence from the July and Octaber contracts tends to 
reject the implications of EMH/RE. Wen evaluating the 
significance of this latter evidence we should bear in 
mind that the two samples are not independent. Data for 
the July and 'October contracts cover a period of 8 
quarters, 6 of which are overlapping. This might explain 
why' both generate similar results. Surprisingly the April 
and July contract also overlap -over a period of 6 
quarters out of 8 and yet the evidence from each sample 
is entirely different. I- 
7.3 Term-structure of time charter rates 
In this section we test the ef f ic lent markets/ 
rational expectations hypothesis in the time charter 
markets. Shipowners, charterers and speculators can chose 
among time charter hire contracts of varying durations. 
The time charter is a rental contract which stipulates 
that over its duration control of the ship passes from 
the shipowner to the charterer. At the one extreme there 
are very short term time charters which cover one voyage 
only, while at the other end the ship might be chartered 
for a period which, especially in the case of tankers, 
might exceed 10 years and so cover most of Its economic 
lif etime. The owner/charterer will often cons Ider the 
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profitability of selling/buying over a period of time on 
the spot market or under a series of short term time 
charters or under a single long term charter or possibly 
a, combination of these strategies. In the zero 
uncertainty perfect foresight case any strategy would 
give the same return because it can be easily shown that 
if this equality does not hold all sellers will switch 
from a low profit charter market A to another more 
profitable charter market 8 while at the same time all 
buyers will leave B and switch to the cheaper market A. 
This condition allows us to derive the fundamental 
equation for the term structure of time charter rates in 
the zero uncertainty case. 
Consider the following alternative strategies open to 
a shipowner/charterer oven a period of time of length T. 
On the one hand the economic agent can operate by 
arranging a long term T period time charter or by 
arranging a series of T short term one period time 
charters. The prof Itability/cost of either of the two 
strategies should be the same at equilibrium. If HT is t 
the f ixed prearranged time charter rate on aT period 
contract at time t wfille HI Is the short term one period t 
time charter then the present value of the stream of 
payments that the two strategies give should be equal. 
The present value of the long T period contract (V L) Is 
TTT-T HtHtHtHt 
L+ vt 
ddt, 
2 
++dt, 
T-1 
(6) 
while the present value (V s) on the alternative strategy 
of sequential short term charters is 
IHIHIHI 
t t*l t+2 t+T-1 
VS +-I-++- (7) 
d 
t'i t, 2 
d 
t, T-1 
where d t, k 
Is a discounting factor defined as 
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k 
t, k 
I 
IT, (l*rt+l) 
where r is the return on capital. In the perf ect 
foresight case. the present value of the two strategies 
should be equal, thus 
vsu VL 
tt 
In the realistic case where there is uncertainty and 
foresight cannot be perfect it shall be assumed that, 
after allowing for a risk premium. a similar relationship 
holds in terms of the expected values of the variables In 
the above equation, which would also be true under risk 
neutrality. - Thus 
Ev5a VL (9) 
ttt 
or using (6), (7) 
HIEHIEHI ERI 
tt t+1 t t+2 t t+T-1 
+ ++ -- -M (10) 
d d d t, 2 t, l t, T-1 
HTHTHT T 
ttt t 
d d 
t, l t, 2 t, T-1 
is the expectation operator conditional on where E t 
inf ormat Ion available at time t. On the RHS of (9) we 
have made use of the fact that at time t, VL Is non t 
random both because long term time charter rates are 
fixed and also because the long term discount factor is 
observable from long term interest rates. This implies 
that VL 
-E V'. ttt 
Economic agents in the shipping markets are unlikely 
to be risk neutral so (9) and (10) should be interpreted 
as being approximately true possibly after allowing for a 
risk premium. 
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Up to here, no assumptions have been made about how 
expectations are formed. The term structure theory 
assumes that the above relationships are valid 
immaterially as to whether expectations are rational or 
not. If additionally it is assumed that expectations are 
rational, then the joint hypothesis Implies testable 
restrictions about the stochastic relationships in the 
data. Define the observable ut as the excess prof It on 
the long term contract which is given by 
Ut =- (11) 
or using (6), (7) and-00) 
HI-EHIHI-EHI 
t+l t t+l t+2 t t+2 
+ 
d 
t, I t, 2 
HIEHI 
t+T-1 t t+T-1 
d 
t, T-1 
Thus ut is a weighted average of forecast errors of 
future short term charter rates. Assuming rationality ut 
should be uncorrelated with any part of the current 
information set. From (12) It can be seen that u t-j 
belongs to the inf ormation set for JsT-1 but not 
necessarily for J>T-1. Thus ut should be at most an 
MA(T-2) process. In addition if' expectations are rational 
then ut should be unpredictable on the basis of any 
subset of the information set. 
The empirical investigation uses quarterly data on 
the short term (one period) time charter rate H and also 
for the four quarter (12 months) time charter rate H4 
The f igures are expressed In $ per dwt per month. The 
above spec if led relationships between the theoretical 
concepts HI and should also be true for their tt 
empirical counterparts after we set Tm4 in the above 
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equations. The same statistical analysis is performed on 
four independent sets of data. Each data set refers to a 
different size group of ships. The first set uses data on 
ships between 12000-20000 dwt, the second looks at the 
20000-35000 dwt group, the third is the 35000-50000 dwt 
group while the fourth is the 50000-85000 dwt group. 
The statistical analysis 
The f ollowing section reports the results of 
unbiasedness, weak rationality and semi-strong 
rationality tests. Table 4 reports the results of 
unbiasedness tests. These are based on equation (11). 
This implies that in the regression equation (Il') 
s va+ bVL +u 
ttt 
(111) 
the null hypothesis that a-0 and b-1 should not be 
rejected. The hypothesis is tested by calculating the 
regression and using aX2 test on the unrestricted 
coef f icients. 
Weak rationality tests are reported in table 5 which 
test the implication 
. 
of the R. E hypothesis that the 
excess prof it ut between 
. 
the two chartering policies 
should be at most an MA(2) process. These tests are based 
on the correlogram of the u's , as wall as on estimated 
autoregressions of u on Its own history. 
Table 6 reports the results of semi-strong 
rationality tests. The R. E hypothesis suggests that ut is 
not only unpredictable on the basis of past u's but also 
on the basis of any variable which belongs to the 
information set. The test Is performed by regressing ut 
on a subset of the information set and testing for the 
s Ign if icance of the coef f IcIents. The chosen, subset 
includes lagged freight rates M, fuel prices (Pb) as 
well as lagged one year time charter rates (H 4 ). 
The error term of the regression equations Is 
autocorrelated. This is because the (forecast) error Is a 
weighted average of future forecast errors of short term 
charter rates, as equation (12) shows. Thus the Hansen L 
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Hodrick procedure has been used in order to take account 
of this problem. This procedure Is Is not the most 
powerful but it Is easy to implement and gives unbiased 
estimates. On the other hand a GLS procedure would give 
biased results. This is because GLS Implicitly filters 
the data and the bias is due to the fact the condition of 
econometric exogeneity is not satisfied. The ut Is in 
general correlated with future values of the regressors. 
To carry out the procedure the variance covariance matrix 
of the error term in the regressions Is calculated from 
the f irst 3 elements of the covariogram of u and has a 
Toeplitz matrix form. Thus all elements of the central 
diagonal are equal to the variance of u. Elements In the 
f irst diagonals of the main one are set equal to r(l) and 
those of the second diagonals are set equal to r(2). All 
other elements are set equal to zero which Is true under 
the null. 
7.3.1 Unbiasedness Tests 
Table 4 shows the results of the unblasedness tests. 
The actual profit on a sequence of short term charters VS 
Lt is regressed on the prof It of the long term charter Vt as 
in the regression equation (111. The regressions have 
been carried out on four independed sets of data 
corresponding to various size groups. According to the 
theory' VL should be an unbiased predictor of Vs since the tt 
expected prof it on the two strategies should be equal. 
Table 4 also reports aX2 test on the hypothesis that 
a=O and b-1. For the size groups 20000-35000 and 
3SO00-50000, this joint hypothesis Is rejected by the data 
at the 5% significance level. For the first and fourth 
size groups the hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 5% 
significance level, but this result Is very marginal. The 
rejection of the hypothesis might be due to the existence 
on a non-zero risk premium which would Imply violation of 
the assumption a-0. A less stringent version of the term 
structure/rational expectations hypothesis Is tested with 
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Table 7.4 5 
Unblasedness Tests 
Estimation of regression equations 
VS =a+ bVL tt 
Size 10000- 20000- 35000- 50000- 
Group : 20000 35000 50000 85000 
a 0.71 (0.45) 0.52 (0.29) 0.77 (0.25) 0.47 (0.24) 
b 0.81 (0.13) 0.85 (0.10) 0.75 (0.09) 0.83 (0.10) 
x25.891 7.465 16.383 5.592 
Marginal 0.053 0.024 0.000 0.061 
Significance 
t-statistic 1.446 1.558 2.705 1.628 
Marginal 0.155 0.126 0.009 0.110 
Significance 
sEstimation tochniquet OLS. Standard errors and test 
statistics have been calculated using the Hanson Hodrick 
(1980) procedure. Figures In parentheses are estimated 
standard errors. The x2 statistic tests for the' joint 
hypothesis that a-0 and but. Under the null, this Is 
asymptotically distributed as a2 variable. The 2 
t-statistic test* for the hypothesis that but. 
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the t-statistics reported towards the bottom of the 
table. These test for the hypothesis that b-1 wfille the 
value for a Is not constrained. For no size groups could 
this hypothesis be rejected at the 5% level. 
Overall the results of the unblasedness tests are 
favourable to the less stringent version of the EMH/RE 
although the acceptance of the hypothesis is somewhat 
marginal. 
7.3.2 Weak Rationality Tests 
Weak rationality tests have been calculated based on 
the correlogram of ut. The results are shown on f 1g. S. 
The theory predicts that ut should follow at most an 
MA(2) process. Thus under the null the true 
autocorrelations of higher order than 2 are equal to zero 
(P(J)=O, JZ3). This restriction of the term 
structure/rational expectations hypothesis can be tested 
on the correlogram of Ut The f Irst two sample 
autocorrelations are indeed much h Igher than the 
remaining ones. In order to test whether the estimated 
autocorrelations dif f er sIgnif Icantly from their 
theoretical values, their sampling distribution under the 
null hypothesis must be known. The following result is 
used which says that for an MA(q) process all sample 
autocorrelations of higher order than q are 
asymptotically normally distributed with mean zero and 
variance given by the following expression 
q 
Var(r(j)) 911+21: p(j) I/ N J>q 
jol 
where N Is the number of' observations. Expression (15) 
involves the unknown -theoretical autocorrelations P(J) 
but can be estimated consistently by using the first q 
order sample autocorrelations r(j) in thý above 
expression. This method has been used In order to 
calculate this quantity and two dotted parallel lines 
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Table 7.5 6 
Weak Rationality Tests 
Estimation of regression equations 
8 
ut=a+EbIu t-i 
1=3 
Size ý10000- 20000- 35000- 50000- 
Group : 20000 35000 50000 85000 
a 
-0.05 (1.05) -0.10 (2.10) -0.10 (1.70) -0.11 (1.82) 
b30.06 (0.30) 0.35 (1.73) 0.04 (0.16) 0.23 (1.02) 
b40.13 (0.73) 0.35 (2.03) 0.45 (2.40) 0.23 (1.29) 
bs 
-0.17 (0.94) -0.24 (1.56) -0.21 (1.20) -0.20 (1.16) 
b 0.18 (1.07) 
-0.16 (1.08) 0.11 (0.59) 0.07 (0.41) 
b70.08 (0.47) 
-0.38 (2.19) -0.12 (0.64) -0.32 (1.61) 
b 0.00 (0.00) 
-0.03 (0.14) -0.12 (0.66) -0.11 (0.64) 
x23.021 12.359 7.045 6.582 
Marginal 0.806 0.054 0.317 0.361 
Significance 
6 
Estimation technique: OLS. Standard errors and test 
statistics have been calculated using the Hanson & Hodrlck 
(1980) procedure. Figures In parentheses are absolute 
t-statlstlcs. The x2 statistic tests for the null 
hypothesis that all coof f Iclents on the lagged u's are 
equal to zero. Under the null It Is asymptotically 
distributed as a2 variable. Xe 
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have been drawn on f ig. 6 at a height given by the 
estimated value of (15) multiplied by 1.96. These lines 
can be used in order to test at the 5% signif Icance level 
the hypothesis that autocorrelations of higher order than 
2 are equal to 0. It can be seen that all the empirical 
autocorrelations lie well within the acceptance region 
which is bounded by the two dotted lines and therefore 
the hypothesis that ut follows an MA(2) process cannot be 
rejected. No doubts about the hypothesis should be cast 
by the fact that the correlogram might exhibit slowly 
moving patterns at higher lags. This Is because the 
sampling errors of the r(J)'s are closely correlated when 
the process is not white noise and this can produce some 
random artificial cyclical movements in the correlogram 
which should not be Interpreted as true. 
Weak rationality tests have also been performed based 
on the regression equation (13). 
uta+jbiu t-j et J=3 
The theory predicts that b 0,1-3, pm. This 
2 implication Is tested with aX test on the coefficients 
of the regression equation (13). The results are shown on 
Table S. Under the null the test statistic Is distributed 
as aX2 variable. The last line of the table shows the 8 
marginal significance of the test. It can be seen that 
for all size groups the test is not significant at the By. 
level. The hypothesis comfortably passes the test except 
for the 20000-35000 group were the result is marginal. 
7.3.3 Semi-strong Rationality Tests 
Table 6 shows the results of semi-strong rationality 
tests. The R. E hypothesis suggests that the excess profit 
Ut should be unpredictable on the basis of any variables 
which belong to the inf ormation set. The test is 
performed by regressing Ut on a subset of the information 
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Table 7.6 7 
Semi-Strong Rationality Tests 
Estimation of regression equations 
a84 
ut=a+EbiF t-I +cL Pb t-I +dLH t-I 
Size 10000- 20000- 35000- 50000- 
Group : 20000 35000 50000 85000 
a 
-2.08 (0.89) -0.11 (0.03) -7.95 (1.16) 5.61 (1.08) 
b 0.37 (1.53) 0.39 (1.06) 0.17 (0.50) 0.63 (1.65) 
b20.05 (0.19) 0.38 (1.03) 
-0.35 (1.27) 0.32 (0.90) 
b3 
-0.58 (2.64) -0.07 (0.20) -0.23 (0.75) -0.30 (0.85) 
b40.07 (0.29) 0.11 (0.30) 0.16-(0.54) 0.69 (2.00) 
b5 
-0.22 (1.01) -0.04 (0.04) -0.29 (1.42) -0.26 (0.82) 
b8 
-0.11 (0.42) -0.56 (1-98) -0.29 (1.10) -0.17 (0.61) 
c 
-0.48 (1.18) -1-05 (1.40) -0.53 (0.89) -1.48 (1.47) 
C2 
-0.27 (0.77) -0.49 (0.67) 0.80 (1.35) -0.54 (0.59) 
Cý 0.60 (1.79) 0.37 (0.53) 0.26 (0.35) 0.32 (0.36) 
c40.01 (0.01) 0.35 (0.54) 0.34 (0.53) -1.18 (1.36) 
C5 
-0.17 (0.45) -0.34 (0.52) 0.15 (0.30) 0.69 (0.67) 
ce 0.70 (1.82) 0.9711.74) 0.82 (1.68)- 0.54 (0.71) 
d10.14 (0.36) 0.39 (1.04) 0.29 (0.61) 0.76 (1.50) 
d20.38 (0.75) 0.28 (0.57) 
-0.14 (0.22) -0.27 (0.38) 
d3 
-0.15 (0.26) -0-57 (0.89) -0.63 (0.87) 0.64 (0.75) 
d4 
-0.35 (0.64) 0.07 (0.11) 0.12 (0.15) -0.20 (0.23) 
d50.58 (0.98) 0.26 (0.39) 1.04 (1.25) 0.44 (0.49) 
d5 
-0.44 (0.89) -0.30 (0.57) -0.90 (1.39) -0.83 (1.24) 
x2 22.596 26.053 27.672 20.127 
Marginal 0.207 0.099 0.067 0.326 
Significance 
7 
Estimation tochniquoi OLS. Standard error* , and test 
statistics have been calculated using the Hanson & Hodrick 
(1980) procedure. Figures In parentheses or* absolute 
t-statistics. The x2 statistic tests for the joint 
hypothesis 
- 
that bla cim dIM0, lot, 
.... 
6. Undert the null, 
it is asymptotically distributed as aX is variable. 
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set and testing for the significance of the coefficients. 
This subset includes lagged freight rates (F), fuel 
prices (Pb) as well as lagged one year time charter rates 
(HY. Accordingly, regression equation (14) Is specified 
as follows 
ut =a+bIF t-I + cl Pb t-I +dIR t-I lul lul iml 
This equation is estimated and the Implication of the 
EMH/RE hypothesis that b aC =d n 0,1-1 
.... 
in is 
, , , 
tested. The test statistic Is based on the deviations of 
the estimated coefficients from their theoretical value 
of zero. This statistic is reported towards the bottom of 
the table 6. Under the null, It is distributed as a X2 
variable. The last row of the table reports the marg inal 
significance level of the test. It can be seen that the 
hypothesis is acceptable for all size groups at the 5% 
significance level. The result is marginal only for the 
third size group. 
Overall it can be said that the results of the 
unbiasedness, weak and semi-strong rationality tests - are 
favourable to the term structure/rational expectati ons 
hypothesis in the time charter markets. 
8 
Lagged short term charter rates have not been Included 
In the set of regressors because of' multico I linearity. 
This arises from the fact that there Is a linear 
relationship between short term charter rates and the 
freight rate and bunker price regressors, as suggested by 
the theory of chapter 3. The exclusion of the redundant 
variable does not affect the test statistic results. 
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7.4 Newbuilding Futures 
In this section data on newbuilding prices and second 
hand values Is used in order to test a joint hypothesis 
of capital markets' efficiency and rational expectations. 
Newbuilding prices refer to ships which are for forward 
delivery since they can only be delivered after a 
considerable construction period has elapsed. On the 
other hand second hand values reported by various brokers 
refer to sales of ships which are for immediate delivery. 
In addition to vintage considerations, differences 
between newbuilding and second hand values will also 
reflect the fact that the former are for future delivery 
where as the latter are for spot delivery. Abstracting 
for the moment from vintage and technological progress 
effects, let It be assumed that new and existing ships 
are identical in physical characteristics. In this 
hypothetical case any differences between newbullding and 
spot prices will reflect the fact that the former are 
strictly for forward delivery. Assuming a one year lag 
between the time of ordering. when the newbuilding price 
is quoted, and the time of delivery when the price must 
be paid , then the relationship between newbuilding values 
Pn 
t and second 
hand spot prices Pt Is the following 
Ph 
- 
Vý-, 
that is, the newbuilding prices quoted by shipbuilders 
and accepted by investors today must equal the current 
expectation of spot prices at the time of delivery. 
Should the above equality not hold then there Is the 
expectation of capital gains/losses for the Investor 
which in the perfect foresight case would lead to massive 
capital inf lows/outf lows from the newbuilding market 
until the equality was restored. In the case where there 
is uncertainty but agents are risk neutral then (16) will 
again be true. If agents are risk averse then similar 
forces operate but to a smaller extent so (16) will now 
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be true after allowing for a risk premium. Thus 
Pn 
t-k+Etp t+l 
(17) 
where k is a constant reflecting the risk premium that 
Investors need in order to accept newbuilding contracts. 
Allowing now for vintage effects and assuming that ships' 
depreciation and shipbuilding technological progress is 
constant over time. then (17) will also hold but now the 
constant k should be reinterpreted as representing risk 
premia, technological progress and depreciation effects. 
In theory, the risk premium might vary with market 
conditions but here its fluctuations will be considered 
to be sufficiently small so that It can be treated as a 
constant. 
In our empirical investigation we assume that. 
relationship (17) is true in terms of the logarithms of 
the variables. The data for Pn t and 
Pt are independently 
based indices so k will now also reflect the arbitrary 
basing of the indices and no economic significance can be 
given to this term anymore. 
Up to here, no assumptions have been made about how 
expectations are formed. The theory presented above might 
hold, immaterially as to whether expectations are 
rational or not. This theory however on Its own cannot be 
tested since expectations are unobservable. If It Is 
additionally assumed that expectations are rational then 
this implies testable restrictions about the stochastic 
structure of the observable time series on Pn to 
Pt and 
other variables. 
- 
The actual future price P t+1 will 
deviate from its expectation by a random forecast error 
v t+l 
P 
t+1 
EtP 
t+1 V t+1 
If expectations are rational 
uncorrelated with any current 
particular with its own history. 
(17) gives 
(18) 
then this should be 
information and in 
Substituting (18) into 
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p 
t+l =-k+ 
Pnt +v t+l 
and where 't-1 is uncorrelated with any current 
information and In particular with its own history and 
also with Pn t 
Thus our joint hypothesis regarding 
investors' behaviour and the formation of expectations 
implies that In a regression of P t*1 on Pn t and other 
variables belonging to the current Information set, the 
coefficient on Ph t should 
be equal to I while all other 
coef f icients should be equal to zero. 
In this section we perform unbiasedness, weak and 
semi-strong rationality tests which test the various 
implications of the ef f Ic lent mark ets/rational 
expectations hypothesis. Unblasedness tests are based on 
equation (19). The future spot (second hand) price Is 
regressed on the predictor which Is the newbuilding 
price. The coefficient on the newbuilding price should be 
equal to one and this Is tested with a standard 
F-statistic. Weak rationality tests are based on the idea 
that the difference between the newbuilding price (the 
predictor) and the future spot price, should ref lect 
genuine new information and thus Is uncorrelated with 
past forecast errors v t_1 since 
these also belong to the 
current information set. The forecast errors Vt are 
calculated (up to a constant) by simply taking the 
difference P t+1 - 
Pn 
t. 
The weak rationality tests 
investigate whether this series obeys the laws of a white 
noise process as the theory would predict. Tests are 
performed based on the correlogram of the series. In 
addition the following regression Is considered 
a 
Vt Ma+biv t-i +et j 
and the hypothesis that bj-0, j=1,..., w is tested using a 
standard F-test. 
Semi-strong rationality tests are performed by 
regressing the forecast error vt on an extended set of 
variables which are part of the Information set. The 
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information subset chosen, consists of data on lagged 
forecast errors, world economic activity (Y), the size of 
the f leet (K) and time charter rates (H 4) which could 
supposedly be used in order to make predictions of future 
V, S. This leads to the following regression equation 
being considered 
mmma 
v =a+ E bv +E CY + EdK +E eH 4 (22) t 1=1 I t-I I., I t-I 1-1 1 t-I tal I t-I 
In theory the coefficients of the regression should be 
equal to zero and this Is also tested with a standard 
F-test. 
7.4.1 Unbiasedness Tests 
Table 7 reports the results of the unbiasedness 
tests. The estimated coefficient 
L 
on the newbuilding 
(futures) price is equal to 0.737. The F-statistic shows 
that the deviation from the theoretical value of I Is 
statistically significant at the 0.05 level. 
7.4.2 Weak Rationality Tests 
Table 8 shows some of the results of weak rationality 
tests that have been performed. The regression equation 
(21) has been estimated. The t-statistics indicate that 
the coefficients on the first two lags are statistically 
significant at the 0.05 level. However the F-statistic 
which tests the joint hypothesis that the coefficients on 
all lags are equal to zero cannot be rejected at the 0.10 
significance level. 
Weak rationality tests have also been performed on 
the correlogram. of the series it 
- 
This Is shown on f ig. 
7.7. According to the theory, v should be white noise t 
and sample correlations should not be statistically 
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Table 7.7 9 
Unbiasedness Tests 
Estimation of regression equation: 
p t+1 0a+ bPn t+ut 
abS. E D. WFM. s 
0.811 0.737 0.329 1.332 4.971 0.035 
(0.444) (0.118) 
Table 7.8 10 
Weak Rationality Tests 
Estimation of regression equation: 
4 
ut=a+bIu t-I 
b2b3b4M. s 
-0.144 0.605 -0-561 0.247 -0.162 2.223 0.103 
(1.642) (2.723) (2.211) (0.964) (0.723) 
9 
Estimation technique: OLS. Figures In parenth*se are 
estimated standard errors. The F-statistic tests for the 
hypothesis that bal while X. S Is the marginal significance 
of this statistic calculated from the F(1,25) distribution. 
10 
Estimation technique: OLS. Figures In parentheses are 
absolute t-statistics. F, tests for the hypothesis that bla 
0, Under the null, It Is distributed as an 
F(4,20) variable. X. S Is the marginal significance level of 
the test. 
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Table 7.9 11 
Semi-strong Rationality Tests 
Estimation of regression equation: 
2222 
ut =a+rbIu t-I + 
_r c, 
Yt_, +EdiK t-I +Ee, Ht_i 
1.1 lot lot Iwo 
u t-I t-2 
0.254 0.225 
(0.077) (0.890) 
K 
t-2 
8.562 
-7.853 
(0.877) (1.082) 
0.556 
(0.803) 
t-I 
-0.900 
(1.859) 
F-statistic 
Marginal 
Significance of F 
2.945 
0.031 
11 
Estimation technique i OLS. 
absolute t-statleticis. The 
hypothesis that blm elm d1w 
It to distributed &a a F(13,18) varl 
y 
t-I 
0.830 
(0.129) 
H4 
t-2 
-0.092 
(0.324) 
y 
t-2 
-0.792 
(0.145) 
FIgures In parentheses are 
'F-statistle tests for ' the 
*I= 0,1=1,2. Under the null, 
able. 
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different from zero. In order to test this, we make use 
of the fact that, under the null, the 'sample 
au tocorre lat ions are asymptotically normally distributed 
with zero mean and variance equal to I /V/ M" , where N Is 
the number of observations. Thus in order to carry out a 
test at the 5% level two parallel dotted lines have been 
drawn on the correlogram at the T. 1.961VI-M" height. It 
can be seen that all sample autocorrelations lie within 
the acceptance region defined by the dotted lines so the 
null hypothesis cannot be rejected by this test at the 5% 
level. 
7.4.3 Semi-strong Rationality Tests 
The results of semi-strong ' rationality tests are 
shown on table S. The forecast error has been regressed 
on variables that belong to the current Information set 
and that could supposedly be used In order to make 
predictions. According to the theory. all coefficients 
should be equal to zero. None of the indiv idual 
t-statistics Is significant at the 6% level. However the 
more powerful F-statistic Is significant and thus the 
null hypothesis is rejected at the O. OS level by this 
test. 
Overall the results are mixed. The theory passes the 
weak rationality tests but it Is rejected by the 
unblasedness and semi-strong rationality tests at the 6% 
level. 
7.5 Interpretation and conclusions 
We have tested joint hypotheses of' capital markets 
efficiency and rational expectations In shipping markets. 
The hypothesis has been tested separately for the freight 
futures, time charter and the newbuilding contract 
market. The evidence Is quite favourable to the 
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ef f iciency hypothesis in the time charter markets. 
However It is of ten rejected In the case of the freight 
futures and newbuilding contract markets at the 0. OS 
signif icance level. This does not necessarily imply 
rejection of the rationality of expectations hypothesis 
unless the capital markets model within which the R. E. 
hypothesis is embedded is maintained to be true. 
The analysis has also implicitly assumed that the 
data corresponds to market clearing prices. This implicit 
assumption is somewhat suspect and might be the cause of 
the rejection of the hypothesis. Thus In the case of 
freight futures, the rejection might reflect the 
distorting influence of limit moves. In the case of the 
newbuilding market there Is also evidence of a similar 
type of distortion. This might happen during periods of 
depression when second hand values fall to a level which 
is not sufficient to cover the cost of building ships 
even after allowing for subsidy. In such cases the 
newbuilding value will probably not move all the way down 
to the level that the theory predicts. The cost of 
construction seems to be a lower bound for newbuilding 
values. When current and expected second hand values fall 
below this level the newbuilding price will not follow 
since there will be little point in building ships at 
huge loss when there is also the less costly option of a 
temporary closure of the yard. During such periods quoted 
newbuilding prices reflect the cost of building ships 
rather that the market value of the vessel. Yards prefer 
to work on their existing order books and there Is very 
little contracting at the inflated newbuilding price. 
In the case of the time charter market there are no 
such constraints in the movements of rates and this might 
explain why the results of the tests are more favourable 
to the efficiency hypothesis tests in a market clearing 
environment. Thus it is not inconceivable that a modified 
version of the hypothesis which takes account of the 
distorting inf luences mentioned above, might be 
consistent with the empirical evidence. 
355 
CHAPTER 
FORECASTING 
8.1 Introduction 
8.2 Spring 1987 forecast 
8.2.1 Recent developments 
8.2.2 The base run forecast 
8.2.3 Unanticipated oil shock 
8.2.4 Anticipated oil shock 
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This chapter Illustrates how the model can be used 
for the purpose of forecasting and scenario planning. A 
base run forecast Is presented and alternative scenarios 
involving unanticipated and anticipated oil shocks are 
also analysed. 
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8.1. Introduction 
This chapter illustrates how the model developed in 
previous chapters can be used for forecasting purposes 
and scenario planning. The model has been routinely used 
in the past in order to generate forecasts about the 
future outlook of the shipping markets. These forecasts 
have been published regularly In the 'Economic Review' of 
the city University Business School. The forecast 
presented here Is the one published In the Spring 1987 
issue of the 'Economic Review. 
The model calculates equilibrium freight rates, ship 
prices, shipbuilding and scrapping among other things. 
One of the crucial assumptions of the model Is that 
expectations in shipping markets are rational. This would 
be true in practise if speculation In real world markets 
made efficient use of available Information. The rational 
expectations, assumption might be somewhat extreme. 
According to some observers of the industry it is 
downright unrealistic. The evidence presented in the 
previous chapter is not conclusive on this matter. In the 
following paragraphs, it is argued that the rational 
expectations hypothesis can still be usefully adopted for 
the practical purpose of generating real world, forecasts 
even though it might not be strictly true. Indeed, It 
might be the only reliable approach to modelling a 
possibly irrational real world. 
Fundamentals and bubbles 
The model, given the assumptions, purports to 
calculate the equilibrium price that will just allow an 
investor to earn a competitive return. We might call this 
price as the 'fundamental' or 'intrinsic' value of ships. 
At a given point in time the actual price might deviate 
from the 'fundamental' level by a smaller or larger 
irrational 'bubble' amount. Our rational expectations 
model assumes that investors always pay the 'fundamental' 
price I. e there are no speculative bubbles. This is a 
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possibly unrealistic assumption. However, there is still 
a practical usefulnes in the predictions generated by 
rational expectations models. This arises from the fact 
that irrational pricing of assets cannot persist for 
long. Sooner or later values must move towards their 
'intrinsic' level (which the model purports to calculate) 
as soon as the 'fundamentals reassert themselves'. The 
point in time when th. is happens cannot be easIly foreseen 
even though it is bound to occur. These 'corrections' 
which set the price to its fundamental level imply loss 
of money for the investor. This creates real world forces 
that would tend to prevent the development of 'bubbles' 
and other irrationalities in the pricing of assets. 
Even if such f orces do not operate Immediatelly, an 
analysis of the fundamentals, such as the one we carry 
out here, is useful for the practical purposes of 
forecasting. It can help to 'identify such irrationalities 
and to point out the direction of future corrections. 
The Spring 1987 forecast 
The following sections present the forecast published 
in the Spring 1987 issue of the "City University Business 
School, Economic Review*. A base run set of assumptions 
regarding future growth in demand for freight, fuel 
prices, shipbuilding costs, interest rates and other 
external factors was used in order to generate a base run 
forecast. The main base run assumptions were that demand 
for dry cargo ton-miles grows by 3% p. a., tanker demand 
grows rapidly in the short run but settles at 2% In the 
long run while the oil price remains at about $18 per 
barrel. Section 8.2.3 considers the effects of an 
unanticipated oil shock while section 8.2.4 analyses the 
effects of an anticipated oil shock. 
The ease Run analysis Indicated that freight rates 
would soon increase by 50-90% and that ships were 
underpriced at the time by as much as 60-100%. Subsequent 
movements in prices and freight rates have vindicated 
these predictions. Dry cargo ship prices and time charter 
rates have doubled during the beginning of 1988. 
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8.2 Spring 1987 Forecast 
THE OUTLOOK FOR THE WORLD SHIPPING MARKET 1987-2000 
Major necessary adjustments in the stock of fleet, 
shipbuilding and scrapping capacity have taken place as 
the market has been gradually adjusting to the now post 
OPEC enviroment. These adjustments together with the 
likely higher growth rates In demand for freight that are 
associated with lower oil prices, are expected to provide 
a solid foundation for significant Improvements In rates 
and values. We foresee significant Increses In rates and 
values once the stock of fleet has completely adjusted to 
the lower levels of demand. The speed with which this 
undoubted long run recovery will take place will however 
be determined by the short term fluctuations In demand. 
8.2.1 Recents Developments 
The shipping industry has recently witnessed Its worst 
depression in living memory. The severity of this 
depression was to a large extent due to the fact that It 
was completely unanticipated so that the growth rate of 
the f leet and of shipbuilding capacity was geared to the 
eventually unfulfilled expectations of high growth rates 
of demand. Now that the possibility of future oil shocks 
is recognised by investors, this will cause informed 
speculation and evasive action to take place that will 
cushion the effects of future oil shocks. The recent 
depression will probably go down in history as a unique 
episode not to be repeated again for a very long time. 
The outstanding feature of 198S has been the Improvement 
in real tanker freight rates and in tanker values. These 
improvements have gone against recent trends. But the 
increase in profitability and the 60-80 per cent rise In 
tanker prices were largely anticipated by our forecast 
360 
for the tanker market published last Spring. 
The rise in freight rates has been caused by the 
increased demand for transportation generated by the 
temporary increase in long-haul Middle East exports. This 
increased demand was operating against an Inelastic short 
term supply, (due to leads, lags and costs in breaking 
out of lay-up), leading to s Ign If icant temporary 
increases In freight rates. The rise in tanker prices 
reflects the general optimism concerning the longer term 
future. 'Whether this is well founded or not Is discussed 
in our forecast below. 
Associated with the Increase in OPEC supply has been the 
collapse in oil prices, and consequently bunker prices. 
Because demand for shipping transportation Is very 
inelastic, a given percentage decrease In bunker prices 
will ceteris paribus lead to significant reductions in 
freight rates and consequently profit. In the case of 
tankers, the negative effect of lower bunker prices on 
profitability has been more than compensated by the 
effect of Increased demand. This increase Is estimated to 
have been in the region of 16%. 
More recently, these trends have been reversing. Middle 
East production, and therefore demand for tankers, has 
fallen. The reactivated fleet has increased the available 
short term Supply# generating further downward pressure 
on rates. 
In the dry cargo market, the picture has been very 
d If f erent. The negative effects of the lower bunker 
prices. were reinforced by a drop in the general level of 
demand, of around 2%. This was mainly due to a reduction 
of. around 13% In ton-miles generated by grain shipments. 
The positive effects of the reduced supply of combined 
carriers in dry and the small reduction In the size of 
the fleet, have not been strong enough to cancel the 
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negative f actors. 
In the last issue of the Review, we projeced strong time 
charter rate increases in the dry cargo market from 1987 
onwards and consequently strong speculative increase In 
values within 1987 of a magnitude of around 90%. Rates 
have already increased significantly In the beginning of 
this year partly as a result of the recovery in oil and 
bunker prices restraining the supply. Prices have already 
increased by 50% since the end of last year as a result 
of I mproved longer term profit expectations. 
The growth rate of the f leet, for a given level of 
shipbuilding costs, shipbuilding capacity and scrap 
prices is mainly determined by the level of ship prices, 
after we allow for lags and leads. Strong ship prices 
make shipbuilding a prof itable proposition, and ' bring 
forward an increased supply of newbuildings. On the other 
hand during a period of depression shipyards are forced 
to close down, permanently or temporarily, ' in order to 
minimise losses. Existing ships are likely to be worth 
more dead rather than alive, leading to increased 
scrapping. This restrains the growth rate of the fleet 
both because shipbuilding contracts and because scrapping 
is stimulated. 
Following the decrease in dry cargo prices, the planned 
future supply of dry cargo newbuildings (as measured by 
the order book) seems eventually to have fallen 
considerably. This was also reinforced by the Icnrease in 
tanker values leading to substitution in shipbuilding of 
tankers for dry cargo newbuildings. Considerable 
permanent reductions in shipbuilding capacity and In 
government subsidies have taken place. These will have a 
restraining Influence on the supply of new ships, as will 
the drop in the value of the dollar against the 
currencies of the major shipbuilding nations. 
The' dry cargo order book at the end of 1986 Is 16.6 
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million dwt against 24.6 at the end of 198S. This Is the 
lowest level since 1964. The corresponding figures for 
tankers are 1S. 2 million dwt in 1986 against 10.7 in 
1985; that is, a 42% Increase. Deliveries of dry cargo 
ships have also fallen to 16.0 million dwt, or around 5% 
of the fleet. Deliveries of tankers, however, have risen 
to 5.8 million dwt. which Is 2.5% of the fleet. 
The considerable Investment in scrapping capacity that 
has taken place during the depression continued to 
generate a considerable demand for scrap during 1986, and 
Is expected to do so in the future In spite of weak metal 
prices. The improvement of tanker values considerably 
reduced the supply of ships for scrap generated by the 
tanker fleet. This had a positive effect on scrap prices 
and consequently on the supply of dry cargo ships for 
scrap. This increased to 15. S million dwt, or 4.7% of the 
f leet. This f igure Is also partly attributable to the 
very depressed dry cargo prices. Taking Into account 
losses and conversions the dry cargo f leet showed a 
negative growth rate of -1% for the f Irst time In Its 
post war history. Because of the Improvement In tanker 
values, tanker -scrapping fell considerably, down to 15.0 
million, dwt against 31.0 in 1985. However, this was not 
sufficient to prevent a 3% reduction in the size of the 
f leet. 
8.2.2. The Base Run Forecast 
Behind the assumptions of the Base Run lies the 
assumption of permanently weak oil prices. Oil prices are 
assumed to remain at $18 in 1987 prices. Therefore demand 
in the dry cargo market is allowed to grow by 3% p. a. 0 
which is 1.5% higher than the average growth rate over 
the last seven years. , This reflects our belief that 
recent growth rates have been abnormally low because of 
the negative effects Of the oil shock of the seventies. 
Lower oil prices are likely to contribute to higher 
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growth rates in world economic activity and therefore In 
the demand for dry cargo freight. 
Lower oil prices are also likely to be associated with 
higher demand for long haul OPEC oil. This Is assumed to 
grow gradually from next year onwards, once last year's 
accumulated stocks have been run down. Therefore demand 
in the tanker freight market, as measured In ton-miles, 
is assumed to grow rapidly from 1988 onwards, before It 
settles to a long run growth rate of 2% p. a. Shipbuilding 
capacity is assumed to be falling up to the end of the 
decade but 'from then on It Is assumed to be rising in 
line with total demand in the freight markets. Our 
assumptions regarding operating costs, nominal Interest 
rates and metal prices reflect our assumptions regarding 
inflation which Is assumed to be 3% p. a. 
The outlook 
The implications of our Bass Run assumptions are shown in 
Tables 1 and 2., 
Because of the speculative behaviour in the second hand 
markets, short run developments In prices, and therefore 
In scrapping and shipbuilding and consequently in the 
freight market as well, are very much Influenced by the 
longer term outlook. A possible Interpretation of the way 
our projections are generated Is the following. The 
model, given say an optimistic set of assumptions, will 
allow prices to jump immediately to ref lect this 
optimism. However, the size of the jump is limited by the 
fact that the higher price will stimulate the growth rate 
of the f leet (by reductions in scrapping and Increased 
supply of newbuildings) which has a negative effect on 
future freight rates. The equilibrium price jump must be 
just enough to guarantee that these future freight rates 
will produce a competitive return to be earned on the 
initial price. Higher prices than the equilibrium ones 
are rejected by the model and are assumed to be rejected 
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by investors, because they Imply higher growth rates for 
the fleet and therefore lower freight rates and thus an 
insufficient return on capital. Similarly lower prices 
than the equilibrium one are also rejected by the model 
since they are likely to lead to lower growth rates of 
the fleet and therefore higher profits and thus an excess 
return on capital. Investors are assumed to Immediately 
bid up or down prices towards the equilibrium level in 
order to eliminate the expectation of an excessively high 
or low return. 
Given our assumptions dry cargo prices are projected to 
increase by 55% within 1987 as compared with the prices 
observed towards the end of 1986. This will Imply of 
course an Immediate drop in scrapping. down to 12.0 
million dwt. Prices are also expected to Increase by 
another 15% in the next two years implying futher falls 
in scrapping in the future. Indeed the scrapping rate Is 
expected to average out at about 2% of the f leet In the 
next 10 years. The level of prices Is also associated 
with increased prof Itability, in shipbuilding and 
therefore an increased supply of new dry cargo ships. In 
the short run, however, deliveries cannot respond to the 
unanticipated increase in prices s Ince they are 
predetermined by past decisions, which were based on a 
more pessimistic outlook. Deliveries are projected to 
fall to 11.0 million dwt In 1987 in the light of recent 
levels in the order book and commencements. 
The supply of new ships, as measured by the order book, 
is expected to increase following the Increase In dry 
cargo prices. The order book is projected to Increase to 
28.7 million dwt by the end of 198T. This seems 
consistent with our assumptions of a doubling In the 
growth rate of demand from the-recent average of 1. S% up 
to 3% p. a. This increase in the order book will be 
translated to increased deliveries from 1988 onwards. 
The difference between deliveries and scrappings gives us 
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the change in the fleet size, after allowing for losses. 
The dry cargo fleet is projected to fall by another 1% 
this year before it starts rising gradually from 1989 
onwards. Our projected increase in prices is sustainable 
because it does not imply such a high growth rate for the 
fleet as will frustrate the possibilities for the long 
term improvement in the freight rates which Is needed to 
justify these higher prices. 
Our assumptions also imply a reduction In the proportion 
of combined carriers In dry. This makes the projected 
growth rate of the trading f leet In dry less that the 
growth rate of the dry cargo fleet Itself. This also 
makes some room for an Increase in dry cargo values. 
Consistent with our projected immediate increase in dry 
cargo values are our projection of higher freight rates 
from 1987 onwards. Freight rates are projected to 
increase by 30% within 1987 and by another 22% in 1988. 
The higher freight rates reflect the increase in bunker 
prices, the Increase in the growth rate of demand and the 
expectation of a further drop In the size of the f leat. 
By the early 1990s, however. the growht rate of the fleet 
is expected to catch up with the growth rate of demand, 
so that no further significant increases In rates are 
expected thereafter. 
Scrapping is expected to Increase significantly towards 
the end of the next decade as we expect the proportion of 
old dry cargo ships to rise significantly. The ageing of 
the fleet reflects the significant dwt of ships delivered 
in the '70s and early 80s. Ageing should contribute 
positively towards an increase In rates and values. 
our assumption of gradual increases In the demand for 
OPEC oil also imply a 40% increase in tanker values 
within 1987. These are expected to be followed by a 
further 20% Increase in the next 2 years. As a result the 
scrapping rate is expected to be significantly reduced to 
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an average of 3% p. a. of the f leet during the next 10 
years. This rate is a little higher than the average 
scrapping rate observed in the past under similar levels 
of ship prices. This Is a consequence of the lengthening 
age profile of the fleet. 
In line with the increase in values we project an 
increase in the supply of new tankers. The order book Is 
projected to increase to 20.1 million dwt tons by the end 
of 1987, and deliveries are expected to double by the 
mid-1990s. These projections Imply that the tanker fleet 
will continue to decrease in the next three years and 
will only start rising In the beginning of the 1990s. 
Freight rates are expected to rise strongly within the 
next f ive years, to a 40% higher level (in $ terms) than 
the average over the last 6 years. However, because of 
the lower bunker prices, time charter rates will increase 
by about 80% by the mid 1990s relative to average rates 
in the last 6 years. This will still be 30% lower In real 
terms than the rates observed during the mid sixties. 
Similarly the prices we project for the mid nineties may 
be considerably higher in relation to those of the recent 
depression, but they still are 30% lower than those 
observed during the years before the 1967 closure of the 
Suez Canal (which in no way was a booming period). 
Our forecast Increases in rates and prices arrest the 
process of fleet reduction, which has been running at an 
average rate of 6.3 p. a. during the depression. 
Allowing for some modest growth in demand, It is clear 
that rates and prices must rise considerably and soon. as 
the balance between supply and demand Improves. 
Eventually the fleet must move in line with demand, which 
in the long run is assumed to grow by 2%. The further 
downward pressure on the growth rate of the fleet that 
arises from the ageing process, simply reinforces the 
need for rate and price rises. Rate and price rise's work 
by reducing scrapping and advancing the supply of 
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newbuildings, so that demand and supply move parallel to 
each other from the mid nineties onwards. 
The higher the growth rate of demand is assumed to be, 
the sooner and stronger will the price Increase have to 
be. Of course the outlook regarding the future path of 
demand is uncertain, as the fluctuations of the past 
decade have made clear. 
Alternative scenarios: oil shocks 
Our Base Run assumptions represent just one of a number 
of possible future scenarios, albeit the one which we 
think most likely to come about. 
In order to explore what other possible paths future 
rates and prices might follow, we have re-run our model 
under a rather dif f erent but still plausible future 
scenario one in which a sharp oil price rise occurs In 
1989. The danger of an oil price hike seems remote at the 
moment, but will increase over the next five years, as 
the OPEC share in world oil supplies increases. 
The effects of an oil price change on the shipping 
markets depends, like all other exogenous factors In our 
model, on whether the oil price change Is expected or 
unexpected. Recent history suggests that unexpected 
changes have more dramatic and more costly effects. Our 
rational expectations model replicates this property, 
since investors can take evasive action in advance of an 
anticipated shock, but are by definition caught cold by 
an unanticipated shock. We therefore look at these two 
possibilities in turn. 
8.2.3 Unanticipated Oil Shock 
In this section we make projections regarding prices and 
rates under the assumption of an unanticipated oil shock. 
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The price rise is assumed to occur In the year 1989 and 
to permanently raise the price of oil to $2S per barrel 
(in 1987 prices). We assume that up to and including 1988 
the movements in external factors and the markets' 
expectations regarding these, are as described in the 
Base Run forecast. This implies that the market moves 
according to our Base Run forecast up to the year 1988. 
The unexpected Increase in the oil price Is assumed to be 
a result of a cutback in long haul OPEC production. This 
reduces the demand for tanker transportation in 1989 by 
16% as compared with the Base Run assumption for 1988. 
Tanker demand also falls by 10% in 1990 and 3% in 1991 
but then grows by 2% p. a. Demand In the dry cargo market 
is constant In 1989, rises by 1.5% in 1990 and 3% from 
1991 onwards. For the remaining exogenous variables we 
make the same assumptions as in the Base Run. 
The implications of this scenario are shown in Tables 3 
and 4. Naturally, the shock has more s Ign If icant 
implications for the tanker market than for the dry 
cargo. The shock implies a significant unanticipated fall 
In the value of ships during the year that the shock 
occurs, '- amounting to 15% for the dry cargo ships and 32% 
for tankers. 
These f Igures are much lower than the actual percentage 
change in values which followed the two oil shocks of the 
seventies. This is only because the assumed shock is of a 
much smaller order of magnitude (40% increase in price of 
oil) in comparison with the shocks of the past which led 
to a quadrapling of the price of oil. 
In the short run freight rates are lower in comparison 
with the Base Run since the drop in demand outweighs the 
positive effect o f the increase in bunker prices. The 
positive effect of the bunker price is permanent, 
however, while the effect of the lower demand disappears 
eventuall y as the stock of ships (the fleet size) adjusts 
to the new lower level of demand. So freight rates are 
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actually higher in the long run under the oil shock 
scenario. 
Time charter rates are initially 17% lower for dry cargo 
and 28% for tankers. However long run demand conditions 
are the same under both scenarios, mainly 3% growth for 
dry and 2% f or tankers. Therefore, after the f leet 
adjusts to the new level of demand time charter rates and 
prices return to their Base Run levels. 
It can be seen from the Tables that the growth rate of 
the fleet Is much lower under this scenario than under 
the Base Run. The short run adjustment of the dry cargo 
f leet to the lower level of demand is achieved by 
increases in scrapping rather than reductions in 
deliveries, while in the tanker case adjustments In 
deliveries and scrappings are equally significant. 
8.2.4 Anticipated Oil Shock 
In this scenario, we assume that the market foresees the 
increase in the price of oil before It happens. Our 
assumptions regarding the exogenous variables In year 
1987, are the same as in the Base Run. In the year 1988 
we assume there is speculative stockpiling of oil, so 
that demand for tankers Increases by 15% and the price of 
oil goes up to $21. In 1989 the price of oil goes up to 
$25 and demand for transportation Is assumed to fall by 
20%, both because of lower oil consumption, and because 
of the running down of accumulated stocks. Demand in 1990 
is assumed to fall by 1% and then grows by 2% p. a. Demand 
in the dry cargo market rises by 3.5% In 1988,1.5% in 
1989,2% in 1990 and from then on grows by 3% p. a. 
The implications of this scenario for the tanker market 
are shown on Table 5. Freight rates rise strongly In 1988 
because the speculative stockpiling increases the demand 
for transportation. Time charter rates increase 
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significantly by the end of 1987, in anticipation of 
this. 
However. the increase in ship values Is much smaller than 
in the Base Run as the market foresees that the 
improvement- is temporary. Indeed the small speculative 
increase in values occurs In 1987 while the stockpiling 
mini-boom still lies ahead. Once this Is over prices are 
27% lower because of the lower rates projected for 1988 
onwards. 
Under the assumptions of this scenario the market 
recovers eventually towards the Base Run level of price 
and rates. This recovery occurs more rapidly than It Is 
the case in the unanticipated scenario. This is because 
the anticipation of the shock allows Informed speculative 
adjustments in prices and the 
-size of the fleet to take 
place early, before the shock actually occurs. This 
accelerates the adjustment ýtowards the long run 
equilibrium. 
Under all scenarios, our common assumption regarding the 
long run growth rate In demand, means that prices and 
prof its will eventually recover to a particular level 
which is determined by this long run assumption, and 
which is not sensitive to the short run fluctuations in 
demand. This Is because the fleet eventually adjusts to 
the level of demand and then grows In line with it, 
unless new shocks in demand are Introduced. It is this 
long run growth rate of demand that determines the long 
run level of prices, freight market balance and rates. 
Rates and prices must be strong enough In order to 
maintain the fleet and its growth to the level wrhich Is 
exogenously determined by demand. Stronger prices and 
rates will therefore be needed in the future to arrest 
the reduction of the fleet by stimulating an expansion in, 
shipbuilding, and by reducing the scrapping rate (by 
extending the economic lifetime of ships). 
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However, the behaviour of demand in the short term Is 
very relevant for determing the speed with which this 
recovery will take place. Under the Base Run scenario 
prices rise immediately and strongly as the balance 
between supply and demand can be achieved rapidly without 
depressed prices, and the fleet recovers quickly. 
Under the alternative scenarios. there Is room for prices 
to remain lower and for the fleet to fall with little 
impact on rates. It therefore takes more time for rates 
and prices to recover to the Base Run levels in the long 
run. This unambiguous long run recovery is a relative one 
however, in the case of tankers. Even In the long run 
prices and rates are still expected to be lower in real 
terms that what would have been expected under normal 
conditions before the 1970s upheaval. 
Projected dry cargo rates and prices. however, compare 
more favourably with their normal levels In the distant 
past. There Is still room for spectacular returns In the 
tanker market however because prices are still quite low. 
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Table I: The Dry Cargo Market 1 (Base Run) 
Year Freight End Year End Year Mid Year 
Rate 12 months Second Fleet 
Time Hand Million 
Charter Prices DWT 
Rate (z P. a) 
1980 100.0 261 100.0 266.1 2.70) 
1981 75.3 142 62.1 276.2 3.80) 
1982 39.9 88 32.8 291.1 5.39) 
1983 38.0 102 37.9 304.5 4.60) 
1984 39.4 134 43.4 315.3 3.55) 
1985 35.1 109 30.8 325.5 3.24) 
1986 30.0 95 38.9 329.6 1.26) 
1987 39.2 144.1 60.5 326.2 ( 
-0.8) 
1988 47.9 156.2 64.1 327.3 0.3) 
1989 51.2 171.4 70.4 333.3 1.8) 
1990 54.9 180.8 75.0 342.1 2.6) 
1991 57.1 188.8 79.0 352.7 3.1) 
1992 58.8 194.2 82.6 364.3 3.3) 
1993 59.1 194.8 85.2 377.2 3.5) 
1994 58.8 196.7 86.4 390.8 3.6) 
1995 58.8 196.2 87.3 404.5 3.5) 
1996 59.0 196.5 89.1 417.4 3.3) 
1997 59.5 196.5 91.6 431.5 3.2) 
1998 60.0 198.7 96.3 445.5 3.2) 
1999 60.9 206.1 102.9 459.3 3.1) 
2000 63.2 215.5 104.1 471.9 2.7) 
1980 
- 
1986 Actual historical figures 
1987 
- 
2000 Projections 
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Year End Year Deliveries Scrapping Fleet over 
Order Book 20 years 
Million DWT Million DWT Million DWT old z 
------- ------------- ------------- 
(Z) 
-------------- ------------ 
1980 36.1 10.9 2.50 (0.94) 16.2 
1981 41.0 15.1 1.50 (0.54) 15.1 
1982 31.2 19.0 4.00 (1.37) 15.6 
1983 37.3 16.8 7.00 (2.30) 15.2 
1984 32.7 20.3 9.00 (2.85) 14.3 
1985 24.6 20.0 11.50 (3.53) 13.7 
1986 16.6 16.0 14.70 (4.46) 13.2 
1987 28.7 11.4 12.0 (3.7) 14.3 
1988 34.6 13.7 7.4 (2.3) 16.1 
1989 38.0 16.1 6.7 (2.0) 17.6 
1990 40.2 18.0 6.1 (1.8) 19.2 
1991 42.0 19.5 6.1 (1.7) 19.7 
1992 44.0 20.6 6.3 (1.7) 22.3 
1993 45.9 22.1 6.3 (1.7) 24.0 
1994 47.2 23.2 7.1 (1.8) 24.0 
1995 48.1 24.2 8.3 (2.1) 23.6 
1996 49.1 25.0 9.1 (2.2) 23.2 
1997 50.5 25.7 9.6 (2.2) 27.3 
1998 52.9 26.6 10.1 (2.3) 27.8 
1999 56.2 27.9 12.5 (2.7) 27.3 
2000 59.5 29.2 14.8 (3.2) 26.6 
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Table 2: The Tanker Market2 (Base Run) 
Year Freight End Year End Year Kid Year 
Rate 12 months Second Fleet 
Time Hand Million 
Charter Prices DWT 
Rate (Z P. a) 
1980 285.0 6.01 100.0 326.9 (-0.1) 
1981 213.0 2.96 48.7 322.6 (-1.3) 
1982 175.0 2.38 35.3 311.4 (-3.4) 
1983 175.0 3.68 50.9 292.1 (-6.2) 
1984 180.0 3.09 47.3 276.3 (-5.4) 
1985 180.0 2.86 42.7 257.3 (-6.8) 
1986 184.0 4.03 76.5 239.2 (-7.0) 
1987 125.3 4.16 84.9 239.4 (-1.8) 
1988 203.7 3.85 89.0 236.9 (-1.1) 
1989 195.2 4.84 102.5 236.0 (-0.4) 
1990 229.7 5.19 107.2 236.9 0.4) 
1991 242.9 5.51 109.7 239.8 1.2) 
1992 255.1 5.58 109.4 244.3 1.9) 
1993 259.2 5.46 107.4 250.3 2.5) 
1994 258.4 5.42 106.2 257.2 2.7) 
1995 259.9 5.39 105.6 264.6 ( 2.9) 
1996 261.7 5.39 105.7 272.3 ( 2.9) 
1997 265.0 5.42 106.3 274.7 ( 2.7) 
1998 268.6 5.44 107.5 287.1 ( 2.6) 
1999 271.7 5.50 109.7 295.2 ( 2.8) 
2000 276.9 5.60 112.0 303.5 ( 2.8) 
1980 
- 
1888 Actual Historical Figures 
1987 
- 
2000 Projectlons 
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Year End Year Deliveries Scrapping Fleet over 
Order Book 15 years 
Million DWT Million DWT Million DVT old 2 
(Z) 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
1980 18.3 6.99 7.71 (2.36) 14.7 
1981 13.6 8.25 11.97 (3.71) 15.3 
1982 9.1 6.16 21.58 (6.93) 16.0 
1983 10.4 4.58 23.22 (7.95) 16.1 
1984 11.3 4.19 17.49 (6.33) 15.9 
1985 11.6 4.30 21.82 (8.48) 15.6 
1986 13.5 7.30 12.75 (5.33) 16.6 
1987 20.1 7.5 9.9 (4.1) 73.4 
1988 25.1 8.2 9.4 (4.0) 73.8 
1989 31.0 9.0 8.2 (3.5) 72.9 
1990 36.2 10.1 7.4 (3.1) 71.7 
1991 40.4 11.4 6.8 (2.8) 70.8 
1992 44.1 12.6 6.5 (2.7) 68.7 
1993 44.4 13.8 6.6 (2.6) 65.7 
1994 44.9 14.4 6.5 (2.5) 62.6 
1995 45.4 14.8 6.4 (2.4) 59.7 
1996 46.1 15.1 6.8 (2.5) 57.9 
1997 47.1 15.3 7.3 (2.5) 56.2 
1998 47.9 15.6 7.6 (2.6) 54.8 
1999 48.4 15.8 7.1 (2.4) 53.5 
2000 50.1 16.1 7.0 
. 
(2.3) 52.8 
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Table 3: The Dry Cargo Market (Unanticipated Oil Shock) 
Year Freight End Year End Year Mid Year 
Rate 12 months Second Fleet 
Time Hand Million 
Charter Prices DWr 
Ra te (x P. a) 
1989 48.5 141.7 54.3 333.2 (1.8) 
1990 47.6 146.7 58.1 341.0 (2.3) 
1991 48.7 155.0 62.7 349.7 (2.5) 
1992 50.7 161.5 66.9 359.1 (2.7) 
1993 52.5 171.2 72.9 368.8 (2.7) 
1994 54.9 183.1 79.9 378.6 (2.6) 
1995 57.8 193.4 86.8 388.3 (2.5) 
1996 60.6 200.8 92.8 398.7 (2.7) 
1997 62.3 203.2 96.5 410.7 (3.0) 
1998 63.2 205.2 100.5 424.1 (3.3) 
1999 64.2 211.6 106.0 437.3 (3.1) 
2000 66.2 220.0 111.7 450.1 (2.9) 
Year End Year Deliveries Scrapping Fleet over 
Order Book 20 years 
Million DWT Million DWT Million DWT old z 
------- ------------- 
------------- ----------------- 
--------- 
1989 32.6 16.1 6.8 (2.2) 17.6 
1990 36.9 16.5 6.4 (1.9) 19.2 
1991 40.1 18.1 7.1 (2.0) 20.0 
1992 42.7 19.8 8.4 (2.3) 22.8 
1993 44.8 21.2 9.4 (2.5) 24.6 
1994 47.9 22.6 10.8 (2.8) 24.7 
1995 51.2 24.1 12.1 (3.1) 24.4 
1996 54.5 25.8 12.3 (3.1) 23.8 
1997 56.7 27.6 12.1 (2.9) 27.7 
1998 58.9 29.0 12.1 (2.9) 27.9 
1999 61.4 30.5 14.7 (3.4) 27.0 
2000 64.1 32.0 17.2 (3.8) 26.0 
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Table 4: The Tanker Market (Unanticipated Oil Shock) 
Year Freight End Year End Year Mid Year 
Rate 12 months Second Fleet 
Time Hand Million 
Charter Prices DWT 
Ra te (Z P. a) 
1989 178.6 3.5 60.9 235.2 (-0.7) 
1990 202.5 3.2 62.6 232.7 (-1.1) 
1991 191.0 3.7 71.1 228.9 (-1.6) 
1992 216.0 3.8 75.2 225.6 (-1.4) 
1993 222.7 4.2 80.0 j223.6 (-0.9) 
1994 236.2 4.3 83.7 223.1 (-0.2) 
1995 244.7 4.5 87.5 224.3 0.5) 
1996 255.1 4.7 90.9 226.5 1.0) 
1997 263.7 4.8 94.2 229.3 1.2) 
1998 272.3 5.0 97.0 232.3 1.3) 
1999 279.2 5.1 100.0 236.3 1.7) 
2000 286.6 5.2 103.3 241.2 2.1) 
Year End Year Deliveries Scrapping Fleet over 
Order Book 15 years 
Million DVT Million DWT Million DWT old x 
------- ------------- 
------------- ------------- ------------- 
1989 22.6 9.0 9.7 (4.1) 72.8 
1990 23.8 8.6 11.8 (5.1) 71.8 
1991 25.6 8.6 11.8 (5.2) 71.2 
1992 28.7 8.9 11.0 (4.9) 69.5 
1993 31.4 9.5 10.1 (4.5) 67.1 
1994 34.1 10.2 9.2 (4.1) 64.3 
1995 36.1 11.0 8.5 (3.8) 61.6 
1996 37.3 11.7 8.5 (3.8) 60.0 
1997 38.0 12.2 8.7 (3.8) 58.4 
1998 38.9 12.7 8.8 (3.8) 57.0 
1999 39.6 13.0 7.8 (3.3) 56.0 
2000 41.2 13.3 7.4 (3.1) 55.0 
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Table 5: The Tanker Market (Anticipated Oil Shock) 
Year Freight 
Rate 
End Year 
12 months 
Time 
Charter 
. 
Rate 
End Year 
Second 
Hand 
Prices 
Mid Year 
Fleet 
Million 
DWT 
(Z P. a) 
1987 125.8 5.6 68.4 238.9 (-2.0) 
1988 257.1 2.5 53.5 234.1 (-2.0) 
1989 
-161.7 3.7 67.8 228.2 (-2.5) 
1990 210.2 3.4 70.0 227.9 (-2.7) 
1991 201.2 4.1 78.5 216.4 (-2.5) 
1992 229.7 4.1 81.5 212.6 (-1.8) 
1993 232.6 4.5 85.9 210.7 (-0.9) 
1994 247.0 4.6 88.2 210.6 ( 0.9) 
1995 253.0 4.7 90.8 212.3 ( 0.8) 
1996 261.8 4.8 93.1 215.4 1.4) 
1997 268.4 4.9 95.5 219.2 1.7) 
1998 275.7 5.0 97.9 223.5 2.9) 
1999 281.6 5.1 100.7 228.4 2.2) 
2000 288.3 5.3 103.8 234.3 2.5) 
Year End Year Deliveries Scrapping Fleet over 
order Book 15 years 
Million DWT Million DWT Million DWT old x 
------ -------------- ------------- 
(Z) 
----------------- --------- 
1987 15.0 7.5 10.9 (4.6) 73.4 
1988 15.8 7.0 12.0 (5.1) 77.4 
1989 17.5 6.6 12.2 (5.4) 73.5 
1990 20.6 6.6 12.4 (5.6) 72.9 
1991 24.2 7.1 11.3 (5.2) 72.7 
1992 28.3 7.9 10.2 (4.8) 71.4 
1993 31.3 8.9 9.4 (4.5) 69.1 
1994 34.5 10.0 8.5 (4.0) 66.3 
1995 37.5 10.9 7.8 (3.7) 63.5 
1996 40.0 11.9 7.8 (3.6) 61.8 
1997 41.7 12.8 8.0 (3.6) 60.1 
1998 42.5 13.5 8.3 (3.7) 58.0 
1999 42.5 13.8 7.4 (3.2) 55.8 
2000 42.7 14.1 7.2 (3.1) 53.8 
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This chapter summarises the main topics analysed and 
the results presented in this thesis. It reviews the 
novel features of our theory and their Implications. It 
also describes the main results of the empirical work. It 
concludes with recommendations about how future research 
could proceed along the lines of the theoretical 
framework we have developed. 
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S. I Conclusions 
The main objective of this thesis has been to explain 
how equilibrium freight rates. ship prices, shipbuilding 
and , scrapping are determined in terms of the exogenous 
impulses and the Interactions among the freight market 
and the markets for vessels. 
9.1.1 A 'new' theory 
In order to model the way that rates, prices, 
shipbuilding and scrapping are determined, a new theory 
of the shipping markets has been presented and based on 
this. econometric models of the dry cargo and tanker 
market have been specified and estimated. 
The theory distinguishes between the freight, second 
hand, newbuilding and scrapping markets. For each market, 
aggregate demand and supply relationships were specified. 
These were derived as solutions to constrained 
maximisation problems of economic agents, rather than 
being ad hoc specifications. 
Novel features of the theory are. f Irst, the 
treatment of new and second hand ships as capital assets 
and, secondly, the assumption of rational expectations. 
According to the capital asset approach, the demand for 
existing ships is specified to depend on the return on 
ships relative to the available returns on other 
investments. This Implies that at equilibrium the price 
of ships moves to a level where the return on ships Is 
equal to the return on other assets after allowing for 
risk. 
The capital asset approach also revolutionizes the 
problem of specifying a demand for newbuildings function. 
The specification of the newbuilding demand has been the 
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weakest and theoretically least satisfactory part of 
existing econometric models of the shipping Industry. In 
spite of its central importance. Our theory suggests that 
newbuilding construction (investment) Is determined from 
the supply side in terms of the amount of ships that 
builders wish to supply at the equilibrium price which 
investors are prepared to pay. Demand for newbuIldings Is 
inf inetely elastic at the equilibrium price. A small 
change in price Is sufficient to turn an expensive 
newbuilding asset into a bargain, generating a tendency 
for massive capital inf lows/outf lows that prevents the 
price from*deviating from Its equilibrium level. 
In previous work. the problem of specifying second 
hand and newbuilding functions had been compounded by the 
inappropriate treatment of expectations. These had. 
typically, been assumed to be extrapolations of recent 
and longer term trends. Instead. we have modelled 
expectations according to the rational expectations 
hypothesis. This endogeneises expectations by assuming 
they are the same as the predictions of the model. The 
rational expectations hypothesis differs fundamentally 
from the alternative (e. g adaptive) expectations 
generating mechanisms. It has novel Implications about 
how investment and equilibrium prices of 
newbuilding/second hand ships are determined in the asset 
markets. The rational expectations hypothesis creates 
speculative forward looking links in the model between 
the current ship markets and the future markets for 
freight and ships. This Illuminates the role of 
speculation and explains real world phenomena that 
alternative theories do not. In particular, the role of 
"neQs' and how these can cause speculative jumps in 
values and overshooting phenomena are clearly 
illustrated. It allows us to distinguish between 
anticipated and unanticipated shocks and 1o simulate the 
response of the market to each of these types of shocks. 
The results of these simulations indicate that 
freight rates, ship values, shipbuilding and scrapping 
overshoot their long run equilibrium in response to a 
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demand or bunker price shock. In the short run the f leet 
is fixed, so the maximum effect on rates occurs at the 
time of impact. In anticipation of the sluggish response 
of t he fleet, there is a strong short term response In 
values. The increase in values leads to a shipbuilding 
boom and a parallel decrease In scrapping. These cause 
the fleet to rise gradually so freight rates and prices 
begin to ease. As values fall. shipbuilding and scrapping 
also begin to return to normal levels until the system 
makes a soft landing to a new long run equilbrium. 
In contrast to demand and bunker price shocks. 
freight rates and prices tend to undershoot their new 
long run equilbirium level when a shipbuilding cost shock 
occurs. This is because this shock has no direct impact 
on the freight market. The effect of this shock comes 
through the ship markets. The shock has a gradual effect 
on the size of the fleet' which in turn begins to affect 
freight rates. In anticipation of this, there Is small 
Initial response in ship prices. As the changes In the 
f leet size are accumulated freight rates and prices 
increase further. Eventually prices move to such an 
extent that this completely cancels out the Initial 
restraint of higher costs on shipbuilding. Fleet and 
demand grow in line with each other again. In the 
meantime the fleet growth has lagged behind that of 
demand so there is a permanent Improvement In market 
balance, freight rates and ship values. 
, The simulated response of the market to an 
unanticipated demand shock, exhibits cyclical features 
which are similar to those of a real world cycle. The 
latter were described In chapter 1. There, It was found 
that freight rates, time charter rates, prices, 
shipbuilding and fleet growth move procyclically. They 
also move in phase with rates except for shipbuilding and 
f leet growth which tend to lag behind rates by a year or 
SO. On the other hand, lay-up and scrapping move 
countercyclically and also in phase with rates. These 
correlations in - rates, values and f leat changes were 
replicated by the theoretical model's simulations of the 
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effects of an unanticipated demand shock. We can 
say, therefore, that our model provides a theoretical 
explanation of the phenomenon of the shipping cycle. 
9.1.2 The econometric models 
In chapter 4,5 the theoretical model was used as a 
basis in order. to specify and estimate econometric models 
of the world dry cargo and tanker markets respectively. 
Aggregate demand and supply functions were specified for 
the freight, second hand, newbuilding and scrapping 
markets. These were estimated from post World War 11 
data. 
The empirical results were consistent with a priori 
views regarding the sign and magnitude of various 
elasticities. Supply in the freight market was found to 
be very inelastic at low levels of lay-up. This was 
estimated to be 0.24 for the dry cargo market and 0.31 
for the tanker market. These results are consistent with 
the findings of other studies applied to, not only post 
war, but also to 19th century and early 20th century 
data. However, supply is very elastic at depressed 
freight rates where 
, 
lay-up is h igh. There, a small 
increase in rates will induce a large number of ships to 
break lay-up and thus supply responds strongly. 
Supply of new ships was found to be more elastic than 
the freight market supply. The long run elasticity of the 
dry cargo order book with respect to prices was found to 
be 0.77 while that of the tanker order book was found to 
be 2.38. In the short run, however, supply of newbuilding 
is completely inelastic as deliveries are predetermined 
in terms of past orders. Supply was also found to be 
inversely related to the price of the alternative ship 
type. Thus, supply of dry cargo newbuildings is 
negatively affected by the price of tanker newbuildings 
and vice versa. 
The equilbrium price of ships was found to be 
positively related to expected short term profitability 
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and expected' capital gains. The elasticity with respect 
to the f ormer was found to be much lower than that with 
respect to the latter. This is not surprising since ships 
are assets of considerable longevity. For dry cargo 
ships, the elasticity of prices with respect to short 
term prof Its was found to be 0.27 and that with respect 
to expected capital gains was estimated to be 0.73. The 
corresponding figures for tankers were 0.29 and 0.71 
respectively. The estimated A2 of the empirical inverted 
asset demand functions were found to be very high indeed. 
The results give strong support to the capital asset 
approach we have adopted. 
The supply of ships for scrap was found to be 
inversely related to the price of ships relative to the 
price of scrap. Scrapping is also much lower within the 
younger age groups than within the older ones. ýhen the 
market is strong, scrapping of young ships virtually 
drops to zero. However. scrapping of young ships becomes 
more significant during the depression. For example, at 
the bottom of the depression there -is 1.9% tanker 
scrapping in the 10-15 years old age. group, 12% in 'the 
1S-20 years old age group and 21% in the 20 years and 
over group. On the other hand, at the peak of the boom 
these figures drop to 0.2%, 1.4% and 3.2% respectively. 
The empirical models were used in order to simulate 
the response of the system to various anticipated and 
unanticipated external shocks. The qualitative results 
were found to be similar to those derived by simulations 
of the theoretical model. ' However, simulations of the 
empirical models allowed us to determine the magnitude of 
the response as well. Because supply of freight is 
Inelastic, demand and bunker shocks have a very strong 
impact effect on freight rates. Prices also respond 
strongly to the anticipated improvement in the profit 
prof ile. Because supply of newbuildings is fairly 
elastic. the fleet adjusts quite rapidly to any short 
term shortage in the freight market. The increase in 
prices leads to a shipbuilding boom and a parallel drop 
in scrapping. This helps to eliminate the shortage and 
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within a relatively short period of time the market 
approaches its long run equilibrium. 
The dry cargo freight market submodel was also used 
in order to perform historical simulations. These tracked 
the actual historical movements very accurately. Standard 
measures of simulation performance were calculated and 
these were f ound to be very satisfactory. These 
simulations illustrate the usefulness of the aggregate 
approach. The significant oscillations in rates over a 
period of 25 years were accuratelly explained in terms 
of the aggregate freight market balance, fuel prices and 
operating costs. 
In chapter 6 the dry cargo and tanker models were 
linked together. For this purpose, the behaviour of the 
combined carrier fleet had to be modelled. The 
integration of the tanker and dry cargo sectors allowed 
us to calculate the spillover effects from one market to 
the other. The effects of an increase in tanker demand on 
the dry cargo market and vice versa were calculated. It 
was seen that an increase in, say, the demand for tanker 
freight services leads to an increase in dry cargo rates 
and prices as well. This Is because of various freight 
and ship market links between the various sectors. 
These links are the following: In the freight market 
combined carriers will switch from the tanker to the dry 
cargo sector depending on relative freight rates. In the 
shipbuilding market supply of dry cargo ships, say, Is 
negatively related to tanker prices. In the scrap market, 
total demand for scrap is satisfied by tanker and dry 
cargo supply of ships for scrap. 
These links imply that an increase in tanker demand 
will spillover to the dry market and vice versa. The 
higher tanker demand will lead to an increase in tanker 
rates which will attract combined carriers to oil. This 
will reduce the supply in the dry sector so dry cargo 
freight rates will also improve. At the same time the 
strengthening of tanker prices will lead to an increase 
in tanker supply partly at the expense of dry cargo 
newbuilding supply. This restrains the growth rate of the 
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dry cargo fleet which leads to further Improvements In 
rates and prices. In the scrap market, the Improvement in 
tanker values leads to a reduction In the supply of 
tankers for scrap. This reduces the total supply of ships 
for scrap and thus scrap prices increase. This in turn 
creates an incentive to scrap other ship types so the 
supply of dry cargo ships for scrap Increases so as to 
fill the gap that is left by the withdrawal of tankers 
from the demolition market. 
9.1.3 Testing the rational expectations hypothesis 
In chapter 7 we tested the assumption of rational 
expectations in the shipping markets. This was one of the 
crucial and distinguishing assumptions of our model. The 
assumption was separately tested in the freight futures, 
time charter and newbuilding markets. The test results 
were consistent with the assumption of rational 
expectations in the time charter markets. However the 
test results for the freight futures and newbuilding 
markets often rejected the Implications of EMH/RE 
hypothesis. 
These negative results do not necessarily imply 
rejection of the rational expectations hypothesis. This 
is because the RE assumption has been imbeded within the 
EMH. A negative result might be due to failure of the 
latter rather than the former. More importantly perhaps, 
the implicit assumption that observable freight futures 
and newbuilding prices are market clearing prices Is 
somewhat suspect. In the case of freight futures, we have 
the distorting Influence of limit moves. In the case of 
newbuildings we have a similar constraint in the movement 
of prices. Wen the market becomes depressed, newbuilding 
prices seem to adjust In a sluggish way as yards prefer 
to work on their existing order books rather than arrange 
new orders by offering competitive prices. 
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9.1.4 Forecasts 
In chapter 8 we used the model In order to generate 
forecasts of the dry cargo and tanker markets up to the 
end of the 1990S. These indicate that the recent 
improvement in market conditions is largely permanent. 
The severe depression of the early 1980s was an extreme 
one off event which was intensified by the unforeseen 
nature of the oil shocks which caused it. The stock 
adjustments in shipbuilding and scrapping capacity and 
the size of the fleet which have already occured, 
together with the expected mild growth in demand support 
the higher level of prices and freight rates that have 
been seen recently. 
9.2 Recommendations for future research 
our results have illustrated the usefulness of the 
rational expectations hypothesis and the capital asset 
approach to the modelling of ship markets. The capital 
asset approach was found to be empirically acceptable and 
much more satisfactory than alternative specifications. 
Unlike other specifications, it is also consistent with 
the axioms of rationality. These observations suggest 
that future modelling of the demand for newbuilding and 
second hand ships should proceed along these lines. 
The rational expectations hypothesis was usefully 
exploited to explain real world phenomena such as 
overshooting of freight rates, prices etc., the role of 
speculation and the Influence of 'news'. The validity of 
the rational expectations hypothesis was tested in 
chapter 7. The evidence supported the RE hypothesis in 
the time charter markets. The results for the futures 
markets were mixed while for the newbuilding market the 
tests tended to reject the EMH/RE hypothesis. For reasons 
already discussed, these results cannot conclusively 
reject the RE hypothesis. 
Even if It could be shown that the rational 
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expectations hypothesis in the shipping markets Is not 
strictly true, It would still be desirable, in f uture 
research, to model expectations in a more forward looking 
way than what has been the case in the past. The possibly 
extreme version of rational expectations is a useful 
starting point. 
Disaggregation 
The theoretical framework used for modelling the 
freight, second hand, newbuilding and scrapping markets 
has produced satisfactory results. These suggest that 
future research might benefit by proceeding within the 
guidelines of our general theoretical framework. The 
theoretical framework can straightforwardly, and without 
any major conceptual modif Ication, be used for 
disaggregated modelling of the shipping markets. Vhether 
this, is desirable is debatable. The answer to 
-this 
question depends, of course, on an evaluation of - the 
costs and benefits of such an extension. In theory there 
are some good reasons for disaggregation. At the same 
time there is a combination of theoretical and practical 
(e. g. data availability) factors that argue against 
disaggregation. In any case, the following paragraphs 
Illustrate how disaggregation can be achieved within the 
theoretical framework developed in chapters 3,4. 
For example, in the case of tankers It might be 
desirable to distinguish between smaller and larger 
tankers since these are not perfectly substitutable. This 
would require a separate specification of a freight 
market for small and large ships. Both the demand and 
supply sides of the two markets are highly 
interdependent. Demand for various vessel types is 
interdependent because there are routes where many vessel 
types can operate. Their services are highly 
substitutable In these routes. However, there are other 
routes where large vessels cannot operate because of 
draft restrictions. 
We can model the supply side of the dissagregate 
freight market along the following lines. Supply 
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generated by each ship type should be proportional to the 
size of the fleet and should be positively related to 
freight rates but negatively related to fuel prices and 
operating costs. The inf luence of combined carriers 
should also be taken into account. These extensions seem 
to be feasible on the basis of the available data. 
Turning to the ship markets, separate asset demand 
functions for small and large tankers could be specified 
as in chapters 4 and 5. On the newbuilding market, the 
supply of small tankers would in theory be positively 
related to prices of small tankers and negatively related 
to the price of other ship types such as large tankers 
and dry cargo ships. Similarly for large tankers. 
Individual scrapping supply equations could be easily 
specified as in chapters 4 and 5. For example, the supply 
of small tankers for scrap generated by a particular age 
group should reflect the price of small ships relative to 
scrap prices. Similarly for large tankers. These 
extensions also seem to be feasible on the basis of 
available data. 
In the dry cargo markets there are theoretical 
reasons to suggest that we should distinguish between 
bulk and general cargo ships and also between the 
competitive tramp and the oligopolistic liner business. 
Again, here, the theoretical framework can be 
straightforwardly be used in order to specify separate 
and possibly interdependent demand and supply functions 
in the individual freight, second hand, newbuilding and 
scrapping markets. However in this case It becomes much 
more difficult to separate the various sectors both in 
theory and from the data. 
Supply of new ships and newbuilding prices 
The results of chapter 7 cast some doubt on the 
validity of the joint hypothesis of efficient markets and 
rational expectations. Our interpretation of these 
negative results was that these are mainly due to the 
fact that the quoted newbuilding price cannot always be 
interpreted as a market price. Such a situation usually 
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occurs during an unexpected depression. There, prices of 
new existing ships can drop to levels where they do not 
cover the cost of shipbuilding even after allowing for 
subsidy. During such periods shipbuilders prefer to work 
on their existing orders which have been contracted at 
higher past prices. There is little incentive to arrange 
for new orders until the existing order book Is 
sufficiently depleted and thus no incentive to offer 
acceptable prices to investors. This implies that the 
quoted prices cannot be interpreted as market prices 
unless sufficient contracts have been signed by investors 
at these prices. Even after the order book has been 
depleted, the quoted newbuilding price of ships might 
still not move down to level suggested by the theory. If 
market prices of now ships are still far below the 
shipbuilding cost then builders cannot offer these 
prices. The quoted newbuilding price tends to reflect the 
cost of shipbuilding. At the same time, during such 
periods of prolonged depression, new order contracts seem 
to be accompanied by a number of cheap finance, subsidy 
and other clauses which reduce the 'effective newbuilding 
price' paid by the investor and received by the builder. 
It is this latter unobservable 'ef fective newbuilding 
price' which determines market behaviour and not the 
unrepresentative quoted price. 
These negative results do not invalidate our 
theoretical framework. Our theory Is still valid, albeit 
in terms of the unobservable "effective newbuilding 
price' rather than the 'quoted newbuilding price'. The 
'quoted newbuilding price' has always been used in past 
research as the relevant price mainly because of the lack 
of data on unobservable 'effective newbuilding prices'. 
However, the above remarks suggest that future modelling 
of newbuilding markets would benefit by the construction 
of measures of 'effective newbuilding prices' to be used 
in place of 'quoted newbuilding prices' which should be 
disregarded since these are not market prices. 
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